17th Report - Permanent secretaries: their appointment and removal

The government's response

What the committee recommended 26

1. 1
   The impartiality and perceived impartiality of the civil service is a central tenet of our... Conclusion · paragraph 17
2. 2
   The provision of formal ministerial involvement in the appointment process strikes an appropriate balance, allowing... Conclusion · paragraph 52
3. 3
   We were told that ministers were not sufficiently aware of the extent of their influence... Conclusion · paragraph 53
4. 4
   We see no reason to alter the current practice by which the Prime Minister is... Conclusion · paragraph 54
5. 5
   In our view “merit” includes having the right personality and characteristics to carry out the... Conclusion · paragraph 58

See all 26 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

• 17th Report - Permanent secretaries: their appointment and removal ↗The committee's report, parliament.uk
• Government response to the Committee's report on Permanent secretaries: their appointment and removal (15 January 2024) ↗The government's response, 24 January 2024, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 26

1. 1
   The impartiality and perceived impartiality of the civil service is a central tenet of our... Conclusion · paragraph 17 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The impartiality and perceived impartiality of the civil service is a central tenet of our constitution and not seriously challenged. Any fundamental changes to it should be made consciously and openly, and should be implemented only following careful scrutiny. In some cases, the change would require amendment of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Where legislative change is not needed change should still be carried out with appropriate scrutiny and cross-party agreement. Under no circumstances should significant changes to the constitutional balance of the appointment and departure processes for civil servants take place through unscrutinised evolution of practice.
2. 2
   The provision of formal ministerial involvement in the appointment process strikes an appropriate balance, allowing... Conclusion · paragraph 52 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The provision of formal ministerial involvement in the appointment process strikes an appropriate balance, allowing ministers input into the job description, the person specification and the composition of the panel while preventing them from engineering the process in favour of a preferred candidate. This balance preserves the principle of merit, and it is important that ministers have proper regard to that principle throughout the process.
3. 3
   We were told that ministers were not sufficiently aware of the extent of their influence... Conclusion · paragraph 53 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   We were told that ministers were not sufficiently aware of the extent of their influence over appointments, or the limits on it. It is incumbent upon permanent secretaries to brief incoming ministers on the degree to which they can be involved in the appointment of senior civil servants, and to repeat this briefing and clarify the extent to which the minister wishes to be involved when a relevant vacancy arises. This will help to avoid tension during the recruitment process and reinforce ministerial ownership of the process and the quality of those appointed.
4. 4
   We see no reason to alter the current practice by which the Prime Minister is... Conclusion · paragraph 54 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   We see no reason to alter the current practice by which the Prime Minister is presented with a choice of appointable candidates for permanent secretary posts. It is important the Prime Minister makes such a choice conscious of their constitutional position as Minister for the Civil Service and with proper regard for the principle of merit. They should ensure that the chosen candidate is able to work with any minister, of whatever political persuasion, who might be appointed to the relevant department.
5. 5
   In our view “merit” includes having the right personality and characteristics to carry out the... Conclusion · paragraph 58 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   In our view “merit” includes having the right personality and characteristics to carry out the tasks required at a particular time. We are not convinced the Recruitment Principles need to be amended to reflect this. But it should be implicit in the preparation of a good job description and person specification. It would also help give ministers confidence that they have appointed the right person for their requirements if they have worked closely with the Civil Service Commission to ensure their priorities are reflected in the job description and pursued at interview.
6. 6
   Given the importance of the Cabinet Secretary’s role, including as Head of the Civil Service,... Conclusion · paragraph 63 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Given the importance of the Cabinet Secretary’s role, including as Head of the Civil Service, the appointment process for that post should be regularised, set out and made transparent in a manner similar to that for permanent secretaries. The exact nature of the process would need to be adapted in accordance with this unique role, with different considerations potentially applying to the roles of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, should they be separated. This would strengthen permanent secretaries’ confidence in the management of the civil service. The closeness of the working relationship between the Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister means that the Prime Minister should remain closely involved with the appointment and make the final choice. The Recruitment Principles should be updated to provide for a strengthened process for Cabinet Secretary and Head of Civil Service appointments. This should then be reflected in an updated Cabinet Manual. This would strengthen permanent secretaries’ confidence in the management of the civil service. The closeness of the working relationship between the Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister means that the Prime Minister should remain closely involved with the appointment and make the final choice.
7. 7
   Private discussions between ministers and their special advisers are impossible to regulate, but the decision... Conclusion · paragraph 71 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Private discussions between ministers and their special advisers are impossible to regulate, but the decision with respect to these issues must be that of the minister. Special advisers should not be formally involved in the appointment or departure processes.
