Select committee inquiry
Immigration Enforcement
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The Home Office is responsible for preventing abuse of immigration rules, tracking immigration offenders and increasing compliance with immigration law. A series of NAO reports have identified some of the long-standing challenges it faces in managing enforcement activity, removing foreign national offenders and overseeing the immigration detention system and facilities. The Immigration Enforcement directorate also depends on effective collaboration with other parts of the wider border and immigration system, as well as law enforcement and international partners. The NAO’s report ‘Immigration enforcement’ examines whether the Department is achieving its aim to reduce the size of the illegal population and the harm it causes, and doing so in a way that delivers value for money. It finds that the Home Office does not know how many people currently reside in the UK illegally: its last estimate, made 15 years ago in 2005, was around 430,000 people. More recent estimates from other organisations suggest that number might have doubled. While the Home Office collects a large amount of performance data on its activities, these do not allow it to demonstrate the impact of its work or policies. For example, the NAO found that the Home Office is unable to assess whether its measures to prevent people from accessing government funded services – the “No Recourse to Public Funds” policy that is a central plank of the “hostile environment” - have any meaningful impact on how likely a person is to return to their country of origin. The Home Office is stopping increasing numbers of people from entering the country illegally, but it doesn’t know if this is because it’s catching more of these attempts or there are simply more attempts. The Home Office returned, or helped to return, just over 13,100 people without leave to remain in the year to November 2019, of which 5,600 people returned voluntarily: although the numbers returning voluntarily have dropped from an average of 1,200 a month in 2015 to approximately 460 a month in 2019. The other 7,400 were enforced removals, of which 5,000 were foreign national offenders, but that was less than half - 48% -of the planned enforced removals for that period, often as a result of late legal challenges to removal. As a result, the Home Office released 14,900, or 62%, of immigration detainees from immigration removal centres last year. It believes many of these late legal challenges are used to delay removal but did not provide any evidence that it has tried to actively understand and manage these challenges. The Home Office is currently considering its response to the Windrush review and has commissioned a review of the wider border and immigration system. The NAO argues that these reviews give the Home Office an opportunity to address many of the issues identified in its report. On Monday 13 July the Committee will question officials from the Home Office on the performance of its core immigration enforcement activity, to establish what progress the Department has made in dealing with these enduring, ongoing challenges. If you have evidence on the questions raised in this inquiry please submit it here by 5.30pm on Thursday 9 July 2020.”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
In the committee's words, from the summary of Seventeenth Report - Immigration enforcement ↗
Immigration has always been a cause of public and political debate. Despite years of discourse on the topic, we remain concerned by how little evidence the Home Office (the Department) has with which to inform that debate. It is disappointing that, despite this Committee’s previous findings, the Department is still not sufficiently curious about the impact of its actions and the underlying reasons for the challenges it faces.
We are concerned that if the Department does not make decisions based on evidence, it instead risks making them on anecdote, assumption and prejudice. Worryingly, it has no idea of what impact it has achieved for the £400 million spent each year by its Immigration Enforcement directorate. There are major holes in the Department’s understanding of the size and scale of illegal immigration and the extent and nature of any resulting harm. It does not understand the support people need to navigate its systems effectively and humanely, or how its actions affect them. In 2019, 62% of immigration detainees were released from detention because the Department could not return them as planned to their country of origin. The Department does not really understand why this figure is so high or what it can do ensure these returns are completed as planned.
The significant lack of diversity at senior levels of the Department means it does not access a sufficiently wide range of perspectives when establishing rules and assessing the human impact of its decisions. Professional judgement cannot be relied upon if an organisation has blind spots, and the Windrush scandal demonstrated the damage such a culture creates. We are pleased to hear the Permanent Secretary say that he is committed to achieving greater diversity and acknowledge clearly that with diversity comes better leadership, decision-making and governance. The Department must deliver on these intentions to reduce the likelihood of another Windrush-type scandal in the future.
