Individual at Askham Grange

Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
death of a woman in June 2006,
following her absconding from HMP Askham Grange
Report by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman for
England and Wales
September 2007
This is the report of an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of
a woman whose body was found in Hull on 24 June 2006. At the time of her death,
she was unlawfully at large from HMP Askham Grange. She had absconded at the
end of April 2006. A man has since been charged with her murder.
I offer my sincere sympathy and condolences to her family and friends for their tragic
loss.
At the time of her death, the woman was still technically a prisoner and under my
terms of reference I considered it right and proper to conduct an investigation.
However, because of the criminal proceedings, this report is much shorter than those
I normally issue following a death in custody and its focus is upon the period leading
up to her absconding.
One of my deputy ombudsmen and one of my investigators conducted the
investigation. I would like to thank the Governor of Askham Grange and his staff for
their help and co-operation.
I am content that Askham Grange took reasonable steps to assess the woman’s
suitability for release on temporary licence (ROTL) and also took the appropriate
action when it was discovered that she had absconded. Nobody could reasonably
have predicted that the woman would take the action that she did. However, I am
concerned that only limited steps were taken by police to apprehend her once she
was unlawfully at large.
Despite the fact that 702 prisoners absconded from open conditions in 2005/2006, it
seems the re-arrest of prisoners such as the woman may not be classed as a
policing priority. Public confidence in the criminal justice may be undermined if the
re-arrest of prisoners unlawfully at large is not treated as a serious matter. I have
therefore recommended that a copy of this report is sent to the Home Office Minister
of State with responsibility for police policy for his attention and any action that he
may deem appropriate.
This investigation has also highlighted, not it must be said for the first time, the
problems which can occur with a prisoner’s documentation when they transfer
between establishments. I have made a general recommendation on this matter.
My report also demonstrates that allocation to an open prison can be a disorientating
and anxious experience for some prisoners, and one which they are not necessarily
equipped to face. Accordingly, I have made a recommendation for Askham Grange
to review its induction procedure.
Stephen Shaw CBE
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman September 2007
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SUMMARY
On 24 June 2006, the body of the woman was discovered in Hull. She had
absconded from HMP Askham Grange almost two months earlier and been
unlawfully at large since that time. Humberside Police launched a major inquiry and
a man has been charged with her murder. She was 29 years old.
Before absconding, the woman was serving her first prison sentence. She appeared
to be making good progress against her sentence plan, having attended offending
behaviour programmes as well as education.
The woman had begun her sentence at HMP New Hall before being transferred to
open conditions at Askham Grange in December 2005. As part of her progression
through sentence, she gained approval to be released on temporary licence to
attend medical/dental appointments, the ‘Think First’ programme, and one day family
support visits in the vicinity of York. The prison took the necessary steps in
assessing her suitability for release on temporary licence
The woman appeared to fellow residents and staff at Askham Grange as a larger
than life, streetwise character. However, it emerged that she was an anxious woman
who felt that illicit drugs gave her the support she needed to cope with the pressures
of life. She had concerns about leading a normal life and becoming the primary
carer for her son. However, it is clear that she kept her feelings and anxieties well
hidden.
On 30 April 2006, having been released on temporary licence to be with her family,
the woman failed to return to Askham Grange. This was to the surprise of her family,
staff and fellow residents.
Askham Grange took appropriate and timely action in informing North Yorkshire
Police of her disappearance. However, the woman was considered to be a low risk
prisoner and police efforts to establish her whereabouts and return to prison appear
to have been limited and shortlived. It is likely that she had fallen back into her
previous chaotic lifestyle.
This investigation has highlighted that some prisoners can feel ill equipped to deal
with the challenges, responsibilities and temptations that an open prison presents.
Whilst I am satisfied that support is available to prisoners, I have asked Askham
Grange to review its induction procedures. The investigation has also drawn
attention to the importance of ensuring that all relevant documentation transfers
when a prisoner moves from one establishment to another, thus enabling continuity
of professional care and treatment.
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THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS
1. Although she was not in custody when she died, the woman was an absconded
prisoner. As a consequence, an investigation into the circumstances
surrounding her death came within my remit. My office was informed of her
death on 27 June 2006.
2. My deputy ombudsman visited HMP Askham Grange on 28 June 2006. She met
with the deputy governor and was able to review the custodial documents. On 17
August 2006, the deputy ombudsman and one of my investigators re-visited
Askham Grange to interview staff and residents. The terms of reference were to
investigate the circumstances leading up to the woman absconding. Notices
were issued to staff and residents informing them about the investigation and
giving them the opportunity to speak with the investigation team. Several
residents came forward as a result.