8. 8
   Public statements by special advisers about the recruitment, performance or departure of civil servants are... Conclusion · paragraph 72 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Public statements by special advisers about the recruitment, performance or departure of civil servants are unacceptable as they risk giving the impression—or tolerating the reality—that special advisers are managing civil servants. Ministers are responsible for the actions of their special advisers and they should ensure this does not happen.
9. 9
   External appointments to the civil service can fill skills gaps and refresh organisational culture. Conclusion · paragraph 78 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   External appointments to the civil service can fill skills gaps and refresh organisational culture. There may be great benefit in encouraging inward and outward moves, both for the career development of individuals and to ensure the civil service is as effective as it can be. Nonetheless, skills acquired and experience accrued in the civil service should be valued, as should the continuity provided by a cadre of long-serving civil servants working for administrations of different political persuasions. If the ‘external by default’ system is to succeed it must be monitored closely to ensure that departments properly commit to it.
10. 10
    The Senior Leadership Committee is an opaque body, with its role having been described in... Conclusion · paragraph 88 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Senior Leadership Committee is an opaque body, with its role having been described in apparently contradictory terms. We welcome the Cabinet Secretary’s undertaking to publish details of its terms of reference and membership.
11. 11
    The Senior Leadership Committee should be as transparent as possible, for example by publishing or... Conclusion · paragraph 88 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Senior Leadership Committee should be as transparent as possible, for example by publishing or providing to the Civil Service Commission an annual account of its activities.
12. 12
    The governance structure concerning selection routes for very senior appointments is convoluted and unclear, and... Conclusion · paragraph 89 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The governance structure concerning selection routes for very senior appointments is convoluted and unclear, and has evolved significantly since the Senior Appointments Protocol was agreed and the most recent Recruitment Principles published. Among other changes, the Prime Minister now appears directly to approve appointments at director general level, an evolution not widely publicised. The Senior Appointments Protocol and Recruitment Principles should both be updated, in particular to reflect the ‘external by default’ policy and the Prime Minister’s role in approving director general appointments. We welcome the commitment of the Cabinet Secretary and First Civil Service Commissioner to ensure this is done. The Senior Appointments Protocol and Recruitment Principles should both be updated, in particular to reflect the ‘external by default’ policy and the Prime Minister’s role in approving director general appointments.
13. 13
    We look forward to seeing the forthcoming work, promised by the Cabinet Secretary, on the... Conclusion · paragraph 93 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We look forward to seeing the forthcoming work, promised by the Cabinet Secretary, on the rules concerning business appointments and the role of ACOBA in setting expectations for those seeking to enter the civil service. Regularisation of inward and outward moves might entail a greater role for the Civil Service Commission. This might require the relationship between its responsibilities and those of the Senior Leadership Committee and ACOBA to be redefined.
14. 14
    In the rare circumstances in which a permanent secretary must be dismissed on performance or... Conclusion · paragraph 102 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    In the rare circumstances in which a permanent secretary must be dismissed on performance or misconduct grounds this should be treated wholly as a human resources matter, following due process. We welcome the current process of performance and misconduct management for permanent secretaries as outlined by the Cabinet Office.
15. 15
    There is scope for the Civil Service Commission to play a role in the dismissal... Conclusion · paragraph 103 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There is scope for the Civil Service Commission to play a role in the dismissal of senior civil servants on performance or conduct grounds, by ensuring due process is followed.
16. 16
    There is insufficient evidence that fixed five-year tenure has had any general impact on churn... Conclusion · paragraph 111 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There is insufficient evidence that fixed five-year tenure has had any general impact on churn at permanent secretary level, notwithstanding the notable dip between 2019 and 2023. Nonetheless, it serves as a valuable check on a permanent secretary’s continuation in post, allowing the Head of the Civil Service, the secretary of state and the Prime Minister to consider various factors before deciding whether renewal is appropriate.
17. 17
    We acknowledge the risk that where the completion of a permanent secretary’s five-year tenure coincides... Conclusion · paragraph 112 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We acknowledge the risk that where the completion of a permanent secretary’s five-year tenure coincides with a change of Government, it could be used as an opportunity to appoint a permanent secretary more politically aligned to the incoming Government. However, there is insufficient evidence to suggest this has happened to date.
18. 18
    We recognise that for a permanent secretary fostering a positive relationship with the secretary of... Conclusion · paragraph 122 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We recognise that for a permanent secretary fostering a positive relationship with the secretary of state is, in itself, a matter of performance. The Recruitment Principles require panels to assess a candidate’s ability to work with the minister as part of the permanent secretary appointment process and it is rare that a breakdown in relationship occurs. However, forming a positive relationship is a two-way process. Incoming ministers must allow permanent secretaries time to establish a productive relationship before seeking their removal. It is vital that ministers prize expertise and good advice over pre-conceived notions about their ability to work with a particular permanent secretary. Removal on the grounds of a poor working relationship must not become cover for arbitrary removal of permanent secretaries on political or ideological grounds.
