Rycroft Review
Index summary
Independent review commissioned by the Secretary of State at MHCLG in December 2025 and chaired by Philip Rycroft, former Permanent Secretary at the Department for Exiting the European Union, to examine the risks to UK democracy from foreign financial influence. The review focuses on direct financial interference in the political process and foreign efforts to undermine trust in democracy through social media, making 17 recommendations covering political finance, party procedures, enforcement, online interference, lobbying, and government prioritisation. No formal government response has been published; the review endorsed legislative provisions in the Representation of the People Bill 2026 while arguing further measures are needed.
Original evidence
Government Response
HM Government response published 6 July 2026 (CP 1636) addresses each of the 17 recommendations by number, accepting ten, accepting four in principle, and setting out its position on the remaining three without a stated accept or reject decision.
Recommendations
Recommendation · source text
The Representation of the People Bill (RoPB) currently before Parliament will introduce a robust package of reforms to protect against foreign interference, improve transparency in political funding, strengthen due diligence requirements on donations and close existing loopholes. Together, these measures will increase public confidence in the integrity of our democratic institutions.
The government accepts recommendations 1 to 5 of the Rycroft Review and, where primary legislation is needed swiftly, will take forward their implementation through the RoPB.
In respect of recommendations relating to overseas donations and emerging financial risks (recommendations 1 and 3), the government has already confirmed its intention to introduce a cap on donations from overseas electors and a moratorium on donations made via cryptoassets.
While many donations from British citizens living abroad are legitimate and lawful, the government recognises the inherent complexity in tracing the true source of political donations made by overseas electors due to the very nature of their overseas residence. The government also recognises the concern raised by Mr Rycroft regarding the democratic fairness of allowing large donations from British citizens living – and therefore having their wealth taxed - abroad. A cap on the amount overseas electors can donate therefore provides an additional, proportionate safeguard against the risk of this route being used to channel illicit funds. An amendment to the RoPB will place an annual cap of £100,000 on the total value of donations an overseas elector may make, and/or regulated transactions (such as loans) that an overseas elector can participate in.
This cap will apply to all political donations from overseas electors made on or after 25 March 2026, so donations made following that date which exceed the cap will need to be returned. Regulated transactions involving an overseas elector as a participant that breach the rules will also become void upon the coming into force of the relevant provisions and any monies owed under them will have to be repaid. The full detail of how this retrospective period will operate has been set out in correspondence to political parties and published on GOV.UK for reference. The retrospective approach here is deemed necessary as there is a clear, time-critical risk of evasion that would otherwise undermine the purpose of this measure if brought in at a later date.
The cap will be accompanied by a “minimum residency” period during which an overseas elector who returns to the UK will remain subject to the £100,000 cap until they have been back in the UK for a full calendar year. This provision will also apply retrospectively from 25 March 2026 removing the opportunity for individuals to seek to circumvent the strengthened regime.
We will also apply the cap and a minimum residency period to other individuals who move to the UK and who were not registered as an overseas elector when outside the UK. We want to ensure that such individuals do not seek to get around these rules by moving to the UK before the rules come into effect. We will therefore apply retrospectively a slightly modified annual donation cap (£100,000 per recipient) for those individuals where they move to the UK and make a donation between the date of publication of this response to the Rycroft Review and the date of commencement of the measures. Once the measures have commenced, all donors will need to make a declaration at the point of donation to confirm their status as an overseas elector or as subject to the minimum residency period and that their aggregate donation remains within the annual cap, supporting effective compliance and enforcement.
The moratorium on political donations made via cryptoassets will apply to all political donations of any value made through cryptoassets on or after 25 March 2026, with a 30-day period following commencement of the provisions for any previously accepted cryptoasset donations to be returned or forfeited.
The anonymity inherent in cryptocurrency transactions creates a clear route for foreign or illicit actors to channel money into our politics, and that is why we agree that a moratorium is necessary until the regulatory environment around cryptoassets is robust enough to protect the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference.
In response to Recommendation 2, the existing provisions in the RoPB introduce strict new eligibility criteria which companies must meet in order to make political donations. Companies (and limited liability partnerships) making donations will be required to demonstrate a genuine and substantive connection to the UK or Ireland, preventing the use of shell companies to channel foreign or illicit money into UK politics.
The Review highlights loopholes in this proposed system, which the government accepts in full. We will therefore introduce an amendment to the RoPB to replace the revenue test with a post-tax profit test measured over five years. This will enable corporate permissibility to be assessed against profits rather than revenue, closing a key loophole and strengthening the integrity of corporate political finance. Some legitimate companies are not set up with the explicit purpose of making profit, and it would not be fair to automatically exclude them from making political donations where they would otherwise be able to donate. Therefore, we will use a definition of profit which accommodates different types of organisations.
It is imperative we ensure the package of reforms in this area are coherent, robust and enforceable. We are therefore also introducing a requirement for donors making donations over a certain threshold to submit a declaration. This will ensure that both recipients of donations and the Electoral Commission have the information necessary to comply with and enforce the law.
Further, recognising the residual concerns that bad actors could still use cryptoassets to channel impermissible funds into fiat currency and make a political donation, the declaration will require the donor to state whether the funds have been converted from cryptoassets. Where fiat funds have come from cryptoassets, we will oblige recipients to take extra steps to determine that the funds are permissible.
The approach of a declaration for all donors making donations over a certain threshold is necessary to fully and effectively implement the recommendations from the Review, and we will take care to ensure that the declaration process is designed in such a way as to achieve this without creating unnecessary administrative burden for parties and donors. We will consult with the Electoral Commission and political parties over the coming weeks on the detail of this declaration and its practical operation, in order to achieve this.
With regard to recommendation 4, the government accepts the case for strengthening the rules for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity to ensure non-party campaigner and candidate spending are from permissible donors, thereby strengthening protections against foreign financial interference.
Through the RoPB we will introduce permissibility requirements for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity: candidates will be required to provide a declaration to confirm donations used to fund campaign activity prior to an election are from permissible sources, addressing the current gap outside of the regulated period associated with an election and for non-incumbent candidates. In addition, donations received prior to candidacy which exceed £2,230 will need to be declared by candidates, providing a practical means of ensuring transparency and enforceability of the regime.
Mr Rycroft also makes recommendations regarding non-party campaigners and campaigning definitions. We agree that the current rules fall short of protecting against foreign interference in our democracy and political discourse. It is imperative, however, that any action in this area focuses on impermissible and malign activity, and does not unduly limit or burden individuals and campaign groups in exercising their right to civic advocacy and democratic participation. As Mr Rycroft recommends, we therefore commit to consultation and further work to develop proposals to amend the non-party campaigning rules.
