Regulatory Sandbox for Rendezvous and Proximity Operations: Stage 1

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG ensures that RPO missions fall under the scope of section 1(4)(b) of the SIA 2018, which relates to “operating a space object.”
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that RPO missions are covered under the existing framework for operating space objects.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG and the regulator clarify in guidance the concept of “operating a space object” and who is deemed an “operator” according to the SIA 2018.
• the regulator issues guidance with the precise meaning of the term “operating a space object” under section 1(4)(b) of the SIA 2018 confirming that RPO operators should not be deemed to be “operating” the client object.
• the regulator adopts guidance clarifying the interpretation of section 1(2) that only the licensed RPO operator is considered to be “causing the space activity to occur” or “responsible for its continuation.”
• the regulator adopts guidance aligning interpretations of section 1(2) and section 1(4)(b), reinforcing that the entity subject to licensing is the one with the final decision-making authority over the space activity’s operations.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that RPO operators require an “operator licence,” in accordance with the SIA 2018.
• the regulator clarifies in guidance any requirements associated with an “operator licence” where the space activity being licensed is the operation of a space object (section 1(4)(b)).
The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG ensures that consistent terminology is used across legislation, eliminating overlaps or contradictory terms.
• HMG considers the inclusion of the definition of an “orbital operator licence” in the Regulations, with clearly specified requirements applicable to the operation of a space object.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG develops RPO policy to clarify any specific information to be provided in respect of customers.
• if any information on client and client object is essential for assessing the application, HMG considers amending the relevant legislation to include this requirement formally.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator recommends in guidance that RPO applicants provide it voluntarily.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG clearly defines and outlines the role of each government stakeholder supporting the licensing process.
• HMG ensures that any non-regulatory involvement remains strictly advisory and proportionate, within the constraints of the applicable legislation. HMG stakeholders, other than the Secretary of State, should not impose additional requirements beyond what is explicitly authorised by law.
• the regulator minimises its reliance on HMG stakeholders where they do not have direct legislative authority over the licensing process.
• the regulator strengthens its internal expertise and personnel to effectively carry out its regulatory functions and assessments, for example in respect of sustainability assessments and liability risk assessment.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG and the regulator clarify internal policy on assessing whether a space activity is “contrary to the national interest” under section 8(2)(c).
• HMG and the regulator recognise that space activities aligning with key national strategies, such as the UK’s National Space Strategy and Space Industrial Plan, including ISAM, should not presumptively be regarded as contrary to the national interest.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator provides in guidance a general description and explanation of the purpose of section 8(2)(c) and the legislative test of “national interest.”
• the regulator ensures and provides in guidance that the assessment under section 8(2)(c) is evidence-based, rather than subjective or arbitrary.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator recognises in guidance the need to provide RPO operators with the ability to service future client objects within the scope of an existing licence.
• the regulator develops an ‘envelope of acceptable parameters’, such as mass, orbit, physical characteristics, and service type, within which the operation of the servicing space object can be carried out and would be reflected in the licence.
• the regulator recognises in guidance that new client objects falling within the pre-approved envelope could be serviced as part of the licensed space activity with no formal licence variation to be required.
• the regulator recognises that the licensed RPO operator is only required to notify the regulator of new client objects through an appropriate monitoring mechanism.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the envelope of parameters and notification process is explored in greater detail in Stage 2.