The Immigration Enforcement directorate has some big challenges ahead. It will need to respond to the end of the transition period for leaving the EU and the new points-based immigration system, implement the recommendations of the Windrush lessons learned review, and overcome the damage done to its reputation. The Department showed a disturbing lack of urgency in some areas. It is good to hear the Department promising improvement and recognising the need for it—but actions speak louder than words and we expect to see tangible improvements when we next review progress.
What the government said
The government responded on 18 November 2020. The deadline was 18 November 2020.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.
The government states that it agrees with the Committee's recommendations on the illegal population, data, user experience, the end-to-end system and safeguarding individuals, and disagrees with the recommendation on preparing for the end of the EU transition period.
- On understanding the illegal population, the government "agrees" (target: Spring 2022) and describes a database of visa overstayers, failed asylum seekers and Foreign National Offenders, including the level of harm presented by each. It is "exploring publication in early 2021" of an economic harm assessment.
- On data, the government agrees (target: March 2021) and says its assessment is that, "with the appropriate allocation and investment of resources", the transformation plan can be delivered by 2025.
- On the end-to-end system, the government agrees (target: Summer 2025). On support for claimants, it says "consideration will be given to a wide range of options" as part of its reforms.
- On EU exit, the government "disagrees" with the recommendation. It says it is working to prepare for a range of outcomes and that "An agreement remains the department's goal" on reciprocal arrangements.
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 15 June 2020 to 22 March 2021. The dashed mark is the deadline Parliament records for the government's response.
- Oral evidence 13 Jul 2020
- Report 18 Sep 2020
- Government response 18 Nov 2020
- Correspondence 4 letters
What it recommended 5 recommendations · 18 conclusions
2The Department relies upon a disturbingly weak evidence base to assess the impact of its...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department relies upon a disturbingly weak evidence base to assess the impact of its immigration enforcement activity. The lack of reliable evidence on what works prevents it from planning and prioritising its activities effectively. The Department accepts that it cannot easily use data to measure the impact of the £400 million it spends each year in Immigration Enforcement and has a “dearth of information” in some aspects of its activities. It allocates resources between its different immigration responsibilities based on “judgements”, but if those judgements are not based on evidence, it is unclear what factors the Department is considering. Worryingly, the Department could not always provide evidence or data to support its decisions, for example on its strategy to tackle organised immigration crime, or to demonstrate understanding of the problems it faces, for example the impact of accessible and good quality legal advice on its success in returns. Although it is working to increase its analytical capabilities to learn from the challenges it faces, this work is only at an early stage. Recommendation: Within six months of this report, the Department should put in place a detailed improvement plan for its collection, use, and analysis of data. It should write to the Committee and set out: • The skills gaps it has identified in its analytical capability and how it intends to fill them; 6 Immigration enforcement • A plan for transforming Immigration Enforcement into a data-led organisation, including timescales and priorities for improvements; and • How it intends to use this in the future to help plan and prioritise its activities.
3The culture and make-up of the Department have left it poorly placed to appreciate the...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The culture and make-up of the Department have left it poorly placed to appreciate the impact of its policies on the people affected. The Department has done little to dispel accusations that its decisions are based on a lack of curiosity, preconceptions and even prejudice. The Department acknowledges how close it came to being declared institutionally racist in the Windrush lessons learned review and that it has to change its culture. It recognises the value of greater diversity for enabling better decision-making, leadership and governance, though only one member of the Department’s current executive committee comes from a BAME background. Similarly, the Department recognises that it could improve the successful management of cases through the immigration system by adopting a more people-centred approach. Yet there is little existing evidence that the Department actively seeks to identify or evaluate the impact of its actions on the individuals it encounters. This creates a risk of harm and distress to innocent people who are here perfectly legally, and we are not satisfied that the Department attaches sufficient importance to this risk. Recommendation: Building on its response to the Windrush lessons learned review, the Department should mobilise its evidence base and evaluations to challenge its own assumptions and beliefs about the user experience within the immigration system. The Department should write to us by 31st December 2020, setting out the insights it has developed about the experience of its users, and what improvements it is making as a result.
