Select committee inquiry
The Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund (ISCF) awards support for research and development projects under the four themes of the government’s Industrial Strategy: clean growth, the ageing society, the future of mobility and artificial intelligence & the data economy. It constitutes a significant part of a government commitment to spend £4.7 billion on research and development over 4 years, and supports the ambitions set out in the government’s Industrial Strategy. UK Research & Innovation (UKRI), established in April 2018, is responsible for implementing the ISCF, which is funded by the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS). The Committee will question senior officials at BEIS and UKRI on the management of the ISCF , focussing on the design of the Fund and oversight of its implementation, and the approach taken to considering performance and progress in making the awards. If you have evidence on the management or performance of the ISCF, please submit it here by 6:00 pm on Thursday 25 February 2021.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
In the committee's words, from the summary of Fifty-Sixth Report - Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund ↗
UK Research and Innovation and the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy set up the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund quickly but we have concerns about its clarity of purpose including the multiple projects now being funded, the length of time it takes for a project to be approved and the lack of clear evaluation about the impact.
By January 2021 over 1,600 projects had benefited from funding of £1.2 billion to support innovation in some of the most complex issues faced by the UK. Businesses and other bodies have contributed almost £600 million themselves to projects in what is known as co-investment. It is important that the fund tracks the job creation ambitions and the number of jobs delivered over time if it is to properly demonstrate its economic impact.
Greater clarity is needed on what the Fund as a whole is trying to achieve and how it is trying to do it. Although UKRI can point to good performance in beginning to tackle the various chosen challenges and amongst their funded projects, and in involving industry in the selection of challenges to support, its objectives for the Fund overall are input focused. This makes it difficult to assess whether the investment of taxpayers’
money through the Fund has been successful in terms of, for example, economic impact including the number and quality of jobs created. The financial support provided by the Fund is currently concentrated in certain parts of the country and larger organisations have recently received an increasing proportion of funding. We are concerned that these risks undermining future performance by overlooking ideas from elsewhere and smaller businesses. The proof of whether the fund delivers is some years off and it is important that clarity about desired outcomes and proper evaluation of progress is built in at this early stage.
The fund is a key element in achieving the government’s ambitious target for the UK to spend 2.4% of GDP on R&D by 2027. This was challenging before the outbreak of COVID-19 and is more so now. The Department needs to set out clearly how it proposes to meet this target. Structural issues in the Fund’s design- such as lengthy approvals processes and co-investment requirements- similarly need an overhaul if it is to play an important role in helping re-build our economy post-pandemic. UKRI, the Department, and HM Treasury need to act with more urgency to tackle these issues and protect taxpayers’ investment.
What the government said
The government responded on 2 September 2021. The deadline was 30 June 2021.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The government agrees with most of the Committee's recommendations on the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund, with target implementation dates of July or October 2021, but disagrees with two, on the R&D spending plan and on reviewing the conditions placed on UKRI.
- On expected benefits, the department "will write to the Committee by the end of October 2021" outlining the impact the existing Challenges expect to achieve in the short, medium and long term, with a focus on jobs and economic impact.
- On intellectual property, the government agrees, and with UKRI will review the current approach and write to the Committee by July 2021, examining the rationale and evidence "to determine whether any changes are needed".
- The government disagrees with the recommendation to publish a plan for the 2.4% R&D target by October 2021. It points to an innovation strategy "due to be published this summer" and further plans in Spending Review 2021.
- The government also disagrees with the recommendation to review the conditions placed on UKRI by July 2021. It considers the "appropriate timescale and mechanism" to be Spending Review 2021, where it proposes to address the Committee's concerns.
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 1 February 2021 to 23 November 2021. The dashed mark is the deadline Parliament records for the government's response.
