Forty-Sixth Report Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk

The pandemic has demonstrated variability in departments’ risk management. A recent cross-government review of risk management by the Government Internal Audit Agency highlighted significant variability across departments, including the 6 Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on … Read more The pandemic has demonstrated variability in departments’ risk management. A recent cross-government review of risk management by the Government Internal Audit Agency highlighted significant variability across departments, including the 6 Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk extent to which senior leaders promote and support risk management, departments’ capabilities, and their degree of alignment to the Orange Book, the government’s guidance on risk management. We are surprised that there are no uniformity in government’s high-level alignment with the Orange Book and a seeming lack of appreciation for the principles of the three lines of defence model. Before the pandemic, departments lacked an agreed understanding of risk tolerance, such as which consequences of a pandemic they deemed acceptable and which consequences they needed to mitigate. It is only after departments started responding to the crisis that they reached a shared understanding of the objectives and priorities they should focus on. Recommendation: The Cabinet Office and HM Treasury should set out what they intend to do to ensure that there is sufficient uniformity in department’s high-level interpretation of and alignment to the principles of the Orange Book. As part of this, the Cabinet Office should set out how it will ensure that departments have a shared understanding of the government’s tolerance for the impacts of major risks, including what levels of impact are acceptable and what levels of impact require mitigation. Show less

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There would be significant benefits in improving the public’s awareness of the main risks facing the country and what government is doing about them. The public and Parliament have limited awareness of the main risks facing the country and of … Read more There would be significant benefits in improving the public’s awareness of the main risks facing the country and what government is doing about them. The public and Parliament have limited awareness of the main risks facing the country and of what government is doing to address them. Although government has published a public-facing national risk register since 2008, this document is not widely known. Our witnesses recognised that government has a chequered history in communicating risks to the public and acknowledged that the government’s messaging on risks should be more balanced, accessible to non-experts and lend itself to practical actions. Greater public awareness of government’s planning for major risks, including the work it will carry out as part of the nascent catastrophic emergencies programme, would help avoid complacency, focus the minds of the officials who are tasked with risk planning, help to ensure the public is more aware of what is being done to protect them from harm and highlight opportunities for public engagement, awareness raising and behavioural change. The Government carried out a consultation last summer on a national resilience strategy and had over a million different interactions with it. This demonstrates a high level of public interest in these matters. Equally MPs collectively received hundreds of thousands of emails at the start of the lockdown, largely because the Gov.uk website did not provide clear and intelligible advice, or provide effective mechanisms for MPs to raise constituents problems. Recommendation: The Cabinet Office should set out how it plans to increase public awareness of the main risks facing the UK. It should also report annually to Parliament: • on what actions government has undertaken during the year to mitigate the risks covered by the catastrophic emergencies programme and provide an assessment of government’s preparedness for each risk; • what changes Government in making as a result of its consultations o Show less

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The pandemic has highlighted the critical role of international collaboration for managing the risks that the UK faces. Given the increasingly interconnected nature of our world, several of the main risks facing the UK may originate abroad and, if they … Read more The pandemic has highlighted the critical role of international collaboration for managing the risks that the UK faces. Given the increasingly interconnected nature of our world, several of the main risks facing the UK may originate abroad and, if they materialise, will require a coordinated international response. To detect them and respond to them effectively, government needs to strengthen the exchange of information with other countries, cooperate on horizon scanning and the early detection of threats, and learn from the experiences of other countries. It will also need to foster international debate on medium and long-term existential risks to humanity, which can only be addressed through concerted global action. Promoting greater international collaboration will require the UK to play a more prominent role in international forums, such as the World Health Organisation. Recommendation: Government should set out how it intends to drive greater international collaboration on risks, including exchanging information on threats, promoting and integrating mutual learning and coordinating responses across borders. Show less

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Government’s slow progress in improving data quality and completeness has hampered its preparedness for this and future pandemics. We have repeatedly highlighted longstanding issues with the quality of data held by government and with its ability to use data effectively … Read more Government’s slow progress in improving data quality and completeness has hampered its preparedness for this and future pandemics. We have repeatedly highlighted longstanding issues with the quality of data held by government and with its ability to use data effectively to support policy interventions. Our 2019 report Challenges in using data across government noted the lack of government-wide data standards, ageing IT systems, fragmented leadership, and a civil service culture that does not support sharing data across departmental boundaries. For instance, the contact centre that government set up a part of its programme to support those most vulnerable during the first lockdown could not get in touch with around 8 Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk 800,000 individuals due to missing or inaccurate NHS records. The lack of progress on data issues over the years is likely to hinder government’s initiatives to improve preparedness. While government has set up a National Situation Centre which will provide real-time access to the data government needs to respond to emergencies, this will bring limited benefits if the quality of the data collected remains low. If government access to key data—such as social care data—is scaled down following the pandemic, this will further hinder preparedness for future emergencies. Recommendation: The Cabinet Office should set out its assessment of the areas in which the data collected by the National Situation Centre are in greatest need of improvement and what it plans to do to implement those improvements. As part of this response, government should set out how it plans to retain access to the social care data required to respond to future pandemics. Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons for government on risk 9 1 Lessons on risk management and communication Show less