Subject to the implementation of recommendation #7, the Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that the variation process should not be triggered by minor operational adjustments or changes that do not significantly impact safety, security, or compliance with legislative requirements.
• the regulator ensures that where a variation is deemed necessary, it adopts a streamlined, efficient process that minimises administrative burden and operational delays. This process should focus on flexibility to accommodate changes such as the addition of client spacecraft (if recommendation 6 is not adopted and section 15 is deemed necessary), changes to major operational parameters, or amendments to the mission CONOPS, provided these do not conflict with the core safety and regulatory requirements.
The Consortium recommends that:
• instances of potential changes to RPO mission parameters outside the licensed envelope are explored in Stage 2 and the applicability and suitability of the licence variation process is assessed.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG considers consolidating the statutes.
• HMG and the Secretary of State use the opportunity arising from the Sandbox to assess whether the Regulations require significant changes or amendments, as highlighted in this Report.
• the Secretary of State continues to work on a review process for the provisions within the Regulations in line with regulation 287.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG issue clear, publicly available policy and guidance focusing and outlining how the regulator will apply the legislative tests under section 8(1). This guidance should ensure operators have as much information as possible to assess the likelihood of their proposed missions being successfully licensed.
• the policy states that while the regulator’s primary concern is public safety, the regulator will exercise its discretion taking into account the UK’s commitment to fostering private space activities as a driver of economic growth and innovation.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG ensures that the CAA’s role as the appointed regulator under regulation 3 is fully exercised and effectively carried out, so that the licensing process functions as intended and does not create unnecessary legal uncertainty. While the Secretary of State retains a consent function under section 8(4) of the SIA 2018, decisions made by the regulator, after thoroughly assessing the proposed space activity in line with its legal obligations, should not be subject to reversal in a way that undermines regulatory certainty for operators.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator reformulates the TLS to better serve the specific needs of RPO missions and provide the regulator with early insights into the most uncertain aspects of an RPO mission, helping to identify potential issues early in the process.
• the regulator adapts the TLS to serve as a pre-assessment for key legislative tests, such as national security and national interest, which are critical for RPO missions licensing.
• the regulator recognises and adopts the feedback from the TLS, which albeit non-binding, should, at the very least, inform the subsequent full application process.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator provides clear guidance acknowledging that, in the absence of clear secondary legislation establishing prescribed risk assessment requirements for prescribed roles in orbital operations, operators can comply with section 9(2) of the SIA 2018 with a simple statement that there are no particular risks to the health and safety of individuals who are to take part in a prescribed role.

The Consortium recommends that:
• The regulator updates CAP 2210 reflecting the distinct regulatory treatment of orbital operations compared to launch and return operations.
The updated guidance should clarify that:
• orbital operators are not required to submit a “full safety case” to satisfy the safety assessment in section 9 of the SIA 2018.
• the legal requirement for a safety case, as defined in regulation 29(1) of the Regulations applies exclusively to launch and return operators.
• the safety assessment requirements for orbital operators are distinguished from the safety case.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator maintains the position clarified during the Sandbox that the regulator’s default position is not to assume all RPO activities are considered “novel, complex or dangerous,” requiring a safety assessment that goes beyond the TQS.
• the regulator explicitly defines in guidance what mission characteristics indicate an RPO mission is novel, complex or dangerous.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator explores whether this classification should be abandoned entirely. Instead, the TQS could be revised to better align with the ALARP demonstration required under section 9(4) of the SIA 2018. A revised TQS could incorporate a more comprehensive safety assessment structure, that is, one that reflects legislative requirements directly rather than relying on an ambiguous classification.
• further work is carried out in Stage 2 to develop recommendations on revising the TQS, ensuring operators are equipped to meet legal safety obligations without unnecessary interpretation or extended negotiation with the regulator.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG considers legislative changes to the SIA 2018 to implement the exclusion of activities under section 1(4)(b) (operating a space object) from the scope of ALARP section 9(4).
• HMG considers the adoption of clear, prescriptive requirements in secondary legislation to define how safety should be demonstrated for RPO missions.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator adopts clear guidance regarding the ALARP’s application to orbital operations, tailored to ensure transparency and proportionality, if the exclusion of ALARP for activities under section 1(4)(b) (operating a space object) is not feasible or deemed inappropriate. This should include detailed guidance on how ALARP is to be demonstrated (for RPO missions) setting out specific, practical parameters that would be sufficient for the demonstration of what constitutes a “reasonable” safety measure.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance how the ALARP framework applies to RPO missions, confirming that only first-order risks are considered, and non-safety risks are excluded.
Finally, the Consortium recommends that further work is undertaken in Stage 2 to provide specific recommendations for revising the TQS for RPO activity ALARP demonstration.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator adopts guidance explicitly recognising internationally agreed-upon quantitative thresholds for safety of space operations are sufficient to satisfy the ALARP requirement under section 9(4) of the SIA 2018. These thresholds reflect the current state of the art in space safety and, if formally recognise, would significantly streamline the ALARP demonstration process, reducing regulatory burden.
• HMG and the regulator engage with industry before adopting such thresholds.
• the regulator adopts in guidance that if an operator’s risk estimate exceeds these established thresholds in guidance, only then additional justification would be required (ALARP demonstration). However, if the estimate is below these thresholds, no ALARP demonstration should be required.
For example, the Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator adopts guidance that explicitly recognises an internationally accepted threshold of 10-4 for the re-entry casualty risk of the servicing satellite.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator updates the TQS to focus on questions around safety necessary to comply with section 9(4).
• the regulator updates the TQS to solely to support the parties in providing the necessary information to fulfil the statutory and regulatory obligations, notably on safety of the space activity.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator updates guidance on the ALARP demonstration for risks to health, safety and property of persons in orbit, in accordance with section 9(4).