In response to recommendation 5, the government agrees that strengthened “know your donor” requirements are essential to mitigating the risks of illegitimate or foreign funding. The new “Know Your Donor” (KYD) scheme being introduced via the RoPB will require recipients of donations over £11,180 to consider the risk of those donations being from illegitimate sources.
As recommended, we will enhance the currently proposed scheme by including ‘location’ as an explicit risk factor in donations checks. We agree with Mr Rycroft that ‘large-value donations’ warrant extra due diligence. The value of a donation is already captured within existing risk assessment factors in our current measure, and we commit to working with the Electoral Commission with regard reinforcing the risk associated with very large donations through guidance.
This approach will therefore support more effective due diligence as recommended by the Rycroft Review, whilst maintaining “Know Your Donor” as a risk-based, enforceable regime designed to achieve a comparable protective effect to the anti-money laundering standards without duplicating existing regulatory regimes.
Taken together, these reforms build on those already brought forward in the RoPB to deliver a significant strengthening of the UK’s political finance framework. The government will continue to work closely with Parliament, the Electoral Commission and other stakeholders to ensure that these measures are implemented effectively and proportionately, reinforcing confidence in the resilience and integrity of our democratic system.
Recommendation · source text
The Representation of the People Bill (RoPB) currently before Parliament will introduce a robust package of reforms to protect against foreign interference, improve transparency in political funding, strengthen due diligence requirements on donations and close existing loopholes. Together, these measures will increase public confidence in the integrity of our democratic institutions.
The government accepts recommendations 1 to 5 of the Rycroft Review and, where primary legislation is needed swiftly, will take forward their implementation through the RoPB.
In respect of recommendations relating to overseas donations and emerging financial risks (recommendations 1 and 3), the government has already confirmed its intention to introduce a cap on donations from overseas electors and a moratorium on donations made via cryptoassets.
While many donations from British citizens living abroad are legitimate and lawful, the government recognises the inherent complexity in tracing the true source of political donations made by overseas electors due to the very nature of their overseas residence. The government also recognises the concern raised by Mr Rycroft regarding the democratic fairness of allowing large donations from British citizens living – and therefore having their wealth taxed - abroad. A cap on the amount overseas electors can donate therefore provides an additional, proportionate safeguard against the risk of this route being used to channel illicit funds. An amendment to the RoPB will place an annual cap of £100,000 on the total value of donations an overseas elector may make, and/or regulated transactions (such as loans) that an overseas elector can participate in.
This cap will apply to all political donations from overseas electors made on or after 25 March 2026, so donations made following that date which exceed the cap will need to be returned. Regulated transactions involving an overseas elector as a participant that breach the rules will also become void upon the coming into force of the relevant provisions and any monies owed under them will have to be repaid. The full detail of how this retrospective period will operate has been set out in correspondence to political parties and published on GOV.UK for reference. The retrospective approach here is deemed necessary as there is a clear, time-critical risk of evasion that would otherwise undermine the purpose of this measure if brought in at a later date.
The cap will be accompanied by a “minimum residency” period during which an overseas elector who returns to the UK will remain subject to the £100,000 cap until they have been back in the UK for a full calendar year. This provision will also apply retrospectively from 25 March 2026 removing the opportunity for individuals to seek to circumvent the strengthened regime.
We will also apply the cap and a minimum residency period to other individuals who move to the UK and who were not registered as an overseas elector when outside the UK. We want to ensure that such individuals do not seek to get around these rules by moving to the UK before the rules come into effect. We will therefore apply retrospectively a slightly modified annual donation cap (£100,000 per recipient) for those individuals where they move to the UK and make a donation between the date of publication of this response to the Rycroft Review and the date of commencement of the measures. Once the measures have commenced, all donors will need to make a declaration at the point of donation to confirm their status as an overseas elector or as subject to the minimum residency period and that their aggregate donation remains within the annual cap, supporting effective compliance and enforcement.
The moratorium on political donations made via cryptoassets will apply to all political donations of any value made through cryptoassets on or after 25 March 2026, with a 30-day period following commencement of the provisions for any previously accepted cryptoasset donations to be returned or forfeited.
The anonymity inherent in cryptocurrency transactions creates a clear route for foreign or illicit actors to channel money into our politics, and that is why we agree that a moratorium is necessary until the regulatory environment around cryptoassets is robust enough to protect the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference.
In response to Recommendation 2, the existing provisions in the RoPB introduce strict new eligibility criteria which companies must meet in order to make political donations. Companies (and limited liability partnerships) making donations will be required to demonstrate a genuine and substantive connection to the UK or Ireland, preventing the use of shell companies to channel foreign or illicit money into UK politics.
The Review highlights loopholes in this proposed system, which the government accepts in full. We will therefore introduce an amendment to the RoPB to replace the revenue test with a post-tax profit test measured over five years. This will enable corporate permissibility to be assessed against profits rather than revenue, closing a key loophole and strengthening the integrity of corporate political finance. Some legitimate companies are not set up with the explicit purpose of making profit, and it would not be fair to automatically exclude them from making political donations where they would otherwise be able to donate. Therefore, we will use a definition of profit which accommodates different types of organisations.
It is imperative we ensure the package of reforms in this area are coherent, robust and enforceable. We are therefore also introducing a requirement for donors making donations over a certain threshold to submit a declaration. This will ensure that both recipients of donations and the Electoral Commission have the information necessary to comply with and enforce the law.
Further, recognising the residual concerns that bad actors could still use cryptoassets to channel impermissible funds into fiat currency and make a political donation, the declaration will require the donor to state whether the funds have been converted from cryptoassets. Where fiat funds have come from cryptoassets, we will oblige recipients to take extra steps to determine that the funds are permissible.
The approach of a declaration for all donors making donations over a certain threshold is necessary to fully and effectively implement the recommendations from the Review, and we will take care to ensure that the declaration process is designed in such a way as to achieve this without creating unnecessary administrative burden for parties and donors. We will consult with the Electoral Commission and political parties over the coming weeks on the detail of this declaration and its practical operation, in order to achieve this.
With regard to recommendation 4, the government accepts the case for strengthening the rules for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity to ensure non-party campaigner and candidate spending are from permissible donors, thereby strengthening protections against foreign financial interference.
Through the RoPB we will introduce permissibility requirements for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity: candidates will be required to provide a declaration to confirm donations used to fund campaign activity prior to an election are from permissible sources, addressing the current gap outside of the regulated period associated with an election and for non-incumbent candidates. In addition, donations received prior to candidacy which exceed £2,230 will need to be declared by candidates, providing a practical means of ensuring transparency and enforceability of the regime.
