Football Policing

The interim report of Sir Andy Cooke, His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, concluded that West Midlands Police had been subject to “confirmation bias” in their assessment of Maccabi Tel Aviv fans. We agree with this judgment; our inquiry has found that despite a wealth of evidence available regarding the Amsterdam disorder, West Midlands Police relied on inaccurate information on the behaviour of Maccabi Tel Aviv fans in reaching a view of them as unusually high-risk. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly why this inaccurate narrative took hold, but it is clear that West Midlands Police failed to do even basic due diligence on the information they received. This included false information that was generated by AI. West Midlands Police also failed to retain contemporaneous notes relating to matters central to their decision making. In addition, West Midlands Police continually emphasised that it was this unique risk from the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans which led to the recommendation to ban away fans, and not local community tensions, despite evidence of risk emanating from local communities in Birmingham. The initial attempt by West Midlands Police to downplay the role of local community tensions was unbalanced and ultimately served to undermine confidence in both the decision and the force itself. (Conclusion, Paragraph 13)

West Midlands Police failed to engage directly with the Birmingham Jewish community early enough in relation to this fixture. As a result, West Midlands Police limited their access to information that might challenge their narrative about Maccabi Tel Aviv fans and also underestimated the impact of the decision to ban fans on local Jewish communities. While we have not received any evidence to suggest that antisemitism was a motivating factor in the decision, the failure to consult with the local Jewish population, in contrast to the comprehensive engagement with other communities, significantly damaged relations with the Jewish community, and provided a basis for some to perceive the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans as antisemitic. We welcome the steps that West Midlands Police are now taking to rebuild trust with the Jewish community. (Conclusion, Paragraph 17) 21

The next permanent Chief Constable of West Midlands Police should continue the work to rebuild trust with the Jewish community as a priority. (Recommendation, Paragraph 18)

Given the damage caused to community relations by the decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, it is surprising and disappointing that Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara was not more precise in his remarks about whether Jewish representatives had supported the ban. However, we note his personal apology to representatives of the local Jewish community and have no evidence to suggest that ACC O’Hara intended to mislead the Committee on this point. More concerning is the fact that the Safety Advisory Group was incorrectly briefed on several occasions that the Jewish community had been consulted; West Midlands Police clearly believed that consulting the Community Security Trust was equivalent to consulting the Jewish community and did not attach significant priority to engaging the local community directly. This falls some way short of the level and quality of community engagement that the Birmingham residents are entitled to expect from their police service. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

Former Chief Constable Guildford was not informed ahead of giving oral evidence on 6 January that Microsoft Copilot AI had been used to generate the erroneous information about a match between West Ham and Maccabi Tel Aviv. On this basis we can only conclude that the former Chief Constable did not intentionally mislead the Committee. However, by 6 January 2026 we understand that the use of AI had been disclosed within West Midlands Police, so it is reasonable to expect that former Chief Constable Guildford and Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara should have been accurately briefed on this matter. Having been asked specifically about the use of AI on 1 December 2025, it demonstrates a remarkable lack of professional curiosity on the part of the former Chief Constable not to interrogate the evidential basis to furnish himself with accurate information ahead of our session on 6 January. The fact that he was able to give the Committee incorrect information on two separate occasions is more evidence of the poor due diligence which West Midlands Police applied to information in this case. It should not have taken two oral evidence sessions and a subsequent written correction to achieve candour and accuracy; this raises serious questions about the culture of transparency and commitment to accuracy in West Midlands Police. (Conclusion, Paragraph 24)

Promoting a culture of transparency and attention to detail should be a priority for both the Acting Chief Constable and next permanent Chief Constable of West Midlands Police to address. (Recommendation, Paragraph 25) 22 The role of the Safety Advisory Group

It is particularly surprising that firm challenge was not applied given the political sensitivity of this decision. The Safety Advisory Group recognised this in asking West Midlands Police for a clearer recommendation and clearer justification to exclude away fans. However, the Safety Advisory Group clearly lacked the ability to consider issues other than narrow safety considerations, including community cohesion and both local and national political consequences. The Safety Advisory Group process rightly focuses on safety but in instances where judgements around safety may be politicised and have national as well as local political ramifications, Safety Advisory Groups are not equipped to challenge the evidence they receive or balance local and national considerations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 31)