The Consortium recommends that:
• in line with recommendation #17, second-order risk is out of the scope of the ALARP demonstration.

The Consortium recommends that:
• in line with recommendation #17, second-order risk is out of the scope of the ALARP demonstration.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator provides clear guidance specifying a defined timeframe for assessing risks associated with safety of space activities.
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that assessment of risk should be time-bound, ensuring that operators are not required to evaluate consequences indefinitely but have to do so within a reasonable and proportionate period relevant to the nature of the hazard.
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that the assessment of safety risk is intended to capture risks where the consequence of risk occurs in a defined timeframe after risk condition occurs, whereas longer term impacts are covered under the sustainability assessment.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator provides guidance on accepted tools and techniques in this respect.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator acknowledges and clarifies in guidance the lack of legislative basis to require an orbital operator to have a safety manager.
The Consortium recommends that:
• if the regulator or HMG believe a role akin to a safety manager is required for RPO missions, that such a role is created based within the powers granted to the regulator in primary legislation, and that such role, its tasks and responsibilities, are clearly outlined in secondary legislation and, subsequently, in supporting guidance.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator updates the TQS to provide definitions of the terms used for the bespoke operations in section 4.
• the regulator ensures that the TQS is structured and, if necessary, amended to clearly outline the information from operators to demonstrate compliance with legislative and regulatory obligations. Questions within the TQS should be explicitly linked, whenever possible, to the relevant legal or regulatory requirement.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that the IADC Guidelines is the only document presently considered under section 2(2)(h) and that no other space debris mitigation guidelines issued by international organisations in which the UK is represented are indirectly incorporated into the regulatory framework.
• the regulator clarifies in guidance how it will “take into account” the space debris mitigation guidelines, specifically outlining the legal status of the IADC Guidelines in the licensing framework and the consequences of non-adherence for applicants.
• if the regulator intends to consider organisations other than the IADC as an “international organisation in which the government of the United Kingdom is represented” under section 2(2)(h), it should issue guidance clearly identifying those organisations and what space debris mitigation guidelines need to be considered.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that the space debris mitigation guidelines that can be applied as conditions in the licence under Schedule 1, 1(g) of the SIA 2018 are the same as those considered under section 2(2)(h) of the SIA 2018.
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that any compliance requirements related to space debris mitigation guidelines under Schedule 1, 1(g) of the SIA 2018 are intended to apply as ongoing requirements during the licensed activities, rather than conditions for obtaining a licence.

