Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee

Recommendation 12

12

Our previous work on Covid-19 has highlighted the gaps in economic planning for pandemics, even...

Recommendation
Our previous work on Covid-19 has highlighted the gaps in economic planning for pandemics, even though the risk of a pandemic was one of the most likely risks government had identified. In July 2020, we recommended that the Cabinet Office should review its contingency planning for the most serious risks and ensure that these consider whole-of-government impacts, including economic modelling, and we will monitor how government responds to the issue.31 22 Q 44 23 Q 38 24 Q 4; C&AG’s Report, Contingency preparations for exiting the EU with no deal, Session 2017–19, HC 2058, 12 March 2019, pages 10–12 25 Q 6 26 Qq 8–9 27 Q 15; C&AG’s Report, para 11 28 Qq 15–16 29 Q 43 30 Q 17 31 Q5; Whole of Government Response to COVID-19, Thirteenth Report of Session 2019–21, HC 404 dated 16 July 2020 and Published on 23 July 2020 12 Whitehall preparations for EU Exit The government has announced that there will be a review of its response to Covid-19, which the Cabinet Office expects will provide some lessons for the future in terms of how the pandemic has affected different parts of the economy and different parts of the country.32 However the review has not yet progressed beyond the scoping stage. The Cabinet Office informed us that so far only initial discussions have been held and no date has been set.33 Financial Management
Government Response Not Addressed
HM Government Not Addressed
5.1 The government agrees with this recommendation. Recommendation implemented 5.2 The government regularly conducts scenario-based exercises to ensure robust plans and appropriate capabilities are in place to respond to events, mitigate impacts and ensure the continuity of public services. 5.3 The work led by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) is driven by a systematic assessment of risk, using cross-government, medium term tools such as the National Security Risk Assessment and formalised short-term risk assessment processes to deal with emerging events. This delivers consistency and authority. 5.4 CCS works closely with all government departments and agencies, under the Lead Government Department principle, to ensure this risk assessment translates into plans and actions to mitigate or prepare to deal with disruptive challenges. 5.5 From December 2020, CCS will be supplemented with an enhanced multi-agency Command, Control and Coordination (C3) system, to coordinate the most disruptive challenges across the system; working alongside the EU Exit and COVID-19 secretariats to make sure key decisions and topics are coordinated, and possible synergies and crossovers highlighted. 5.6 This approach reflects the lessons and experience from previous events, including COVID-19 and previous Brexit-related planning. 5.7 This C3 structure will provide the government with clear situational awareness which will be used to monitor and track whether disruptive challenges are beginning to manifest. 5.8 These structures will increase CCS’s capacity to respond robustly to events, ensure that risks are viewed holistically and create easier data flows across the department and wider system. Lessons and improvements will be permanently incorporated into enduring crisis management arrangements.