The Cabinet Office’s review of guidance to Safety Advisory Groups should identify whether more guidance is needed on the level of challenge that Safety Advisory Groups should be resourced to provide. The Government should also consider whether an escalation process is required in the rare cases where the decisions of Safety Advisory Groups may have broader community and political consequences. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32)

While we cannot conclude that the Safety Advisory Group’s decision was made because of political pressure, on the basis of the evidence we have seen we also cannot conclude with any confidence that the decision was not politically influenced. It is clear that on this occasion councillors, with a stated political aim, had a disproportionate opportunity to influence Safety Advisory Group decision-making on a deeply divisive political issue. While the presence of elected politicians on Safety Advisory Groups has potential benefits in terms of local representation, it also risks decision- making becoming politically motivated, undermining trust in the process. It is right given the role of the Safety Advisory Group in this matter that the Government is conducting a review of Safety Advisory Group governance. (Conclusion, Paragraph 34)

We recommend that the Government takes the necessary steps to ensure that elected politicians cannot sit on Safety Advisory Groups. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35) 23 Response of the Home Office and Government

While the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) was not involved in the Safety Advisory Group process, and it is right that the principle of operational independence is respected, the West Midlands PCC appeared to prioritise defending the Chief Constable above holding him to account, until this approach proved untenable with the release of further information. (Conclusion, Paragraph 39)

The principle of police operational independence is an extremely important one, so it is right that Ministers are cautious about intervening in police decision-making. However, by intervening only after the decision to ban away fans was taken, the Government increased tension around the fixture but was ineffectual in enabling Maccabi Tel Aviv fans to attend the fixture, which reflects unfavourably on the culture of the Home Office. While the Home Secretary herself was not informed directly, it is clear that both the Home Office and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were informed on 8 October 2025 that Maccabi fans were likely to be banned from attending the match against Aston Villa. If the Government had intervened privately at this point, to make its preference known, and to offer assurances that the Government was prepared to support with additional resources, a different outcome might have been achieved. The Home Office failed to recognise the significance of the decision and escalate appropriately, which is surprising given that it had already been asked by No. 10 for information regarding the fixture. We believe that early intervention could have been achieved in a way that was sensitive to operational independence. This would have been preferable to the action the Government did take in publicly challenging a policing decision before the event had taken place, without full consideration of the evidence that supported that decision. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)

Given the international context and location of this fixture, it may have been proportionate to designate this fixture as one of national significance, had the recommendation of Baroness Casey been adopted. (Conclusion, Paragraph 48)

The Government should give serious consideration to the proposal to introduce a new category for football matches of national significance, with a process for designation, to provide a stronger basis for intervention in the future. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49) 24 Conclusion

This incident has caused serious damage to trust in West Midlands Police, particularly among the local Jewish community, as well as to public confidence in the effectiveness of the force. Assistant Chief Constable O’Hara told us that there was no conspiracy to ban away fans, and we have seen no evidence of such. However, we cannot rule out the suggestion that political pressure played a part in the decision. West Midlands Police were clearly scarred by the visit of Legia Warsaw fans in 2023 and understandably wished to avoid the risk of similar disorder. This risk mitigation, combined with local political pressure and community tensions related to the international situation, led to the exceptional decision to exclude Maccabi Tel Aviv fans. West Midlands Police were warned that their preliminary recommendation would be badly received and should have been more careful in their subsequent due diligence and adopted a more robust approach to interrogating their initial findings, as well as been more transparent about the reasons for recommending a ban. Instead, evidence was selected partially in order to justify the ban, and West Midlands Police were overly reliant on inaccurate and unverified information about the Maccabi Tel Aviv fans. This has undermined faith in the competence of West Midlands Police and provided a basis for those questioning their motivation. It is right that former Chief Constable Guildford has retired so that West Midlands Police can begin to address the loss of trust and confidence that has resulted from this episode. (Conclusion, Paragraph 50) 25