Recommendations & Conclusions
5 items
5
Recommendation
Fifty-Third Report - Covid 19: supporti…
Rejected
MHCLG and DHSC do not know whether 800,000 clinically extremely vulnerable people slipped through the net and missed out on much needed support. DHSC explains that it took a ‘multi-channel’ approach to engaging with those affected. Through this approach, it focused first on sending letters, then an email, then calls …
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MHCLG and DHSC do not know whether 800,000 clinically extremely vulnerable people slipped through the net and missed out on much needed support. DHSC explains that it took a ‘multi-channel’ approach to engaging with those affected. Through this approach, it focused first on sending letters, then an email, then calls from the contact centre, which was established at a cost of £18.4 million. 1.8 million Covid 19: supporting the vulnerable during lockdown 7 people did not register their needs or respond when contacted by letter, so their details were passed to the contact centre for follow-up. However, the contact centre was unable to get in touch with around 800,000 vulnerable people, despite apparently making hundreds of thousands of calls every day. It took central government one month to pass the details of these people to local authorities, so local authorities could check if they needed help. Crucially, MHCLG has no knowledge of whether local authorities then managed to reach any or all of these people. Recommendation: MHCLG should urgently update the Committee on whether it has now successfully confirmed the support needs of all vulnerable people, including the additional 1.7 million people advised to shield in February 2021.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating that all reasonable steps were taken to alert CEV individuals and provide support, with local councils confirming through outcomes data that most needs were met.
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HM Treasury
11
Conclusion
Fifty-Third Report - Covid 19: supporti…
Rejected
As well as NHS Digital using patient data to add people to the shielding list, GPs and hospital doctors were asked to review the list and use their clinical judgement to add or remove people. GP and hospital doctors’ additions brought the total to 1.8 million by 18 April and …
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As well as NHS Digital using patient data to add people to the shielding list, GPs and hospital doctors were asked to review the list and use their clinical judgement to add or remove people. GP and hospital doctors’ additions brought the total to 1.8 million by 18 April and then 2.2 million by 7 May.20 As people were added, NHS England & NHS Improvement (NHSE&I) sent them letters advising them to shield and of their eligibility for support.21 We received written submissions from charities which reported delays in people receiving these letters, potentially putting them at risk of infection, and causing distress and delays in accessing support.22 Overall, 900,000 people were added to the list between 18 April and 7 May.23
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Government response AI summary
The government explicitly disagrees with the conclusion that it took too long to identify CEV people, asserting that it worked as quickly as possible. While generally committed to learning lessons for future data use, it does not address the reported delays in people receiving shielding …
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HM Treasury
21
Conclusion
Fifty-Third Report - Covid 19: supporti…
Rejected
Government used a range of ways to engage with clinically vulnerable people, to advise them to shield and how to register to access support.51 Government wanted all affected to register whether they needed support or not. NHSE&I and DHSC were initially responsible for advising people to shield, and began sending …
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Government used a range of ways to engage with clinically vulnerable people, to advise them to shield and how to register to access support.51 Government wanted all affected to register whether they needed support or not. NHSE&I and DHSC were initially responsible for advising people to shield, and began sending letters and texts from 23 March. The Government Digital Service developed a website and an automated telephone helpline for people to register for support.52 Government also commissioned a contact centre through the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) to call around 1.8 million people who had not yet registered using the website or automated helpline, despite having been sent letters. The contact centre cost a total of £18.4 million. However, the contact centre was unable to get in touch with around 800,000 people despite MHCLG’s assessment that the centre was making hundreds of thousands of calls every day.53
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Government response AI summary
The government explicitly disagrees with the conclusion, stating it has taken all reasonable steps to alert CEV individuals to shielding guidance and support using a multi-channel approach, and defending its existing communication strategy.
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HM Treasury
22
Conclusion
Fifty-Third Report - Covid 19: supporti…
Rejected
DHSC and MHCLG explained that for the 800,000 vulnerable people that the contact centre could not reach, their contact details were passed to local authorities, as it was thought local authorities might be better placed to contact these people and identify their need for support.54 These details were given by …
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DHSC and MHCLG explained that for the 800,000 vulnerable people that the contact centre could not reach, their contact details were passed to local authorities, as it was thought local authorities might be better placed to contact these people and identify their need for support.54 These details were given by the contact centre to local authorities starting from 28 April, over one month after the start of shielding. MHCLG told us that local authorities had, before 28 April, received the full shielded patient list and the details of those who had registered for support by then and that they had started contacting people before receiving the details of the 800,000 ‘uncontactables’.55
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Government response AI summary
The government disagrees with the Committee’s conclusion and the associated recommendation, stating that all reasonable steps were taken to alert CEV individuals and intelligence from local councils provided assurance that most were able to remain self-sufficient.
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HM Treasury
25
Conclusion
Fifty-Third Report - Covid 19: supporti…
Rejected
MHCLG considered that it established a communication strategy that took all reasonable steps to reach people.58 DHSC explained how it used a ‘multi-channel’ approach to communicate with clinically vulnerable people: its preference was to contact people using letters first as it considered letters used the highest-quality contact records, followed by …
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MHCLG considered that it established a communication strategy that took all reasonable steps to reach people.58 DHSC explained how it used a ‘multi-channel’ approach to communicate with clinically vulnerable people: its preference was to contact people using letters first as it considered letters used the highest-quality contact records, followed by email, and then a telephone call. DHSC highlighted that it also relied on GPs to make sure that the necessary contact was made.59 We asked DHSC why such a large proportion of vulnerable people have incomplete patient records. DHSC responded that it is difficult to make sure phone numbers are up to date, as a ‘surprisingly large number’ of people change their phone numbers quite often. It said that NHS records are ‘only as good as what patients provide’.60 The NAO also reported how local authorities struggled with inaccurate contact data which created additional work and potentially delayed getting support to those who needed it.61
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Government response AI summary
The government explicitly disagrees with the committee's conclusion, asserting that it took all reasonable steps to alert CEV individuals to guidance and support, and that some people chose not to register their needs.
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HM Treasury