4The Department’s failure to develop an end-to-end understanding of the immigration system leads to problems...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department’s failure to develop an end-to-end understanding of the immigration system leads to problems which it could avoid. At present, there are gaps in its digital and paper trail, and it is likely these have an impact on Immigration Enforcement’s ability to remove individuals from the UK. The Department says that there is now an “active conversation” with Ministers around improving its ability to move cases through the system. In 2019, the Department released 62% of immigration detainees it intended to remove from the UK, an increase from 56% in 2018. The Department believes this rise reflects abuse of asylum claims and other protection routes, but it did not provide any systematic analysis to support this. Given the strong passions seen on all sides of the immigration debate, a Government Department making unsupported claims of this kind risks inflaming prejudices against legitimate immigrants and bona fide asylum seekers. It did, however, accept our suggestion that direct engagement and better quality legal advice at an earlier stage may influence its ability to ensure returns are successful. Recommendation: The Department needs to develop a joined-up approach across the full end-to-end immigration system to ensure that people get the right support at the right time. It should record and assess how people move through the immigration system to understand where and how problems arise. This should include evaluating whether earlier access to good quality, affordable legal advice Immigration enforcement 7 might help to reduce the number of late claims. The Department should write to the Committee within six months of this report, setting out progress in this regard.
5The Department is unprepared for the challenges the UK’s exit from the EU presents to...
Recommended (the committee's words)
The Department is unprepared for the challenges the UK’s exit from the EU presents to its immigration enforcement operations. The Department relies on cooperation with EU partners to support its international operations, including the return of foreign national offenders and individuals who arrive in the UK illegally via EU transport hubs. It would like this cooperation to continue after the end of the transition period for the UK’s departure from the EU but showed a worrying lack of urgency about securing the necessary agreements. When we took evidence in mid- July, the Department provided no evidence that it had begun discussions with EU partners or internally to prepare for the possible impact these changes may have on its operations. Without putting new arrangements in place successfully, there is a real risk that EU exit will actually make it more difficult to remove foreign national offenders and those who try to enter the country illegally. Recommendation: The Department urgently needs to develop a forward plan and put in place actions to mitigate the risks to its work with EU partners. This should include consideration of reciprocal arrangements for: • immigration staff working in other countries; • the return of offenders, from the UK to EU member states and vice versa, following the end of transition period; and • the return of individuals who attempt to enter the UK with false documents or by clandestine means from an EU country, or indeed those who enter EU countries from the UK.
6We are not convinced that the Department is sufficiently prepared to safeguard the status of...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are not convinced that the Department is sufficiently prepared to safeguard the status of individuals while also implementing a new immigration system and managing its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department faces several challenges in the immediate future. The extension of visas during the COVID-19 pandemic raises concerns that mistakes in case and data management could affect an individual’s future immigration status. The Immigration Enforcement directorate also needs to adapt to the updated vision and values the Department sets out for the UK’s future immigration system from January 2021. The Department committed again to implementing the recommendations of the Windrush lessons learned review and contacting all those who were affected, not only those from the Caribbean. Whilst we are pleased that this is the Home Office’s policy now, we note that the Department initially rejected the recommendation made by our predecessor Committee in March 2019 that the Department should extend its historical reviews beyond Caribbean Commonwealth nationals to include nationals from other Commonwealth countries. Tackling these challenges will require significant change. The Department pins its hopes on its ongoing programme of digitisation and automation to support its response to these challenges, including its implementation of Atlas, but its history of delivering such projects is patchy at best. Recommendation: Within six weeks of this report, the Department should write to this committee to explain its priorities while implementing these significant changes. Specifically, it should set out: 8 Immigration enforcement • How it will balance risks to delivery against the risk that these changes will unfairly affect the lives and rights of individuals; • What practical steps the Department has taken and will take to achieve this balance; and • What testing it has conducted to ensure that its information systems can fully support these steps. Immigration enforcement 9
1On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence...
