Recommendation 4

HM Government Accepted

The MOD’s 10-year strategy includes a commitment to improving our understanding of the region, how it is changing, and the activities of state and non-state actors within it. The region, working closely with cross government partners and the international community, and regularly review the UK’s defence and security priorities for the region. We are currently monitoring a range of defence and security challenges in the region: Ȥ We recognise that, as an Arctic nation, Russia has legitimate interests in the Arctic region. Accordingly, we expect Russia to comply with international law. However, as our 2021 Integrated Review outlined, Russia remains the most acute threat to the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, and the Arctic is not exempt from that. This analysis was reiterated in our 2023 Integrated Review Refresh. Ȥ Russia is taking an increasingly militarised approach and has steadily increased military activity in the region, establishing a new Northern Joint Strategic Command, reopening Cold War-era bases above the Arctic Circle and investing further in Arctic-capable equipment. In the North Atlantic, the Cold War. This could impact upon the interests of the UK, our Allies, and partners. On 30 November 2022, the Russian Federation Council approved a bill on an authorisation-based procedure governing navigation of foreign warships and other state vessels operated for non-commercial purposes on the Northern Sea Route. Ȥ China’s primary goals in the region are economic, focusing on dominating access to minerals and energy sources in the region, as well as taking advantage of opening sea routes. China is increasing investment and activity in the region, declaring itself a “near-Arctic state”, and supporting its proposed Polar Silk Road with a range of infrastructure and capabilities, including ports, undersea cables, and a nuclear icebreaker. Chinese companies are showing an interest in the growing commercial opportunities in the High North. Complexity will grow as China takes a more active role, as it builds its third icebreaker, increasing competition for fossil fuels and rare earth minerals. Ȥ Climate change poses an existential threat to the Arctic as we know it. for shorter transit routes to Asia and beyond, and access to previously inaccessible natural resources. There are, however, specific challenges which would need to be overcome, including in relation to new technology that will 4 Government Response: Defence in Scotland: the North Atlantic and the High North be required to meet the challenges of transport via the Arctic. It is highly likely that there would be implications for insurance, environmental and labour regulation, and international agreement over territorial boundaries. Ȥ Equally, we note increased access to the region as a result of melting sea ice risks increasing competition between states. As Arctic shipping routes become more open, the UK continues to advocate for the highest possible shipping standards and adherence to international regulations, including the Polar Code. We support the work of the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) and its goal to manage responsible, environmentally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and its efforts in striving to set the highest possible operating standards. Coastal State reactions to the expected gradual increase in maritime traffic, such as the adoption of national regulations, which are not in-keeping with UNCLOS and which attempt to exert influence over both international and national waters, risk undermining UNCLOS in the region. Ȥ Receding sea ice will drive state competition in the region for previously inaccessible natural resources. Under UNCLOS, it is the role of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to regulate and control all mineral- related activities in the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction for the benefit of mankind as a whole. In so doing, the ISA has the duty to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment from harmful effects that may arise from deep seabed activities. Through the Ilulissat Declaration, the Arctic Coastal states have all committed to resolving maritime issues within UNCLOS, and there have been no serious problems arising from resource competition as yet. Ȥ Our adversaries view our subsea infrastructure as a key vulnerability and have developed capabilities that put this under threat. The Russian MOD’s English-language website includes “destruction of sea-based gas and oil facilities” in its submarine missions. Russia’s capability has grown in recent years and the activity of ships such as the Vladimirsky in European waters show that this is a perceived national vulnerability. We regard subsea cables (including for telecoms and energy) as essential to our national infrastructure and monitor a variety of risks they face. Submarine fibre optic cables are specifically considered in the National Risk Assessment which is kept unde