Twelfth Report - COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update

The value of the cost tracker is lessened by poor data from some government departments and functions. The level of completeness and accuracy of COVID- related data is variable across government departments. Several departments are still not able to provide a robust assessment of their COVID-related activity, or the extent to which other activity has been cancelled or displaced. While HM Treasury is working with government finance functions to improve definitions and recognition of COVID-19 related expenditure in the accounts, these systems have only been put in place recently and more needs to be done to embed them. Existing systems are still not adequate to provide timely and accurate data. There also remain areas of spending where it is not possible to distinguish between COVID-driven or non-COVID-driven expenditure, for example, spending in the NHS, and Universal Credit (DWP). Recommendation: To support the next iteration of the cost tracker, and in advance of the autumn Spending Review, HM Treasury should continue working with departments to develop robust methodologies for identifying and capturing the full cost of COVID-19, including economic impacts and the extent of displaced activity, to have a clear basis for future fiscal decisions and recovery plans.

The COVID-19 response means government will be exposed to significant financial risks for decades to come. As a consequence of responding quickly to the pandemic, government has taken on significant financial risks that are spread across multiple government departments and schemes. While we acknowledge that 6 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update there was a need to relax the usual rules surrounding major spending decisions and introduce flexibilities due to the emergency circumstances of the pandemic, we are concerned that this has created serious risks that may require managing for years. A clear example of risks from the government’s approach materialising is the 10,000 shipping containers of personal protective equipment (PPE) ordered earlier in the pandemic that we heard in May were still yet to be unpacked. HM Treasury used the example of vaccines development to show how government took on necessary risk, in this case to develop vaccines much more quickly, with government spending more to achieve that speed. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury has explained, in his 1 April 2021 letter to the Chair of the Treasury Committee, government’s approach to spending controls during COVID-19, acknowledging that there were successes and areas where lessons need to be learnt on how best to apply an emergency control framework. Recommendation: HM Treasury should develop a single cross-government framework for monitoring and managing the risks to public finances stemming from government’s COVID-19 response. HM Treasury should then explain in the autumn Spending Review how it plans to manage these risks and any fiscal trade- offs that will need to be made.

Achieving value for money from government expenditure during COVID-19 is being compromised by poor quality impact assessments and Accounting Officer assessments. Government accepted the need for a higher risk appetite in order to make decisions and move funding more quickly for COVID-related measures, adapting the Managing public money principles to the extraordinary situation. It flexed its approach to value for money to adapt to the need to act quickly and provide funding rapidly. HM Treasury believes that the Managing public money framework worked well over the pandemic. However, it acknowledges that impact assessments for some COVID-19 measures needed better data and better evidence to justify the financial investment. Furthermore, it accepts that there needs to be clearer guidance around Accounting Officer assessments, particularly around how you assess risk appetite in an emergency, and assessments across multiple departments. It is planning on identifying and sharing examples of good assessments, and more training across finance functions on how Managing public money works, including for ministers. Recommendation: HM Treasury should report back to this Committee by the end of 2021 on its progress improving the quality of impact assessments and Accounting Officer assessments, and its roll out of training on Managing public money, so that proper emphasis on achieving value for money is restored. Recommendation: HM Treasury should review major COVID-related spending decisions to identify cases where decisions made during the pandemic have resulted in poor value for money. It should report its findings back to this Committee by the end of 2021, and use the lessons learnt to produce guidance to minimise the risk of this happening in the future.

The total value of government-backed loans has increased greatly during the crisis. To provide businesses with access to funding quickly during the pandemic, government launched a number of loan schemes, delivered by private sector COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update 7 providers under the direction of the British Business Bank. The total value of loans issued is currently expected to be £92 billion. Government guaranteed these loans by up to 100% of their value in order to compensate the private sector for an increased risk of borrower default. Government currently estimates that the calls on these guarantees may amount to as much as £26 billion, which would represent a significant drain on the public sector budget. HM Treasury expects all loans to be repaid but accepts that there is a high degree of uncertainty around this, as the repayment profile will depend on the strength of the economy and of the underlying businesses. HM Treasury is unclear about how it plans to manage the expanded loan book and the associated risks. Recommendation: Through the autumn Spending Review, HM Treasury should set out how it is managing the significant expansion of the value of government loan guarantees and the associated risk of write-offs, and the steps being taking to reclaim the taxpayer’s investment.

