Third Report - From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world

Mass atrocities not only reflect deep inhumanity but undermine global stability at a time when population displacement is more pronounced than at any point since World War Two. Key trends today may fuel greater violence, for instance climate change, threats to democracies and the involvement of non-state actors in conflict. The Prime Minister has expressed her personal commitment to preventing mass atrocities, seeing this as morally right and “absolutely” in the UK’s strategic interest. Without concerted action, however, mass atrocities are likely to become more common, which will constrain global development. (Paragraph 15) Policy response

Despite the UN Security Council’s role in protecting populations and its considerable powers, it faces gridlock in practice. The threat of an UNSC permanent member exercising its veto constrains international action to prevent and end “conscience- shocking” mass atrocities, which raises fears of an ‘age of impunity’. The UK Government must therefore pursue other means and use other channels to prevent atrocities, while simultaneously advocating multilateral diplomacy and institutional reform.

In 2019, the Government set out the tools that it can use to prevent mass atrocities, even at a time of multilateral gridlock. These tools include early warning mechanisms, diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, development support to address the root causes of conflict, and defence and policing tools.

Since 2019, the Government’s approach to preventing mass atrocities has become clearer. In particular, welcome changes were implemented in the course of this inquiry. The Government has launched the Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation (OCSM), which will contain a new hub to consider atrocity prevention. This hub will pilot interventions to prevent atrocities in ‘priority countries’ and build a new warning system for atrocities and conflict.

The UK must do more. A new cross-departmental strategy to prevent mass atrocities offers opportunities. It can drive greater coherence between existing policy initiatives on human protection. As the UK will not always be able to prevent mass atrocities, a strategy can also clarify the metrics by which the UK will measure the success of its efforts. The Government appears open to a new strategy, which NGOs, academics and many Members of Parliament have advocated for many years.

The United States has introduced sophisticated legislation on atrocity prevention, and it recently adopted an (inter-agency) Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities. The UK Government should take all opportunities to learn from, and collaborate with, the United States and like-minded partners in the Global Network of R2P Focal Points. Partnership is critical in the face of rising atrocity risks today. When possible, the UK and its partners should share the results of country 42 From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world risk assessments and collectively agree which national governments have the greatest leverage and/or influence to lead prevention initiatives in specific countries/regions.

Armed conflict and mass atrocities are linked, but overfocusing on conflict is likely to miss atrocity risks, to leave groups unprotected and to ignore how atrocities themselves can drive conflict. In addition to conflict prevention, the Government must explicitly recognise the separate but interlinked priority of atrocity prevention.

The Government must introduce a cross-departmental strategy for preventing and responding to mass atrocities globally, both within and outside of conflicts. It must strive for greater consistency of purpose across Government. The strategy must: a) support development by considering prevention at all stages of the policy cycle, recognising that prevention must begin before judicial determinations, and should continue even if atrocities are committed; b) clarify training, tools and methods to prevent atrocities, including the role of the UK’s new sanctions regime; c) demonstrate and formalise how the UK will act in concert with like-minded international partners, particularly the United States; d) be inclusive to the many groups at risk of atrocities and recognise the wider circumstances that can drive discrimination and persecution, such as grievances, political marginalisation and criminal economies; e) prioritise the mitigation of atrocity risks across the whole of Government, including trade, supply chains, arms exports, education, asylum and border policy; f) take account of new threats and challenges, including new technology, climate change and the wide range of conflict actors; and g) build on the UK’s positive efforts to secure justice for Ukrainian victims and consider how these can be applied to other contexts.

The Government must ensure consistency between a new strategy on atrocity prevention and the ‘strategic conflict framework’ under development. This framework itself must articulate atrocity prevention objectives, as distinct from general conflict prevention objectives.

The Government should ensure that Ministers provide regular and strategic direction to the UK’s atrocity and conflict prevention policy by adding this to the agenda of the Foreign Policy and Security Council and giving the Secretariat responsibility for tracking implementation of the new atrocity prevention strategy (see para 46).

The UK Government must submit an annual report to Parliament on its actions to prevent atrocities. That report should be produced by the new Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation (see paras 24, 51), with input from other teams in the FCDO and other relevant departments. (Paragraph 49) From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world 43

The new atrocity prevention strategy should be developed in consultation with civil society and relevant experts. (Paragraph 50) Skills and capabilities

The Government must empower the new Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation (OCSM) in the FCDO by allocating appropriate funds and staff to meet the scale of the UK’s ambitions.

