Second Report - The Integrated Rail Plan for the North and Midlands

We welcome the scale of the Government’s promised spending on improving rail in the North and the Midlands. £96 billion is a very substantial sum; it has the potential to transform rail travel for future generations and make a significant contribution to levelling up the country.

Nonetheless, there is still a need for prioritisation and hard choices, and the proposals set out in the Integrated Rail Plan have already left some towns and cities very disappointed. It is crucial that the Government bases its decisions on how to spend this investment on the fullest possible evidence for what will bring the greatest overall benefit to rail services, to the economy, to the environment and to communities across the North and Midlands.

Whilst we recognise that the Golborne link was not perfect, and faced substantial local opposition, given its importance in terms of unlocking capacity for passengers and freight, and reducing journey times to Scotland, we are concerned that it has been cancelled without an alternative being proposed. The Department for Transport should set out alternative plans which add similar capacity as a minimum by March

The failure to calculate an updated benefit-cost ratio (BCR) raises questions over whether the case for changes to the HS2 Eastern leg have been properly assessed. It is concerning that the Government would make a decision on such an important infrastructure project before having done the BCR calculations to fully understand and substantiate that decision. This is particularly so given previous BCR calculations suggested that the economic case for the Eastern leg was stronger than that for the Western leg.

To take account of the changes of plan for the HS2 Eastern leg and to inform current and future decision-making, the Department for Transport should publish by March 2023 an updated BCR for (a) the entire HS2 project and (b) the previous full proposals for the Eastern leg of HS2 Phase 2b. The methodology used must fully reflect impacts on regional inequalities.

Without having completed a full analysis of the wider economic impacts, it is difficult to see how the Government has fully assessed the levelling-up agenda and the case for different NPR options. Leaving out these key elements of analysis means that the value for money and economic return cannot be compared and validated.

The Government’s levelling up agenda commits it to ending geographical inequality in the UK. However, by underserving the rail needs of the North of England it is letting down those who require change the most. Upgrading lines will undoubtedly bring modest benefits to rail services in the North and Midlands, but not to the 34 The Integrated Rail Plan for the North and Midlands transformative extent necessary to end regional imbalances. The evidence base for the IRP must be reconsidered in the light of these aims, if this once-in-a-generation investment in rail is not to be a missed opportunity.

The Government must remain open to the possibility that this thorough reassessment of the evidence base, taking full account of the impact on levelling up communities in the North and Midlands, may show that Options 2 or 3 for Northern Powerhouse Rail represent the best potential value. If so, they must grasp that nettle. Extra costs are not to be incurred lightly, but a significantly better outcome for our economy and communities is a worthwhile investment for generations into the future.

The potential of Bradford as an engine room of the Northern Powerhouse may be squandered if it is not given opportunities to thrive through better connectivity. Direct high speed connections would give the city access to a much broader pool of labour, as well as allowing other cities to benefit from the talent and potential of its own residents. Leaving such a large and dynamic city behind would undermine the project of levelling up the country. Better public transport is essential to encouraging modal shift, and the attendant decarbonisation gains would be significant across such a large population. The Government is making a circular argument by pointing to current patterns of public transport use as justification for decisions about future infrastructure. Services must be in place, consistently, for people to use them.

A full assessment of the levelling up impact of the various NPR and HS2 Eastern leg options does not appear to have been carried out to date. The Government must ensure that the impact of NPR decisions on Bradford in particular is robustly assessed, including producing BCR analyses for all NPR options. This is consistent with the spirit of commitments previously made by the Prime Minister to investigate all the options for Northern Powerhouse Rail, and to allow the lead on what comes next to be taken locally.

We welcome the Government’s pledge to look at how the Eastern leg of HS2 might be constructed in full to Leeds as originally planned; the city is a key focal point not only of existing rail networks, but of economic value and potential in the North.

The Government must conduct its study on how best to take HS2 to Leeds urgently. We ask that a timetable for this work, including a firm date for the final report, be published by September 2022. This is essential for demonstrating that the commitment made to Leeds for high speed connections will be fulfilled. (Paragraph 47) Stations and cities

The redevelopment of Leeds station is key to fully realising the benefits of the Integrated Rail Plan on the economy and connectivity in Leeds and West Yorkshire, and more widely. Already over capacity in its current configuration, Leeds station will not be able to handle the increased services and passengers generated by the IRP, and this will continue to have knock-on effects elsewhere in the network. We are also conscious of the economic potential of the huge amount of land that cannot be used until a decision is made about HS2 services to Leeds. (Paragraph 57) The Integrated Rail Plan for the North and Midlands 35

We ask the Government to commit to supporting redevelopment of Leeds station by 2035 so that it has sufficient capacity to accommodate services planned under the IRP, including HS2 trains arriving in Leeds.

