Digital ID can refer to many different aspects of a person’s identity which can be recorded and stored digitally, including names and demographic information, digital versions of government-issued documents such as visas, or even biometric information like a fingerprint or face scan. In an increasingly digital world, several countries have begun to develop digital ID …
| Title | HC No. | Published | Items | Response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8th Report - Mandatory to manageable: the government’s plan… | HC 986 | 20 May 2026 | 15 | Pending |
The Prime Minister’s initial announcement of mandatory digital ID was rushed, poorly thought through and failed to make a convincing case for the introduction of mandatory digital ID. While digital ID was being discussed by Westminster think tanks and politicians, for the general public the proposal came out of the …
The track record of digital transformation in government is poor, and we are sceptical that digital ID will be any different. The rushed nature of the government’s initial announcement of digital ID, subsequent changes of policy, and the complacency about government capacity for implementation, suggest that the government has not …
When the government publishes the response to its consultation it should set out a much clearer estimate of the expected cost and forecast benefits of its final policy, with a detailed roadmap for implementation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20) 27
The digital verification services sector in the UK has developed over 17 years, contains considerable expertise, and contributes an estimated £2 billion to the UK economy. The government’s initial announcement threatened to undermine this sector and was in direct conflict with the government’s own policy to support a trusted digital …
Digital ID will not achieve widespread adoption unless the majority of people can trust that their data is secure, so it is vital that the programme is subject to the highest standards of privacy and cyber and data security. Given the government’s poor track record in handling data securely, building …
Digital right to work checks offer some benefits to employers, but mandating digital right to work checks would mean a very significant shift in the way that employers are required to carry out right to work checks. It is vital that this change is not just treated as an afterthought …
The government should ensure that its plans for the transition to digital right to work checks reflect the significance of this policy change for both businesses and individuals. In particular, we recommend that the government takes steps to engage the general public on the specific question of what identity documents …
Digital right to work checks are not foolproof, and while the intelligence that these checks generate can help to target enforcement, intelligence alone will not reduce illegal working. There is no replacement for frontline enforcement to follow up on intelligence with investigations, arrests and penalties. (Conclusion, Paragraph 42) 28
In response to this report, the Home Office should set out whether and how resources were reallocated to support an increase in illegal working enforcement visits in 2025, and how this level of resource for frontline enforcement will be maintained in the future, in order to make effective use of …
Intelligence that is currently being gathered by digital identity providers should clearly be informing Home Office enforcement and we share the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister’s incredulity that this intelligence cannot already be shared and acted on effectively. We do not see any good reason that improving this intelligence …
We recommend that the Home Office works with digital identity providers to ensure that there is an effective mechanism for them to share the intelligence they currently gather through digital right to work checks, so that this can support enforcement activity. This work should take place immediately. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)
The government should learn from the errors that have affected the eVisa system in developing digital ID, as well as ensuring that opportunities to improve eVisas through the development of digital ID are not missed. In particular, the government should consider whether eVisas should be transferred into the digital ID …
There are theoretical benefits of digital ID in terms of ease of access to public services, but the government has not yet decided which public services will be accessed in this way. The government should be clear about the evidence base for proposing future uses of digital ID and provide …
The government is right to identify the need for safeguards to ensure that any proposed future expansions of digital ID cannot be made without proper scrutiny: not a slippery slope, rather a staircase, with progress—and direction—governed by Parliament. The government should set out these 29 safeguards in its forthcoming legislation …
The government’s initial announcement of digital ID was rushed, poorly thought through, and failed to articulate convincingly any of the potential benefits. This undermined existing public support for the introduction of digital ID. The government has since taken positive steps to improve its policy including abandoning the commitment to make …
| Date | Witnesses | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 Mar 2026 | Dan Hobbs · Home Office, Mike Tapp MP · Home Office, Phillipa Rouse · Cabinet Office, Rt Hon Darren Jones MP · Cabinet Office | View ↗ |
| 28 Jan 2026 | Alex Hall-Chen · Institute of Directors, David Crack · The Association of Digital Verification Professionals, Dr Kuba Jablonowski · University of Bristol, Joanna Hunt · DAC Beachcroft, Monique Hawkins · the3million | View ↗ |
| 18 Nov 2025 | Alexander Iosad · Tony Blair Institute, James Baker · Open Rights Group, Laura Foster · techUK, Professor Edgar Whitley · London School of Economics, Ruth Ehrlich · Liberty, Silkie Carlo · Big Brother Watch | View ↗ |
| Date | Direction | Title |
|---|---|---|
| 25 Mar 2026 | To cttee | Letter from the Minister for Migration & Citizenship relating to the Digital ID… |