Mr Rycroft also makes recommendations regarding non-party campaigners and campaigning definitions. We agree that the current rules fall short of protecting against foreign interference in our democracy and political discourse. It is imperative, however, that any action in this area focuses on impermissible and malign activity, and does not unduly limit or burden individuals and campaign groups in exercising their right to civic advocacy and democratic participation. As Mr Rycroft recommends, we therefore commit to consultation and further work to develop proposals to amend the non-party campaigning rules.
In response to recommendation 5, the government agrees that strengthened “know your donor” requirements are essential to mitigating the risks of illegitimate or foreign funding. The new “Know Your Donor” (KYD) scheme being introduced via the RoPB will require recipients of donations over £11,180 to consider the risk of those donations being from illegitimate sources.
As recommended, we will enhance the currently proposed scheme by including ‘location’ as an explicit risk factor in donations checks. We agree with Mr Rycroft that ‘large-value donations’ warrant extra due diligence. The value of a donation is already captured within existing risk assessment factors in our current measure, and we commit to working with the Electoral Commission with regard reinforcing the risk associated with very large donations through guidance.
This approach will therefore support more effective due diligence as recommended by the Rycroft Review, whilst maintaining “Know Your Donor” as a risk-based, enforceable regime designed to achieve a comparable protective effect to the anti-money laundering standards without duplicating existing regulatory regimes.
Taken together, these reforms build on those already brought forward in the RoPB to deliver a significant strengthening of the UK’s political finance framework. The government will continue to work closely with Parliament, the Electoral Commission and other stakeholders to ensure that these measures are implemented effectively and proportionately, reinforcing confidence in the resilience and integrity of our democratic system.
Recommendation · source text
The Representation of the People Bill (RoPB) currently before Parliament will introduce a robust package of reforms to protect against foreign interference, improve transparency in political funding, strengthen due diligence requirements on donations and close existing loopholes. Together, these measures will increase public confidence in the integrity of our democratic institutions.
The government accepts recommendations 1 to 5 of the Rycroft Review and, where primary legislation is needed swiftly, will take forward their implementation through the RoPB.
In respect of recommendations relating to overseas donations and emerging financial risks (recommendations 1 and 3), the government has already confirmed its intention to introduce a cap on donations from overseas electors and a moratorium on donations made via cryptoassets.
While many donations from British citizens living abroad are legitimate and lawful, the government recognises the inherent complexity in tracing the true source of political donations made by overseas electors due to the very nature of their overseas residence. The government also recognises the concern raised by Mr Rycroft regarding the democratic fairness of allowing large donations from British citizens living – and therefore having their wealth taxed - abroad. A cap on the amount overseas electors can donate therefore provides an additional, proportionate safeguard against the risk of this route being used to channel illicit funds. An amendment to the RoPB will place an annual cap of £100,000 on the total value of donations an overseas elector may make, and/or regulated transactions (such as loans) that an overseas elector can participate in.
This cap will apply to all political donations from overseas electors made on or after 25 March 2026, so donations made following that date which exceed the cap will need to be returned. Regulated transactions involving an overseas elector as a participant that breach the rules will also become void upon the coming into force of the relevant provisions and any monies owed under them will have to be repaid. The full detail of how this retrospective period will operate has been set out in correspondence to political parties and published on GOV.UK for reference. The retrospective approach here is deemed necessary as there is a clear, time-critical risk of evasion that would otherwise undermine the purpose of this measure if brought in at a later date.
The cap will be accompanied by a “minimum residency” period during which an overseas elector who returns to the UK will remain subject to the £100,000 cap until they have been back in the UK for a full calendar year. This provision will also apply retrospectively from 25 March 2026 removing the opportunity for individuals to seek to circumvent the strengthened regime.
We will also apply the cap and a minimum residency period to other individuals who move to the UK and who were not registered as an overseas elector when outside the UK. We want to ensure that such individuals do not seek to get around these rules by moving to the UK before the rules come into effect. We will therefore apply retrospectively a slightly modified annual donation cap (£100,000 per recipient) for those individuals where they move to the UK and make a donation between the date of publication of this response to the Rycroft Review and the date of commencement of the measures. Once the measures have commenced, all donors will need to make a declaration at the point of donation to confirm their status as an overseas elector or as subject to the minimum residency period and that their aggregate donation remains within the annual cap, supporting effective compliance and enforcement.
The moratorium on political donations made via cryptoassets will apply to all political donations of any value made through cryptoassets on or after 25 March 2026, with a 30-day period following commencement of the provisions for any previously accepted cryptoasset donations to be returned or forfeited.
The anonymity inherent in cryptocurrency transactions creates a clear route for foreign or illicit actors to channel money into our politics, and that is why we agree that a moratorium is necessary until the regulatory environment around cryptoassets is robust enough to protect the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference.
In response to Recommendation 2, the existing provisions in the RoPB introduce strict new eligibility criteria which companies must meet in order to make political donations. Companies (and limited liability partnerships) making donations will be required to demonstrate a genuine and substantive connection to the UK or Ireland, preventing the use of shell companies to channel foreign or illicit money into UK politics.
The Review highlights loopholes in this proposed system, which the government accepts in full. We will therefore introduce an amendment to the RoPB to replace the revenue test with a post-tax profit test measured over five years. This will enable corporate permissibility to be assessed against profits rather than revenue, closing a key loophole and strengthening the integrity of corporate political finance. Some legitimate companies are not set up with the explicit purpose of making profit, and it would not be fair to automatically exclude them from making political donations where they would otherwise be able to donate. Therefore, we will use a definition of profit which accommodates different types of organisations.
It is imperative we ensure the package of reforms in this area are coherent, robust and enforceable. We are therefore also introducing a requirement for donors making donations over a certain threshold to submit a declaration. This will ensure that both recipients of donations and the Electoral Commission have the information necessary to comply with and enforce the law.
Further, recognising the residual concerns that bad actors could still use cryptoassets to channel impermissible funds into fiat currency and make a political donation, the declaration will require the donor to state whether the funds have been converted from cryptoassets. Where fiat funds have come from cryptoassets, we will oblige recipients to take extra steps to determine that the funds are permissible.
The approach of a declaration for all donors making donations over a certain threshold is necessary to fully and effectively implement the recommendations from the Review, and we will take care to ensure that the declaration process is designed in such a way as to achieve this without creating unnecessary administrative burden for parties and donors. We will consult with the Electoral Commission and political parties over the coming weeks on the detail of this declaration and its practical operation, in order to achieve this.
With regard to recommendation 4, the government accepts the case for strengthening the rules for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity to ensure non-party campaigner and candidate spending are from permissible donors, thereby strengthening protections against foreign financial interference.