Concluded (the committee's words)
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department) about immigration enforcement activities in the UK.1
7The Department described the different forms of harm that occur from immigration crime.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department described the different forms of harm that occur from immigration crime. These include criminal harm by foreign national offenders against their victims and society, and the harm organised crime groups commit against society and vulnerable people. It also includes the financial harm to legitimate UK employers of competitors employing people illegally and harm caused to taxpayer-funded public services by people attempting to use them illegally.10 The Department acknowledged that the vast majority of illegal immigrants do not cause direct harm to the public, but can cause harm to the wider economy.11 In response to a recommendation in the NAO’s report, the Department told us it was reviewing whether its use of the concepts of risk, threat and harm was consistent.12
8We asked the Department about the financial impact of providing public services to people who...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the Department about the financial impact of providing public services to people who should not be receiving them. It could not provide a figure for this.13 We heard that the Department had no data on the harm suffered by people who were victims of organised immigration crime or the distinction between those victims and other immigration offenders.14 We asked when the Department would have meaningful and reliable indicators of the scale of harm in its four categories. The Department claimed it can measure the amount of harm that it prevents, for example by removing a foreign national offender, but acknowledged that it would be a long time before it could measure the total harm that arises from immigration crime.15 6 Qq 38–39, 42–43, 64 7 Q 46 8 Q 35 9 Qq 45, 46 10 Q 33 11 Q 40 12 Qq 33, 40; C&AG’s Report, para 19 13 Q 34 14 Q 36 15 Q 43 Immigration enforcement 11 2 Understanding the business and setting priorities Using information to manage the business effectively
9The NAO reported that Immigration Enforcement uses management information to assess the performance of individual...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The NAO reported that Immigration Enforcement uses management information to assess the performance of individual teams rather than the system’s overall health, and the Department accepted this finding.16 We asked whether the Department could deliver an effective immigration enforcement service without basic management information. The Department rejected the suggestion that it had no management information, and stated it had “too much [management information], but not of the right sort”. It recognised the need to improve its management information and its ability to measure the overall outcomes of its activities rather than inputs and outputs.17 For example, the NAO reported that the Department and its partners identified 11,300 clandestine attempts to enter the country at UK ports and 35,600 attempts from overseas in the twelve months to the end of October
10We asked how the Department allocated resources across the immigration system and heard that this...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked how the Department allocated resources across the immigration system and heard that this relies upon the judgements of senior staff rather than direct evidence. The Department explained that a “dearth of information” on some immigration enforcement activities meant it is not possible to assess the outcomes of deploying resources from one part of the system to another.20 The Department accepted that it had not always focussed on gathering data that would allow Immigration Enforcement to prioritise effectively. The Department also stated that it is attempting to better understand the illegal population so it can make “the right interventions with the right people at the right time”. We heard that Immigration Enforcement now focusses on improving prioritisation by putting harm at the top of its prioritisation framework. We asked whether someone who is not doing any harm would be a lower priority, and heard that people who are in the UK illegally would always be of interest to Immigration Enforcement.21
11During the evidence session, the Department failed to provide a specific answer to questions about...
