Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation 5
5
EU Exit and the Covid-19 response have shown up critical gaps in the civil service’s...
Conclusion
EU Exit and the Covid-19 response have shown up critical gaps in the civil service’s approach to planning, particularly for unexpected events or undesired outcomes. The Cabinet Office keeps a national risk register, with input from across government and particularly the Treasury. The risk register includes “unexpected events” in terms of those that are irregular but known to occur, and those which may not have occurred before but which there may be a chance of occurring. However, in practice, recent events have shown up the limitations in these plans. Ministers specifically limited the amount of contingency planning the civil service was expected to carry out ahead of the EU Exit referendum in 2016. This led to a delay on negotiating positions and preparations as government had to take time after the referendum to formulate policy and determine what type of agreement they wanted to have with the EU. Our previous work on Covid-19 has highlighted the gaps in economic planning for pandemics, even though the risk of a pandemic was one of the most likely risks government had identified. The government has announced that there will be a review of its response to Covid-19, but so far only initial discussions have been held and no date has been set. Recommendation: The civil service has a duty to plan for multiple scenarios, even those which it or Ministers considers unlikely or undesirable. Civil servants should seek formal instruction if told not to plan by Ministers. Planning should be proportionate to the risk, but there should be mechanisms for activity to ramp up as risks get bigger. For example, on EU Exit, we would have expected increasing levels of planning from when the referendum commitment appeared in the Conservative Party manifesto. The civil service should consider the development of standard principles, particularly for planning for unexpected scenarios, which would put government in a better position to respond quickly.
Government Response
Not Addressed
HM Government
Not Addressed
5.1 The government agrees with this recommendation. Recommendation implemented 5.2 The government regularly conducts scenario-based exercises to ensure robust plans and appropriate capabilities are in place to respond to events, mitigate impacts and ensure the continuity of public services. 5.3 The work led by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) is driven by a systematic assessment of risk, using cross-government, medium term tools such as the National Security Risk Assessment and formalised short-term risk assessment processes to deal with emerging events. This delivers consistency and authority. 5.4 CCS works closely with all government departments and agencies, under the Lead Government Department principle, to ensure this risk assessment translates into plans and actions to mitigate or prepare to deal with disruptive challenges. 5.5 From December 2020, CCS will be supplemented with an enhanced multi-agency Command, Control and Coordination (C3) system, to coordinate the most disruptive challenges across the system; working alongside the EU Exit and COVID-19 secretariats to make sure key decisions and topics are coordinated, and possible synergies and crossovers highlighted. 5.6 This approach reflects the lessons and experience from previous events, including COVID-19 and previous Brexit-related planning. 5.7 This C3 structure will provide the government with clear situational awareness which will be used to monitor and track whether disruptive challenges are beginning to manifest. 5.8 These structures will increase CCS’s capacity to respond robustly to events, ensure that risks are viewed holistically and create easier data flows across the department and wider system. Lessons and improvements will be permanently incorporated into enduring crisis management arrangements.