Strategic Defence Review 2025

While Defence plays a central role in protecting the UK's security, prosperity, and values, the nature of today's threats means it cannot do this alone. To ensure the UK can act with the necessary agility in deterring adversaries in competition, crisis, and conflict, the MOD must work with wider Government to:
• Increase options for retaliation in response to an attack—or the threat of attack—on the UK and its allies.
• Build national preparedness and resilience, ensuring the UK can withstand attacks and recover quickly.
• Nurture a robust strategic culture, ensuring senior leaders and officials across Government are equipped with the knowledge, skills, and intellectual framework to understand the nuclear dimensions and escalation risks of today's strategic environment. This should be regularly exercised and tested through wargames and table-top exercises.
• Rebuild the relationship with, and better utilise, the intellectual base outside Government to support long-term adaptation in deterrence and defence policy, working with industry, think tanks, and academia to ensure there is a thriving network of expertise and debate.
• Cohere these efforts with close allies, developing and exercising mechanisms for political decision-making in response to crises, especially where they fall short of war.

A 'NATO First' policy is essential as the UK steps up its contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. This demands a different approach from that taken since the end of the Cold War. The Alliance should be mainstreamed in how Defence plans, thinks, and acts. Defence must establish a roadmap for delivering this deeper interoperability with NATO Allies and for leading the way on shared approaches and standards by January 2026. Implementation should commence no later than July 2026.

Defence must transform how it works to become a leading tech-enabled defence power, with an Integrated Force that deters, fights, and wins through constant innovation at wartime pace. To drive this transformation, Defence must more systematically ensure that its efforts deliver both for the warfighter and for the UK economy—with the forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy an important opportunity to embed radical reforms. Success will require the MOD to develop an understanding of the relationship between its military competitiveness and the performance of the defence innovation and industrial base. As a starting point, the MOD should establish and track metrics for:
• The lethality of the Armed Forces.
• Productivity within Defence and, separately, of industry.
• The national economic impact of Defence spending and procurement (including departmental research and development spend), especially within the defence and dual-use technology sectors.

The Government should implement the Integrated Force model to achieve full integration within Defence, delivering a more agile and lethal combat force. To ensure accountability for the continual adaptation of the Integrated Force over time, Defence should:
• Submit an annual statement to the Secretary of State on force design that identifies what has changed.
• Undertake an annual evaluation of the effectiveness of the Integrated Force model, measured through demonstrable improvements in: availability of assets; sustainability; pace of exploitation; rates of experimentation through to adoption; NATO interoperability; and speed of decision-making.

Digital integration is essential if the UK Armed Forces are to significantly increase their lethality. The MOD should (a) protect digital spend as a no-fail priority and (b) embed a culture of constant innovation with a target of minimum annual shift of 10% expenditure from current to next-generation capabilities on its enterprise digital platforms and services. To ensure accountability for delivery:
• Progress in establishing the fundamental capabilities of a core common platform—under the authority of the Chief Information Officer—should be reported to the Secretary of State on a quarterly basis.
• Progress should be catalysed through a single digital mission: to deliver a digital targeting web in 2027, requiring access, in whole or in part, to a Defence-wide Secret Cloud, with a minimum viable product available in 2026.
• The MOD should report to the Secretary of State by July 2026 on assurance of critical data flows, with a plan for scaling up dissemination and exploitation of data in warfare and across Defence.
• A new Digital Warfighter group should be established, with appropriate recruitment and pay freedoms, by July 2026. This new group should allow Defence to deploy digital and conventional warfighters on operations side-by-side.

To boost private investment in the defence and dual-use technology sectors, and to support new entrants and innovation, the MOD should develop a dedicated strategy for the financial services sector by March 2026. Important starting points include: establishing a Defence Investors' Advisory Group whose membership includes venture capital and private equity investors; and exploring alternative funding and financing models for Defence programmes and projects.

By December 2025, the MOD should establish a revitalised system for science and technology and innovation that more directly responds to the annual problem set provided by the MSHQ to the National Armaments Director (NAD). The MOD should reorganise existing structures into two new organisations under the National Armaments Director Group:
• A Defence Research and Evaluation organisation, focused on enabling external early-stage research. Highly expert Defence researchers should serve as affiliated faculty to partner universities, starting in the 2026–27 academic year.
• The UK Defence Innovation organisation, focused on harnessing commercial innovation, including dual-use technologies.
These two organisations should work in collaboration with the Chief Scientific Adviser. The NAD should set ambitious targets for pull through and scaling, reporting quarterly to the Secretary of State on these efforts.

