Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 1
1
Not Addressed
The Crown Prosecution Service determined that it required specific evidence that China posed an “active...
Conclusion
The Crown Prosecution Service determined that it required specific evidence that China posed an “active threat” to UK national security at the relevant time, following a Court of Appeal ruling known as “Roussev”. It is not within the Committee’s remit to second guess the decision-making and professional judgement of the independent Crown Prosecution Service and First Senior Treasury Counsel. However, we remain unclear as to why the Court of Appeal ruling altered the legal landscape so significantly. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38)
Government Response Summary
The government's response focuses on clarifying the DNSA's witness statements and timelines rather than directly addressing the Committee's stated unclarity regarding the significant legal impact of the Roussev Court of Appeal ruling.
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government
Not Addressed
The Government welcomes the Committee’s conclusion that the witness statements provided by the Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) were clear that China posed a range of threats to the United Kingdom’s national security. The Committee requested further clarity regarding the capacity in which the DNSA was giving evidence. Based on the request made for evidence by Counter Terrorism Policing, it was the DNSA’s understanding that he was providing evidence as a witness of fact specifically based on his experience and position in advising the Prime Minister on matters of intelligence, defence and national security, as described in his witness statements. The DNSA was asked to comment on the Government’s position on China. The DNSA has stated that he was explicit from the outset in providing his witnesses statements that he could only provide evidence “in line with government policy at the time”. This was communicated to law enforcement officers responsible for gathering evidence for the case to inform the CPS’ decision on whether to pursue a prosecution. The Committee requested clarity on the extent to which civil servants can act as witnesses of fact on matters that are not made explicit by government policy. While civil servants regularly provide evidence as witnesses of fact in support of prosecutions, it is unusual for a government official, such as the DNSA or NSA, to be involved in providing evidence in a criminal espionage case as a witness of fact. The nature of the facts in issue in any given case is determinable by reference to the legal ingredients of the offence charged and any defence raised. The general rule is that witnesses may only give evidence of facts they personally perceived. However, drawing on the in-depth report led by the JCNSS, the Government acknowledges there were misaligned expectations between the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Government and accepts that there is room for improvement in communications to clarify the capacity in which Government witnesses are providing evidence. The Government agrees with the Committee’s recommendation to undertake an internal exercise aimed at developing guiding principles that ensure expectations are aligned in future criminal cases and to strengthen coordination between policing, CPS and government departments on evidential and disclosure requirements. The Attorney General’s Office, the Crown Prosecution Service and Cabinet Office will conduct an internal exercise to produce a forward-looking, constructive guidance product to be used by government departments when required to provide evidence for national security prosecutions. Once finalised this guidance will be shared with the Committee and it will specifically provide clarity on: • The capacity of Government witnesses giving evidence in criminal proceedings, who they can share their evidence with (including other Government departments) and the principles of evidence and procedure in criminal proceedings; • How to optimise coordination between policing, CPS (or other prosecutorial bodies) and government departments to ensure collaboration and a shared understanding on evidential and disclosure requirements in criminal prosecutions; • The extent to which legal advice and draft statements subject to legal advice from government lawyers are properly subject to disclosure in criminal proceedings; • Whether a single witness statement is the right approach in future prosecutions, or whether the government instead prepares a position statement or relies on other materials. The Government agrees that timely acquisition and delivery of evidence should always be a priority in support of criminal prosecution processes. However, we do not recognise the Committee’s conclusion that there was a delay as work to provide these witness statements was ongoing. However, we do not recognise the Committee’s specific conclusion that there was an eight-month delay in the DNSA providing the second witness statement. This DNSA was approached for the statement by Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) in late November 2024, with initial meetings taking place in December and the witness statement was produced in February 2025. This timeline involved complex reviews by external counsel; National Security Secretariat (NSS) officials; and the DNSA himself. These reviews were undertaken to ensure that the DNSA’s witness statement met the evidential ask he received from CT Policing and fully reflected the DNSA’s understanding of: • The senior CCP leader mentioned in his first witness statement • The threat that China posed based on his understanding of the Government’s position at the material time • The evidence provided to him for assessment by CT Policing. The initial evidential pack provided to the DNSA by CT Policing for comment in his first witness statement was also vast. A similar process took place for the third statement. CT Policing approached the DNSA’s team for a statement in May and it was submitted at t