Source · IOPC Learning Case

Failure to investigate indecent exposure – Metropolitan Police Service, February 2021

Metropolitan Police Service Ref: 2021/150091 Recommended 22 May 2023 Response due 17 Jul 2023

Corruption and abuse of power

Case background

Text published by the IOPC.

On 9 March 2021, a serving Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officer was arrested in connection with the disappearance of Ms Sarah Everard. He was later identified as the suspect for incidents of indecent exposure and was further arrested for this offence.

The MPS referred the recordable conduct matter to the IOPC the following day.

On 28 February 2021, a manager of a fast-food restaurant reported an incident to the police where a man indecently exposed himself to staff while driving through an order-collection route.

An MPS officer attended the fast-food restaurant to conduct an initial investigation into the reports of indecent exposure. It became apparent there were two incidents of alleged indecent exposure on 7 and 27 February at the same branch of restaurant.

The officer conducted a system check which confirmed the name of the registered owner of the vehicle.

The officer did not take any further action in relation to identifying the suspect or progressing the investigation for the next seven days, at which point the investigation was taken over by a different team.

We specifically investigated the decisions and actions taken by the officer in relation to the report of indecent exposure and whether adequate steps were taken to progress the investigation.

We also investigated whether the officer or supervisor knew the serving MPS officer who exposed himself or were aware he was a police officer with the MPS.

During our investigation, the officer produced a statement where she described carrying out further system checks, which we later confirmed not to be true because the checks were not conducted. The officer also informed the IOPC that CCTV footage was not available from the restaurant, which contradicted the account provided by the restaurant manager, a key witness.

We also investigated the actions of a supervisor responsible for the crime report and whether they adequately supervised the investigation.

During our investigation, we obtained statements from several witnesses and reviewed crime reports. We analysed an audit of police systems and obtained accounts from the officers involved. We interviewed the police officer responsible for carrying out the initial investigation into indecent exposure after serving a gross misconduct notice.

Our investigation concluded in January 2022. We waited for all external proceedings to conclude before publishing our findings.

We concluded there was an indication that a person serving with the police committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner justifying the bringing of disciplinary proceedings.

We were of the opinion the initial investigating officer had a case to answer for gross misconduct, specifically for failing to carry out appropriate actions when conducting the initial investigation into two incidents of alleged indecent exposure and for providing a false account to us regarding her actions surrounding CCTV and intelligence checks.

We were of the opinion that the supervisor did not have a case to answer.

The evidence indicated that the supervisor did not have any responsibility to investigate the allegation of indecent exposure, nor was he responsible for supervising the other officer’s actions or ensuring the matter was being progressed. In addition, the crime report was set up within the relevant timescales, indicating the supervisor performed his duties appropriately.

The officer subject to misconduct proceedings resigned in November 2022.

A gross misconduct hearing was held in May 2023.

On 23 May, the panel found gross misconduct proven against the former officer.

Misconduct was proven in relation to her failures in the initial investigation of indecent exposure allegations, while gross misconduct was proven for the breach of honesty and integrity during our investigation.

The panel ruled that she would have been dismissed had she still been serving and she will be added to the barred list preventing future employment with the police.

We carefully considered whether there were any learning opportunities arising from the investigation. We make learning recommendations to improve policing and public confidence in the police complaints system and prevent a recurrence of similar incidents.

We identified potential areas of learning for Metropolitan Police Service and following consultation, we issued three recommendations in May 2023.

Our investigations into the Met and Kent Police’s handling of the indecent exposure allegations highlighted there is no system in place to alert forces that a suspect in a criminal case may be a police officer.

We will be exploring this as a potentialnational learning recommendation with the National Police Chiefs’ Council.