3. The Governor and his staff produced the core record and a number of other
documents for examination. The investigation team spoke to members of staff
who had known the woman, as well as to staff who could clarify operational
matters in regard to risk assessment of residents and to reporting those who
abscond.
4. One of my Family Liaison Officers contacted the woman’s father and mother by
letter. She offered the family an opportunity to meet with the investigation team
to discuss the purpose of the investigation, and to raise any concerns or
questions about the woman’s time in prison that they would like explored and
addressed. To date, the family has not contacted my office and I am therefore
not aware of any issues that they would wish to raise.
5. The circumstances of the woman’s death will be the subject of a criminal trial. A
copy of this report will be sent to Her Majesty’s Coroner.
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HMP ASKHAM GRANGE
6. HMP Askham Grange is an open prison for women, situated in the village of
Askham Richard outside York. According to its entry on the Prison Service
website, decency and resettlement are the key focus of the establishment, and
residents receive support to achieve personalised development plans that will
place them in a strong position for their return to the community.
7. The main accommodation is in a converted manor house which dates back to
1886. The establishment can accommodate up to 96 women in dormitories of
varying size. A small number of single rooms are available for life sentenced
women.
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KEY EVENTS
8. On 16 November 2005, the woman was refused a day release on temporary
licence because Humberside Probation Service would not support her application
in light of previous breaches of trust. However, on 6 December 2005, she was
transferred from HMP New Hall to Askham Grange. She had been assessed as
a low risk prisoner of good behaviour who was keen to address her offending
behaviour through sentence planning. On arrival at Askham Grange,she spent a
few days on the induction unit before moving to a dormitory block.
9. On 2 February 2006, the woman attended the Risk Assessment Board at
Askham Grange and, following favourable reports, a ROTL was authorised for
her to attend the ‘Think First’ programme and medical and dental appointments.
These visits were unescorted. On 14 February, the Risk Assessment Board
recommended ROTL licences so that she could attend days out with her family in
the York area to develop and sustain family relationships, particularly with her
son. Her records indicate that the relationship with her son was improving.
10. Throughout her sentence and as part of her resettlement plan, the woman was
keen to further her education and she undertook a number of adult learning
courses. She also participated in a family learning programme as she and her
family hoped that she would eventually become the primary carer for her son.
Her records also confirm that the woman attended a number of offending
behaviour programmes including ‘Think First’. Attendance and progression on
these programmes are designed to help the individual tackle their offending, and
build up their self-esteem and confidence. It was envisaged that participation
would allow the woman to find gainful employment in charitable or paid work.
She appeared to progress well and was working for a short time in a charity shop.
According to her records, she was free from drugs - although an entry in her
CARATs file for 1 February indicated that she did not think she could cope with
life without using drugs.
11. On 12 March, a Security Information Report (SIR) indicated a suspicion of drug
activity by one or more of the residents in the woman’s houseblock. The report
focussed on another prisoner who was not complying with the regime. On 20
March, that prisoner absconded from Askham Grange. My investigators also
established that another prisoner from the woman’s dormitory had absconded
about two weeks previously. It is possible their example may have had an impact
on her own decision to abscond.
12. On 10 April, her record indicates that the woman tested positive for morphine on
a voluntary drugs test (VDT), and she was subsequently referred to CARATs for
counselling. The woman was described as blasé about the incident. Another
VDT conducted on 24 April was negative.
13. The application for ROTL for a family ties visit on 30 April was approved. Under
the terms of her licence, the woman was required to remain within a ten mile
radius of York and to return to Askham Grange by 6.00pm. She did not do so.
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14. The fact that the woman had not returned by 6.00pm was noted by the prison.
As she had still not made contact by 7.30pm, and as part of the prison’s
contingency plan when a prisoner fails to return from an authorised absence, the
police were notified she was missing.
15. The police attended Askham Grange on 1 May to make further enquiries, and
they contacted her father. From the information received, they checked likely
addresses where she might be. However, she was not found and remained at
large. It appears nothing more was heard of the woman for almost two months.
Events after the woman’s death
16. Some staff and residents at Askham Grange first learned of the woman’s death
from the local news on 24 June. The deputy governor contacted North Yorkshire
Police so that they could confirm with Humberside Police whether the named
victim was the woman. North Yorkshire Police would normally have been
contacted by Humberside Police because of a warning flag on the Police National
Computer. However, this does not appear to have happened. The Police Liaison
Officer for Askham Grange, told my investigators that Humberside Police
subsequently attended the prison to collect her property.
17. A serving prisoner at HMP Leeds, also heard of the woman’s death from the
local news. He told my investigator that he had not heard from her since 30 April
and had wondered what was wrong. He told my investigator that he had received
a good level of support from Leeds. He was released from prison in August
2006.