The MOD must establish a new partnership with industry that maximises internal and industrial expertise, accelerates acquisition processes, manages risk and cost, and engages a wider set of suppliers. Greater agility and productivity should be delivered through service-agnostic capability portfolios and a segmented approach to procurement:
• Major modular platforms (contracting within two years).
• Pace-setting spiral and modular upgrades (contracting within a year).
• Rapid commercial exploitation (contracting within three months). This segment should benefit from protected funding, with at least 10% of the MOD's equipment procurement budget spent on novel technologies each year.
This new approach to market segmentation and capability portfolios should be established by March 2026.

To ensure long-term accountability for delivery:
• Two productivity Key Performance Indicators should be agreed for the National Armaments Director—one focused on departmental productivity (for which accountability should be shared with the Chief of the Defence Staff), and one externally focused on supply chain productivity.
• Senior Responsible Owners of service-agnostic capability portfolios and acquisition programmes for major modular platforms should remain in post for at least five years, without disadvantage to promotion.

By April 2026, the MOD should develop a package of support for its industrial partners that removes barriers to collaboration and drives better, more cost-effective results: reducing by at least 50% the burden of Defence Standards and Conditions; working across Government to amend the Single Source Contract Regulations; reforming regulations, Intellectual Property handling, and security clearance requirements; and providing access to intelligence, data, and test and evaluation sites.

The MOD should establish a mechanism for assessing the full implications of largescale capability partnerships with allies, including in NATO. This should be supported by a multilateral capability plan with NATO Allies that identifies capabilities for joint procurement, agrees common standards, and drives interoperability. Delivery would be enhanced by mutual recognition of well-founded test and evaluation regimes across the Alliance, saving time and money.

The UK must establish the necessary conditions for boosting defence exports and joint capability partnerships under the leadership of the National Armaments Director. This should include:
• Clear governance, accountability, and streamlined processes. Responsibility for UK Defence and Security Exports should be transferred from the Department for Business and Trade to the MOD. The MOD should coordinate with other relevant departments to achieve its export goals.
• A new framework for building and sustaining government-to-government relationships, including through ongoing military-to-military collaboration, with a view to delivering export opportunities for UK businesses.
• A review of export licensing policies. This should include considering how to improve prioritisation and provide clarity to industry and international partners.

The MOD must have a robust Balance of Investment process in which the Secretary of State has access to detailed analysis of through-life costings and the affordability of the proposed capability within the overall Defence portfolio. To support this:
• The MOD's Cost Assurance and Analysis Service must have 'open book' access to data and the authority and independence to provide regular advice to Ministers, including on overall budget affordability.
• The MOD must digitise acquisition and support processes as soon as funding allows.

The MOD must take a 'whole force', skills-based approach to workforce planning to deliver Defence outcomes and meet the evolving requirements of the Integrated Force over time. In the current strategic and fiscal situation:
• There should be no further reduction in the number of Regulars across the three Services.
• The number of Active Reserves should be increased by 20% when funding allows.
• Civil Service costs should be reduced by at least 10% by 2030.
For a truly 'One Defence' workforce, the Reserves and civil servants should have protected access to the necessary funding, time, and equipment for training alongside Regulars. To maximise existing resources, the MOD should seek to move all Regular personnel from administrative into front-line roles and should automate at least 20% of Human Resources, Finance, and Commercial functions by July 2028. This should be delivered as a minimum first step.

To create a workplace where all are empowered to deliver, the MOD must:
• Remove the red tape and excessive bureaucracy created by 'people' policy, process, and assurance. It should rewrite its 'people' policies in accordance with the principle of trust, starting with the top ten by May 2026. Technology should be used to make day-to-day processes such as claiming expenses and auditing easier, with positive and efficient user experience a key criterion.
• Develop a plan to prioritise and address the structural, behavioural, and leadership barriers to the creation of a more representative and meritocratic workforce that resolutely delivers a more capable warfighting and deterrent force. This plan should be established by June 2026. Recommendations for independent oversight of implementation should be made by October 2025.