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Government would have been better prepared for COVID-19 if it had applied learning from previous incidents and exercises. Government was unprepared for a pandemic with widespread asymptomatic transmission, but this was not unprecedented. The early spread of HIV, too, was partly caused by the fact that it was an asymptomatic …

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On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office and the Department of Health & Social Care (the Department) on the government’s preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic.1

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The three lines of defence model of risk management, widely used in the private sector, sets out what the Orange Book characterises as a “simple and effective way to help delegate and coordinate risk management roles and responsibilities within and across the organisation”.8 Under the first line of defence, management …

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The NAO found that, before the pandemic, departments lacked an agreed understanding of risk tolerance, such as which consequences of a pandemic they deemed acceptable and which consequences they needed to mitigate. The Cabinet Office agreed that government reached a shared understanding of the objectives and priorities they 3 Qq …

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The National Security Risk Assessment, which sets out government’s assessment of the main risks facing the UK and its interests overseas, is classified. Government has published a summary of this assessment and of the mitigations it has put in place every two or three years since 2008.11 The last edition …

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It was reported in September 2021 that the Health and Safety Executive had been notified of 103 instances of serious laboratory leaks, including nine in the most secure level-4 laboratories.15 Lack of transparency to the public about these leaks has hindered public discussion on balancing the benefits of scientific research …

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We raised the question of whether individual members of the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) should be allowed to make public statements that are inconsistent with the collective messaging of the Group. When asked if refraining from making such statements should be a condition for joining SAGE, the Department …

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The Cabinet Office acknowledged the need for international co-operation to assess threats, manage risks and share information. As examples of the UK’s engagement, they mentioned work carried out with the World Health Organisation (WHO) in response to Ebola; the Carbis Bay Declaration, issued in July 2021, which commits G7 countries …

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The Cabinet Office recognised that the UK needs to further strengthen international cooperation and noted that this will be a central feature of the UK resilience strategy. The Department stated that the UK is seeking a new pandemic treaty through the WHO that would place greater obligations on countries and …

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Alongside greater international cooperation, the Cabinet Office noted the need to strengthen domestic collaboration on risks, especially with the private sector. The Cabinet Office stated that government is considering requiring regulated companies and those that have significant dealings with government to comply with resilience standards, and enhancing its communication to …

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Government lacked detailed plans for several aspects of the response to COVID-19, including financial support to local authorities, identifying a large population advised to shield, and economic support schemes.23 A submission we received from an academic research group studying the issues concerning the early childhood education and care sector arising …

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The Cabinet Office attributed the absence of detailed planning for a pandemic like COVID-19 to the fact that they did not anticipate a disease with asymptomatic transmission which required an extended lockdown.26 Yet, a large-scale infection with widespread asymptomatic transmission was not unprecedented. The early spread of HIV, too, was …

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While government took action following major pandemic simulation exercises such as Cygnus and Winter Willow, it did not act upon some of the warnings about the UK’s lack of preparedness from these simulations. For instance, at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many departmental business continuity plans lacked detailed arrangements …

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The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the potential large-scale economic impact of a public health emergency requiring lockdowns and self-isolation. Yet, a submission that we received from academics working on lessons from loans to support businesses through Coronavirus noted that it is unclear whether government would be able to reinstate the …

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We have repeatedly highlighted longstanding issues with the quality of data held by government and with its ability to use data effectively to support policy interventions. Our 2019 report Challenges in using data across government noted the lack of government-wide data standards, ageing IT systems, fragmented leadership and a civil …

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Insufficient progress made on data issues over the years has hindered government’s initial pandemic response. For instance, local government initially lacked access to information from NHS Test and Trace that they needed to deliver their local pandemic response.34 A submission from the International Longevity Centre UK noted that, despite successive …

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The Cabinet Office noted that, in 2021, government set up a National Situation Centre which will provide real-time access to data government needs to respond to the emergencies set out in the National Security Risk Assessment. The Cabinet Office hopes that this will significantly enhance emergency response as it will …

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The Department stated that, while government’s access to data from the social care system has greatly improved during the pandemic, it is likely that this access will be somewhat scaled down as the emergency subsides. It told us that this is because providing 31 Qq 12–27 32 Q 24; letter …

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