Recommendations & Conclusions
5 items
5
Recommendation
Thirteenth Report - Initial lessons fro…
Not Addressed
Government has yet to improve its approach to managing risk or set out which trade-offs it intends to make in future emergencies. The pandemic has highlighted the importance of carrying out robust risk planning and being clear about risk appetite and risk tolerance. Government lacked pre-existing plans for many aspects …
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Government has yet to improve its approach to managing risk or set out which trade-offs it intends to make in future emergencies. The pandemic has highlighted the importance of carrying out robust risk planning and being clear about risk appetite and risk tolerance. Government lacked pre-existing plans for many aspects of its response such as employment support schemes, support for people shielding and disruption to schooling. In the interests of speed, government took decisions which it recognised would lead to an increased risk of fraud and error, including relaxing some controls and streamlining spending approvals. The estimated financial consequences of this are large. Between £2.1 billion and £4.2 billion of employment support payments may be due to fraud and error. Similarly, between £16 billion and £27 billion in loans from the Bounce Back Loans scheme may not be repaid. Government’s decisions on imposing or easing restrictions involve considering a wide range of factors, including health risks with, social and economic risks, yet government has lacked a formal process to balance these risks and decide which trade-offs to make. Government has acknowledged that it needs to strengthen its management of cross-cutting risks and has accepted a recommendation, from the Boardman review, that it establish a cross-department risk management profession and training programme for risk managers. Recommendation: The Cabinet Office should, by 31 October 2021, write to us detailing how, and when, it will implement the Boardman review’s recommendation to establish a risk management profession and training programme and provide us with a quarterly progress update until this has been fully implemented.
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Government response AI summary
The government's response is completely unrelated to the recommendation, discussing BBC audience decline and strategies rather than the implementation of a risk management profession.
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HM Treasury
1
Conclusion
Thirteenth Report - Initial lessons fro…
Not Addressed
On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health & Social Care (the Department) and HM Treasury on initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1
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On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Cabinet Office, the Department of Health & Social Care (the Department) and HM Treasury on initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.1
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Government response AI summary
The government's response provides an overall introduction to its response to the Committee's report, outlining the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the government's actions, rather than specifically addressing this introductory conclusion about the committee's evidence session.
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HM Treasury
15
Conclusion
Thirteenth Report - Initial lessons fro…
The NAO found that the pandemic had disproportionately impacted specific groups of people. For example, disrupted schooling is likely to have longer-term adverse effects on children from disadvantaged backgrounds. The Education Endowment Foundation predicted that schools closures in the 2019/20 academic year could widen the attainment gap between disadvantaged children …
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The NAO found that the pandemic had disproportionately impacted specific groups of people. For example, disrupted schooling is likely to have longer-term adverse effects on children from disadvantaged backgrounds. The Education Endowment Foundation predicted that schools closures in the 2019/20 academic year could widen the attainment gap between disadvantaged children and their peers by an average of 36%.33 We therefore asked the Cabinet Office about the widening of the education attainment gap between disadvantaged children and their peers during the pandemic and how the government was monitoring the catch-up schemes set up by the Department for Education to determine if they were effective. It explained that the Department for Education had evaluation frameworks in place for these programmes and progress was reported regularly to the Prime Minister, who monitored the effectiveness of interventions through the newly established Delivery Unit. The Cabinet Office acknowledged that monitoring educational attainment in real time is challenging and that gathering information on this takes time.34 Transparency and openness
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HM Treasury
19
Conclusion
Thirteenth Report - Initial lessons fro…
Our previous work has shown a mixed picture in terms of the views of end users regarding the satisfaction and success of programmes introduced in response to the pandemic. Gathering feedback from end users and frontline workers is vital for monitoring the effectiveness of interventions and improving existing processes.41 We …
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Our previous work has shown a mixed picture in terms of the views of end users regarding the satisfaction and success of programmes introduced in response to the pandemic. Gathering feedback from end users and frontline workers is vital for monitoring the effectiveness of interventions and improving existing processes.41 We asked what structures had been put in place to take soundings from end users. The Cabinet Office highlighted three structures: a fieldwork team within the COVID Taskforce, which had been examining what worked and the impact of policy in its implementation; the Department’s local action committee, which had helped ensure that information from frontline workers fed into local decision-making; and 10,000 community champions, who were tasked with gaining the trust of local communities and explaining why government took specific actions. The Cabinet Office told us that government might continue to use these structures after the pandemic to ensure that feedback from end users and frontline workers informed government’s actions.42
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HM Treasury
25
Conclusion
Thirteenth Report - Initial lessons fro…
Our recent report on fraud and error highlighted that the taxpayer is expected to lose billions of pounds from the increased risk of fraud and error in the government’s COVID-19 schemes. It found that the cost of fraud and error within the tax and benefits system is fairly well understood …
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Our recent report on fraud and error highlighted that the taxpayer is expected to lose billions of pounds from the increased risk of fraud and error in the government’s COVID-19 schemes. It found that the cost of fraud and error within the tax and benefits system is fairly well understood by government, and HMRC and DWP have well- established approach to tackle and address fraud and error in their areas. But for many areas of spend outside the tax and benefits system there is still no formal measurement and limited capability to tackle fraud and error, risking large amounts of fraud and error being unidentified or untackled.53 We therefore asked HM Treasury what it was doing to ensure that Departments pay greater attention to identifying and addressing fraud and error and complied fully with requirements set out in Managing Public Money. HM Treasury and 50 Qq 4–6 51 C&AG’s Report, paras 5–11; Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Support for children’s education, Committee of Public Accounts, COVID-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme, HC 687, Session 2019–21, 16 December 2020, para 1; C&AG’s Report, para 6 52 Qq 21, 41; C&AG’s Report, paras 7–8 53 Committee of Public Accounts, Fraud and Error, HC 253, Session 2021–22, 30 June 2021 Initial lessons from the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic 19 the Cabinet Office explained that, as well as departments with established counter-fraud capabilities, such as the Department for Work & Pensions and HM Revenue & Customs, other departments such as the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs had to deal with increased fraud risks. It told us that government was supporting those departments with additional resource and capability, strengthening the counter-fraud and finance functions, and reminding accounting officers of their responsibilities with regard to fraud and error.54
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HM Treasury