Defence must offer novel ways of entry into the Armed Forces that attract more people from a wider range of backgrounds, submitting a plan with timelines for delivery to the Secretary of State by November 2025. Options include:
• Offering shorter commitments that appeal to more of society, including the MOD's forthcoming plans for 'gap years'.
• Developing a series of Tri-Service 'phase 0' camps to which applicants can report within 30 days of expressing initial interest, with suitable recruits offered roles at the camps' conclusion.
• Applying medical standards that are tailored to role types, accounting for advancements in medical treatments and reflecting shorter assumed periods of service. Terms and conditions can be changed to move liability for some pre-existing conditions to the applicant, thereby enabling many more who want to join on those terms to do so.

To aid retention, Defence should explore options to support Service personnel's aspirations for home ownership. This would strengthen the bond between those that serve and the communities that support them. It should be accompanied by an approach that reduces the frequency with which people must move to new locations if that is their preference, staying in roles longer or moving to roles in the same location.

To meet the changing needs of the Integrated Force, education must be 'whole force by default, single Service by exception'. By the end of 2026, Defence must establish a career education pathway for the whole force—Regulars, Reserves, and Civil Service—designed to respond to the changing ways of warfare over time and with NATO at its heart. To drive integration, the MSHQ should:
• Oversee which personnel undertake key courses at each stage of the education pathway.
• Direct the delivery of staff training from the Initial Staff Course up, with single Service input.
• Provide the required integrated elements of single Service courses.
• Own the funding for joint education to remove the incentives for single Services to 'opt out'.

Training and education must be adaptive to operational lessons, innovation, and research. The MOD must rewrite the relevant policy by January 2026, empowering those who deliver training to revise courses at speed and consulting them in the policy's design. The department should also:
• Develop a single virtual training environment that is integrated into Defence's common digital architecture, drawing on existing resources where this is beneficial. Procurement programmes must embed a requirement for a synthetic wrap and virtual training that is good enough to reduce reliance on live training.
• Adopt civilian qualifications and standards where possible and use civilian providers for education and training where it is available at a similar cost or less. A review of current standards, qualifications, and in-house training should be completed by the end of 2025. Where there are significant barriers to progress, the MOD should work with the Department for Education, other relevant Government departments, and industry to develop a plan to overcome them.

Defence must invest in foundational leadership, financial, commercial, and technology skills across the civilian and military workforce. This should include: the flexibility to reward the development of expertise in specialist areas, including through pay and promotion freedoms; and developing a two-way secondment programme with a focus on short-term, informal schemes that are effective and can be delivered quickly. A plan for delivery should be developed by March 2026.

The MOD should co-ordinate with other Government departments and agencies to prioritise the use of the defence instrument in support of UK defence and wider foreign policy. It should do so based on a new Defence Diplomacy Strategy to be completed by December 2025.

The UK should seek closer bilateral relations with NATO Allies to strengthen collective security in the Euro-Atlantic, developing cost-effective means of delivering priority capabilities and strengthening Europe's collective industrial base.

The MOD should explore further opportunities to bolster the UK's ironclad commitment to Ukraine. Options include industrial collaboration and—once the immediate conflict is over—developing Ukrainian access to new markets that shore up its defence industry as well as its future security.

The UK should ensure AUKUS and the Global Combat Air Programme are exemplars of co-innovation and industrial collaboration between allies. Underscoring its commitment to success, the UK should double down on both pillars of the AUKUS agreement, using Pillar 2 to test and develop a template for future technology partnerships.

To support the development of the Integrated Global Defence Network, the MOD should:
• Complete a review of its principal elements by April 2026, optimising Defence's overseas footprint for delivering its core roles (Chapter 3). This should be worked through in close coordination with the One HMG platform managed by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.
• Develop a military and civilian career stream for international defence engagement, creating deep understanding of regions of interest to the UK. Pathways to senior appointments should include completion of at least one international posting (with an emphasis on NATO), giving Defence access to a pool of deep expertise for more effective engagement across the world.