- Oral evidence 4 Mar 2021
- Report 30 Apr 2021
- Government response 2 Sep 2021
- Correspondence 3 letters
What it recommended 9 recommendations · 12 conclusions
2We are not convinced that UKRI’s and the Department’s approach to intellectual property generated by...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are not convinced that UKRI’s and the Department’s approach to intellectual property generated by the Fund adequately protects taxpayers’ interests. Taxpayer funding invested through the Fund creates a ‘bridge’ between pure research investment and commercial development. There will potentially be value in the intellectual property associated with the projects that are funded. As we have seen with previous reports, it is important that intellectual properly produced as a result of taxpayer investment is exploited to maximise the value of the investment. However, UKRI has not ensured that any intellectual property generated as a result of the Fund is used to the benefit of the UK. The Department asserts that the Fund’s purpose is to accelerate R&D investment generally, not to capture any potential benefits in this way. We are not convinced by its view that retaining a say over intellectual property rights is not necessary to recoup the benefits of the Fund for the UK. A better understanding of what benefits the Fund is expected to deliver to the UK economy would provide UKRI and the Department with a stronger basis for considering the best way to protect taxpayers’ interests. The Committee is highly sceptical about the Department’s response after the hearing that “IP rights, should be owned by the party best placed to exploit them” because UK Academia does not have a strong record of protecting IP rights. Recommendation: UKRI should re-examine its current approach of not holding a claim on intellectual property generated through the Fund. It should write to the Committee by July 2021 setting out the results of its review and explain how it intends to best protect the taxpayers’ interests and maximise the value from taxpayer investment in the future.
3The Department has not yet made clear how it will make sure the UK will...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department has not yet made clear how it will make sure the UK will meet the target to spend 2.4% of its GDP on R&D by 2027. The government has a target to 6 Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund increase the UK’s public and private investment in R&D to 2.4% of GDP by 2027. In 2018, the latest year for which data are available, the UK spent £37 billion on R&D, the equivalent of 1.7% of its GDP. This is well below the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s average of 2.4%, and the level achieved by other OECD countries. Germany for example spent 2.9% of its GDP on R&D in 2018. In 2019, the Department announced that to achieve government’s target of 2.4%, both public and private R&D investment would need to rise to around £60 billion each year. The government has committed to increasing public investment in R&D to £22 billion by 2021–25. UKRI asserts that meeting the target is challenging but plausible. The recent impact of COVID-19 on the economy may make prioritising the public investment required to meet the target even more challenging. Recommendation: The Department should develop, and then publish, by October 2021, its plan setting out the steps it will take to meet the 2.4% spending target by
5UKRI is not doing enough to make sure the Fund is attracting successful bids from...
Recommended (the committee's words)
UKRI is not doing enough to make sure the Fund is attracting successful bids from across the country. Funding awarded by the Fund is distributed unevenly across the regions of the United Kingdom. By October 2020, just over 63% of the Fund had been awarded to organisations registered in London, the South East and West Midlands. UKRI does not assess the regional balance of bids in assessing awards. In part, this distribution of funding probably reflects to a degree the location of existing centres of R&D activity, for example the advanced manufacturing base in the West Midlands. The nature of the challenges selected could also have an impact on the location of projects funded, skewing project selection to existing areas of activity. The geographical distribution of funding, however, is not necessarily explained by the distribution of businesses undertaking R&D activities in the economy. UKRI asserts that activity can take place outside of the regions where the company in receipt of funding is registered, but does not have additional analysis to show that this was the case. Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 7 Recommendation: The Department and UKRI should, by October 2021, set out: the factors that are inhibiting more widespread participation in the Fund; and the steps they are taking to attract more interest in the Fund from across the UK.
6The elongated time taken by the Department and UKRI to provide funding to successful bidders...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The elongated time taken by the Department and UKRI to provide funding to successful bidders risks putting off businesses from applying for the programme. It took UKRI, the Department and HM Treasury 72 weeks to select and approve the challenges that were given funding in 2019–20. It took UKRI on average a further 31 weeks to assess applications for project funding and approve individual projects. The lengthy time taken to agree challenges and approve projects leads to delays in funding projects. For example, we heard from one organisation that meaningful work has yet to start on some projects for which those responsible had started to bid for funding as early as 2018. Taking too long to approve challenges and then select projects to fund risks delaying the impact from the projects which are supported. This prolonged process may also potentially deter some organisations from applying for funding and delay the impact of UKRI’s investments. We are concerned that this could particularly affect smaller businesses which may not have the financial and staffing resources to wait for funding. Recommendation: The Department, HM Treasury and UKRI should set out by October 2021 how they intend to speed up the time taken to approve challenges and projects.