18. Prisoners at Askham Grange were formally told of the woman’s death on 25
June and offered the support of staff and the chaplaincy. Askham Grange is a
small, close knit community and the death came as a profound shock to
residents and staff alike. The prison appointed the deputy governor as the family
liaison officer and condolences were given by telephone to the woman’s father
and step-mother on 26 June. Since her death, continued offers of support have
been given to the family, although telephone contact has been difficult to
maintain and establish.
19. On 28 June, a memorial service was held for the woman in the chapel at Askham
Grange. The service was very well attended, reflecting her popularity and the
impact of her death.
20. The woman’s funeral took place in July and was attended by staff and two
residents from Askham Grange. The prison offered the family financial
assistance towards the funeral.
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ISSUES
Transfer to open conditions
21. Although there is nothing in the woman’s records to indicate that she was finding
it hard to adapt to Askham Grange, my investigators were told that she had found
it very difficult to adjust to open conditions. Apparently she felt that, whilst she
was given more scope to develop and progress at Askham Grange, it was difficult
to cope with the responsibility. Her feelings would not necessarily have been
known by other residents or staff. During the investigation, most residents whom
my investigators spoke to reported that they too had found it very difficult to
acclimatise to open conditions, having transferred, from prisons with more
structured regimes sometimes at short notice. In a number of instances,
residents said that they were not allocated a ‘buddy’ on arrival and felt very
uneasy and adrift. Whilst some of the residents reported that they had frequent
and constructive relationships with their personal officers, this was not universal.
22. My investigators learnt that, on first arrival at Askham Grange, some residents felt
they would prefer to serve the rest of their sentence in closed conditions. This
prompted some of them to abscond in order to be recaptured and returned to
closed conditions. Whilst some recognised that they had a lot to lose if they
absconded from Askham Grange, others said the temptation was always there.
23. There can be no doubt some prisoners who had spent a lot of time in closed
conditions found a transfer to Askham Grange to be a disorientating, anxious
experience, particularly in the first month. It was also apparent that some
prisoners needed more support than others if they were to complete their
sentence and realise their potential.
The Governor should review the effectiveness of the induction procedures
at Askham Grange to ensure that clear information and support is given
and individual needs are met.
The woman’s state of mind
24. Residents told my investigators that, in the week before she absconded, the
woman’s mood had changed. They attribute this to telephone calls she was
receiving from a long term male acquaintance who had apparently just been
released from prison. (Residents at Askham Grange are able to receive
incoming telephone calls, as well as make outgoing ones.) The investigation has
been unable to establish the identity of this man, but he could have influenced
her decision to abscond. Residents also told my investigators that, on the day
before she absconded, the woman was subdued and had taken her posters down
from the dormitory wall and collected her CDs. However, they and staff were
surprised by her decision to abscond as she appeared to have settled down and
was progressing well through her sentence.
25. The male prisoner from Leeds told my investigators that she could have been
upset about being ‘knocked back’ for parole, and that this may have been a
reason for her decision to abscond. However, residents at Askham Grange told
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my investigators that the woman was very anxious about being released and had
talked about ‘sabotaging’ her parole. The woman had also told her ‘Think First’
tutor that she was scared of failure in leading a normal life. At the woman’s last
meeting with her probation officer at Askham Grange on 13 March, she
mentioned her anxieties about release from prison because of the lure of drugs.
Following her disclosure, Humberside Probation Service was contacted by the
prison to establish what drug support services were available to the woman in the
community, should she be released.
Release on Temporary Licence
26. Temporary release on licence (ROTL) is designed to ensure that suitable
prisoners are released only for precisely defined and specific activities which
cannot be provided for in the establishment, and to support them in their
resettlement plans. All prisoners arriving at Askham Grange have a sentence
plan (reviewed every six months) as part of the resettlement process. This may
include an aspiration or a target to attend some form of education or employment
in the community. The resident will make an application for ROTL. Before a
licence is approved, reports are requested from a number of sources which may
include Healthcare, Probation Service, CARATs and Education. A report is also
requested from the personal officer who comments on behaviour, application and
compliance with the prison’s regime. A key feature in considering whether a
prisoner is suitable for temporary release is the risk assessment process which
considers the level of threat to the general public and the potential for re-
offending.