We welcome the Prime Minister's launch of a national conversation on defence and security. This should be centred on a two-year series of public outreach events across the UK, explaining current threats and future trends, the role wider society must play in the UK's security and resilience, and the rationale for investing more in defence and security as an insurance policy. Defence must play its part in this effort, with the Armed Forces becoming more visible in society. To achieve this, the MOD should:
• Work with the Department for Education to develop understanding of the Armed Forces among young people in schools.
• Expand in-school and community-based Cadet Forces across the country by 30% by 2030, with an ambition to reach 250,000 in the longer term. There should be greater focus within the Cadets on developing STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) skills and exploring modern technology. Defence, wider Government, and partnerships with the private sector must provide appropriate leadership, support, and funding to deliver this expansion.
• Immediately give the Defence Academy and other Defence centres of training and educational excellence commercial freedoms to operate, lifting the restriction that only irreducible spare capacity can be offered externally. By February 2026, the Defence Academy should establish a plan for inviting company leaders, from FTSE100 companies and wider, onto Defence courses as appropriate.

Much greater focus is needed on ensuring the UK's critical national infrastructure (CNI) is protected from attack below and above the threshold of war. Defence should more actively support the Cabinet Office in its work to set and enforce robust standards of protection and resilience for infrastructure, defining and prioritising the CNI on which Defence and wider Government relies in the first instance. A more comprehensive approach should include:
• Strengthening Government powers to protect CNI where necessary, completing the process of updating existing legislation or bringing forward new legislation by the end of this Parliament (2029).
• Exploring options for a 'new deal' for the protection of CNI in partnership with private-sector and allied operators. As part of this, the MOD should develop options for the protection of CNI in the event of crisis or conflict, including a new Reserve Force, with plans presented to the Secretary of State by December 2026.

Alongside plans for defending the UK in the event of war, Defence should work across Government to put in place a suite of measures that would significantly improve national readiness. Important areas of focus include:
• A new Defence Readiness Bill that gives the Government powers in reserve to respond effectively in the event of escalation towards a war involving the UK or its allies. The Bill should mandate annual reporting on UK warfighting readiness to facilitate external scrutiny.
• Ensuring plans made under the Home Defence Programme meet Defence's needs in the event of escalation to war, including mobilisation of Reserves and industry, and ensuring Defence has ready access to private-sector infrastructure for operations. This should be underpinned by legislation as necessary.
• Stepping up engagement with the Strategic Reserve, sustained through annual training and volunteer roles. A digitised approach to Reserves management should be established by January 2027.

Building on recent experimentation and existing acquisition plans, Defence must move further and faster to transform, moving to warfighting readiness across the Integrated Force. Priorities across the conventional elements of the Armed Forces over the next five years include:
• A shift towards greater use of autonomy and Artificial Intelligence. To support this, Defence should establish an initial operating capability for a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre by February 2026. The MOD should also create a protected Defence AI Investment Fund to accelerate the adoption of Artificial Intelligence across Defence, prioritising the most promising use-cases.
• Creating an 'always on' munitions production capacity, ready to scale up for higher-tempo production in the event of escalation to war.

The UK must facilitate greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. This should incorporate all domains and the entire spectrum of conflict, including high-intensity war against nuclear-armed states. Action should include:
• Further investment in conventional deep (long-range) precision strike and Integrated Air and Missile Defence (Chapter 7.4) to provide the broadest range of options for deterring and responding to high-impact threats.
• Strengthening NATO- and UK-led training and exercises, addressing potential escalation and conflict scenarios with nuclear-armed states.
• Commencing discussions with the United States and NATO on the potential benefits and feasibility of enhanced UK participation in NATO's nuclear mission.

The UK must continue to champion its nuclear responsibilities while seeking to renew the arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation regime, centred on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, the UK's priorities and objectives in seeking this renewal must be realistic about the absence of willing partners in Moscow and Beijing.

The National Security Council (Nuclear) committee of senior Ministers should review progress on the 'National Endeavour' for delivering the UK's nuclear deterrent at least twice a year. These meetings should bring together Ministers from all departments essential to its delivery.

The Government must take a comprehensive approach to improving industrial productivity as a key factor in delivering and maintaining the UK's nuclear deterrent. This includes:
• Ensuring it has the flexibility to incentivise industry investment in infrastructure and asset management. This should include serious consideration of amendments to the Single Source Contract Regulations.
• Removing barriers to productivity that sit outside industry's direct control. Projects such as the National Nuclear Strategic Plan for Skills and the Barrow Transformation Fund should be prioritised, with other Government departments committing to providing funding at the necessary pace and scale.
• Exploring opportunities for legislative reform that could, in extreme circumstances, direct industry to prioritise defence nuclear requirements in the sovereign supply chain or enable compulsory acquisition of assets where necessary to protect national security.