Through the RoPB we will introduce permissibility requirements for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity: candidates will be required to provide a declaration to confirm donations used to fund campaign activity prior to an election are from permissible sources, addressing the current gap outside of the regulated period associated with an election and for non-incumbent candidates. In addition, donations received prior to candidacy which exceed £2,230 will need to be declared by candidates, providing a practical means of ensuring transparency and enforceability of the regime.
Mr Rycroft also makes recommendations regarding non-party campaigners and campaigning definitions. We agree that the current rules fall short of protecting against foreign interference in our democracy and political discourse. It is imperative, however, that any action in this area focuses on impermissible and malign activity, and does not unduly limit or burden individuals and campaign groups in exercising their right to civic advocacy and democratic participation. As Mr Rycroft recommends, we therefore commit to consultation and further work to develop proposals to amend the non-party campaigning rules.
In response to recommendation 5, the government agrees that strengthened “know your donor” requirements are essential to mitigating the risks of illegitimate or foreign funding. The new “Know Your Donor” (KYD) scheme being introduced via the RoPB will require recipients of donations over £11,180 to consider the risk of those donations being from illegitimate sources.
As recommended, we will enhance the currently proposed scheme by including ‘location’ as an explicit risk factor in donations checks. We agree with Mr Rycroft that ‘large-value donations’ warrant extra due diligence. The value of a donation is already captured within existing risk assessment factors in our current measure, and we commit to working with the Electoral Commission with regard reinforcing the risk associated with very large donations through guidance.
This approach will therefore support more effective due diligence as recommended by the Rycroft Review, whilst maintaining “Know Your Donor” as a risk-based, enforceable regime designed to achieve a comparable protective effect to the anti-money laundering standards without duplicating existing regulatory regimes.
Taken together, these reforms build on those already brought forward in the RoPB to deliver a significant strengthening of the UK’s political finance framework. The government will continue to work closely with Parliament, the Electoral Commission and other stakeholders to ensure that these measures are implemented effectively and proportionately, reinforcing confidence in the resilience and integrity of our democratic system.
Recommendation · source text
The Representation of the People Bill (RoPB) currently before Parliament will introduce a robust package of reforms to protect against foreign interference, improve transparency in political funding, strengthen due diligence requirements on donations and close existing loopholes. Together, these measures will increase public confidence in the integrity of our democratic institutions.
The government accepts recommendations 1 to 5 of the Rycroft Review and, where primary legislation is needed swiftly, will take forward their implementation through the RoPB.
In respect of recommendations relating to overseas donations and emerging financial risks (recommendations 1 and 3), the government has already confirmed its intention to introduce a cap on donations from overseas electors and a moratorium on donations made via cryptoassets.
While many donations from British citizens living abroad are legitimate and lawful, the government recognises the inherent complexity in tracing the true source of political donations made by overseas electors due to the very nature of their overseas residence. The government also recognises the concern raised by Mr Rycroft regarding the democratic fairness of allowing large donations from British citizens living – and therefore having their wealth taxed - abroad. A cap on the amount overseas electors can donate therefore provides an additional, proportionate safeguard against the risk of this route being used to channel illicit funds. An amendment to the RoPB will place an annual cap of £100,000 on the total value of donations an overseas elector may make, and/or regulated transactions (such as loans) that an overseas elector can participate in.
This cap will apply to all political donations from overseas electors made on or after 25 March 2026, so donations made following that date which exceed the cap will need to be returned. Regulated transactions involving an overseas elector as a participant that breach the rules will also become void upon the coming into force of the relevant provisions and any monies owed under them will have to be repaid. The full detail of how this retrospective period will operate has been set out in correspondence to political parties and published on GOV.UK for reference. The retrospective approach here is deemed necessary as there is a clear, time-critical risk of evasion that would otherwise undermine the purpose of this measure if brought in at a later date.
The cap will be accompanied by a “minimum residency” period during which an overseas elector who returns to the UK will remain subject to the £100,000 cap until they have been back in the UK for a full calendar year. This provision will also apply retrospectively from 25 March 2026 removing the opportunity for individuals to seek to circumvent the strengthened regime.
We will also apply the cap and a minimum residency period to other individuals who move to the UK and who were not registered as an overseas elector when outside the UK. We want to ensure that such individuals do not seek to get around these rules by moving to the UK before the rules come into effect. We will therefore apply retrospectively a slightly modified annual donation cap (£100,000 per recipient) for those individuals where they move to the UK and make a donation between the date of publication of this response to the Rycroft Review and the date of commencement of the measures. Once the measures have commenced, all donors will need to make a declaration at the point of donation to confirm their status as an overseas elector or as subject to the minimum residency period and that their aggregate donation remains within the annual cap, supporting effective compliance and enforcement.
The moratorium on political donations made via cryptoassets will apply to all political donations of any value made through cryptoassets on or after 25 March 2026, with a 30-day period following commencement of the provisions for any previously accepted cryptoasset donations to be returned or forfeited.
The anonymity inherent in cryptocurrency transactions creates a clear route for foreign or illicit actors to channel money into our politics, and that is why we agree that a moratorium is necessary until the regulatory environment around cryptoassets is robust enough to protect the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference.
In response to Recommendation 2, the existing provisions in the RoPB introduce strict new eligibility criteria which companies must meet in order to make political donations. Companies (and limited liability partnerships) making donations will be required to demonstrate a genuine and substantive connection to the UK or Ireland, preventing the use of shell companies to channel foreign or illicit money into UK politics.
The Review highlights loopholes in this proposed system, which the government accepts in full. We will therefore introduce an amendment to the RoPB to replace the revenue test with a post-tax profit test measured over five years. This will enable corporate permissibility to be assessed against profits rather than revenue, closing a key loophole and strengthening the integrity of corporate political finance. Some legitimate companies are not set up with the explicit purpose of making profit, and it would not be fair to automatically exclude them from making political donations where they would otherwise be able to donate. Therefore, we will use a definition of profit which accommodates different types of organisations.
It is imperative we ensure the package of reforms in this area are coherent, robust and enforceable. We are therefore also introducing a requirement for donors making donations over a certain threshold to submit a declaration. This will ensure that both recipients of donations and the Electoral Commission have the information necessary to comply with and enforce the law.
Further, recognising the residual concerns that bad actors could still use cryptoassets to channel impermissible funds into fiat currency and make a political donation, the declaration will require the donor to state whether the funds have been converted from cryptoassets. Where fiat funds have come from cryptoassets, we will oblige recipients to take extra steps to determine that the funds are permissible.
