Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Forty-Second Report - COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment
Public Accounts Committee
HC 928
Published 10 February 2021
Recommendations
6
We are concerned that the Department’s ordering of an enormous amount of PPE might compromise...
Recommendation
We are concerned that the Department’s ordering of an enormous amount of PPE might compromise government’s ambition to maintain a UK manufacturing base for PPE. Between February and July 2020, the Department ordered 32 billion items of PPE. It intended …
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HM Treasury
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Conclusions (28)
2
Conclusion
While government had plans and a stockpile of PPE, this proved inadequate for the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department had a strategy for managing an influenza pandemic, which included a stockpile of PPE owned and managed by Public Health England. In March 2020, NHS England & NHS Improvement gave public assurances …
3
Conclusion
The high-priority lane was not designed well enough to be a wholly effective way of sifting credible leads to supply PPE. Government’s PPE buying team, within the parallel supply chain, received over 15,000 offers to supply PPE. This cross- government PPE buying team set up a high-priority lane to separately …
4
Conclusion
The Department’s focus on supporting hospitals meant assistance to social care providers was neglected. The pandemic has shown the tragic impact of delaying much needed social care reform and treating the sector as the NHS’s poor relation. This is an issue this Committee has raised concerns about before when we …
5
Conclusion
The Department does not know enough about the experience of frontline staff, particularly BAME staff. The Department set up a daily process for gathering information about the PPE required by local organisations and maintains that its formal reporting arrangements did not identify any provider organisation, in health or social care, …
7
Conclusion
The Department has wasted hundreds of millions of pounds on PPE which is of poor quality and cannot be used for the intended purpose. The urgent need for PPE meant it accepted more risks when buying PPE than it usually would. At the time of our evidence session, some 195 …
8
Conclusion
It should also update us on the number of contracts (and their financial value) in which it is seeking to recover costs for undelivered or substandard PPE. COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment 11 1 Government’s approach to procurement during the pandemic
1
Conclusion
On the basis of two reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office, Department of Health & Social Care (the Department) and Public Health England about government procurement during the COVID-19 pandemic and the supply of personal protective equipment (PPE).1 As part of our …
9
Conclusion
Access to the high-priority lane was based on recommendations coming from government officials, ministers’ offices, MPs and members of the House of Lords. The NAO found that there were no written rules which determined the basis on which suppliers should be recommended for the lane, meaning that it was left …
10
Conclusion
The British Medical Association and the Royal College of Nursing told us that their organisations did not have access to the high-priority lane, even though they were being contacted by, and therefore would have been able to put forward, credible leads based on the knowledge of their members. The British …
11
Conclusion
Between February and July 2020, the Department ordered 32 billion items of PPE. The Department told us that it was seeking to avoid shortages in the event of a potential second wave and had deliberately looked to build up a stockpile equivalent to four months’ usage across all lines of …
12
Conclusion
Government’s PPE strategy aims to build a UK manufacturing base so that there is a resilient domestic supply. The Department explained that 70% of PPE (excluding gloves) that it expected would be supplied between December 2020 and February 2021 should come through contracts set up under the Department’s UK Make …
13
Conclusion
The Department asserted that while it had deliberately secured a significant stockpile of PPE, it was not clear it had over-ordered as the stock would be needed for the ongoing COVID crisis. It admitted that it did not have full information about how much PPE had been provided by suppliers …
14
Conclusion
Not all of the PPE the Department bought can be used. The Department told us that only 0.5% of the 18 billion items of PPE it had received and checked so far had failed to meet clinical safety standards and therefore could not be used at all. However, this figure …
15
Conclusion
The Department had not calculated the value of unusable or potentially unsuitable items but told us that it was currently undertaking work to estimate this and committed to coming back to us with a timetable for when this would be complete.24 It told us that it was investigating potential fraudulent …
16
Conclusion
The Department accepted that the urgent need for PPE meant it accepted greater risks when buying PPE than it usually would. The Department maintained, however, that it did not ask the Health and Safety Executive to lower standards. It told us that it bought millions of FFP2 respirator masks which …
17
Conclusion
Government had a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Programme and a stockpile of PPE for managing an influenza pandemic, but not a coronavirus pandemic (such as COVID-19). Public Health England told us this was because the national risk register identified an influenza pandemic as the number one risk. Public Health England owned …
18
Conclusion
In March 2020, officials from NHS England & NHS Improvement publicly assured the Health and Social Care Select Committee that these stockpiles meant the country was well placed to manage the COVID19 pandemic. However, the NAO report found that the stockpiles provided no more than two-weeks’ worth of most types …
19
Conclusion
The Department told us that it had not been complacent over the stockpiles, but that COVID-19 was a novel virus and it learned more about it over time. Unlike influenza, COVID-19 can be passed on by people who are not showing symptoms of the illness. The Department explained that this …
20
Conclusion
Almost all the PPE was manufactured abroad and had to be shipped, flown or put on a train to the UK. This meant it took a long time to be delivered. Therefore, despite the creation of the parallel supply chain, the time lag between ordering PPE and it being available, …
21
Conclusion
The Department explained that its formal reporting arrangements did not identify any provider organisation, in health or social care, as having run out of PPE completely. It monitored the risk that social care could run out within 48 hours. It told us the national supply disruption emergency helpline, which was …
22
Conclusion
We have previously noted that the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the tragic impact of delaying much needed social care reform and integration with health, and instead treating the sector as the NHS’s poor relation.35 Between March 2020 and July 2020, the Department provided NHS trusts with 1.9 billion items of …
23
Conclusion
Care England and the British Medical Association told us that the contingency planning process for a pandemic appeared to focus on the NHS at the expense of the social care sector despite some of the most vulnerable people being in social care. Care England told us this lack of planning …
24
Conclusion
Witnesses from organisations representing staff working in health and social care told us that providers received unusable PPE from central government. The Royal College of Nursing told us of instances where it had received masks on which the elastic was rotten, goggles which took significant amounts of time to assemble …
25
Conclusion
Staff representative organisations ran surveys in which frontline staff reported not having the PPE they needed. The British Medical Association, the Royal College of 37 Qq 11, 17, 37–38, 66–67, 121, 123 38 Qq 11–12, 17, 23–24, 37, 66, 123; House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, Readying the NHS and …
26
Conclusion
We asked about the experience of BAME staff and whether this had been different to that of their white colleagues. The British Medical Association told us that its surveys showed between two and three times as many BAME doctors as white doctors felt pressured to work without adequate protection. It …
27
Conclusion
By October 2020, employers had reported 8,152 diagnosed cases of COVID-19 and 126 deaths as being linked to occupational exposure among health and care workers.45 The British Medical Association and Unison asserted that the Department should investigate whether PPE shortages contributed to staff infections and deaths from COVID19. The Department …
28
Conclusion
Witnesses representing the health and social care sectors raised a number of concerns about the PPE guidance issued by government. The Department told us that it held conversations with the Royal Colleges (and with the NHS and public health services of the UK nations) about the PPE guidance issued.47 The …
29
Conclusion
By the end of June, 44 Transport for London workers had lost their lives to COVID19. We asked representatives of health and social care staff organisations about the provision of PPE to non-healthcare key workers, such as taxi drivers, cleaners, transport, supermarket and security workers. The British Medical Association considered …