The Consortium recommends that:
• if the regulator or HMG stakeholders wish to prioritise space debris mitigation and space sustainability as a matter of policy, this must be pursued through the appropriate statutory framework. This could include amending the SIA 2018 to introduce specific provisions on sustainability, akin to the safety provisions, or explicitly empowering the creation of statutory instruments that outline detailed sustainability requirements – none of which are enshrined in legislation at the moment. While it is acknowledged that the regulator and Secretary of State retain considerable discretion in assessing licence applications, this flexibility must be balanced with the need for legal and regulatory certainty. Without a clear legislative foundation, sustainability-related requirements risk undermining transparency, consistency, and the overall effectiveness of the UK’s licensing framework for RPO activities.
• the regulator clearly states in guidance that the sustainability assessment is based solely on information provided in response to the TQS and on the IADC Guidelines.
• the regulator adopts guidance to explicitly reflect this, ensuring operators understand which sustainability frameworks are considered relevant, taken into account, and subject to being added as licence conditions, and that any additional expectations must derive from a clear legal mandate.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator updates the TQS and any guidance it provides to operators to remove references to a need for operators to demonstrate implementation or adherence to the LTS Guidelines as these do not apply to operators.
The Consortium recommends that:
• if HMG considers the UK commitments made under the LTS Guidelines as insufficiently implemented in the current regulatory regime, HMG develops policy for such implementation into requirements for UK-licensed operators by means of legislation, which can be demonstrated as part of the licensing process.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator adopts in guidance interpretation and verification methods of the IADC Guidelines for RPO missions.
• such interpretation and verification methods are developed in collaboration with the regulator in Stage 2 of the Sandbox.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator and other HMG stakeholders recognise that any non-binding instrument the UK supports should first undergo policy development and legislative consideration before it informs regulatory requirements. This ensures that commitments arising from international engagements are translated into targeted, proportionate, and predictable requirements in statute for orbital operators, preserving legal certainty and preventing the imposition of de facto obligations beyond the regulator’s statutory mandate.
• the regulator adopts internal guidance to clarify which instruments are considered binding international obligations and which are non-binding, with the latter treated as best practice rather than regulatory requirements.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator updates CAP 2210 to reflect that the Secretary of State’s guidance on environmental objectives applies only to spaceports and launch operations, thus eliminating the ambiguity for orbital operators.
• the regulator avoids referencing government guidance intended for the regulator in its guidance aimed at applicants but instead reformulate it to clearly communicate what operators need to demonstrate.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator provides guidance giving an indication to RPO operators of criteria and indicators that will be used to assess whether a proposed mission or activity may impair national security. While the Consortium recognises that publishing such guidance may raise national security concerns, the need for clarity and predictability in the regulatory framework for non-governmental, commercial space activities is paramount. National security concerns should be addressed in a way that balances the need for confidentiality with the broader goal of enabling a thriving commercial space sector in the UK.
• the regulator takes a flexible and pragmatic approach to achieve this balance, while adhering to the legal requirements under the SIA 2018.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator confirms the legal basis to request a cyber security strategy, in line with regulation 185, for orbital operations.
• if a lack of legal basis is identified, HMG ensures that cyber security requirements in regulation 185 specifically apply to orbital operations.
• HMG considers adding detail and specific requirements on cyber security strategy in regulation 185.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator amends CAP 2535 to outline in more detail, the information required to be included in the cyber security strategy, including whenever possible, specific aspects associated with RPO missions and how RPO operators can demonstrate compliance with regulation 185.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that, generally, provided that the interfaces with the ground systems of the operator of the client spacecraft are sufficiently protected, the client ground systems are out of scope of the cyber security risk assessment. However, such risk assessment would cover the above-mentioned interfaces.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG promotes and ensures the Regulations explicitly exclude orbital operators, or mission management facilities used by orbital operators to operate space objects from the United Kingdom, from any Part 11 requirements that are disproportionate or unreasonable. This recommendation is deemed critical by the Consortium and should be addressed in secondary legislation as soon as possible. The Consortium believes that the amendments can be implemented through the negative procedure, as they are largely technical in nature and would not require extensive parliamentary debate.
• Stage 2 is used to identify all instances where Part 11 regulations are not appropriate for orbital operations.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG considers whether there should be any specific security requirements for RPO missions.
• HMG ensures that any identified security requirement is reflected in regulations.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG develops policy on whether RPO mission types, or client objects associated jurisdictions, or a combination of the two, raises national security issues.
• the policy reflects the presumption that RPO activities do not automatically trigger issues of national security.
• the policy reflects the nationality of launch site, launch operator jurisdiction, and any other states with a specific role under the international treaties, if possible, do not automatically trigger issues of national security.
• the policy reflects where proposed activities involving RPO missions where the client is a UK-licensed operator, it would not give rise to national security issues.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance the exact meaning of the obligations under regulation 169 if a security manager is to be appointed for orbital operations.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator adopts a voluntary pre-application security check mechanism to allow RPO operators to provide relevant information about prospective customers and client space objects before submitting a full licence application. This check could be a standalone form and should serve as a [non-binding] confirmation that there are no national security issues based on the information provided. If the information on the customer remains the same at the time of the full application, the national security assessment at that stage should be informed by the pre-application determination to accelerate and streamline the process, avoiding unnecessary duplication of assessments.
If the regulator determines that access to such information is necessary for national security assessments, either to comply with section 8(2)(a) of the SIA 2018 or to determinate whether an orbital operator must appoint a security manager under regulation 10(2), the Consortium recommends that:
• HMG ensures that such requirements are explicitly outlined in legislation.
The Consortium recommends that:
• the TMC is used in Stage 2 to test the feasibility of a new RPO customer questionnaire in a hypothetical commercial mission involving different types of customers representing different services and markets.
• Stage 2 is used to test scenarios where client information cannot be disclosed and the regulator’s approach given the lack of legislative mandate to require additional information.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator updates guidance to reflect that responsibility does not constitute a specific additional assessment but is addressed through the legislative tests (safety, fit and proper persons, etc.) and that there are no additional expectations with regards to responsibility.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator updates guidance to reflect that, while these two areas are important, they do not require any demonstration from the applicant during the licensing process.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG, with support from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) or the Attorney General’s Office, establishes and standardises the meaning and interpretation of what constitutes the “international obligations of the United Kingdom” for the purposes of the SIA 2018, and the regulator adopts and applies this interpretation consistently throughout the licensing process.
• the regulator and HMG map out all international obligations relevant for RPO operators, including those arising from the UN space treaties and any other relevant international obligations of the UK.
• HMG analyses and confirms whether RPO missions (or certain aspects of an RPO mission) could breach the UK’s international obligations.
If this analysis reveals that for the UK to comply with certain international obligations new requirements need to be imposed on operators licensed in the UK, the Consortium recommends that:
• HMG ensures such international obligations are implemented into the domestic legal system via the appropriate legislative process.