It will become increasingly important to distinguish between spending that is aimed at economic and societal recovery from COVID-19, from spending in direct response to COVID-19. The cost tracker suggests that around 92% of the cost of government’s COVID-19 measures is categorised as being in direct response to the pandemic, with the remaining 8% attributed to the wider economic and societal recovery from the pandemic. However, this distinction is inexact, as for some measures it can be difficult to precisely define whether spending relates to the response phase or the recovery phase of government’s overall response to the pandemic. Some measures contribute to both objectives, for example the vaccines programme. For some measures, it is difficult to distinguish activity that results directly from COVID-19 from business-as-usual activity, for example with new Universal Credit claims. HM Treasury acknowledges the need for better understanding of the progress of the pandemic and the economy in order to assess the cost of recovering from COVID-19. It expects more reliable information to be available by September as the uptake and repayments against major schemes like the Bounce Back Loans Scheme become clearer. Recommendation: Government should, through the autumn Spending Review, set out a fully costed plan for recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and returning to ‘business as usual’. 8 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update 1 HM Treasury’s understanding of COVID-19 costs

On the basis of the COVID-19 cost tracker published by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from HM Treasury about the costs of government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1

HM Treasury told us that it is tracking and controlling public expenditure on COVID-19 in the same way that it does routinely for all public expenditure, through regular monthly reporting of departments’ spending, which it described as a robust mechanism for tracking spend. It puts more focus and effort on tracking particular items of COVID-19 spending because they are large and, in many cases, novel.7 It has used the cost tracker to corroborate departments’ spend-to-date data, and to reconcile and challenge consistency of data across departments. Through the cost tracker, HM Treasury has picked up issues with categorisation of cost data, with the way in which departments are recording data, and with the completeness of information. It plans to use the cost tracker as a source of key information for the Whole of Government Accounts.8

HM Treasury has, over the last few months, started to identify items of spending that are COVID-related, and designate them as such.9 It described how for some areas of expenditure it is straightforward to do so, for example, the business support grant schemes. For other areas, it is not possible to categorise expenditure as COVID-driven or not, for example, spending in the NHS – it is possible to identify the net increase in spend, but not how much of that is driven by COVID-19. Similarly, for universal credit spending, the number and amount of universal credit claims is known, but individual claims are not categorised as resulting from the impact of COVID-19 or otherwise.10 Completeness of departmental data

HM Treasury confirmed that it regards the NAO’s £372 billion estimate of the total cost of the government’s response to the pandemic to be a good representation of the total gross lifetime costs of policy decisions driven by COVID-19, and a reliable snapshot based on what is known now. It remarked that the NAO’s estimate is close to the figure of £407 billion for the COVID-19 funding made available at the Budget, and that it can reconcile the £35 billion difference between the two.11

The cost tracker purposefully excludes some financial decisions that government has taken as a result of the pandemic to support the recovery from the pandemic, for example the corporation tax super deduction and increases in capital spending that were announced in Budget 2020. It also does not include the effect of COVID-19 on receipts to public finances. HM Treasury told us that it is better that the scope of the cost tracker remains as it is, and that wider effects of the pandemic are covered elsewhere, for example in the Office for Budget Responsibility’s forecasts. The cost tracker is therefore a good measure of the gross cost of government’s policy response to the pandemic, but there are broader measures of the overall cost of the pandemic that could be drawn.12

We challenged HM Treasury on why several departments are not able to provide the NAO with a complete assessment of the costs and spend of their COVID-related activity. We heard how there are measures for which estimating the lifetime cost is difficult because of a lack of evidence upon which to base cost estimates, and how some departments have concentrated on the quality of estimates rather than producing more timely, but rougher, 7 Qq 1, 2 8 Qq 3, 14 9 Q 1 10 Qq 3, 4, 6, 7 11 Qq 12, 13 12 Qq 5, 16, 17, 22 10 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update estimates. HM Treasury drew attention to two groups of government measures where evidence is lacking: those measures that have yet to start, and those that relate to tax where the effect has not yet been seen. There are measures where the cost will depend on take- up, and that in turn will depend on the progress of the pandemic, for example the cost of the testing programme. HM Treasury expects the estimated total cost of the pandemic to change over time and expressed confidence that it would have a much clearer assessment of the total cost of the pandemic within the next 12 months.13

HM Treasury told us of what it is doing to improve its understanding of the costs of the pandemic. It has provided departments with instructions on how to gather the information that is needed to make cost estimates of COVID-19 measures.14 It described how it had instigated monthly tracking of information from local authorities, which enabled it to understand what local authorities were spending on and put in place escalation routes for emergency funding that could be transferred quickly. When asked why information to the same level of detail and accuracy could not be gathered from the NHS, we heard that the Department of Health and Social Care has good standardised data capture tools, but data from across the entire group is only consolidated at year end because of the huge scale of the exercise. HM Treasury said that as part of this year’s year-end production of reports on accounts, it would have conversations with all departments about lessons learned and consider what best practice should be, including how the NHS can gather timelier data that can be aggregated more quickly.15 13 Qq 8–12 14 Q 9 15 Qq 25, 28 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update 11 2 HM Treasury’s understanding and management of risks to public finances through the pandemic COVID-19 financial risks

