Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Twenty-Fifth Report - Asylum accommodation and support transformation programme
Public Accounts Committee
HC 683
Published 20 November 2020
Recommendations
5
The Department’s lack of transparency on the service’s performance is hindering the kind of engagement...
Recommendation
The Department’s lack of transparency on the service’s performance is hindering the kind of engagement with stakeholders that it claims to want. The Department has committed to learning lessons from the Windrush scandal, including listening to the people most affected …
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HM Treasury
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13
We received written evidence from stakeholders representing asylum seekers who told us that they needed...
Recommendation
We received written evidence from stakeholders representing asylum seekers who told us that they needed information on the contracts’ performance to help them better support people. The Refugee Council told us that they needed greater transparency over service standards and …
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HM Treasury
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Conclusions (22)
2
Conclusion
We are very concerned that thousands of people continue to be placed in hotels rather than more appropriate accommodation. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, ministers decided to continue support for asylum seekers after their asylum claim had been resolved. As a result, since March 2020 many more people have entered …
3
Conclusion
The Department’s failure to prepare effectively for the new service means that it has yet to deliver what was promised. The model of regional accommodation contracts is similar to what existed under COMPASS, although the Department intended the new service to improve asylum seekers’ experience and make it more sustainable. …
4
Conclusion
Despite paying more for the new service than for COMPASS, the Department has not yet demonstrated that it is getting value for money in return. The Department asserts that COMPASS was under-priced and that its modelling indicated that the new services should cost between 20% and 31% more. Only three …
6
Conclusion
The Department has failed to ensure the safety and security of some of the vulnerable people who use asylum accommodation and support services. We are concerned that the Department focuses on processes, such as awarding contracts on time, at the detriment of the needs and experiences of asylum seekers. While …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department) about asylum accommodation and support services in the UK.2
7
Conclusion
As well as call volumes, we asked whether the AIRE service had underestimated the length of each call. The Department had historical data that suggested calls would take between 12 and 17 minutes. In contrast, Migrant Help based its bid for the AIRE service on an average call length of …
8
Conclusion
The Department told us that it knew at the start of the transformation programme in 2016 that COMPASS was under-priced. It explained that it carried out a ‘should cost’ model to establish a reasonable range of costs, which indicated that the new services should cost between 20% and 31% more.18 …
9
Conclusion
The Department recognised that it had paid more for the new contracts, but told us that as a result it was getting a better quality service, with better support for vulnerable people. We saw little evidence of this and the Department22 accepted that its ability to determine whether this was …
10
Conclusion
The Department expected providers to be able to share data as part of the new contracts, to make sure they are providing the service expected for asylum seekers. The contracts required an automated link for issue reporting between the AIRE provider and the accommodation providers.23 However, the NAO found that …
11
Conclusion
The Department estimated that the accommodation providers could make profits of between 5% and 13%. We were concerned that this was about twice as large as would normally be expected by outsourcing companies and asked the Department whether it considered this level of profit excessive, given the level of risk …
12
Conclusion
We examined the Windrush scandal in March 2019 and found that the Department lacked understanding of the needs of applicants for compensation, did not monitor the impact of its ‘compliant environment’ policy on vulnerable members of society and had not done enough to identify people that might have been affected. …
14
Conclusion
The accommodation contracts allow providers to use hotels as contingency accommodation to meet excess demand. Throughout 2017 and 2018, fewer than 100 people had stayed in hotels each night. But since October 2019, this number has increased to more than 1,000 each night.34 At the start of the COVID-19 lockdown …
15
Conclusion
The Department explained that its aim was for as few service users as possible to be accommodated in hotels and that those who do spend as little time as possible in hotels once they are there.37 The Department expected providers to move people with straightforward needs into dispersed accommodation within …
16
Conclusion
Hotel accommodation usually lacks facilities for children and suitable accommodation for families to share for extended periods.42 We received written evidence from the Refugee Council, which told us that while in hotels or initial accommodation, asylum seekers cannot register with a GP or enrol their children into school.43 We received …
17
Conclusion
The Department told us that it currently accommodated asylum seekers in hotels in approximately 50 local authorities. It noted that whenever it arranges for a hotel to be used for asylum accommodation, it instructs its relevant teams to contact the local authority and MP affected. We were therefore concerned to …
18
Conclusion
The Department told us that sourcing hotels in the COVID-19 pandemic had been an extremely challenging and fast-moving situation. It recognised that there had been some issues with engaging local authorities and explained that it had redoubled its efforts since we last discussed this issue in July 2020.49 However, since …
19
Conclusion
We asked the Department about specific examples where there had been issues with its engagement with local stakeholders. At the end of August 2020, the Department moved asylum seekers, 47 of whom had tested positive for COVID-19, from the Stone Road initial accommodation in Birmingham that was closing to hotels …
20
Conclusion
We received written evidence regarding the health and well-being themes for initial accommodation residents in Birmingham, which told us that the Department’s plans to commission additional contingency hotel sites to accommodate asylum seekers were not shared in a reasonable timeframe. It also told us that the plans were not subject …
21
Conclusion
The Department stressed that it awarded its contracts for the new services on time and on budget, and the National Audit Office found that it had laid the foundations for a better service. The NAO also found that the transition to the new services was relatively smooth, with only 5% …
22
Conclusion
We asked the Department how it ensured the safety and security of asylum seekers who are housed in hotels, particularly given the public interest that this can attract. The Department said that it worked with its providers when they raised concerns relating to the security of service users, and engaged …
23
Conclusion
The Department told us that 429 asylum seekers had been tested for COVID-19, 122 of whom had tested positive.63 In its letter to us after our evidence session, the Department further explained that of those that had tested positive, 29 asylum seekers were in hotels.64 The Department also told us …
24
Conclusion
We asked why, if safeguarding was essential to the new contracts, the Department’s accommodation contract with providers did not contain a key performance indicator for safeguarding asylum seekers. The Department agreed that this was a critical aspect of the new contracts and explained that safeguarding was instead reflected throughout almost …