7Powers currently delegated by the Department and HM Treasury to UKRI do not strike the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Powers currently delegated by the Department and HM Treasury to UKRI do not strike the right balance between the governance necessary to support efficient decision making and unnecessary bureaucracy. The Department and HM Treasury set the governance arrangements for UKRI’s oversight of the Fund, including the requirements for approving new challenges. UKRI, the Department and HM Treasury each approve business cases for challenges in turn—as a result business cases can take over a year to approve. One consequence of this delay is that funding is slow to be allocated. In addition to delaying getting funding to those delivering approved projects, this could create extra financial pressures in the later years of the programme as funded activity builds up. The Departments’ approach to the appointment of senior civil service positions has led to delays in appointing Challenge Directors, which have taken an average of over 37 weeks. Challenge Directors are fundamental in setting the direction for, and then overseeing delivery against, the objectives for each challenge. UKRI would like to be able to appoint these senior staff earlier, but to do so depends on its delegated powers from the Department. Recommendation: The Department and HM Treasury should, by July 2021, review the conditions they place on UKRI to manage the Fund with a view to supporting more efficient decision making. The Department and HM Treasury should write to the Committee to explain the changes they have introduced together with their intended impact. 8 Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 1 Measuring the impact of the Funds
1On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (the Department) and UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) about the management of the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund (the Fund).1 Assessing Fund performance
4The Department has five objectives for the Fund, to: • increase UK businesses’ investment in...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department has five objectives for the Fund, to: • increase UK businesses’ investment in R&D, while also improving R&D capability, capacity and technology adoption; • increase multi- and inter-disciplinary research; • increase engagement between academia and industry on targeted innovation activities; • increase collaboration between new small companies and those that are established; and 1 C&AG’s Report, UK Research and Innovation’s management of the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund, Session 2019–21, HC 1130, 5 February 2021 2 C&AG’s Report, paras 2, 3 and 6 3 C&AG’s Report, para 1.11 4 HM Treasury, Build Back Better: our plan for growth, Policy Paper CP 401, 3 March 2021 Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 9 • and increase overseas investment in R&D in the UK.5
8We asked the Department and UKRI why it had not ensured that the taxpayer benefited...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We asked the Department and UKRI why it had not ensured that the taxpayer benefited from any intellectual property generated as a result of successful commercial development paid for by the Fund.19 The Department told us that securing intellectual property was not the purpose of the Fund—instead it was to accelerate R&D expenditure more generally. UKRI recognised that it was important to consider how to ensure a return on public investment, but added that it was not clear that retaining intellectual property rights was necessarily the best way to recoup the benefits of an investment. In its view, securing intellectual property was neither “...simple, cheap or low energy”. It told us that it was considering alternatives such as taking an equity stake in some investments.20 We sought assurances from UKRI and the Department that they would seriously think about how the public purse can benefit in the event of any “commercial successful roll out that has benefited from this bridge funding from the public purse.”21 The Department agreed to look at whether there might be specific exceptions to its current position.22 The Department subsequently wrote to us to explained that the Intellectual Property Office was working on “how to ensure that the Government receives a financial reward for its innovation and taxpayers are getting value for money going forward.”23 Meeting the R&D spending target
9The government has a target to increase the UK’s public and private investment in R&D...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The government has a target to increase the UK’s public and private investment in R&D to 2.4% of gross domestic product by 2027. The Fund contributes to this target.24 In 2018, the most recent year for which data are available, the UK invested 1.7% of its gross domestic product in R&D. This is below the average across the OECD of 2.4%. UKRI told us that it thought the UK should be aiming well above the OECD average. It told us that in 2018 Germany spent 2.9% of its GDP on R&D.25
10In 2019, the Department announced that to achieve government’s target of 2.4% both public and...