HM Treasury reiterated what the Chief Secretary to the Treasury set out in his letter of 1 April 2021 to the Chair of the Treasury Committee: that the COVID-19 pandemic is a national health emergency that has required a response by government without precedent in terms of speed and scale.16 Consequently, government was prepared to accept a greater level of uncertainty about the efficacy of spending compared with normal times. HM Treasury told us how it became clear very quickly that responding to the crisis would require it to use the spending control framework more flexibly than it otherwise would have done. It increased delegated departmental spending limits, allocated additional funding for departments to use, and delegated greater authority to departments to enable them to make spending decisions.17 HM Treasury confirmed that it was consulted upon major new funding commitments before they were announced.18

HM Treasury used the example of vaccines development to explain how government took on necessary risk, in this case to develop vaccines much more quickly than would usually have been the case. The rapid development of a vaccine was central to dealing with the pandemic and recovering from it, and there was strong public interest in supporting it. Government set up the Vaccines Taskforce to create momentum and get ahead in the vaccines programme, in conditions of considerable uncertainty that required difficult judgments, for example around pricing. HM Treasury provided advice that maintained a focus on value and good financial practice, in the context of it being a critical national priority to make rapid progress on the vaccines programme.19

The Chief Secretary to the Treasury acknowledged in his letter of 1 April 2021 that a consequence of an enhanced risk appetite is that risks are more likely to crystalize. A clear example of risks from the government’s approach materialising is the 10,000 shipping containers of personal protective equipment (PPE) ordered earlier in the pandemic that were yet to be unpacked when we took evidence on the matter in May.20 HM Treasury cautioned that the current estimates of the expected cost of the government’s COVID-19 response are snapshots of government’s exposure as of today, rather than assessments of the final bill. For some of government’s actions, for example the business loan schemes, the full extent of financial risks will become apparent over future years.21 HM Treasury told us that it is updating its guidance on undertaking risk assessments during an emergency.22 16 Qq 18, 20, 21; Letter of 1 April 2021 from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury to the Chair of the Treasury Committee 17 Qq 21, 51 18 Q 52 19 Q 20 20 Q 55; Letter of 1 April 2021 from the Chief Secretary to the Treasury to the Chair of the Treasury Committee 21 Q 12 22 Q 40 12 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update Achieving value for money

HM Treasury told us that over the pandemic it had kept the same basic framework for public expenditure decisions, with a strong emphasis on value for money, but that it had adapted it and made it more flexible to recognise the circumstances. In some areas, value for money was best achieved by moving quickly and accepting the need for a higher- than-normal risk appetite. As time has gone by, HM Treasury has been looking at where it can tighten up and reintroduce the usual set of controls, and it confirmed that it had done so in a quite a few areas.23

HM Treasury explained that it told accounting officers that throughout the pandemic they remained responsible for assuring themselves that public money was being properly spent, for applying the principles of Managing public money and for accounting to Parliament for their spending.24 HM Treasury considers that Managing public money has worked well as a framework over the pandemic, with the principles within it having proved to be enduring, and the framework having the flexibility and agility to respond to the pandemic.25 When quizzed over the increased use of accounting officer directions over the pandemic, HM Treasury responded the directions enabled accounting officers to set out publicly the financial challenges they were facing. It has concluded that the accounting officer direction process worked well in supporting rapid decision making, and that it was the appropriate mechanism for accounting officers to raise their concerns.26 It added that over the pandemic there had been closer decision-making between ministers and officials, which had sped up and improved the quality of decisions.27

HM Treasury acknowledged that the process of undertaking impact assessments for some major COVID-19 schemes had been challenging and hampered by poor data and evidence.28 It used the example of the excess stockpiles of PPE to illustrate that big lessons need to be learned.29 This fits with a trend the Committee has previously picked up on, that less reliance is being placed on impact assessments, and their quality appears to be waning, despite being integral to understanding whether policies will deliver value for money. HM Treasury has also concluded that there needs to be clearer guidance around accounting officer assessments and on how to apply the principles and the tests in Managing public money. It is planning on identifying and sharing examples of good accounting officer assessments. It plans to update the guidance on how to undertake accounting officer assessments in an emergency, and when policy and delivery are undertaken across multiple departments, for example testing in schools, where the accounting officers of the Department for Health and Social Care and the Department for Education worked together. HM Treasury told us that it is also planning more training across finance functions on how to apply Managing public money, including for ministers.30 23 Q 18 24 Q 21 25 Q 40 26 Q 43 27 Q 44 28 Q 53 29 Q 54 30 Qq 40–42 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update 13 Government-backed loans

