Recommendation 2

NHST&T still struggles to consistently match supply and demand for its test and trace services, resulting in either sub-standard performance or surplus capacity. We accept the need to build surplus capacity into test and trace services to handle unexpected, sometimes exponential, surges in infections. However, the percentage of total laboratory testing capacity used in November and December has remained under 65%, at the lower end of what NHST&T states is best practice (between 60% and 85%). Even with spare capacity, NHST&T has never met the target to turn around all tests (in face-to-face settings) in 24 hours. In September 2020, NHST&T significantly underestimated the increase in demand for testing when schools and universities returned, resulting in poor performance. When the demand for tests surged again over Christmas, NHST&T feels it managed access to tests better, but there were still dips in turnaround times despite apparent spare laboratory capacity. For tracing, the Department accepts that, with hindsight, it did not need to scale 6 COVID-19: Test, track and trace (part 1) up central tracing services for May as much as it did. While it has sought to reduce capacity and increase flexibility since then, low utilisation rates—well below the target of 50%—persisted into October. Recommendation: For all aspects of its testing and tracing operations, NHST&T should identify opportunities to make better use of the capacity it has paid to create. Where it retains surplus capacity, this should be for a clear and explicit purpose. It needs to strike a better balance between meeting surges in demand, maintaining timely services, having eligibility criteria that allow it to identify as many people with the virus as possible, and not paying unnecessarily for surplus capacity.