Recommendations and responses

3 indexed

Recommendation 1

Link to recommendation · Accepted

Addressed to: Metropolitan Police Service

Linked bodies: Metropolitan Police Service

IOPC recommendation

The IOPC recommends that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) issues an accessible guidance document to Emergency Response Team (ERT) Officers outlining the expectations and processes involved when handing a case over to the My Investigation Support Team (MIST). This should include the initial investigative actions ERT Officers are expected to carry out when attending an appointment as well as providing clear instruction on how to pass an investigation over to MIST.

This follows an IOPC investigation where an Emergency Response Team (ERT) Officer attended a fast-food restaurant drive-through to conduct initial inquiries into a report of indecent exposure. The officer conducted a system check which confirmed the name of the registered owner of the vehicle. The officer did not take any further action in relation to identifying the suspect or progressing the investigation for the next seven days, at which point the investigation was taken over by a different team.

During the IOPC investigation it became apparent that in addition to the failure to carry out the necessary initial investigative enquiries, the ERT Officer had experienced some confusion in relation to how the investigation would be passed across to MIST.

At the time, MIST was a new team which had been recently introduced to investigate and progress non-serious or complex crimes as well as assisting with prisoner processing requirements.

Both the failure to complete initial investigative enquiries and the confusion surrounding the passing over of a case to MIST is indicative of a wider issue amongst ERT officers. The current process requires the responding officer to complete the initial investigative enquiries so that a Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS) can be completed and passed onto MIST. It would appear that the issue remains unresolved and ERT officers are still requiring reminders of their duty to carry out proper initial investigative enquiries before handing over an investigation to MIST.

Failure to carry out proper initial investigative enquiries could result in investigations being unnecessarily prolonged with enquiries having to be carried out again by MIST due to important information being missed. Furthermore, this could lead to potential evidential sources being missed altogether if evidential gaps are not highlighted later in the investigation. Therefore, an easily accessible guidance document such as the one suggested here would provide ERT Officers with a helpful reminder to refer to when carrying out initial investigative enquiries, ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken before handing over a case to MIST for further investigation.

Response published by the IOPC

Recommendation accepted:

The Metropolitan Police Service (“MPS”) has reviewed and accepts this IOPC recommendation.

The circumstances investigated by the IOPC relate to matters that occurred in February 2021. Since then, the MPS has continued to develop guidance for investigators, including the role of My Investigation Support Teams (MIST), and a review of the MPS General Investigation Policy. This policy includes revised guidance on both minimum investigative standards for frontline officers and the handing over of an investigation from a primary responder to secondary investigator.

In addition, the guidance addresses minimum standards of supervision (i.e. if an Officer in the Case [OIC] has an investigation that is not being progressed expeditiously then there would be an expectation for the intervention of a supervisor) and will address the proposed recommended action.

The first draft of the new General Investigation Policy has been completed and returned to the MPS Policy Unit with feedback. In order to implement the proposed recommendation, the MPS Investigation Improvement Team will:

- Publish the minimum investigative standards for frontline officers, handing over of an investigation and minimum standards of supervision guidance within three months (September 2023) and to make this document accessible to Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and MIST imminently.
- Support this guidance with a pan-MPS Operational Notice published on the MPS internet site highlighting the new document with targeted communications to both ERT and MIST strands.
- Commit to the completion of the review, consultation and publishing of the General nvestigation Policy within 12 months (June 2024) which will include a review of the initial guidance published at three months.

Check the original case on the IOPC website

Recommendation 2

Link to recommendation · Accepted

Addressed to: Metropolitan Police Service

Linked bodies: Metropolitan Police Service

IOPC recommendation

The IOPC recommends that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) considers the development of a system which automatically notifies the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) of when a serving police officer is linked to an ongoing police investigation.

During the IOPC investigation it became apparent that when the identity of registered owner of the vehicle was confirmed, the individual’s role as a serving MPS officer was not highlighted on MPS intelligence systems. As part of the IOPC’s enquiries, the MPS confirmed that the Integrated Intelligence Platform does not provide information of an individual’s status as a serving police officer and that such information would only be made apparent if the individual provided their occupation to a police officer as part of an investigation.