Recommended (the committee's words)
In 2019, the Department announced that to achieve government’s target of 2.4% both public and private R&D investment would need to rise to around £60 billion.26We asked witnesses how, and by when, it was going to increase funding to meet the target. The Department told us that it hoped to start to see significant increases in public investment in R&D in the next dataset published by the Office for National Statistics, which would cover
11UKRI considered that meeting the target as very challenging but also described it as plausible...
Concluded (the committee's words)
UKRI considered that meeting the target as very challenging but also described it as plausible if it could, for example, maintain the momentum the Fund had generated around private investment. It asserted that having an ambitious target was important “otherwise, one won’t even meet unambitious targets, let along ambitious ones”.30 UKRI acknowledged though that the “hit to the economy” from COVID19 would make prioritising public investment in R&D challenging.31 28 Q 16, C&AG’s Report, footnote 6 29 Q 16 30 Q 17 31 Qq 16–17 12 Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 2 Distributing funding fairly and efficiently Speeding up approval of challenges and projects
12In the third and most recent wave of funding that started in 2019–20, it took...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the third and most recent wave of funding that started in 2019–20, it took UKRI, the Department and HM Treasury 72 weeks to select and approve challenges.32 We asked the Department and UKRI why it took them over a year to select and approve challenges. The Department told us that fundamentally the time taken was because it was a difficult process, but recognised that overall it had taken too long and committed to a faster process next time. It identified three reasons for the day: that it had been more open to receiving ideas for challenges and had to consider over 250 proposals as a result; the business cases themselves were challenging because they needed to demonstrate that the Fund was supporting research that could be considered ‘genuinely incremental’; and it had to make sure that proposals were relevant to the Industrial Strategy.33
13The Department told us that part of the reason for the delays in approving challenges,...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that part of the reason for the delays in approving challenges, and ultimately projects, lay with drawn-out approval processes.34 The Department and HM Treasury are responsible for approving business cases for challenges. The Department told us that the process for selecting and signing off challenges started with UKRI consulting industry and academia, and then shortlisting potential challenges. UKRI submitted a business case for each challenge to the Department and HM Treasury for their approval in sequence.35 Once challenges have been approved, UKRI has to select which projects to fund. UKRI explained that it does this after considering, for example, a project’s alignment with challenge objectives and financial checks on the applicant and on the project costs. The National Audit Office looked at the total time taken from when applications were submitted to when funding was offered, and found that UKRI took on average 31 weeks.36 UKRI told us that the time taken to approve projects was because it had to undertake a series of due diligence checks which were crucial to ensure that taxpayer’s money was being spent well. It acknowledged that while this was an iterative process it could “drag on for far too long” and that it needed to find effective ways to speed it up.37 It noted that some of the process it could “speed up within UKRI” but highlighted its dependency on, for example, companies responding promptly to checks.38
14We were concerned that lengthy approval times, combined with changes in coinvestment requirements, could deter...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We were concerned that lengthy approval times, combined with changes in coinvestment requirements, could deter participation from some small and microsized companies.39 For example, we received written evidence from Tees Valley Combined Authority which told us that it had submitted three successful and sequential bids relating to industrial decarbonisation for funding from the Fund. It explained that it had started its bids in early 2018, however meaningful work on the project had yet to commence 32 Q 37, C&AG’s Report, para 15 33 Q 37 34 Q 37 35 Q 38, C&AG’s Report, paras 2.14, 2.16 36 C&AG’s Report, paras 2.18–2.19, Figures 1 and 6. Of the 236 projects with applications submitted in late 2018 of after, it took an average of over 31 weeks for funding to be offered. The shortest time between an application being submitted and funding offered was 16 weeks, and the longest took over a year at 53 weeks. 37 Q 42 38 Q 42 39 Q 59 and C&AG’s Report, para 2.19 Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 13 due to “the on-going process associated with managing the funds”.40 Similarly, evidence from Universities Scotland indicated that lead times for the Fund’s project—“to build the consortium, complete the application, await assessment outcomes, and for funding to come through to universities”—were, in its opinion, far too long.41 UKRI acknowledged that a two year wait for funding was very frustrating for businesses wanting to get on with projects. UKRI and the Department told us that there was a trade-off between quality and speed, and that they were hoping in the future to be “equally high quality and a lot faster at the same time”.42