The Consortium recommends that
• HMG and the regulator ensure and clarifies in guidance that any ‘consent’ required from RPO operators should be limited to consent from the operator of the client spacecraft, or the counterparty to the service agreement when such counterparty is the entity “having all necessary power and authority to modify the current state of the client object, or to dispose of it, or the entity authorised in respect of an object that is not operational, depending on the characteristics of the client spacecraft.
• the regulator clearly states in guidance the time by which such consent must be obtained.
• the regulator defines in guidance the precise wording of such letter of consent, which should be limited to:
○ acknowledgment of the intended services in respect of the client spacecraft;
○ confirmation by the customer of notification to the State with responsibility for authorisation and supervision; and
○ confirmation by the customer of compliance with regulations applicable to operation of the client spacecraft.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG ensures that State-to-State agreement or arrangements provide maximum flexibility regarding contractual liability agreed between the RPO operator and its customer.
• HMG and the regulator confirm that a State-to-State agreement or arrangement is not a prerequisite for the granting of a licence.

Subject to recommendation #45 above, State-to-State MoUs in respect of international joint RPO missions could help facilitate RPO licensing in the UK.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG clarifies that RPO missions do not trigger a need for the UK to consult other States under Article IX beyond direct engagement with the relevant States involved in the mission.
• HMG and the regulator clarify that any consultation requested by other States under Article IX does not impact the licensing process of RPO missions.
• HMG consider the notification process under Article XI as a way to mitigate risk of consultation request by other States under Article IX and any perception that the UK might be breaching its international obligations under the OST by licensing an RPO mission.
• HMG and the regulator ensure that the approach to the notification process:
○ does not impact the timeline to licence a mission;
○ involves sharing a reasonable amount of information on the mission, considering commercial sensitivity and national security; and
○ is clarified in guidance.