27. The Principal Officer who oversees the Resettlement Process, said that a risk
assessment board is held around the sixth week following arrival at Askham
Grange. Available information on the resident is assessed to determine whether
they are suitable for temporary release in terms of the risk of re-offending or
breach of trust. The risk assessment board is multi-disciplinary. If someone is
assessed as suitable for temporary release, they will be authorised to attend
specified activities within a 10 mile radius of York. Someone who over time
consistently complies with the terms of her licence may be authorised to travel
further a field and unaccompanied. The purpose of the licence is to fulfil the
individual’s sentence plan and is also used to develop and sustain a consistent
level of trust and responsibility.
28. It was established during the investigation that a resident must have completed
13 weeks of unpaid community work before consideration for paid employment.
The Governor’s approval is required for a resident to look for and gain paid
employment. Good relationships have been nurtured between the prison and the
local business community. Suitable residents are encouraged to look for their
own employment opportunities in order to build confidence and self esteem. This
also gives them some financial independence on release. Consequently, there is
a significant daily movement in and out of the establishment in order to attend a
range of activities.
29. The Principal Officer explained that, if a resident is assessed as suitable for a
licence specifically for the development and maintenance of family ties, they are
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placed under the supervision of a suitable adult. In the woman’s case, this was
her father. The licence condition required her to remain within a ten mile radius
of York and to return to Askham Grange by 6.00pm. The investigation
established that the woman would have been made fully aware of the terms of
her licence and the consequences if she failed to comply. However, her father
would not necessarily have been aware of the specific conditions in her licence.
30. Before 30 April, the woman had been on day release on a number of occasions
in order to attend ‘Think First’, medical appointments and voluntary employment
as well as for family visits. No problems had been reported. She was considered
to be progressing well and developing a sense of responsibility and trust.
Procedures for reporting an abscond
31. As noted, the woman was expected to return to Askham Grange by 6.00pm on
Sunday 30 April. Staff told my investigators that in many cases some additional
time is allowed for residents to report to reception because of delays on the roads
or on public transport. In many instances, residents will attempt to make contact
by telephone to alert staff that they may be delayed. If a resident fails to return or
otherwise contact reception within about 40 to 50 minutes of their specified time
for return, staff in consultation with the duty manager will initiate the abscond
procedure.
32. By 7.30pm on 30 April, staff were concerned that the woman had not reported
back and had not made contact with them. Consequently, the Acting Senior
Officer contacted the duty governor who implemented the prison’s contingency
plan in the event of an abscond. As part of the contingency plan, a roll call was
taken and the area was checked. The Senior Officer then contacted the North
Yorkshire Police control room at York and officially reported the woman as
missing. This call was logged at 7.33pm. The Prison Service’s Incident
Reporting System was also updated to reflect that the woman had breached the
terms of her licence and was an absconded prisoner.
33. The Police Liaison Officer said that the woman would have been reported as a
person missing from home, although as a prisoner she would have been dealt
with similarly to a member of the armed forces who was absent without leave. In
these circumstances, rather than wait 24 hours for a missing person to turn up as
is usual in the wider community, initial telephone enquiries would have been
made to try and locate the individual. Once the incident had been logged by
North Yorkshire Police, it would have been given a unique reference number and
allocated to the next available officer. That officer would have made initial
enquiries by telephone to Askham Grange to establish some facts about the
woman and the circumstances behind her absconding. In view of the fact that
she was not considered to be a violent prisoner or a danger to the public, she did
not warrant immediate police action. On 1 May, police attended Askham Grange
to make these further enquiries.
34. The Police Liaison Officer confirmed that the Police National Computer (PNC)
would have been updated and details of the woman would have been circulated
nationwide as a wanted/missing person. As the force was notified of her
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abscond, North Yorkshire Police became the ‘owners’ of that PNC record. If the
woman had been stopped by police and a PNC check carried out, the record
would indicate that she was wanted by North Yorkshire Police. On arrest, she
would have been returned to closed prison conditions.
35. On 1 May, the officer allocated the enquiry from North Yorkshire Police spoke by
telephone to the woman’s father. It was ascertained that, at about 1.00pm on 30
April, he had driven her to a supermarket in Hull and dropped her off in order to
meet her boyfriend. Although the woman was in breach of the terms of her
licence, her father had no reason to believe that she would not meet him later on
for the journey back to Askham Grange by 6.00pm. Her father gave the police
her boyfriend’s address in Hull.
36. Humberside Police were asked by North Yorkshire Police to conduct address
checks at the woman’s parents’ address as well as at her boyfriend’s home.
There was no reply from the boyfriend’s house on 1 May, and neighbours
reported that they had not seen a woman there. Humberside Police also made
enquiries at a hotel in Hull where it was reported that she might have been
staying with her boyfriend, but again there was no trace of either of them.
