Recommendations & Conclusions
12 items
3
Conclusion
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
The witness statements provided by DNSA were however clear that China posed a range of threats to the United Kingdom’s national security. In our view it is plain that, taken together, these amounted to a more general active threat to the United Kingdom’s national security. We appreciate the legal argument …
Government response. The government concurred with the committee's assessment that the outdated Official Secrets Act 1911 was the root cause of the prosecution's failure, stating the National Security Act 2023 would have allowed the prosecution to proceed. They also acknowledged caution about …
Cabinet Office
4
Conclusion
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
We are surprised that the Crown Prosecution Service considered the evidence available insufficient to survive a submission of ‘no case to answer’ and to be put before the jury. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)
Government response. The government acknowledges the committee's findings and will develop new guidance for government departments on providing evidence in national security prosecutions, covering witness capacity, coordination with policing and the CPS, legal advice disclosure, and optimal statement approaches.
Cabinet Office
5
Conclusion
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
It is regrettable that the prosecution hinged on the testimony of a Government witness who would not state directly that China posed an active threat to national security at the material time. We acknowledge 48 however the arguments from the Crown Prosecution Service that, once the decision had been taken …
Government response. The government welcomed the committee's conclusion and, in response to the implied issues, committed to producing new guidance on government witnesses in national security prosecutions, covering witness capacity, coordination, legal advice disclosure, and statement formats.
Cabinet Office
8
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
We do not seek to unpick any of these professional judgements. In future, however, it is essential that improved communications, common sense, clarity on strategic objectives and appropriate flexibility can be applied to ensure finely balanced judgements ultimately favour the public interest. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)
Government response. The government accepts the need for improved communications and will conduct an internal exercise involving the AGO, CPS, and Cabinet Office to produce new guidance for government departments providing evidence in national security prosecutions, which will be shared with the …
Cabinet Office
11
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
We recommend that timely acquisition and delivery of evidence should be made a priority in future. In response to this report the Government should confirm what steps it will take, and commit to implementation within six months. (Recommendation, paragraph 77)
Government response. The government agrees that timely evidence acquisition is a priority but disputes the Committee's conclusion of delays, providing a timeline to demonstrate that witness statements were produced in a timely manner despite complex reviews.
Cabinet Office
12
Conclusion
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
We remain uncertain about the capacity in which the DNSA was giving evidence, and the extent to which civil servants can act as witnesses of fact on matters that are not made explicit by government policy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)
Government response. The government explained that the DNSA understood he was giving evidence as a witness of fact based on his experience and position. To provide clarity on this, the government committed to producing new guidance on the capacity of government witnesses …
Cabinet Office
13
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
We recommend the Government clarifies this issue in response to this report. (Recommendation, paragraph 79) Questions of improper influence
Government response. The government clarifies the DNSA's understanding of his role as a witness of fact providing evidence aligned with government policy, and commits to producing new guidance to provide future clarity on the capacity of government witnesses in national security prosecutions.
Cabinet Office
17
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
As the international security environment worsens, we expect the number of national security prosecution cases to rise. We urge the Government to avoid characterising the failure of the Cash/Berry case as a one-off peculiarity created solely by outdated legislation: there are structural parallels in the National Security Act 2023 which …
Government response. The government heeds the Committee's caution regarding "structural parallels" in the National Security Act 2023, committing to carefully handle issues like diplomatic sensitivities and ensuring new, future-focused guidance for government witnesses addresses these challenges in future prosecutions.
Cabinet Office
18
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
The Cabinet Office and Security Services must conduct an internal exercise to consider scenarios in which the Government might be asked to provide diplomatically sensitive evidence under the National Security Act 2023. They must then work with legal partners, including the Crown Prosecution Service, to formalise principles for handling sensitive …
Government response. The government commits to an internal exercise led by the AGO, CPS, and Cabinet Office to produce guidance for government departments on providing evidence in national security prosecutions, aiming to formalize principles and improve coordination for sensitive cases.
Cabinet Office
19
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
The Cash/Berry case suggests there may be value in providing a degree of top-level support to the Deputy National Security Advisers (DNSAs), particularly if they face significant public exposure. We suggest the Government uses the case conference recommended in paragraph 75 as a waypoint to sense check who—aside from the …
Government response. The government accepted the recommendation to consider and review support mechanisms and line management structures for senior officials acting as witnesses in high-profile cases, committing to cover this in new guidance being produced by the AGO, CPS, and Cabinet Office.
Cabinet Office
20
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
We acknowledge and commend the important work led by the National Security Adviser and his Deputies. We appreciate that there is deep experience and co-operation across the Cabinet Office leadership. We nevertheless recommend that the Government reviews the nature of responsibilities, line management and support structures for the DNSAs. This …
Government response. The government welcomes the recommendation to review the support and line management structures for DNSAs and other bound witnesses in sensitive cases, confirming this will be specifically covered within the guidance product being developed by the AGO, CPS, and Cabinet …
Cabinet Office
21
Recommendation
2nd Report - Espionage cases and the Of…
Accepted
The Government should also review the adequacy of high-level support and advice which is made available to bound witnesses in sensitive national security cases. The Government should outline the findings of that review to the Committee within six months. (Recommendation, paragraph 136) 51
Government response. The government welcomes the recommendation to review support for bound witnesses in sensitive cases and will cover this specifically as part of the guidance product being developed by the AGO, CPS, and Cabinet Office.
Cabinet Office