The OCSM must: a) ensure that UK posts and desks for priority countries can access the training and resources that they need, including when factoring relevant thematic objectives into country plans; b) provide the expertise to enable greater awareness of atrocity risks; and c) strengthen co-ordination, the exchange of lessons and intelligence-sharing across related teams in the FCDO, such as the Open Societies and Sanctions teams, and related Departments, such as the Ministry of Defence, the Joint Intelligence Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and the Treasury.

UK Missions overseas are not getting the support that they need on atrocity prevention. Current training and support appear to attach insufficient weight to prevention, which risks leaving staff without the information that they need to recognise and act on the warning signs of atrocities. Although some Missions acknowledged the value of the training, Missions in more than 90% of countries and territories do not appear to have recently accessed it. Some of the Missions that have apparently not accessed the training are based in countries where the FCDO believes that human rights violations and abuses are ongoing. Such critical training cannot be left to individual discretion. That point is especially pertinent, because the Government plans to give greater power to Heads of Missions.

The FCDO must mandate short, introductory atrocity prevention training for all Ambassadors/Heads of UK Missions, with a refresher every three years and more in- depth training for at-risk countries. Training should also be mandatory for other key Embassy staff, such as conflict advisers and military attachés, in priority countries. The UK may benefit from studying similar training provided by its international allies, such as the United States.

The FCDO should review its existing training and consider whether it provides sufficient support to UK Missions. Such training may require greater preventive focus.

The FCDO should introduce a new Atrocity Prevention Toolkit to provide applied, day-to-day guidance to UK Posts and desks on existing support and how to raise the alarm in a crisis.

The OCSM should track training uptake and ensure that Posts in priority countries are accessing enhanced, specialist support, in the form of conflict advisers, dedicated 44 From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world internal atrocity prevention and human rights advisers or external experts. Data on training uptake should be included in the proposed annual report to Parliament (see para 49).

Although ultimate responsibility must lie with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Ambassadors and other UK Heads of Mission should have a central role in preventing atrocities in the countries where they work. That role should be explicitly articulated in their job descriptions.

The OCSM should continue to foster learning between Embassies and to provide opportunities for exemplary teams to showcase their approach.

The OCSM must continue to develop the analytical capabilities to monitor and identify countries and groups at risk of mass atrocities, working closely with UK Posts and desks. This work should inform the UK’s policy and programming objectives in countries at risk.

The Government should invest in network analysis capabilities within both the OCSM and priority geographic teams to highlight enablers of atrocities, such as financial flows or key information channels. Such capabilities will support effective sanctions designation.

In addition to the OCSM’s processes of longer-term monitoring and analysis, the Government should introduce a system for tracking and responding to imminent or escalating mass atrocities. This system for ‘raising the alarm’ should: a) provide UK Missions with a simple tool for reporting and urgent warning to be used when officials perceive an imminent or rapidly escalating risk; b) include a clear communication protocol between senior responsible officials in London, the OCSM and the relevant Mission to fast-track ministerial decisions and policy responses. The process for responding should also have been agreed and rehearsed in advance; and c) draw on the resources and latest intelligence offered by the situation centre in the Cabinet Office if suspected atrocities are occurring. (Paragraph 82 Aid programming

UK aid programmes that strengthen institutions and civil society can foster environments where atrocities are less likely, when these programmes are sensitive to atrocity and conflict risks. We are concerned that successive reductions in those programmes may have blunted their effectiveness. The new International Development Strategy fails to reiterate the previous commitment to direct half of aid spending to fragile and conflict-affected states, which may dilute the UK’s efforts to prevent atrocities.

The Government must increase the share of UK Official Development Assistance (ODA) spent on development programmes that strengthen inclusive and accountable institutions and that reinforce civil society organisations, consistent with Sustainable Development Goal 16. (Paragraph 89) From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world 45

The Government must adopt a marker to tag aid programmes with a substantial atrocity prevention component, which it should use when reporting spending to the International Aid Transparency Index.

The Government should reassess whether the new International Development Strategy allows for a sufficient share of ODA to reach communities in fragile and conflict- affected states, as well as other states it assesses as being at risk of mass atrocities. It must also introduce a dedicated budget line for atrocity prevention within the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.

Civil society organisations in the UK and overseas must be empowered to play an active role in preventing atrocities, as they are often the first to be exposed to potential warning signs.

The Government must simplify funding streams for local civil society organisations and formalise the relationship between these organisations and relevant Government teams, building a more consistent role for these organisations in the Government’s early warning systems. (Paragraph 98) 46 From Srebrenica to a safer tomorrow: Preventing future mass atrocities around the world