Concluded (the committee's words)
During the evidence session, the Department failed to provide a specific answer to questions about the characteristics of the illegal population or the evidence it used to make decisions.22 We asked the Department to provide us with facts to support its claims rather than possibilities or speculation.23 For example, the NAO reported that the Department could not support its assertion that a larger number of minor disruptions could have a more lasting effect on organised crime groups than major disruptions. The Department 16 Q 78; C&AG’s Report, para 3.15 17 Qq 34, 42 18 C&AG’s Report, para 2.6 19 Q 77 20 Qq 47, 49 21 Qq 41, 42 22 Qq 34, 36, 80, 95, 97, 105 23 Q 40, 98 12 Immigration enforcement had agreed the NAO report and so it was somewhat surprising to hear the Department respond that it “did not express itself [to the NAO] as well as it could have done” on this point.24 The NAO also reported other cases where the Department could not provide solid evidence for its actions.25 We asked whether acting without adequate evidence left the Department open to the charge that it acted on prejudice. The Department responded that it was determined to act on evidence and data. It admitted its frustration at not being able to have a clearer assessment of its value for money and prioritisation decisions and expressed its wish to improve.26 Challenging assumptions within Immigration Enforcement
12The Committee of Public Accounts has found previously that the Department did not use its...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Committee of Public Accounts has found previously that the Department did not use its own data to fully explore the impact of its work on individuals.27 During the evidence session, we asked whether the Department considered the implications of immigration enforcement actions for young people whose immigration status had not been formalised.28 The Department did not think these people would be a “particular priority” and said it would take into account any barriers that had prevented their earlier engagement with the UK Visas and Immigration or Immigration Enforcement. We heard that the Department “would hope” that these cases would be identified earlier to allow discussions about their status and that checkpoints in the system would prevent them being unnecessarily caught up in the enforcement system.29
13We asked the Department to account for the plummeting number of people it returns to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked the Department to account for the plummeting number of people it returns to their countries of origin. The Department claimed that the fall in returns was because of greater compliance with immigration rules, changes to the legal framework and higher numbers of claims made on human rights, modern slavery, asylum or medical grounds.30 The Department asserted that most asylum claims in detention are designed to thwart the system, but it accepted it was struggling to see what it could do to prevent this.31 However, the NAO reported that the Department did not explore possible failings within Immigration Enforcement in its internal analysis on unsuccessful returns.32 We did not hear evidence of any analysis the Department had conducted on the impact of decreasing the financial package available for voluntary returns, its claimed success in returning foreign national offenders on charter flights during the COVID-19 pandemic or the percentage of people granted asylum after making a claim in detention.33
14The NAO reported that Immigration Enforcement could make better use of its analytical functions and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The NAO reported that Immigration Enforcement could make better use of its analytical functions and evaluations to improve as an organisation.34 The Department recognises the need to refresh its research and evidence base across the borders and immigration system and told us about its increasing use of analysis and evaluation to 24 Qq 97–98; C&AG’s Report, para 2.16 25 C&AG’s Report, paras 2.9 & 2.30 26 Qq 105–106 27 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Windrush generation and the Home Office, Eighty-second report of session 2017–19, HC 1518, 6 March 2019, pp.6–7 28 Q 67 29 Qq 68–69 30 Q 80; C&AG’s Report para 2.30 31 Q 93 32 C&AG’s Report, para 2.30 33 Qq 81, 90, 93 34 C&AG’s Report para 3.23 Immigration enforcement 13 demonstrate the impact of its immigration enforcement activities.35 The Department also told us that it needs to open up and “get much more used to working with and listening to the communities” working with it, particularly those who have not had a positive view of it.36 It expressed the need for a more people-centred immigration process, which it defined as supporting the people within it.37
15The Department accepted that the Windrush lessons learned review had come exceptionally close to declaring...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department accepted that the Windrush lessons learned review had come exceptionally close to declaring it as institutionally racist. We were pleased to hear the Department commit to implementing each of the recommendations of that report and acknowledge the need to change the whole culture of the Department.38 We asked what proportion of senior staff within the Department came from minority backgrounds; only one member of its Executive Committee came from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background.39 The Department described the benefits of greater diversity at senior levels for its decision-making, leadership and governance but acknowledged diversity as being its biggest issue.40 Organising an end-to-end immigration enforcement system
16We asked whether Immigration Enforcement should focus on in-country immigration enforcement rather than having to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked whether Immigration Enforcement should focus on in-country immigration enforcement rather than having to provide support at the border. The Department responded that it sees managing immigration into the country and in- country as a single system.41 However, the NAO reported that the Department “does not yet manage” immigration enforcement as an end-to-end system.42 The Department accepted the need for an end-to-end perspective which supports a smoother route for people through its immigration enforcement processes.43 The Department said it is working with Ministers to address issues affecting its ability to move people’s cases forward. It also believes that its modernisation programmes will better support that end-to-end perspective.44 The Department claimed, though, that there were examples where it worked together as a “seamless whole”. We suggested that these examples were thin on the ground in the NAO’s report and requested more specific details.45
