Seventh Report - Defence in Scotland: the North Atlantic and the High North

The UK Government is clear that Scotland’s geography, and the capabilities located there, is critical to meeting the UK and NATO’s defence and security objectives in the North Atlantic and the High North.

The UK Government’s policy document, The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North, adopts appropriate strategic priorities for the region. At the same time, the geopolitics of the North Atlantic and the High North are evolving and the UK will need to be prepared to adapt its approach and commit additional resources as appropriate in response to new security threats, whether those come from malign actors or from climate change. The implications of this evolution will affect defence activities in Scotland in particular. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, which occurred shortly before the publication of the MOD’s paper and which has significant implications for the security of the region, illustrates this point. In the next section of this report, we explore several factors which are contributing to the region’s growing importance.

The Ministry of Defence should commit to updating its Arctic defence strategy every five years, to reflect the strategic acceleration in the region and to bring it into line with the FCDO’s Arctic Strategy for the whole of Government, which is updated every five years. We hope that, before then, the Defence Command Paper will properly reflect the changed situation in the North Atlantic and the High North resulting from Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

The UK and NATO face new challenges in the North Atlantic in the High North. In particular, the Arctic faces new environmental and political challenges which must be navigated carefully if the region is to remain one of high co-operation and low tension.

The UK Government should continue to be proactive in considering how the UK’s defence and security priorities in the North Atlantic and the High North may change in the future, in response to the changing geopolitical context and the effects of climate change. In its response to this report, the UK Government should set out its most recent assessment of these challenges. Among the most important issues the UK Government must consider are: • increasing Russian belligerence; • growing Chinese interest in Arctic politics; • the opening of new sea routes and the potential for increased maritime traffic as a consequence; • increasing resource competition; and • the vulnerability of offshore and subsea infrastructure. Defence in Scotland: the North Atlantic and the High North 41 Regardless of how the UK’s priorities in the region evolve, it is likely Scotland as part of the UK will continue to play a prominent role in meeting those aims.

Climate change is likely to lead to the opening of new sea routes due to the retreat of Arctic ice. While the overriding priority should be to minimise the effects of climate change, the UK Government must also be prepared for the likelihood that navigation via these routes will gradually become more possible in the future. Increased maritime traffic presents economic and trade opportunities but also has practical and strategic implications, such as the increased risk of accidents and the probability that navigation rights will be asserted and challenged. It is highly likely that increasing maritime activity in the High North will create new responsibilities for the Royal Navy, and Scotland’s geography means it would be likely to play a role in fulfilling those duties.

The UK Government should consider how the effects of climate change might create new defence and security responsibilities in the future, in particular for naval policing and search and rescue. The UK should also seek to promote and uphold the principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) such as the right of innocent passage, and we believe that the MOD’s paper, The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North, is right to make this a priority.

Events like the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipeline have shown that Critical National Infrastructure that is based offshore or beneath the sea can be vulnerable to interference. This is a concern in the North Atlantic, where transatlantic cables are critical lines of communication, as well as in the UK’s own Exclusive Economic Zone. Investment in subsea surveillance like the Multi-Role Ocean Support Ships is welcome, but vulnerabilities remain. We heard that weaknesses in the legal regime governing subsea cables makes them a tempting target for malign actors. The UK Government told us that repair of subsea cables was a matter for the cables’ commercial owners; we are concerned that the UK Government did not have more to say about how such important infrastructure could be repaired in the event of sabotage or failure.

The UK Government should produce and publish a strategy for protecting offshore infrastructure. This should include a plan for how attempts by malign actors to interfere with Critical National Infrastructure can be deterred or prevented, and how damaged infrastructure can be repaired quickly by their commercial owners.

The UK Government should set out the timeline for the refitted Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship, RFA Proteus, and the future purpose-built Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ship to come into service. It should state whether it is still the intention, as set out in the 2021 Integrated Review, for the purpose-built MROSS to be built in Scotland.

The UK’s role and responsibilities in NATO may evolve in response to changing geopolitics, including increasing tensions with Russia and the consequent accession of Finland and (as seems likely) Sweden to the alliance. This may entail new or changed responsibilities in the North Atlantic and the High North. The same is true of the Joint Expeditionary Force, which may need to respond to new challenges in 42 Defence in Scotland: the North Atlantic and the High North the North Atlantic and the High North. It is highly likely that UK capabilities based in Scotland will be an important part of the contribution to NATO and JEF in the region.

We recommend that the UK Government convene discussions with its NATO and Joint Expeditionary Force allies about how these alliances should respond to new challenges in the North Atlantic and the High North, and be prepared to take an expanded role in the region if required.

The UK’s relationships with its Arctic allies are essential to meeting common security objectives in the North Atlantic and the High North. These relationships will become more important should the challenges in the region become more prominent.

The UK should continue considering how it can best contribute to diplomacy and collaborative problem-solving in the North Atlantic and the High North. Actions it could take include stepping up its participation in existing fora where appropriate and considering the appointment of a dedicated ambassador or envoy to the Arctic region.

