Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee

Recommendation 26

26 Acknowledged

Establish a central CNI list to improve coordination and clarify priority areas.

Recommendation
Cross-government and external agency coordination in mitigating the risk of technological dependence on China is uneven and disjointed. The Government should create a central CNI list to improve coordination and clarify areas of priority. With the technology sector now dominated by a few key players, we are now over-reliant on Chinese technology. This is the direct result of deliberate, carefully directed and well- coordinated CCP policy to create dependence. We cannot overcome this dependence without an equally well-coordinated resilience strategy. (Paragraph 88) Alliances and partnerships
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges the need for CNI resilience and states it is developing a Critical National Infrastructure Resilience Strategy. However, it does not explicitly commit to creating a central CNI list to improve coordination as recommended.
Government Response Acknowledged
HM Government Acknowledged
100. The Government agrees with the Committee that it is unacceptable that any foreign government or its proxies should engage in transnational repression (TNR) on UK soil or against UK citizens. That is why the Government has a zero-tolerance approach to any attempts to intimidate, harass, or harm individuals or communities in the UK. Any such acts are unlawful and completely unacceptable. This includes the targeting of Hong Kong pro-democracy activists in the UK. We take all allegations of TNR extremely seriously. 101. As the Foreign Secretary made clear in his statement to Parliament on 19 December 2023, the UK will not tolerate any attempts by any foreign power to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the UK. We will take all necessary action to protect those legally present here, in line with our responsibilities and values. We regularly communicate our expectations directly to countries where we have concerns, at a high level. Where there are credible allegations of TNR on UK soil, the police will investigate thoroughly and take action where appropriate. The UK will use all tools at its disposal to counter TNR, including the diplomatic toolkit, to deter future acts. We also take a broad approach across government and with our international partners to addressing the wider systemic challenges posed by hostile state actors, as set out in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023. 102. The Government has a number of tools to protect those legally resident in the UK from harm, including the National Security Act, which enables authorities to disrupt hostile state activity more effectively. In 2023, the Government also announced an additional £14 million in funding to protect community organisations from harassment, abuse, and intimidation by foreign states. 103. The Government also regularly monitors trends in state threats and updates its threat assessments accordingly, sharing guidance with our partners to raise awareness of methods and how to identify and protect against hostile state activity. We have provided training to UK police forces and partners across government on how to identify and tackle hostile state activity. 104. The Government agrees that all pillars of society are under attack from autocracies. This is precisely why the Government has taken a ‘whole-of-society’ approach, and updated its Integrated Review Refresh (IRR 2023) to address the threats that autocracies pose to the UK’s society, economy, and national security, as well as to our allies’ security and values. This includes the UK’s world-leading universities, its research base, and its private sector. The Government is working across departments and with industry, academia, and civil society to build our collective resilience and protect our national interests from state threats. 105. The Government agrees that the UK needs to build resilience against China’s use of economic coercion, and that we must understand our dependencies on China. We are identifying our dependencies, including in critical sectors, and taking action to mitigate risks, whilst working with industry to support diversification. Our Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sectors are subject to stringent security measures to protect them. The Government continues to work with CNI operators to address the threats posed by foreign actors, including through supply chains. We are developing the UK’s resilience in Critical National Infrastructure through the Critical National Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, which ensures a comprehensive approach to managing the risks. We continue to work with industry to increase their understanding and awareness of the risks of foreign interference and to increase their resilience.