Due to the increased level of responsibility afforded to police officers, it is a cause for concern that there is no system in place which allows the MPS to be made aware of when a serving MPS officer is suspected of committing an offence.

The IOPC is aware that the MPS is working on developing and/or improving a system called CONNECT. As the MPS are considering changes to their IT systems the IOPC believes this would be an ideal time for MPS to consider how it could embed an automated function to provide an alert when an MPS officer is subject to a police investigation or when a serving police officer from another force is linked an ongoing MPS investigation.

On account of the DPS being the body responsible for maintaining professional standards within MPS, the IOPC believes that the DPS would be the department best placed to monitor such a system. Automatically notifying the DPS of when a serving MPS officer is linked to a police investigation would afford the opportunity for the DPS to filter the most serious investigations and monitor the relevant officer during the course of the investigation. Furthermore, as a matter of public confidence, the DPS could also consider if any type of intervention is necessary depending on the seriousness of the alleged offence, to restrict an officer’s interactions with members of the public whilst an investigation into their actions is ongoing.

Response published by the IOPC

Recommendation accepted:

The Metropolitan Police Service (“MPS”) has reviewed and accepts the IOPC recommendation. For clarity, the MPS suggests that the IOPC need to be clear that the recommendation relates to criminal investigations (on the basis that a conduct/complaint investigation will already have police officers notified to DPS).

If the recommendation is to be effectively implemented, our view is that the IOPC needs to propose this as a national learning recommendation for NPCC (National Police Chiefs’ Council). This would ensure interoperability of intelligence system changes across the UK and so most effectively address the risk that has been identified, as police officers’ personal and professional lives cross force boundaries.

The MPS request that the IOPC update the NPCC Professional Standards and Ethics Portfolio on their recommendation, with a view for this to be included on the agenda in either the portfolio or one of the working groups, the most appropriate group could be the NPCC Counter Corruption Group, who next meet in September 2023. National options could include all police officers having records on the Police National Database (PND) orthe Police National Computer (PNC), which would allow all forces to appropriately share information.

Any internal force system will necessarily be much more limited. This is one of the reasons why the PND datawash has been, and will continue to be required.

The MPS does not presently have an automated technological solution that could notify DPS when a police officer is linked to a criminal investigation. Clearly, there are a number of non-technological processes, alongside management and leadership, that do notify DPS when a police officer is linked to a criminal investigation.

Whilst more limited than a national policing response, the MPS is scoping its own technological options, with a view to testing and piloting approaches. This might encompass a link to the historical data wash functionality and also the new MPS CONNECT* system.

The MPS works towards a solution, but again highlight that this would be more limited than the benefits of a national approach.

*CONNECT – a data capture IT system which is structured around a POLE (People, Object, Location, Event) database. This creates a single, accurate and comprehensive record for every Person, Object, Location and Event in the system.

Check the original case on the IOPC website

Recommendation 3

Link to recommendation · Accepted

Addressed to: Metropolitan Police Service

Linked bodies: Metropolitan Police Service

IOPC recommendation

The IOPC recommends that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) ensures that its call handlers are aware that they have discretion when assigning the length of time slots for police officers to attend car appointments for allegations of sexual offences.

During the IOPC investigation it became apparent that the appointment for an ERT officer to attend the fast-food restaurant made was by the call handler. The appointment was booked for three days after the instance of indecent exposure was reported to MPS. The current Met CC/BCU Appointments Policy states all appointments should be arranged within 48 hours of first contact or as soon as possible thereafter. For non-domestic appointments, as long as there is no risk and the victim agrees, the appointment can be made for anytime within the next seven days.

When a member of the public calls the Met Contact Centre wishing to report a crime which meets the criteria for a car appointment, the call handler may arrange an appointment slot for one or two hours depending on the complexity of the crime being reported. Whilst the IOPC accepts that the current wording of the Appointments Policy already provides discretion to call handlers when assigning timings for car appointments, it also understands there has been previous instruction to assign two-hour slots when booking appointments relating to sexual offences.