To avoid the costs of the past, the Government must commit to not extending the life of the Dreadnought class submarines beyond their intended end-of-service dates from the mid-2050s. It should start to define the requirement for the post-Dreadnought nuclear deterrent within this Parliament.

To sustain long-term support for the UK's nuclear deterrent and to ensure stability in delivering the portfolio, the Government should:
• Develop mechanisms for enhanced parliamentary scrutiny—under appropriate conditions—to provide confidence that taxpayer money is being spent wisely in pursuit of the nation's highest defence priority.
• Deliver a 'National Endeavour' public communications campaign that conveys the fundamental importance and necessity of the deterrent.
• Confirm the intended numbers of SSN attack submarines, including the next-generation attack submarines under the AUKUS partnership, as soon as possible to provide the necessary assumptions for the required build capacity and tempo.

The Royal Navy must play a new, leading and coordinating role in securing the UK's critical undersea infrastructure and maritime traffic that is vital to daily national life. As part of this, the Royal Navy must work with wider Government and commercial partners to develop enhanced maritime surveillance through existing and novel capabilities.

The Royal Navy must continue its transformation in the skills, equipment, and ways of operating needed for the 21st century maritime domain as part of an Integrated Force. This should include:
• Moving to a 'hybrid' carrier airwing, comprising crewed combat aircraft, autonomous collaborative platforms in the air, single-use drones, and, eventually, long-range missiles capable of being fired from the carrier deck.
• Rapid evolution of anti-submarine warfare through the integration of underwater, surface, and airborne drones (including Protector) with Type 26 frigates, P-8 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, and SSN attack submarines.
• Rapid evolution of mine-hunting to be delivered with autonomous platforms.
• Exploring possible development from a Type 45 destroyer to a minimally crewed or autonomous air dominance system that could integrate directed energy weapons and enable better connectivity to other assets within the UK's Integrated Air and Missile Defence system.

Given the global market for autonomous and uncrewed systems, the Royal Navy should engage with commercial partners—including private finance—and other Governments to rapidly deliver an integrated frigate force for anti-submarine warfare, comprising crewed, uncrewed, and autonomous platforms. This project—enhancing the capabilities of the Type 26—should be an exemplar of how private money is attracted to defence technology and linked to export-led opportunity under a new partnership with industry (Chapter 4.2).

More flexible regulation is needed to enable experimentation in areas such as autonomy. By April 2026, Defence should establish options to enhance the mandate of the Defence Maritime Regulator to allow the Royal Navy and industry to use a dedicated regulatory 'sandbox' to test and deploy new technologies.

The Royal Navy should explore alternative approaches to augmenting the Royal Fleet Auxiliary to deliver a balanced, cost-effective fleet that maximises the UK's warfighting capabilities. This may include using commercial vessels and burden-sharing capabilities with allies to augment assets such as the Fleet Solid Support ships in non-contested environments.

The Army must modernise the two divisions and the Corps HQ that it provides to NATO as one of the Alliance's two Strategic Reserves Corps (SRC). The SRC should be led by the Corps HQ (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps) and enabled by, and command, Corps-level capability. The first division should comprise a fully deployable Headquarters, three manoeuvre brigades with armoured and mechanised capabilities, support brigade, and associated enablers. Planning should include the integration of the Royal Marines Commando Force into the SRC when appropriate (Chapter 7.2).

The Army must accelerate the development and deployment of its new 'Recce-Strike' approach—combining existing capabilities and technologies, such as armoured platforms, with constantly evolving technology—as part of its efforts to modernise the SRC. It should be bolder in its ambition, seeking to increase lethality ten-fold.

The Army must evolve its mix of Regulars and Reserves, with a minimum of 100,000 soldiers, of which 73,000 are Regular. A small uplift in Regular personnel should be considered when funding allows (accounting for the costs of equipping and training these personnel), while the Army should benefit from the proposed 20% increase in Active Reserve numbers (Chapter 4.3). It should focus the current Active Reserve only on tasks that it can deliver well and with value for money. It must reconnect to its Strategic Reserve as a core aspect of military mobilisation planning (Chapter 6).