The approach of a declaration for all donors making donations over a certain threshold is necessary to fully and effectively implement the recommendations from the Review, and we will take care to ensure that the declaration process is designed in such a way as to achieve this without creating unnecessary administrative burden for parties and donors. We will consult with the Electoral Commission and political parties over the coming weeks on the detail of this declaration and its practical operation, in order to achieve this.
With regard to recommendation 4, the government accepts the case for strengthening the rules for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity to ensure non-party campaigner and candidate spending are from permissible donors, thereby strengthening protections against foreign financial interference.
Through the RoPB we will introduce permissibility requirements for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity: candidates will be required to provide a declaration to confirm donations used to fund campaign activity prior to an election are from permissible sources, addressing the current gap outside of the regulated period associated with an election and for non-incumbent candidates. In addition, donations received prior to candidacy which exceed £2,230 will need to be declared by candidates, providing a practical means of ensuring transparency and enforceability of the regime.
Mr Rycroft also makes recommendations regarding non-party campaigners and campaigning definitions. We agree that the current rules fall short of protecting against foreign interference in our democracy and political discourse. It is imperative, however, that any action in this area focuses on impermissible and malign activity, and does not unduly limit or burden individuals and campaign groups in exercising their right to civic advocacy and democratic participation. As Mr Rycroft recommends, we therefore commit to consultation and further work to develop proposals to amend the non-party campaigning rules.
In response to recommendation 5, the government agrees that strengthened “know your donor” requirements are essential to mitigating the risks of illegitimate or foreign funding. The new “Know Your Donor” (KYD) scheme being introduced via the RoPB will require recipients of donations over £11,180 to consider the risk of those donations being from illegitimate sources.
As recommended, we will enhance the currently proposed scheme by including ‘location’ as an explicit risk factor in donations checks. We agree with Mr Rycroft that ‘large-value donations’ warrant extra due diligence. The value of a donation is already captured within existing risk assessment factors in our current measure, and we commit to working with the Electoral Commission with regard reinforcing the risk associated with very large donations through guidance.
This approach will therefore support more effective due diligence as recommended by the Rycroft Review, whilst maintaining “Know Your Donor” as a risk-based, enforceable regime designed to achieve a comparable protective effect to the anti-money laundering standards without duplicating existing regulatory regimes.
Taken together, these reforms build on those already brought forward in the RoPB to deliver a significant strengthening of the UK’s political finance framework. The government will continue to work closely with Parliament, the Electoral Commission and other stakeholders to ensure that these measures are implemented effectively and proportionately, reinforcing confidence in the resilience and integrity of our democratic system.
Recommendation · source text
The Representation of the People Bill (RoPB) currently before Parliament will introduce a robust package of reforms to protect against foreign interference, improve transparency in political funding, strengthen due diligence requirements on donations and close existing loopholes. Together, these measures will increase public confidence in the integrity of our democratic institutions.
The government accepts recommendations 1 to 5 of the Rycroft Review and, where primary legislation is needed swiftly, will take forward their implementation through the RoPB.
In respect of recommendations relating to overseas donations and emerging financial risks (recommendations 1 and 3), the government has already confirmed its intention to introduce a cap on donations from overseas electors and a moratorium on donations made via cryptoassets.
While many donations from British citizens living abroad are legitimate and lawful, the government recognises the inherent complexity in tracing the true source of political donations made by overseas electors due to the very nature of their overseas residence. The government also recognises the concern raised by Mr Rycroft regarding the democratic fairness of allowing large donations from British citizens living – and therefore having their wealth taxed - abroad. A cap on the amount overseas electors can donate therefore provides an additional, proportionate safeguard against the risk of this route being used to channel illicit funds. An amendment to the RoPB will place an annual cap of £100,000 on the total value of donations an overseas elector may make, and/or regulated transactions (such as loans) that an overseas elector can participate in.
This cap will apply to all political donations from overseas electors made on or after 25 March 2026, so donations made following that date which exceed the cap will need to be returned. Regulated transactions involving an overseas elector as a participant that breach the rules will also become void upon the coming into force of the relevant provisions and any monies owed under them will have to be repaid. The full detail of how this retrospective period will operate has been set out in correspondence to political parties and published on GOV.UK for reference. The retrospective approach here is deemed necessary as there is a clear, time-critical risk of evasion that would otherwise undermine the purpose of this measure if brought in at a later date.
The cap will be accompanied by a “minimum residency” period during which an overseas elector who returns to the UK will remain subject to the £100,000 cap until they have been back in the UK for a full calendar year. This provision will also apply retrospectively from 25 March 2026 removing the opportunity for individuals to seek to circumvent the strengthened regime.
We will also apply the cap and a minimum residency period to other individuals who move to the UK and who were not registered as an overseas elector when outside the UK. We want to ensure that such individuals do not seek to get around these rules by moving to the UK before the rules come into effect. We will therefore apply retrospectively a slightly modified annual donation cap (£100,000 per recipient) for those individuals where they move to the UK and make a donation between the date of publication of this response to the Rycroft Review and the date of commencement of the measures. Once the measures have commenced, all donors will need to make a declaration at the point of donation to confirm their status as an overseas elector or as subject to the minimum residency period and that their aggregate donation remains within the annual cap, supporting effective compliance and enforcement.
The moratorium on political donations made via cryptoassets will apply to all political donations of any value made through cryptoassets on or after 25 March 2026, with a 30-day period following commencement of the provisions for any previously accepted cryptoasset donations to be returned or forfeited.
The anonymity inherent in cryptocurrency transactions creates a clear route for foreign or illicit actors to channel money into our politics, and that is why we agree that a moratorium is necessary until the regulatory environment around cryptoassets is robust enough to protect the integrity of our political finance system from foreign interference.
In response to Recommendation 2, the existing provisions in the RoPB introduce strict new eligibility criteria which companies must meet in order to make political donations. Companies (and limited liability partnerships) making donations will be required to demonstrate a genuine and substantive connection to the UK or Ireland, preventing the use of shell companies to channel foreign or illicit money into UK politics.
The Review highlights loopholes in this proposed system, which the government accepts in full. We will therefore introduce an amendment to the RoPB to replace the revenue test with a post-tax profit test measured over five years. This will enable corporate permissibility to be assessed against profits rather than revenue, closing a key loophole and strengthening the integrity of corporate political finance. Some legitimate companies are not set up with the explicit purpose of making profit, and it would not be fair to automatically exclude them from making political donations where they would otherwise be able to donate. Therefore, we will use a definition of profit which accommodates different types of organisations.
It is imperative we ensure the package of reforms in this area are coherent, robust and enforceable. We are therefore also introducing a requirement for donors making donations over a certain threshold to submit a declaration. This will ensure that both recipients of donations and the Electoral Commission have the information necessary to comply with and enforce the law.