Despite not receiving a response from the boyfriend’s home address, it does not
appear that Humberside Police made any further attempts to find the woman. In
light of recent national controversies regarding levels of absconding from open
prisons, there must be concerns about the initial address checks made by
Humberside Police and the subsequent failure to follow them up. Whilst the
woman’s re-arrest may have been considered a low policing priority given other
operational demands, it is surprising that no further efforts were made to locate
her in the two months that she was unlawfully at large.
In light of my concerns regarding the apprehension of prisoners unlawfully
at large, I recommend that a copy of this report is sent to the Home Office
Minister of State with responsibility for police policy for his consideration
and any action he may deem appropriate.
Documentation on prisoners transferring between establishments
37. It emerged during the investigation that, when a prisoner is transferred to
Askham Grange, important information about them in the form of paper records
can be delayed. Whilst the prisoner’s medical record is placed in a sealed
confidential file that accompanies the prisoner, probation files and the CARATs
file do not necessarily arrive at the same time. I understand that files are often
despatched by post after the prisoner has transferred and can take up to one
week to arrive at Askham Grange. This was a source of some frustration for staff
working in the disciplines concerned and meant that, in some instances, they
would have to start afresh when a new prisoner arrives. This situation is by no
means unique to Askham Grange. I do not consider the delay in transferring this
information to be reasonable or in the prisoner’s best interest. In view of the fact
that the medical record will invariably accompany a prisoner, the same level of
importance should be attached to other relevant information in the records to
ensure continuity of care and treatment.
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The Prison Service should review arrangements for the transfer of paper
files when a prisoner is moved from one institution to another.
Conclusion
38. On the surface, the woman was making determined efforts through her sentence
plan and with the support of staff to prepare herself for a decent life in the
community. This included efforts aimed at becoming the primary carer for her
son. Her transfer to Askham Grange reflected these efforts and was considered
to be a positive step towards her resettlement and eventual release. However, it
is also clear that, despite portraying herself as a confident individual, the woman
had anxieties about leading a full and responsible life. These anxieties focussed
on letting down those she loved and reverting back to a chaotic lifestyle, primarily
drug misuse. However, she kept these feelings well camouflaged from staff at
Askham Grange.
39. Many prisoners who transfer to open conditions find this a disorientating and
anxious experience. Taking personal responsibility for their own lives and
preparing for a constructive life in the community is not easy. With additional
responsibility there comes opportunity, and in all open prisons there is the
temptation to abscond. Many of the residents who spoke to my investigators said
that the first month at Askham Grange can be very stressful, and the levels of
support and induction required vary according to personal needs. Whilst I cannot
know why the woman decided to abscond, I am satisfied that Askham Grange
took reasonable steps to assess and review her suitability for ROTL. The prison
could not reasonably have predicted she would abscond, nor reasonably have
intervened to prevent her from doing so. I am also satisfied that once the
abscond was discovered the proper procedures for reporting her to the police
were followed.
40. Whilst I appreciate that police resources are finite, and that policing priorities
should be risk-led, I am concerned that efforts to locate and apprehend the
woman appear to have been very limited. In her case, despite her being
regarded as a low risk to the public, it was highly likely that she would return to a
life of drugs and vice and therefore herself become vulnerable. But quite
separately, public confidence in the criminal justice may be undermined if the re-
arrest of prisoners unlawfully at large is not treated as a serious matter.
41. It also emerged from this investigation, as it has from many others I have
conducted that, whilst there is a wealth of relevant and important information
about a prisoner on different files, this information is not always readily available
when the prisoner is transferred. CARATs and Probation files were found to take
up to a week to follow the prisoner, and this is a source of much frustration to
staff responsible for providing consistent and continuous care.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The Governor should review the effectiveness of the induction procedures
at Askham Grange to ensure that clear information and support is given
and individual needs are met.
A new three day induction programme has been introduced that starts on the
residents second day at Askham Grange. All new residents are allocated a buddy
as they arrive and that support remains for their first full week. Within their first
week all residents are seen on sentence planning and initial risk assessment
boards.
In light of my concerns regarding the apprehension of prisoners unlawfully
at large, I recommend that a copy of this report is sent to the Home Office
Minister of State with responsibility for police policy for his consideration
and any action he may deem appropriate.
A copy will be sent on receipt of the final report
The Prison Service should review arrangements for the transfer of paper
files when a prisoner is moved from one institution to another.
C-Nomis should improve this process but until roll out Askham Grange will
endeavour to work with sending establishments to improve this system.
It is mandatory under PSO 6400 Discharge for a prisoner’s F2050, F2051, IMR
and any open ACCT to be issued to the escorting officer when a prisoner is being
transferred to another establishment or it is thought likely they will be sent from
court to another establishment.
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