Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Thirty-third Report: Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme
Public Accounts Committee
HC 687
Published 16 December 2020
Recommendations
6
Government has no apparent plans to measure the Scheme’s impact, including identifying how many businesses...
Recommendation
Government has no apparent plans to measure the Scheme’s impact, including identifying how many businesses have been unable to access support. The Department indicates that its initial barometer for success was delivering cash to as many businesses in need, as …
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HM Treasury
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Conclusions (20)
2
Conclusion
The Scheme was implemented with impressive speed but does not strike the right balance between supporting business and protecting the taxpayer. Thanks to the hard work and effort of civil servants, the Scheme was launched within two weeks of the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposing it to the Department and …
3
Conclusion
Shortcomings in the Scheme’s design have exposed the taxpayer to potentially significant losses. Government achieved its very narrow objective of distributing cash quickly and to a very large number of small businesses across the UK. It delivered £8.4 billion in the first week and £21.3 billion in the first month, …
4
Conclusion
Government’s plans for managing risks to the taxpayer—from both fraud and borrowers who are unable to repay loans—are woefully under-developed. Government does not have a counter-fraud strategy for the Scheme and has not identified what types of fraud it will prosecute. The Bank does, nevertheless, have a weekly lender fraud …
5
Conclusion
HM Treasury has not yet finalised the rules lenders need to follow to ensure overdue loans are repaid. If a borrower does not repay the loan HM Treasury expects lenders to try to recover the money owed. But there is no requirement to complete this recovery process before the lender …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG), we took evidence from HM Treasury, the Department of Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (the Department) and the British Business Bank (the Bank) on the Bounce Back Loan Scheme (the Scheme). The Scheme was developed to support …
7
Conclusion
Both Germany and Switzerland delivered schemes to support small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs) much earlier than the UK.16 Their schemes offered 100% guarantees.17 CBILS, although in place at a similar time, offered an 80% guarantee attempting to remain line with state aid legislation, but unlike other jurisdictions was not …
8
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the lack of preparedness, it is clear that staff at HM Treasury, the Department, and the Bank pulled out all the stops to get the Scheme up and running as quickly as possible; we should not underestimate the level of commitment they have shown in the response to the …
9
Conclusion
The Scheme is designed with the objective that borrowers receive the loans within 24–48 hours of a valid application. This target was based on independent research which suggested that one-third of businesses would probably not be able to access enough cash to continue trading for more than two weeks of …
10
Conclusion
The government’s view that businesses were unable to survive more than a two- week lockdown period was based on anecdotal evidence, and a survey conducted by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants in mid-April.23 The Department told us that its prime role when gathering data to inform decisions on support …
11
Conclusion
The Department informed us that the speed at which finance could be provided was a key design and operational requirement. We were told that the Department placed no budgetary cap on the Scheme and that demand was far greater than the Department anticipated. Government does not know how much of …
12
Conclusion
Under the Scheme, the Government pays a borrower’s first 12 months of interest directly to the lender. At the end of September, when some 1.2 million loans were issued, the Department and the Bank forecast this to cost £1,068 million (£847 million in 2020–21 and £221 million in 2021–22); this …
13
Conclusion
The Bank told us that lenders are responsible for the Scheme’s fraud management. The Bank does, nevertheless, have a weekly lender fraud prevention collaboration working group, as well as conducting ‘data-analytics’ work with the Cabinet Office.32 Lenders are responsible for processing loan applications and are required to conduct counter-fraud, anti-money …
14
Conclusion
The Department has not identified what types of fraud it will prosecute, with the Department suggesting there is a range of criminality in fraud; it has euphemistically referred to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ fraud.34 Hard fraud refers to a type of fraud committed by criminal organizations with the intention to defraud …
15
Conclusion
The Bank does not collect information on how businesses have used the loans.36 The NAO report outlined that there is some evidence that businesses are using the money to pay back existing debt, which the Bank describes as a ‘economically rational’ for businesses to do.37 But this would reduce the …
16
Conclusion
After the initial interest-free period, borrowers will need to make repayments (capital and interest) to the end of the loan period, in line with their loan agreement.40 There is a high likelihood that some businesses who wish to re-pay the loans will simply be unable to do so. UK Finance …
17
Conclusion
HM Treasury and the Bank told us they are continuing to work with lenders on debt recovery protocols and processes that are fair to businesses, lenders and taxpayers. HM Treasury expects lenders to try to recover the money owed but there is no requirement to complete this recovery process before …
18
Conclusion
HM Treasury explained to us that, at present, recoveries for the smaller loans are captured and overseen by the FCA and, for larger loans, by the Lending Standards Board. Thus, although the details have not been clarified, there is already an existing structure regarding recoveries. In turn, it is the …
19
Conclusion
The Government indicated that its overarching objective was speed.48 No written objectives were outlined at the inception of the Scheme and no business case was put forward. The Bank, HM Treasury and the Department, did not agree the Scheme objectives until 15 July and there are no plans in place …
20
Conclusion
The National Audit Office has previously recommended that the Bank focus more 41 UK Finance Written Evidence, para 27 42 Q 49 43 Q 70; C&AG’s Report, para 3.8 44 Q 72 45 Q 64 46 Qq 70, 71 47 Qq 48, 71 48 Qq 19, 26, 27 49 C&AG’s …
21
Conclusion
As HM Treasury informed us, during the 24 September Winter Economy Plan Statement, the Chancellor indicated there would be a further loan scheme, which is currently in development and will be announced early 2021.54 It is important that any replacement guarantee scheme also enables all lenders to compete effectively in …