Further, recognising the residual concerns that bad actors could still use cryptoassets to channel impermissible funds into fiat currency and make a political donation, the declaration will require the donor to state whether the funds have been converted from cryptoassets. Where fiat funds have come from cryptoassets, we will oblige recipients to take extra steps to determine that the funds are permissible.
The approach of a declaration for all donors making donations over a certain threshold is necessary to fully and effectively implement the recommendations from the Review, and we will take care to ensure that the declaration process is designed in such a way as to achieve this without creating unnecessary administrative burden for parties and donors. We will consult with the Electoral Commission and political parties over the coming weeks on the detail of this declaration and its practical operation, in order to achieve this.
With regard to recommendation 4, the government accepts the case for strengthening the rules for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity to ensure non-party campaigner and candidate spending are from permissible donors, thereby strengthening protections against foreign financial interference.
Through the RoPB we will introduce permissibility requirements for candidate donations used to fund campaign activity: candidates will be required to provide a declaration to confirm donations used to fund campaign activity prior to an election are from permissible sources, addressing the current gap outside of the regulated period associated with an election and for non-incumbent candidates. In addition, donations received prior to candidacy which exceed £2,230 will need to be declared by candidates, providing a practical means of ensuring transparency and enforceability of the regime.
Mr Rycroft also makes recommendations regarding non-party campaigners and campaigning definitions. We agree that the current rules fall short of protecting against foreign interference in our democracy and political discourse. It is imperative, however, that any action in this area focuses on impermissible and malign activity, and does not unduly limit or burden individuals and campaign groups in exercising their right to civic advocacy and democratic participation. As Mr Rycroft recommends, we therefore commit to consultation and further work to develop proposals to amend the non-party campaigning rules.
In response to recommendation 5, the government agrees that strengthened “know your donor” requirements are essential to mitigating the risks of illegitimate or foreign funding. The new “Know Your Donor” (KYD) scheme being introduced via the RoPB will require recipients of donations over £11,180 to consider the risk of those donations being from illegitimate sources.
As recommended, we will enhance the currently proposed scheme by including ‘location’ as an explicit risk factor in donations checks. We agree with Mr Rycroft that ‘large-value donations’ warrant extra due diligence. The value of a donation is already captured within existing risk assessment factors in our current measure, and we commit to working with the Electoral Commission with regard reinforcing the risk associated with very large donations through guidance.
This approach will therefore support more effective due diligence as recommended by the Rycroft Review, whilst maintaining “Know Your Donor” as a risk-based, enforceable regime designed to achieve a comparable protective effect to the anti-money laundering standards without duplicating existing regulatory regimes.
Taken together, these reforms build on those already brought forward in the RoPB to deliver a significant strengthening of the UK’s political finance framework. The government will continue to work closely with Parliament, the Electoral Commission and other stakeholders to ensure that these measures are implemented effectively and proportionately, reinforcing confidence in the resilience and integrity of our democratic system.
Recommendation · source text
We recognise the importance of having clear and robust procedures in place and the value this brings to strengthening parties’ internal resilience while providing a consistent framework to manage and mitigate the risks of foreign financial interference. Discussions are ongoing, and we stand ready to support the Electoral Commission in the actions it takes in line with its regulatory responsibilities.
We will continue to work collaboratively with the Electoral Commission and wider stakeholders to ensure that any measures are effectively implemented, drawing on the government’s wider programme of electoral reform.
Recommendation · source text
Transparency in how political parties and campaigners report their finances is a critical component of that system. The government agrees with the Review that greater standardisation of reporting formats would support improved scrutiny, enhance comparability of data and strengthen accountability across the political finance regime.
The government therefore accepts recommendation 7 of the Review and will legislate through the RoPB to provide the Electoral Commission with a clear and consistent statutory basis to prescribe standardised reporting formats for political finance returns across the political finance regime. In doing so, we will amend the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) to align the relevant provisions across party campaign spending, third-party campaigning and referendum expenditure, aligning the language in statute and the policy rationale across the various areas encompassed by political finance. These changes will ensure that the Commission can require the use of prescribed forms where appropriate, while retaining the discretion to allow flexibility where a mandatory approach would not be proportionate. This approach balances the need for consistency and transparency with the practical realities faced by campaigners.
Providing a more explicit statutory footing for standardised reporting will reduce variability in how financial information is presented, making it easier for regulators, enforcement bodies and the wider public to interpret and compare data. It will also support more effective oversight by the Commission and help ensure that potential risks such as complex spending arrangements can be more readily identified and scrutinised.
Alongside these legislative changes, the government agrees that the categories used to support campaign spending should be updated to reflect modern campaigning practices, particularly in the context of increased digital activity and evolving methods of political engagement. We will therefore work closely with the Commission to review and modernise these categories using existing powers to introduce secondary legislation where needed following consultation. This will ensure that reporting requirements remain relevant and capable of covering the full range of campaign expenditure in a way that supports transparency and demonstrates trust.
Taken together, these reforms will strengthen the integrity and accessibility of political finance reporting, ensuring the regulatory framework keeps pace with changes in practice while remaining proportionate and deliverable. The government will continue to work in partnership with the Commission and other stakeholders where appropriate to ensure that implementation is effective and that benefits are realised across the system.
Recommendation · source text
Providing clear guidance on how to recognise, report and respond to such threats is a key strand of the government’s Counter Political Interference and Espionage Action Plan, announced by the Security Minister in November 2025. The work is designed to improve situational awareness across democratic institutions, enhance protective security measures and ensure that channels for escalation and response are well understood and effective. It reflects a broader approach to safeguarding democratic participation from hostile state activity.
Indeed, significant steps have already been taken to strengthen information sharing and engagement across the political system. In October 2025, the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) issued tailored guidance for all individuals working in UK democratic institutions on identifying and mitigating the risks of foreign interference and espionage. NPSA has also committed to deepening its engagement with senior officials within political parties, including through the provision of annual threat briefings.
This activity is complimented by direct engagement from the security and intelligence services. In November 2025, MI5 issued a security alert to MPs, Peers and Parliamentary staff highlighting attempts by foreign states to target individuals with access to sensitive information about the British state. These interventions demonstrate an increasingly proactive approach to threat communication, ensuring those at potential risk are both informed and able to take protective action.
Building on this, in February 2026, the Electoral Commission convened a cross-sector security briefing for political parties, bringing together representatives from across the national security community, including the Security Minister, the MI5 Director General, and the Chief Executive of the National Cyber Security Centre. This marked a significant step in strengthening coordination and ensuring that political parties receive a coherent and consistent picture of the threat environment which draws upon the latest intelligence information.