The NAO’s COVID-19 cost tracker presents a current estimate of the cost of write- offs of government-backed loans made in response to the pandemic of £26 billion.31 HM Treasury confirmed that it recognises this amount as a good snapshot based on current information on what the total losses might be.32 It cautioned that there is a large degree of uncertainty around this amount as there is a wide range of estimates for the proportion of loans that might default. Repayment rates will be driven by the underlying strength of the economy and the pace of the recovery.33 HM Treasury told us that until there is a reasonable record of repayments under the loans, and until there is a much clearer sense of how the economy can be expected to perform, there will inevitably be a wide range for estimates for the possible total loss.34 If the economy performs well, HM Treasury expects a lower rate of default than currently forecast.35

HM Treasury referred specifically to the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, which accounts for £22.8 billion of the forecast total write-off costs of £26 billion.36 It told us that the first loan schemes had been too slow to grant loans to small businesses with no borrowing history and therefore no existing borrowing relationship with a bank or other lender. Even where there were existing relationships it had taken too much time for the lender to go through the approval process, introducing the major risk that a large number of businesses would not be able to survive long enough to get accredited for a loan. It was therefore an explicit policy decision to set up a scheme that would disburse loans quickly, and lenders were asked to set aside their normal processes for approving loans.37 However, HM Treasury stated that it expected loans to be repaid given the generous repayment terms offered, including repayment periods lasting up to ten years.38

HM Treasury told us that it is currently considering its longer-term approach to the management of COVID-19 legacy schemes, including the outstanding loans to businesses. It has not yet decided whether there is benefit in consolidating loan books across departments. As part of its overall monitoring of the economy, it is gathering information on how the loans are affecting businesses across different sectors, and to what extent the management of the loan books is achieving a range of economic policy objectives.39 31 The COVID-19 cost tracker, available at: COVID-19 cost tracker – National Audit Office (NAO) 32 Q 47 33 Q 46 34 Q 60 35 Q 46 36 Q 47; The COVID-19 cost tracker, available at: COVID-19 cost tracker – National Audit Office (NAO) 37 Qq 45, 49 38 Qq 46, 60, 61 39 Q 66 14 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update 3 The post-pandemic recovery Spending on the recovery

The NAO’s latest COVID-19 cost tracker estimates that around 90% of the projected cost of the pandemic will be spent on the government’s response to COVID-19, and around 10% on the recovery phase.40 HM Treasury explained that it is extremely difficult to categorise much COVID-related spending as either part of dealing with the pandemic, or part of recovering from it. It highlighted the vaccines programme as an example of a government action that bridges the two categories. Similarly, economic support schemes, such as the furlough scheme and the various business loan schemes, are both a response to the immediate situation and a critical part of recovery, because they are designed to minimise the long-term damage to the economy from the pandemic. HM Treasury told us it intends to work with the NAO on how best to capture the forecast costs of the recovery.41

HM Treasury assured us that in broad terms government’s pre-pandemic plans and programmes have remained largely in place. It told us that the areas where there has been significant reprioritisation or pausing have tended to be the ones that have been badly affected by COVID-19, the most obvious example being the NHS where delivery of efficiencies planned for this financial year have not been possible. However, most of the rest of the government’s public spending programmes have continued as planned.42 HM Treasury was not able to give us an estimate of the cost attached to programmes that have been paused or cancelled.43 It told us that government’s two largest savings projects that reprioritise funding to the COVID-19 response are the changes to the overseas aid budget and the freezing of public sector pay.44

HM Treasury expected more reliable information on the cost of the recovery to become available around September 2021, as the uptake and repayments against major schemes like the Bounce Back Loans Scheme become clearer.45 It told us that the government will give further details on its plans for recovering from the pandemic in the Spending Review later this year, when it will set out plans for the remaining three years of this parliament. However, HM Treasury assured us that where departments have immediate requirements, it has a reserve allocated for the purpose of dealing with in-year spending pressures.46 40 Q 19; The COVID-19 cost tracker, available at: COVID-19 cost tracker – National Audit Office (NAO) 41 Qq 19, 58 42 Qq 29, 32, 33, 69 43 Qq 29–31 44 Q 31 45 Q 47 46 Qq 24, 38, 39, 57, 59 COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update 15