19. 19
    The Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service has a vital role in ensuring... Conclusion · paragraph 123 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service has a vital role in ensuring that individuals are not removed from their posts by a Prime Minister without due process. If the working relationship between a secretary of state and a permanent secretary is irrecoverable the Head of the Civil Service must be given the opportunity to manage the individual’s transfer to another role or, where appropriate, their retirement. There is a case for formalising the departure process in situations where there is no issue of performance or misconduct (see paragraph 131).
20. 20
    While removal of senior civil servants on political or ideological grounds may be rare, we... Conclusion · paragraph 130 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    While removal of senior civil servants on political or ideological grounds may be rare, we are concerned that recent examples may be an indication that there are insufficient safeguards around the departure of senior civil servants.
21. 21
    Formal departure processes should be set out in writing, requiring ministers and the Prime Minister... Recommendation · paragraph 131 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Formal departure processes should be set out in writing, requiring ministers and the Prime Minister to explain to the Civil Service Commission—in private if necessary—their decision to remove and replace a senior civil servant . A written record of the decision and the reasons for it should be kept. These processes should be sufficiently flexible to allow a minister to replace at short notice a senior civil servant with whom a working relationship has broken down. However, it is desirable that senior civil servants are given sufficient opportunity to build a positive working relationship with the minister and demonstrate that they can deliver the Government’s priorities. Under no circumstances should civil servants be dismissed on purely political or ideological grounds.
22. 22
    The small number of recent high-profile removals of senior civil servants on what appeared to... Conclusion · paragraph 136 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The small number of recent high-profile removals of senior civil servants on what appeared to be political or ideological grounds does not to amount to a trend. However, some recent departures and appointments have been conducted in the public eye and might be seen to reflect a desire on the part of ministers to personalise appointments and assert their authority. This practice should be avoided.
23. 23
    This practice should be avoided. Conclusion · paragraph 146 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    This practice should be avoided. It risks senior civil service turnover coinciding with ministerial churn, creating a perception of politicisation and damaging institutional knowledge. We reject the notion that broad political alignment should be a relevant consideration in the appointment of senior civil servants. The role of the civil service is to provide honest, objective and impartial advice to the Government. After advice has been provided and a secretary of state makes a decision, it becomes the job of the civil service to implement that decision. If a civil servant fails to implement the secretary of state’s decision it is a performance issue and should be dealt with according to the processes outlined in chapter 3. Introducing a criterion of broad political alignment between the secretary of state and the permanent secretary unhelpfully complicates the existing duty on civil servants to serve the government of the day to the best of their ability regardless of their own political beliefs. It risks undermining senior civil servants’ ability to establish the confidence of future secretaries of state and governments of different dispositions.
24. 24
    The role of accounting officer is a valuable aspect of the constitution. Conclusion · paragraph 155 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The role of accounting officer is a valuable aspect of the constitution. To be effective, this function relies on the impartiality of permanent secretaries and their ability to ‘speak truth to power’. A shift towards a system of senior civil servant appointments or departures with a greater degree of ministerial influence would risk having a chilling effect on accounting officer functions to the detriment of the public interest.
25. 25
    We recognise that the arrangement whereby senior civil servants in Scotland and Wales are accountable... Conclusion · paragraph 167 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We recognise that the arrangement whereby senior civil servants in Scotland and Wales are accountable to the Scottish or Welsh government but are line managed by the Head of the UK civil service has the potential to cause confusion about the boundary between devolved competence and reserved matters. However, it is important that the principle of a single civil service across England, Wales and Scotland is maintained. For this reason we consider it the role of the Cabinet Secretary, as Head of the Civil Service of the UK, including Scotland and Wales, to manage any challenges as they arise.
26. 26
    We welcome the Cabinet Secretary’s commitment to provide further guidance to clarify that civil servants... Conclusion · paragraph 172 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We welcome the Cabinet Secretary’s commitment to provide further guidance to clarify that civil servants in the devolved administrations should work and spend public funds exclusively on matters within devolved competence. If the permanent secretaries in Scotland or Wales are concerned that civil servants are being asked to work on tasks outside devolved competence they should raise this as an issue with the Cabinet Secretary as their line manager. The Cabinet Secretary should be in a position to provide direction with respect to the permanent secretary’s executive responsibility. In cases of uncertainty the permanent secretary should seek a written direction from the relevant devolved minister.