15Delays in getting new challenges approved have had a knock-on effect on UKRI’s ability to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Delays in getting new challenges approved have had a knock-on effect on UKRI’s ability to start spending. For example, in 2019–20, UKRI had underspent by £86 million, equivalent to 14% of its budget for the Fund the year. During 2020–21 UKRI agreed to re-profile £165 million from the current budget into future years for 20 challenges, mainly due to the impact of COVID-19. We asked UKRI about the extent to which any delays in distributing funding to projects will affect its ability to spend the Fund in its final years. UKRI said that the need to reprofile spending into future years created financial pressure in the later years of the programme. The NAO found that reprofiling funding could have an impact on planned activity, which in turn might impact on the amount of co-investment generated by partner organisations. It similarly found that additional pressure on future budgets could also come from the impact of COVID-19 on the level of activity undertaken on funded projects. UKRI told us that it would be easier to manage the risks from reprofiling budgets if it had a multi-year settlement. However, in the Spending Review 2020, the Fund was part of a one-year settlement.43
16Lack of staffing capacity within UKRI may also have impacted the time taken to approve...
Recommended (the committee's words)
Lack of staffing capacity within UKRI may also have impacted the time taken to approve bids. At the start of Waves 2 and 3, UKRI faced significant challenges recruiting staff to oversee and manage the challenge programmes. Of the 186 full-time-equivalent staff UKRI estimated it needed to administer the Fund in 2019, 103 were vacant in June
17One of the Fund’s five objectives is to increase collaboration between new small companies and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
One of the Fund’s five objectives is to increase collaboration between new small companies and those that are established. Analysis undertaken by the National Audit Office showed that UKRI had initially succeeded in attracting a range of different sized companies to participate in the Fund. However, in the third wave of funding, the proportion of projects awarded to companies classified as large (categorised as having more than 250 staff) increased from 20% in the second wave of funding to 29% in the third. This expansion has been at the expense of the proportion of micro (categorised as having under 10 staff) and small sized enterprises (categorised as having between 10 and 50 staff). Their proportion of projects awarded fell from 44% in the second wave to 31% in the third wave.47
18There are several reasons why the proportion of smaller businesses receiving funding could have fallen...
Recommended (the committee's words)
There are several reasons why the proportion of smaller businesses receiving funding could have fallen including the increase in UKRI’s requirements for coinvestment from participants for wave 3 funding. UKRI increased the co-investment requirement from industry in wave 3, responding to a requirement from the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy. The ratio of public investment to private investment increased from 1:0.45 in Wave 1 to 1:1.5 in Wave 3.48 The Department told us that it could not prove that the drop in the proportion of small businesses between waves 2 and 3 was solely due to the increase in coinvestment. But it conceded that it was reasonable to believe that it was a “really big factor” because it was harder for small businesses to meet the coinvestment targets. The Department emphasised that co-investment targets were nonetheless important in generating private investment which helped to boost the overall spend on R&D. It explained that it was working with small businesses to help them address this challenge.49 UKRI suggested a more tailored approach to co-investment for different sized companies might help.50