Whilst the IOPC recognises the necessity of initial investigative actions for sexual offence allegations being carried out, there is a concern that any rigidity surrounding two-hour appointments may discourage members of the public meeting with police officers soon after the alleged offence has taken place due to other pre-arranged commitments. This could potentially lead to evidential material being lost and reducing the effectiveness of an investigation.

If a shorter appointment slot would allow a member of the public to meet with a police officer at an earlier date and report an alleged offence, it may be preferable to allow the call handler to exercise their professional judgment and book a one-hour timeslot instead of two. This would allow the member of the public to meet with a police officer sooner so that an investigation can be progressed at a quicker pace.

Response published by the IOPC

Recommendation accepted:

The Metropolitan Police Service (“MPS”) has reviewed and accepts this IOPC recommendation.

MPS First Contact operators are trained to grade every call in accordance with ‘National Contact Management Principles and Guidance’.

The MPS Command and Control (MetCC) / Basic Commander Unit (BCU) Appointments Policy (D14 reference in the IOPC investigation report – “AA copy”) does not specify that the reporting of a sexual offence requires a two hour slot.

It is for the suitably trained First Contact operators utilising the THRIVE+ assessment to determine whether a one or two hour slot would be required. This will depend on the information supplied by the caller in order to gauge thecomplexity of that information and determine an appropriate time slot for the appointment.

On 19 April 2023, a revised “THRIVE+” assessment grading of high, medium and low was introduced in to the MPS Call Handling System. Every call into police requires such an assessment to be made, from which the complexity of the call can be reasonably established in a more consistent way, aligned to national guidance.

The MetCC / BCU Appointments Policy was reviewed in June 2021 and further amendments were made in June 2022.

The relevant section of the policy document is at the third paragraph of section 5.1, which reads: “Appointments will be arranged in 1 or 2 hour slots depending on the complexity of the crime being reported.”

The MetCC / BCU Appointments Policy is not crime type specific when allocating one or two hour slots, but does allow for call handlers to have discretion when assigning slots for allegations of sexual offences.

Sexual offences, for example rape or sexual assault, by default would be graded as “I” (immediate - attendance within 15mins) or “S” (significant – attendance within 60mins). These grades are determined to best support victims and secure best evidence for crimes of this nature. The term ‘sexual offences’ captures a considerable variance in the nature, type and seriousness of an offence and harm to the victim / public, which in turn warrants a different policing response.

The MPS is conducting a further revision of the MPS MetCC/BCU Appointments Policy (referred to as v0.5 and attached) to capture the learning in terms of securing best evidence, and to provide greater clarity to call handling staff around their discretion when allocating one or two hour time slots.

Emphasis has been made around the use of earlier one hour slots to capture any opportunities for victim engagement / securing best evidence in favour of later two hour appointments. This removes the inflexibility implied in the previous wording which could serve to discourage members of the public meeting with police at the soonest opportunity after the alleged offence.

The revised wording also places emphasis on best evidence to maximise evidential opportunities forensically / witness accuracy / CCTV etc., increasing the effectiveness of any investigation.

The MPS has taken the following actions:

- Revised MetCC/BCU Appointments Policy consulted, approved and published on 12th June 2023 (V0.5).
- MetCC Business Operational Support Unit tasked to communicate and disseminate policy revisions, including updating MPS intranet policy amendments, and SharePoint Informationplatforms accessed by all MetCC Staff (June 2023).
- MetCC Training Academy are to incorporate policy amendments into lesson plans for new staff, existing scheduled training days for current staff as part of ongoing Continuous Professional Development (“CPD”) and revisions to training material – to be in place to align with student intakes for August 2023 and updated for the next CPD training sessions in 2023.
- Organisational learning action diarised for the week commencing 2nd October 2023 for the MetCC Quality and Reassurance Team to dip sample appointments made to review and assure compliance.

Check the original case on the IOPC website