The government agrees that the Electoral Commission has an important convening role to play in supporting this work, particularly in ensuring that information is shared in such a way that is accessible, consistent and reaches everyone who needs it. We will continue to work closely with the Electoral Commission and support them in this regard, working collaboratively to develop a forum of parties which will receive annual security briefings. Looking ahead, the government will build on these arrangements to ensure that information sharing is as structured and comprehensive as possible. This will include continuing to develop mechanisms for routine engagement with political parties, and improving the clarity and useability of guidance and threat briefings. We will also continue to explore whether further enhancements are needed to ensure that information flows are coherent.
Through these measures, the government will ensure that political parties are better equipped with the knowledge, tools and support they need to understand and respond to threats of foreign interference, thereby strengthening the resilience and integrity of the UK’s democratic processes.
Recommendation · source text
The government is already taking action, through the RoPB, to strengthen the role and powers of the Electoral Commission in order to maximise impact of reforms being made to the political finance rules. We therefore welcome recommendations 9 and 10 on the Commission’s information sharing and investigatory powers and accept them both in full in order to ensure the Commission is equipped to effectively regulate political finance.
In response to recommendation 9, and building on provisions already set out in the RoPB which enable the Commission to share information with specified regulators and enforcement bodies, we will establish a broad, reciprocal statutory gateway for information sharing. This will address the asymmetry identified in the Review of the current information sharing provisions. We will amend the RoPB to enable the Electoral Commission to share information with, and receive information from, relevant public authorities where the disclosure of information supports the discharge of its functions.
With regard to recommendation 10, we will extend the Commission’s powers to require disclosure of information outside of a formal investigation. By amending the RoPB to expand this power beyond specified regulated entities to any person or organisation, the Commission will be able to more proactively monitor compliance, support timely regulation during election periods and take a more proportionate and effective approach to enforcement. It will also allow issues to be resolved as appropriate without the need to launch a full investigation and enable the Commission to establish more quickly whether there are grounds to suspect an offence requiring further action.
Taken together, these reforms will ensure the Electoral Commission remains well-equipped to discharge its functions effectively and to uphold the integrity of the political finance framework.
Recommendation · source text
The government is already taking action, through the RoPB, to strengthen the role and powers of the Electoral Commission in order to maximise impact of reforms being made to the political finance rules. We therefore welcome recommendations 9 and 10 on the Commission’s information sharing and investigatory powers and accept them both in full in order to ensure the Commission is equipped to effectively regulate political finance.
In response to recommendation 9, and building on provisions already set out in the RoPB which enable the Commission to share information with specified regulators and enforcement bodies, we will establish a broad, reciprocal statutory gateway for information sharing. This will address the asymmetry identified in the Review of the current information sharing provisions. We will amend the RoPB to enable the Electoral Commission to share information with, and receive information from, relevant public authorities where the disclosure of information supports the discharge of its functions.
With regard to recommendation 10, we will extend the Commission’s powers to require disclosure of information outside of a formal investigation. By amending the RoPB to expand this power beyond specified regulated entities to any person or organisation, the Commission will be able to more proactively monitor compliance, support timely regulation during election periods and take a more proportionate and effective approach to enforcement. It will also allow issues to be resolved as appropriate without the need to launch a full investigation and enable the Commission to establish more quickly whether there are grounds to suspect an offence requiring further action.
Taken together, these reforms will ensure the Electoral Commission remains well-equipped to discharge its functions effectively and to uphold the integrity of the political finance framework.
Recommendation · source text
At the most serious end, Counter Terrorism Policing (CTP) already provides a specialist, national capability for investigating state-linked threats. CTP’s counter-state threats mission, delivered in close coordination with MI5, leads investigations into activity that is covert, coordinated or linked to foreign intelligence services or their proxies. This includes the most serious instances of foreign interference in UK politics. This capability brings together the intelligence, legal and investigative expertise required to pursue complex cases and therefore constitutes a core element of the system’s response.
Alongside this, electoral crime enforcement is supported by a networked policing model led by the City of London Police, with centrally based specialists providing advice and coordination to Single Points of Contact across forces. This approach allows expertise to be deployed flexibly and has proved effective at managing demand, particularly during election periods. However, it is not currently configured as a separately resourced, standing capability, and scaling this model to meet more complex or sustained demand would require consideration of further investment and structures.
Taken together, these arrangements already provide elements of a “centre of excellence” in practice, combining specialist national capability for the most serious state-linked threats with a coordinated network for wider electoral offences. The government has announced plans to establish a new National Police Service (NPS), which will in due course incorporate Counter Terrorism Policing functions. This provides a clear opportunity to strengthen and formalise these capabilities, including consideration of how different functions could be brought together to deliver a more consistent and visible response. The Police Reform Bill, due to be introduced later this year, will be critical to making this possible.
The government therefore agrees in principle with the spirit of recommendation 11. It is essential that policing has the specialist expertise, coordination and capacity at the national level to investigate and prosecute the most serious breaches of electoral law, particularly those involving foreign interference. We will work across government and with policing partners to ensure that forthcoming reforms provide a strengthened and more coherent capability in this area, having regard to the findings of the Review, and consider how to deliver this.
Recommendation · source text
It is important to ensure that both evidential thresholds and sentencing provisions support, rather than hinder, the effective investigation and prosecution of serious offences, particularly where such offences may undermine public confidence in the democratic process or create opportunities for illicit influence. A framework that is unable to respond effectively to deliberate breaches risks weakening trust in the transparency and fairness of elections and political finance more broadly.
We recognise the importance of ensuring that the evidential threshold for offences and the sentencing framework under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act 2000 (PPERA) do not inadvertently restrict effective criminal investigation and prosecution of serious wrongdoing, or fail to reflect the potential harm such offences can cause to public confidence.
However, the government also considers that the issues raised by this recommendation are complex and require careful analysis. Changes to the knowledge test and sentencing limits raise complex issues of proportionality, fairness and coherence across the wider criminal and electoral law framework. In particular, any such moves must be carefully balanced to avoid individuals being brought into scope who are engaged in legitimate campaign activity with no intention to evade the rules, but who may make inadvertent errors or omissions. Similarly, changes to custodial sentence levels must be considered alongside comparable offences to remain fair and proportionate.
Significant changes to criminal thresholds and sentencing length require a longer process of analysis and consultation than is possible to deliver in the timeframes of the RoPB. We will however work at pace to develop proposals and bring these forward via a suitable legislative vehicle following engagement with law enforcement, the Electoral Commission, prosecuting authorities, devolved governments and political parties.