19Other factors that may have influenced the reduced participation of smaller businesses include insufficient communication...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Other factors that may have influenced the reduced participation of smaller businesses include insufficient communication about the Fund reaching SMEs, limited capacity within SMEs to participate in collaborative bids, and the lengthy approvals processes for funding.51 We received written evidence from Universities Scotland, which told us that “insufficient communication and notice of calls severely limits breadth and excellence” of the research and innovation funded by the Fund. This issue is particularly relevant to small and medium sized enterprises which have limited resources both in terms of people and resources available for co-investment to engage in collaborative bids.52 UKRI assured us that it is working hard to ensure it is reaching all the businesses that would want to and could contribute and that it has engaged as early and as widely as possible. It asserted that its approach had meant it had been able to reach new participants and that 73% of the businesses that had participated in the Fund had not had any previous interaction with UKRI.53 But it acknowledged it has tended to work in a “fairly generic way” – for example, with regard to setting coinvestment requirements. It recognised that a different approach could help engagement. It told us that it needed to be more conscious of differences in the research and business communities, and that “the mix of big and 47 Q 21; C&AG’s Report, para 5, 2.7, Figure 7 48 C&AG’s Report, para 2.9 49 Q 40 50 Q 41 51 Ev ICF0001, para 1–2, 7, C&AG’s Report, para 2.9. 52 Ev ICF0001 53 Qq 38, 41 Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund 15 small players is different”, within each challenge. It acknowledged that it could take a more flexible approach to targeting its timing of engagement with particular parts of the business community.54 Regional distribution of funding
20Whilst UKRI does not have an explicit objective to consider the regional balance in its...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Whilst UKRI does not have an explicit objective to consider the regional balance in its funding awards, the 2017 Industrial Strategy did include a focus on ‘prosperous communities’ across the UK.55 The government’s 2020 Roadmap for R&D expenditure sets out its intention that spending on R&D and innovation should contribute to its ‘levelling up’ agenda.56 Analysis by the National Audit Office showed that the distribution of funding across the regions was uneven. Between 2017 and 2020, almost two thirds of the money committed to projects as part of the Fund had been distributed to companies registered in three regions of the UK—London, South East and West Midlands. In comparison, areas such as the North East or Yorkshire & Humber received 2.9% and 1.8% of the Fund respectively over the same period. The NAO concluded that this distribution was not necessarily explained by factors such as population size or the distribution of business undertaking R&D activity. UKRI noted that this analysis was based on data on the location of the organisation in receipt of the funding and not necessarily where the R&D activity took place. However, it did not provide us with any analysis setting out the regional distribution of the Fund based on where it thought R&D activity was actually taking place.57
21UKRI recognised the need to think about R&D expenditure in terms of what it described...
Concluded (the committee's words)
UKRI recognised the need to think about R&D expenditure in terms of what it described as the ‘place part of the agenda’.58 Comparing the distribution of the Fund with what it described as normal R&D expenditure, UKRI asserted that it thought that investment through the Fund in London was “very comparable” and that for the South East it was about “one third up”. UKRI considered that the level of investment received by the West Midlands was “over twice the level…you see normally”.59 It told us that this was due to the nature of some of the challenges on which the Fund focused, particularly mobility and the fact the UK’s advanced manufacturing base was located in the West Midlands.60 54 Q 41 55 C&AG’s Report, para 2.10 56 C&AG’s Report, para 2.10, HM Government, UK Research and Development Roadmap, Policy Paper, 1 July 2020 57 Q 44; C&AG’s Report paras 2.11–2.12, Figures 8 and 9 58 Q 46 59 Q 44 60 Qq 44, 46 16 Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 1
- 4 Mar 2021Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund3 witnesses, listed belowparliament.uk ↗
Who gave evidence 3 witnesses
- Jo ShanmugalingamDirector General, Industrial Strategy, Science & Innovation, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
- Professor Dame Ottoline Leyser DBE FRSChief Executive, UK Research and Innovation (UKRI)
- Sarah MunbyPermanent Secretary, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Correspondence 3 letters
- 23 Nov 2021Correspondence from Sarah Munby, Permanent Secretary, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, re Fifty-Sixth Report of Session 2019-21: Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund (ISCF), 3 November 2021
- 10 Sep 2021Correspondence from Sarah Munby, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, re Fifty-Sixth Report of Session 2019-21: Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund (ISCF), dated 29 July 2021
- 22 Mar 2021Correspondence from Sarah Munby, Permanent Secretary, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, re Response to the Committee regarding 04 March Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund Public Account Committee hearing, dated 18 March 2021