17The Department told us that it works with different parts of the public sector and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that it works with different parts of the public sector and Government, such as the Ministry of Justice, to deliver its immigration enforcement services, and that this cooperation may not appear in its performance data.46 We heard that Immigration Enforcement is providing more opportunities for face-to-face interactions and maintaining contact with people even when they are engaged with other agencies.47 It claimed that this allowed it to make the “right intervention” with those people at a later point.48 35 Qq 35, 63, 102 36 Q 65 37 Qq 8, 103 38 Q 71 39 Q 74 40 Q 76 41 Qq 48, 49 42 C&AG’s Report, para 18 43 Qq 38, 78, 94, 103, 104 44 Qq 38, 102 45 Qq 78, 79 46 Qq 36, 41, 67 47 Qq 41, 68, 81 48 Q 41 14 Immigration enforcement
18We asked what the Department could learn from its analysis of late asylum claims to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked what the Department could learn from its analysis of late asylum claims to reduce the number of these. The NAO reported that the Department failed to complete 62% of the returns it planned from immigration detention in 2019, compared to 56% in 2018.49 We heard how decisions and trends elsewhere in the system, for example changes in the legal framework and greater compliance on immigration rules, affect the Department’s success in completing returns. The Department explained that a large number of asylum claims in detention slowed down some elements of the immigration system, but it did not specify which elements. We questioned whether other factors such as the Department’s decision to reduce the financial package for voluntary returns or earlier access to good quality legal advice could influence the successful resolution of cases.50 The Department told us it had not directly assessed the possible impact of legal advice, but it believed legal advice could allow cases to flow more smoothly through the system. The Department was not aware of any analysis it had conducted on whether the cost of providing that advice would save money later in the process, but it offered to confirm that point.51 49 C&AG’s Report, para 2.29, Figure 12 50 Qq 79, 80, 82 51 Qq 100, 101 Immigration enforcement 15 3 Planning for the future The impact of EU exit on the immigration enforcement system
19We asked about the impact of the UK’s departure from the EU on the Department’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We asked about the impact of the UK’s departure from the EU on the Department’s immigration enforcement activities.52 The Department has teams in EU countries which support its work to prevent unlawful entry to the UK and to tackle organised immigration crime. The Department told us the Dublin II agreement allows it to pass responsibility for some asylum cases to EU member states, for example where non-EU nationals enter the UK by clandestine or illegal means from EU countries.53 The Department also explained it has a series of prison transfer arrangements linked to the EU which support the return of foreign national offenders. But the Department believed that many of the arrangements for returns with individual EU member states are done bilaterally, rather than through the EU and Commission.54
20The Department acknowledged that these arrangements would be part of the ongoing negotiations with the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department acknowledged that these arrangements would be part of the ongoing negotiations with the EU.55 We asked whether Immigration Enforcement proposed to keep teams in EU airports after the transition period ended. The Department appeared unconcerned about any possible barriers to this, and said that it did not see any reason why the arrangements would change.56 It also told us it was not aware of any legal barriers to this work and that this issue had not been raised, but it suggested that no discussions had taken place within the Department to prepare for any change in these arrangements. It acknowledged that it would require individual agreements with member states to maintain the presence of UK Immigration Enforcement teams in EU states following the end of the transition period. It highlighted France and Belgium as particular priorities, but it was not aware of any discussions it had had with EU member states. The Department told us its discussions to date had focused on its ambition to replace the Dublin II Regulation and EURODAC system.57 Planning for changes to the immigration enforcement system
21The Department reiterated its commitment to implementing the 30 recommendations of the Windrush lessons learned...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department reiterated its commitment to implementing the 30 recommendations of the Windrush lessons learned review. We heard that it was making progress with the Windrush compensation scheme but was unwilling to set itself targets on the number of cases or amount of money it would deal with.58 It underlined its commitment to include people from non-Caribbean Commonwealth countries in the scope of its Windrush response and offered to write to us with further details of those efforts.59 The Department acknowledged that the review had been a difficult read and stated it had no intention of turning its response into a box-ticking exercise. It stressed the need to understand the scale of transformation that would be involved in delivering on these commitments, which would include setting a vision and values for the whole Department as it implements the 52 Q 84 53 Qq 50–52 54 Qq 84, 85 55 Qq 58, 84 56 Q 53 57 Qq 55–60 58 Qq 9, 11 59 Qq 65–66 16 Immigration enforcement new immigration system. However, when we took evidence in mid-July, the Department did not describe specific steps it would take in responding to the review.60
22During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department extended the visas of all individuals for whom it...
