Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Fourteenth Report: Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak
Public Accounts Committee
HC 405
Published 29 July 2020
Recommendations
2
Discharging patients from hospital into social care without first testing them for COVID-19 was an...
Recommendation
Discharging patients from hospital into social care without first testing them for COVID-19 was an appalling error. Shockingly, Government policy up to and including 15 April was to not test all patients discharged from hospital for COVID-19. In the period …
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HM Treasury
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Conclusions (25)
3
Conclusion
This pandemic has shown the tragic impact of delaying much needed social care reform, and instead treating the sector as the NHS’s poor relation. This Committee has highlighted the need for change in the social care sector for many years, particularly around the interface between health and social care. Despite …
4
Conclusion
Public confidence is likely to be further undermined without an open and honest debate about current capacity and tangible plans to address gaps, for example, in testing and PPE. Government has had to and will continue to have to make quick decisions with sometimes imperfect information as the pandemic develops. …
5
Conclusion
Staff in health and social care cannot be expected to be ready to cope with future peaks and also deal with the enormous backlogs that have built up unless they are managed well. We are deeply concerned about the frontline workers and volunteers who have endured the strain and trauma …
6
Conclusion
Policies designed to create additional capacity quickly, while necessary, have resulted in a lack of transparency about costs and value for money. The NHS boosted its potential maximum capacity for the peak in April by building Nightingale hospitals across the country and signing contracts with independent providers for 8,000 additional …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department of Health & Social Care (the Department), NHS England & NHS Improvement (NHSE&I), the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (the Ministry) and Public Health England on Readying the NHS and …
7
Conclusion
There have been serious and widespread concerns about the lack of timely testing for both staff and the public and inadequate PPE provision particularly in social care.13 When we queried the arrangements for ensuring access to testing, we were told that several bodies were involved, including the Department, Public Health …
8
Conclusion
Similarly, procuring and distributing PPE involved a range of bodies, including the Department, Public Health England, local NHS providers and care homes, yet until the appointment of Lord Deighton in mid-April no one took the lead in making sure there was sufficient PPE.16 Public Health England told us that it …
9
Conclusion
On 17 March the NHS told trusts to discharge urgently all medically fit hospital patients with COVID-19 to maximise inpatient and critical care capacity. On 2 April, the Department told care homes that they needed to make their full capacity available and could admit patients with COVID-19 by isolating suspected …
10
Conclusion
Some organisations such as Care England highlighted to us the flawed nature of this policy and reported that, given the absence of testing and inadequate PPE, social care felt abandoned.21 When we challenged the Department and the NHS on such a reckless and negligent policy, the Department told us that …
11
Conclusion
We remained concerned that the Department had continued its policy of discharging people untested into care homes even once it was clear there was an emerging problem.26 The number of first-time outbreaks in individual care homes peaked at 1,009 in early April. Between 9 March and 17 May, around 5,900 …
12
Conclusion
This Committee has warned before that the Department lacked an effective overall strategy or plan to integrate health and care and that poor outcomes could arise as a result.29 As Care England told us, for too long “adult social care has been kicked into the long grass by governments of …
13
Conclusion
We heard how frequently social care had taken second place to the NHS’s needs, particularly in accessing test kits and results, and securing reliable PPE supply for care homes, which had been neither timely nor coordinated.33 When questioned, the Department denied that social care had been forgotten, citing the work …
14
Conclusion
This Committee has also challenged the Department before over not delivering on its overarching responsibilities towards the care market, and having no credible plans to ensure the sector was sustainably funded.38 We note it was not until June 2020 that the Department appointed a director general for adult social care …
15
Conclusion
The Department stressed that it had to respond quickly to the COVID-19 pandemic often with “imperfect knowledge”, which was why its approach had altered over time.43 But Care England told us that PPE guidance had changed no fewer than 40 times, causing confusion and anxiety to service providers and staff.44 …
16
Conclusion
By comparison, because testing capacity was limited during the earlier stages of the pandemic, the Department said it had sought clinical advice on where that capacity was best deployed. Eligibility for tests changed as capacity increased and the Department noted that testing was the area which had evolved the most …
17
Conclusion
Concerns about the transparency of Government’s reporting about the measures it has taken, particularly around PPE and testing, have been widely publicised.47 We heard from stakeholders in the health and social care sector who highlighted issues with inadequate and unreliable PPE supply.48 For example, despite the fanfare around a large …
18
Conclusion
Testing for COVID-19 is fundamental to controlling the virus, and to informing and reassuring the public.50 Yet, while Government’s announcement of its 100,000 daily test target by the end of April had a galvanising effect to start with, NHS Providers reported that it had ended up being a distraction from …
19
Conclusion
We were keen to know how the Department would ensure sufficient stockpiles of PPE and testing capacity as it rolls out its ambitious ‘track and trace’ programme and the NHS resumes routine services while continuing to deal with COVID-19 this autumn and winter.54 It reiterated that testing capacity had now …
20
Conclusion
NHSE&I explained that the NHS was carrying 100,000 staff vacancies going into the pandemic.58 It said the workforce had been boosted by around 20,000 students; retired NHS staff; and a further 600,000 volunteers (working across a range of public services, including the NHS) who stepped forward to work on the …
21
Conclusion
There have been numerous media reports of PPE shortages for health and social care staff and stakeholders have told us how the failure to provide adequate and timely PPE has impacted staff morale, trust and confidence.61 In the period from 6 April to 19 May, more than 80% of local …
22
Conclusion
Testing for NHS workers (with symptoms) only began from 27 March, with eligibility extended to social care workers (with symptoms) from 15 April, after the pandemic had passed its first peak. In the period up to 15th April up to a maximum of five symptomatic residents in each care home …
23
Conclusion
We were concerned about the NHS needing to call on the same staff who have already worked exceptionally long hours during the first peak in order to deal with the backlogs of treatment, while also standing ready for a potential second peak.66 NHSE&I explained that it was “encouraging people to …
24
Conclusion
Under its reasonable worst-case scenario, the Government expected over 4% of the population might require hospital admission for COVID-19 and 30% of those would require critical care. NHSE&I told us that the number of COVID-19 patients admitted to hospital had risen from a few hundred in mid-March to 18,000 two …
25
Conclusion
Between mid-March and mid-April, the NHS and armed forces are to be commended for increasing the number of beds available for Covid-19 patients from 12,600 to 53,700 in 63 C&AG’s Report, para 3.16 64 RSC0012 National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Health Protection Research Unit in Merging and Zoonotic Infections; …
26
Conclusion
Access to NHS services has reduced significantly during the COVID crisis, potentially creating huge pent-up demand, which will add to the substantial waiting lists that existed before the pandemic.77 NHSE&I told us that access to emergency and critical services, such as cancer, has been maintained throughout the crisis although use …