The Government should reconsider the case for the development of a new station in Bradford. The development of the St James’s Market station would not only enhance rail connectivity in the North, allowing further investment in the city, but also provide further opportunities for rail development in Bradford after the ‘core pipeline’ of IRP upgrades take place.

Local stakeholders and the Government have very different views on the likely merit and cost of the underground station option at Manchester Piccadilly. There are considerable cost and practical challenges to delivering this solution, though we recognise the benefits of a through station and saving land for development. We have heard concerns that there has been a lack of direct engagement and a paucity of detail shared about the basis for the Government’s decision not to opt for an underground station.

If the underground station option were to be deemed deliverable, it could unlock significant land value in the city; it would then be reasonable to expect contributions to the cost from local government and local businesses. We recommend that this expectation should form part of a renewed, transparent conversation about the risks and benefits of the underground station option between Transport for Greater Manchester, Manchester City Council and the Department for Transport.

Birmingham stands to benefit from the new HS2 station at Curzon Street, and the easing of capacity constraints at New Street by services moving to Moor Street station. One last piece of the puzzle appears to be facilitating connections from Moor Street towards Leicester by providing the eastern chord. We urge the Government to commit to this element as part of the review of the Midlands Rail Hub. (Paragraph 73) Realising the benefits

Completed according to the planned timetable, the IRP should provide enhanced rail services for passengers in the Midlands and the North significantly earlier than previous options. This does, however, depend on the projects being completed to time, which is difficult to guarantee.

The Government’s presentation of the benefits of the IRP core pipeline in comparison to previous plans should factor in time and cost ranges that reflect the contingency that will, realistically, be needed for such a large and complex package of work.

Journey time reductions—albeit not to the same degree as promised by previous plans—are a headline benefit of the IRP. We received detailed evidence that cast doubt on the plausibility of the times achievable under the new plans. We ask the Government to publish its full technical appraisals of the feasibility of these reductions, so that communities and stakeholders can have confidence that they are achievable in practice. (Paragraph 87) 36 The Integrated Rail Plan for the North and Midlands

The Government’s fixation on journey times as a benefit of the IRP must not overshadow the issue of capacity. It seems highly unlikely that an upgraded Victorian line can replicate the capacity increases achievable by building new track.

The Department for Transport should commission a full independent assessment of the seat and track capacity offered by the IRP, compared to the previous plans for HS2 and other options for NPR. This assessment must take into account the future effects on both long-distance and local passenger services, and freight capacity.

We welcome the Government’s Future of Freight Plan and the promised work to identify a National Freight Network. We look forward to seeing more detail about how modal shift of freight to rail will be achieved through the IRP core pipeline in particular.

The Department for Transport should publish a rail freight strategy for the country setting out key plans, targets and milestones over a 30-year period. This should include a detailed assessment of how the IRP will achieve greater capacity for and use of rail freight.

Rail upgrades disrupt commuters, rail freight and timetabling. Disruption to existing services caused by upgrades to key rail lines may drive a modal shift from rail to car, which would work against the Government’s decarbonisation goals.

The Department for Transport and Network Rail should set out a timetable for implementing a detailed mitigation strategy to minimise disruption caused by the implementation of the IRP. This should set out a strategy for each individual project and must include plans for consultation with local communities and stakeholders, in partnership with local authorities.

The Government has put together a strong case for the Integrated Rail Plan, but it is based on a best-case scenario which may not come to pass. Cost and time overruns for major infrastructure projects are commonplace, and disruption can be extensive and unforeseen. The promised journey time improvements may not be achievable in practice, and the decision to replace some plans for new high-speed lines with upgrades will limit capacity gains. We urge the Government to produce more cautious estimates for the benefits that are realistically achievable under the IRP, so that the public and stakeholders across the country—especially in the North and Midlands—can assess the situation, plan ahead for the future, and be sure that the benefits will outweigh the drawbacks. (Paragraph 113) The Integrated Rail Plan for the North and Midlands 37