Our objective will be to ensure that the criminal enforcement framework for political finance is robust, proportionate and effective; capable of deterring and addressing serious wrongdoing while maintaining fairness for those participating in our democratic processes in good faith. In doing so, we will ensure that the system continues to uphold the integrity, transparency and public confidence that are essential to the functioning of our precious democracy.
Recommendation · source text
We welcome recommendation 13 and the need to prioritise action to address hostile state activity in the online information environment, the government agrees such activity poses a significant and evolving risk to the integrity of our democratic processes.
Work is already underway across government to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of its collective approach to tackling online information threats as a vector for political interference. This includes enhancing our capability to identify, assess and respond to existing and emerging threats, and ensuring that activity is better coordinated across departments and the wider community.
Our approach to state-directed online political interference must also be considered within the context of the government’s wider response to political interference and hostile state threats. The National Security Act 2023 and the Counter Political Interference and Espionage Plan provide a strengthened framework to counter malign foreign influence, reflecting that hostile actors frequently operate across numerous vectors to achieve their aims. State actors such as Russia, for example, routinely engage in information threats, cyber, and wider offline interference targeting UK politics to advance their goals.
In this context, the government’s policy, governance, capabilities and resourcing need to correspond with the full range of hybrid threats. We will therefore take forward work to ensure that our response to online information threats is fully integrated within this broader national security framework. Through these measures, the government will continue to strengthen its ability to detect, deter and respond to foreign online political interference.
More broadly, the government agrees that the escalating threat to our democracy necessitates a coherent, well-coordinated response and clear accountability at the official level, as set out in recommendation 17. Accordingly, the Cabinet Secretary has accepted this recommendation and appointed the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office to this critical role.
Reporting directly to the Cabinet Secretary, the Permanent Secretary will set the strategic direction for the Defending Democracy Taskforce, coordinate cross-government delivery priorities, and hold departments accountable for meeting these critical commitments.
Taken together, these measures strengthen both the government’s capability to address foreign interference in the online environment and the leadership structures needed to coordinate that response effectively. In so doing, the UK will be better equipped to detect, deter and respond to hostile activity, and to safeguard the integrity and resilience of our democratic processes.
Recommendation · source text
However, we are highly conscious that new regulations for online political advertising have to be effectively designed, enforceable, and can be sustained by online platforms. In both the EU and Canada, new restrictions had a substantial impact on the willingness of major platforms to host political advertising in its entirety. There is consequently a risk that swift implementation of this recommendation could lead to consequences that extend significantly beyond foreign funded activity.
As such, we are committed to identifying the best solution to address the risk of low-level foreign funding of political advertising but recognise it needs to operate effectively. This work will include consideration of the non-party campaigning rules which Mr Rycroft makes reference to, but also wider options to ensure that any proposal does not lead to unnecessary burden on legitimate, UK-based, smaller campaign groups which seek to participate in our democracy. We will set out proposals in due course.
Imprint rules play a vital role in upholding trust in our democratic process by ensuring voters can see clearly who is behind political campaigning material. The RoPB already builds upon the existing framework by extending the requirements to ensure that third-party campaigners include imprints on their organic digital campaigning material, representing a significant step forward in improving the visibility of who is behind online political content. We welcome the recommendations the Review has made to build further on this. We agree that in an increasingly digital campaigning environment, transparency must continue to evolve to reflect new technologies, campaigning techniques and routes of influence.
We also recognise that further reform may be required to ensure the regime keeps pace with modern campaigning practice. This includes consideration of whether imprints should provide greater clarity on who has paid for material, how requirements should apply to new and emerging forms of campaigning such as influencer-led content and whether the definition of material in scope remains appropriate. We accept these considerations in principle but note they raise complex issues of proportionality, enforceability and impact on those who are participating legitimately. We will continue to consider how best to implement these recommendations, such as, where possible, via secondary legislation.
Taken together, this approach will enable the government to strengthen safeguards against foreign interference while continuing to enhance transparency and accountability in online political campaigning. It ensures that the regulatory framework remains robust, proportionate and responsive to the evolving nature of the digital campaigning environment while upholding public confidence in the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes.
Recommendation · source text
In particular, the government recognises that the current VAT exemption has had the unintended consequence of exempting foreign-based lobbying from the Office of the Registrar for Consultant Lobbyists’ transparency scheme.
The Cabinet Office is considering reforms to the exemption as part of the wider lobbying reform agenda, which will be informed by the forthcoming report of the Ethics and Integrity Commission. The government will publish the review’s findings and present the government’s response to Parliament in due course thereafter.
Recommendation · source text
While it is not possible to amend the scope of the Ethics and Integrity Commission’s review within its current timeframe, the government agrees that these are issues which warrant careful consideration. The challenge of foreign financial interference extends beyond political finance rules alone and requires a holistic approach across the entire political eco-system in which such influence is exercised. This is an area in which the government will consider opportunities for further work in the future.
Recommendation · source text
We welcome recommendation 13 and the need to prioritise action to address hostile state activity in the online information environment, the government agrees such activity poses a significant and evolving risk to the integrity of our democratic processes.
Work is already underway across government to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of its collective approach to tackling online information threats as a vector for political interference. This includes enhancing our capability to identify, assess and respond to existing and emerging threats, and ensuring that activity is better coordinated across departments and the wider community.
Our approach to state-directed online political interference must also be considered within the context of the government’s wider response to political interference and hostile state threats. The National Security Act 2023 and the Counter Political Interference and Espionage Plan provide a strengthened framework to counter malign foreign influence, reflecting that hostile actors frequently operate across numerous vectors to achieve their aims. State actors such as Russia, for example, routinely engage in information threats, cyber, and wider offline interference targeting UK politics to advance their goals.
In this context, the government’s policy, governance, capabilities and resourcing need to correspond with the full range of hybrid threats. We will therefore take forward work to ensure that our response to online information threats is fully integrated within this broader national security framework. Through these measures, the government will continue to strengthen its ability to detect, deter and respond to foreign online political interference.
More broadly, the government agrees that the escalating threat to our democracy necessitates a coherent, well-coordinated response and clear accountability at the official level, as set out in recommendation 17. Accordingly, the Cabinet Secretary has accepted this recommendation and appointed the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office to this critical role.
Reporting directly to the Cabinet Secretary, the Permanent Secretary will set the strategic direction for the Defending Democracy Taskforce, coordinate cross-government delivery priorities, and hold departments accountable for meeting these critical commitments.
Taken together, these measures strengthen both the government’s capability to address foreign interference in the online environment and the leadership structures needed to coordinate that response effectively. In so doing, the UK will be better equipped to detect, deter and respond to hostile activity, and to safeguard the integrity and resilience of our democratic processes.