The Headquarters Standing Joint Command (UK) should command all UK military support to national resilience under the MSHQ and be resourced accordingly. It should also be deployed to lead wider efforts to reconnect Defence with society, as part of a 'whole-of-society' approach to deterrence and defence (Chapter 6).

Global crisis response at very high readiness in the land domain should be led by 16 Air Assault Brigade. Airborne parachute capability and capacity should remain focused on specialists and a single battalion group.

The RAF must stay at the leading edge of combat air's evolution, through the transition from exclusively crewed combat air platforms to a Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with a mix of crewed, uncrewed, and increasingly autonomous platforms, integrated into the UK's digital targeting web:
• To assure the future of UK combat air, investment in autonomous collaborative platforms (ACPs) should be considered alongside investment in FCAS and the Global Combat Air Programme. The ACPs must be designed to operate in collaboration with the fourth-, fifth- and future generations of combat aircraft and to operate from the UK aircraft carriers.
• More F-35s will be required over the next decade. This could comprise a mix of F-35A and B models according to military requirements to provide greater value for money.

The RAF must further enhance its agility and adaptability to build greater warfighting readiness by:
• Maintaining E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft. Further E-7 should be procured when funding allows (taking account of infrastructure and operating costs). This may be expedited by a cost-sharing arrangement with NATO Allies.
• Exploring providing Protector with a maritime surveillance capability, integrated with P-8 Poseidon maritime control and reconnaissance aircraft and Type 26 frigates.
• Initiating investment in improving the foundations of the UK's Integrated Air and Missile Defence capabilities to bolster home defence.
• Augmenting the existing fleet of A400M with either more A400M, civilian charter, and/or sponsored service options, reducing routine demand on RAF air transport that does not require military capability.

The RAF must drive greater productivity to enhance its resilience:
• RAF Brize Norton should be a high priority for investment and improvement in partnership with private finance, as part of a new partnership with industry (Chapters 4.2 and 7.11). Given it is not affordable to establish a military alternative to Brize Norton should it be unavailable for operations, alternative commercial facilities must be planned and, if necessary, legislated for under the new Defence Readiness Bill (Chapter 6).
• Hawk T187 and Hawk T2 should be replaced with a cost-effective fast jet trainer. The current flying training arrangements for fast jets must be urgently revised to optimise capacity, building in maximum use of contractors and provision for training overseas students.
• A review of storage and other standards is required to remove regulations that place unnecessary constraints on training and impose significant unnecessary cost in the lifecycle of highly expensive weapons. This review should be completed by June 2026.

The MOD should invest in the resilience of UK military space systems with a focus on space control, decision advantage, and capabilities that support the 'Understand' and 'Strike' functions. The department should periodically review the SKYNET 6A and SKYNET 6EC satellite communications programmes to ensure this capability will be resilient and operationally relevant upon entry into service.

In support of Integrated Air and Missile Defence in the Euro-Atlantic, the MOD should seek partners to develop a next-generation, overhead, persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability. This should provide the ability to sense, warn of, and track threats in the Euro-Atlantic.

By the end of 2025, the MOD should establish an initial operating capability for a new CyberEM Command within Strategic Command. This new command should emulate Space Command's blueprint for domain coherence: cohering, but not executing, military action across cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, and with responsibility for executing offensive cyber operations remaining with the National Cyber Force. CyberEM Command should be led by an officer with domain expertise and of sufficient rank to provide functional leadership within the UK system. It must be a 'whole force' endeavour, with its structure largely filled by a mixture of civilians and Reserves, given that greater expertise exists in the civilian sector. The workforce should be planned and developed as part of the Digital Warfighter group (Chapter 4.1).

The vital role of Permanent Joint Headquarters in commanding UK military operations means the MOD should ensure it is more resilient to both physical and cyber-attack.

Intelligence is foundational to the UK's deterrence and warfighting ability. Defence Intelligence (DI) must be equipped with the tools to attract, develop, and retain a motivated workforce. This might include pay and recruitment freedoms in line with the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC). To avoid counterproductive competition for potential applicants, Defence should work with other departments and agencies in the national security system to ensure a strong talent pipeline across Government, including through the development of:
• A cross-government national security workforce strategy.
• A strong training offer that nurtures critical specialist skills.
• Secondments for military personnel and civil servants, including into industry, to develop expertise in emerging technologies, cyber skills, and knowledge of best practice in technology adoption.