Concluded (the committee's words)
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department extended the visas of all individuals for whom it was difficult to seek visa extensions or return home. The Department told us it was unlikely to apply another blanket extension beyond the end of July 2020 and would instead look on a case-by-case basis.61 The Committee of Public Accounts has previously reported concerns that the Department did not take seriously the risks of making “life- changing decisions” on people’s futures based on “incorrect data from systems that are not fit for purpose”.62 We asked the Department how it could ensure it avoids similar mistakes that would affect someone’s future immigration status. The Department recognised that its data systems in the past would not have been capable of keeping track of such cases, but it assured us that it would take a careful approach and make itself available to anyone who felt they were not being given adequate support.63
23The Department told us that it has high hopes for its modernisation and transformation projects.
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Department told us that it has high hopes for its modernisation and transformation projects. However, the NAO reported that the Department agrees funding for its transformation projects on an annual basis, and their longer-term development is therefore uncertain.64 We heard that e-visas and the introduction of its Atlas programme would provide a better grip on an individual’s immigration data. The Department claimed that Atlas would ensure that it held correct and up-to-date data on immigration cases and make these more accessible for any necessary checks.65 It told us its Business Rules programme would ensure that caseworkers were taking the right actions and improve efficiency.66 However, there have been longstanding concerns about the Department’s systems and data and numerous projects where the importance of good quality data in ensuring the effectiveness of systems was overlooked.67 We also heard that the Department hoped more automated services would allow its immigration enforcement activities to focus more on the most complex cases.68 60 Qq 71–73, 107–108 61 Qq 5–7 62 HC Committee of Public Accounts, Windrush generation and the Home Office, Eighty-second report of session 2017–19, HC 1518, 6 March 2019, p.5 63 Qq 7–8 64 C&AG’s Report, para 1.18 65 Qq 7, 8 66 Q 78 67 Q 64; HC Committee of Public Accounts, Challenges in using data across government, One hundred and eighteenth report of session 2017–19, HC 2492, 25 September 2019, p.12; HC Committee of Public Accounts, Fourth annual report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts, Third special report of session 2017–19, HC2370, 27 June 2019, p.13 68 Q 104 Immigration enforcement 17
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 1
- 13 Jul 2020Immigration Enforcement3 witnesses, listed belowparliament.uk ↗
Who gave evidence 3 witnesses
- Matthew Rycroft CBEPermanent Secretary, Home Office
- Shona DunnSecond Permanent Secretary, Home Office
- Tyson HeppleDirector General, Immigration Enforcement, Home Office
Correspondence 4 letters
- 22 Mar 2021Correspondence from Matthew Rycroft CBE, Permanent Secretary Home Office, re Recommendation 4, Immigration Enforcement, dated 15 March 2021
- 16 Mar 2021Correspondence from Matthew Rycroft CBE, Permanent Secretary Home Office, re Immigration Enforcement, dated 10 March 2021
- 13 Jan 2021Correspondence from Sir Philip Barton, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, re Windrush Compensation Scheme, dated 17 December 2020
- 13 Jan 2021Correspondence from Matthew Rycroft, Permanent Secretary, re Immigration enforcement, dated 17 December 2020