Cooperation around the P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft, which has enabled Norwegian aircraft to be maintained at RAF Lossiemouth, and RAF aircraft to be supported in Norway, has been a success, and provides a model for similar defence cooperation in the future.

Alongside its efforts to develop defence and security cooperation in the North Atlantic and the High North through multilateral institutions, the UK Government should pursue further opportunities for direct bilateral cooperation with Arctic allies, including new NATO members Finland and Sweden. (Paragraph 63) Scotland’s contribution to defence in the North Atlantic and the High North

Scotland’s geography means it will continue to play an important role in meeting UK and NATO defence and security objectives in the North Atlantic and the High North. This means that, should the situation in the region change, Scotland could become home to a larger defence presence. We heard that the naval base at Faslane plays a critical role in UK and NATO defence strategy, because of its location close to the strategically critical Greenland-Iceland UK (GIUK) gap and the role it plays in hosting and protecting the Continuous At-Sea Deterrent. We also heard that the RAF base at Lossiemouth provides vital surveillance and threat response capabilities, including Quick Reaction Alert (QRA).

The UK’s ability to project assets into the North Atlantic and High North if required must be maintained, as this is key to both the UK and NATO’s defence strategy. Currently this capability is based primarily at HMNB Clyde and RAF Lossiemouth. NATO views the continued presence of a nuclear deterrent as essential to its defence policy, and Scottish bases are important to the deployment and protection of that deterrent. (Paragraph 87) Defence in Scotland: the North Atlantic and the High North 43

The committee heard evidence during this inquiry of the need to maintain HM Naval Base Clyde as home to the Royal Navy’s nuclear-armed Vanguard 15 class submarines that form the UK’s Continuous At-Sea Deterrent, as well as the Astute Class of attack submarines. Whilst not all Members of the Committee support this view, we do recognise the serious implications for the UK and NATO should the nuclear fleet ever be removed from Faslane.

In its response to this report, the UK Government should set out what scope it considers for the defence presence in Scotland to be sufficiently scaled up to respond to a scenario where the UK has greater obligations in the North Atlantic and the High North. In particular, its response should consider how rapidly capacity for basing and operating assets from Scottish bases could be increased if required.

RAF assets based in Scotland contribute to defence in the North Atlantic and the High North in a number of important ways, including surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and threat response by way of the Quick Reaction Alert jets stationed at RAF Lossiemouth. Several witnesses expressed doubts as to whether the UK has sufficient aircraft to maintain the necessary presence in the North Atlantic and the High North without withdrawing resources from elsewhere.

In its response to this report, the UK Government should address the concerns raised in evidence both to this inquiry and to the Defence Committee over whether the number of P-8A, E7 and Typhoon aircraft is sufficient to provide the coverage required in the North Atlantic and the High North, and whether any increase in activity required in the region will require resources to be diverted from objectives elsewhere. The MOD must review whether the complement of aircraft it has available is sufficient to meet the increasing security demands in the North Atlantic and the High North.

The UK needs a clear sense of what kind of specialised cold weather capability it will need to meet its objectives in the High North. We heard that the UK currently has limited capability for operating in extremely cold environments. Where there are gaps, and these cannot be filled by complementary capabilities operated by our NATO allies, this will need to be addressed.

The UK Government must review, and report to the House, the extent to which, now and in the future, what capability is needed to operate in extremely cold environments at the scale required to meet evolving defence and security objectives in the High North. The review should consider what equipment and technology might be needed, and whether there are sufficient numbers of appropriately trained personnel to operate in such environments. Because of Scotland’s Arctic-facing geography, Scotland- based capabilities must be a focus of this review. The UK Government should report its findings to the House before Parliament dissolves for the next general election.

We heard that space-based capabilities provide numerous advantages for surveillance at high latitudes. Scotland, with its burgeoning space sector and a northerly location that is suitable for launch into polar orbits, is well-placed to take advantage of this opportunity. We were encouraged to hear that the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology will be publishing a space 44 Defence in Scotland: the North Atlantic and the High North sector policy before the end of the year. We plan to explore UK Government support for the space sector in greater detail in our upcoming inquiry on Scotland’s space sector.

We heard that drones can provide an advantage in cold weather environments, but that not all drones were suited to operating in the extreme cold and that specialised systems might be needed to operate in the High North.

As part of the review into cold-weather capability recommended above, the UK Government should consider what contribution a) drones and b) space technology should make to meeting defence and security objectives in the North Atlantic and the High North. Its conclusions should be published as part of that report, before Parliament is dissolved for the next general election.

When developing and deploying new space-based technologies in support of defence objectives in the High North, the UK Government should make the most of Scotland’s innovative and rapidly growing space sector, and its geographical advantages as a base for launching satellites into polar orbits. The Ministry of Defence and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology’s upcoming space sector policy should clearly identify how to harness the potential of Scotland’s burgeoning space sector to support defence objectives, and set clear and measurable targets against which the success of the policy can be measured. (Paragraph 111) Defence in Scotland: the North Atlantic and the High North 45