Defence should cohere and maximise its expert intelligence capabilities under a single enterprise, 'Military Intelligence Services' (MIS), by November 2025. DI's functional leadership of MIS should be underpinned by a new Defence Intelligence Charter that codifies its role and authorities.

To achieve interoperability with partners across Government, including UKIC, Defence should:
• Work to develop a coherent set of intelligence priorities and timely and secure data-sharing across Government by aligning with UKIC data standards and vetting procedures.
• Encourage a Government-wide review of handling processes for intelligence material to ensure it can be shared more readily in times of crisis and war.

By November 2025, the MOD must establish a single Defence Counter-Intelligence Unit within DI with a mandate to protect Defence from hostile intelligence services, working closely with UKIC.

The MOD must work closely with the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to ensure that the Defence Medical Services (DMS) and the NHS together have capacity to meet Defence medical needs, including in the most extreme circumstances. The two departments must conduct a sprint review of system-wide capacity and capability. Ministers in the MOD and DHSC must also have direct access to information on the collective readiness of Defence, the NHS, and private healthcare to meet the demands of warfighting and other strategic health emergencies involving DMS. An independent review board, akin to the US Defense Health Board, should assure ecosystem readiness, reporting periodically to Ministers, the Defence Board, and Parliament.

DMS should be empowered as the functional lead of a single Defence Medical Enterprise that meets personnel's healthcare needs in peacetime, on operations, and in war. As part of rebuilding DMS and the wider enterprise in line with NATO's Medical Action Plan, the MOD should:
• Invest in medical evacuation and medical stockpiles at a scale that matches military commitments and deployments, as well as critical capabilities like counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment.
• Create a 'whole force' plan that identifies workforce requirements, incentivisation, and measures to return non-deployable personnel to fighting fitness as quickly as possible as part of an enduring approach agreed with the NHS. Strategic Command should develop this plan by March 2026.
• Establish a ten-year physical infrastructure plan for Defence medical by February 2026, working closely with the Defence Infrastructure Organisation as it develops its own plan for recapitalisation across the Defence estate (Chapter 7.11). Resourcing options for medical infrastructure might include drawing on the NHS and private finance.

The MOD must deliver an overarching infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan to the Secretary of State by February 2026. The plan should identify (a) opportunities for drawing in private-sector expertise and capital as quickly as possible and (b) mechanisms for realising this potential as a matter of urgency. It should take account of the department's existing work under the Defence Housing Strategy and Defence Estate Optimisation programme.

The MOD's forthcoming Defence Housing Strategy, due later this year, must set out how it will (a) improve the overall standard of accommodation, in alignment with commercial best practice for ensuring high-quality, good-value accommodation and (b) widen eligibility for those in long-term relationships. Defence should prioritise and increase funding this Parliament for accommodation sites that are in most urgent need of repair.

Under the Recapitalisation Plan, the MOD must assess how best to generate income and maximise the value of its assets, adjusting the Defence Estate Optimisation programme accordingly. Where alternative use or disposal is the right option, the Defence Infrastructure Organisation must have a strategy for the risk-adjusted maximisation of proceeds, engaging actively with the private sector. Where proceeds are realised from housing development on Defence land, the MOD should ensure these are reinvested in the renewal or future development of military accommodation. Where Defence retains land, it must maximise the use of its assets, including through site development and energy generation. Cross-government and private-sector partnership is essential.

Long-term resolution of Defence infrastructure problems requires a highly professional approach to estate management that is digitally enabled and led by an experienced commercial and legal team. The MOD should:
• Ensure that infrastructure requirements are fully integrated into capability development and investment decisions.
• Ensure that Defence is making full use of a fully integrated, digital, real-time Estate Management system.
• Simplify and accelerate its commercial processes by adopting industry build standards and Cabinet Office contracts for standard services. There should be no bespoke Defence contracting and build requirements except where these are critical to infrastructure protection and/or resilience in time of crisis.
• Develop faster, more agile ways of working that are proportionate to the risk involved. Burdensome authorisation processes should be scrapped to avoid costly 'stop-start' project management.