The Consortium recommends that:
• any such risk should not be reflected in the liability risk assessment, and that any such risk can be mitigated by adding those other States as additional insured on the operator’s TPL insurance policy.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator adopts guidance confirming that the conditions in Schedule 1 of the SIA 2018 are conditions “in the licence” rather than “conditions to obtain a licence.”
• the regulator provides further clarification on how Schedule 1 conditions are applied in practice. This includes outlining which conditions are likely to be imposed depending on the nature of the licensed activity and how compliance with these conditions will be monitored post-licensing.
• the regulator ensures that guidance and application processes distinguish between pre-licensing requirements (which must be satisfied before a licence is granted) and post-licensing conditions (which regulate how licensed activities are conducted).

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance that changes to orbital parameters encompassed within the proposed concept of operations and part of the nominal RPO operations will not require the licensee to obtain advance approval from the regulator.

The Consortium recommends that:
• if the regulator imposes conditions in the licence regarding the "use, processing, communication and distribution of data obtained in the course of spaceflight activities" involving an RPO space object, such conditions should be tailored to reflect the unique characteristics of RPO missions and the roles of the parties involved. Specifically, any conditions should ensure that entities identified during the licensing phase as requiring access to mission data are not subject to restrictions that would necessitate additional regulatory approval for routine or pre-identified data sharing.
• the regulator establishes a clear and efficient process for assessing and responding to RPO operators’ requests to share data with third parties. Given the operational importance of timely data sharing, the regulator should provide prompt decisions in line with Schedule 1, paragraph 25, to prevent unnecessary delays that could impact mission success.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator clarifies in guidance its approach to granting two licences for a single mission.
• the regulator ensures that liability limits on any two licences falling under both Acts are clearly defined.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG develops a clear policy establishing that RPO missions licensed in the UK will, at a minimum, be treated as standard space activities involving the operation of a space object for liability and indemnification purposes. Specifically, the current indemnification obligation as liability cap should be set at EUR 60 million, or its equivalent in pound sterling.
• HMG develops a policy to continue encouraging RPO operations in the UK, considering lower liability caps, indemnities and matching third party liability cover for RPO operators, in line with the safety and sustainability approach.

The Consortium recommends that:
• Stage 2 is used to consider the impact of State-to-State agreement on liability assessment upon receipt from the UK Space Agency of input following initial Liability Workshop.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG adopts policy that, for missions fully aligned with HMG’s policy objectives in space, such as those under the National Space Strategy and the Space Industrial Plan, the limit on the operator’s liability should be set at zero, and this limit should be specified in the licence in accordance with the SIA 2018. This approach to liability should also extend to licences issued under the OSA 1986 for the procurement of the launch of an RPO mission from overseas. The circumstances can include:
○ where the RPO mission itself is deemed safe and sustainable;
○ where the RPO mission involves the removal of derelict objects improving the safety and sustainability of the space environment; and
○ where the RPO mission is in the public interest or the UK national interest.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG and the regulator ensure that the decision to adopt cross-waivers of liability, as well as the conditions and minimum requirements surrounding them, remain at the discretion of RPO operators.
• should HMG develop policy involving the use of cross-waivers to facilitate the carrying out of RPO missions in the UK with respect to international liabilities, any necessary cross-waiver provisions and requirements be incorporated into the regulatory framework.
• the topic is further explored in Stage 2 as the Consortium may wish to support and make recommendations in respect of the application of cross waivers.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG adopts policy to exercise the Secretary of State’s discretion under section 35(2) to indemnify an operator in respect of liability for direct TPL claims made against it in relation to licensed activities, should the liability amount exceed the insurance amount specified in the operator’s licence. The Consortium believes this would significantly benefit RPO operators.
• HMG provides clear policy confirming that the UK will always indemnify the operator in such cases, even where insurance coverage does not fully cover the liability cap specified in the licence.
• HMG clarifies that the reference to insurance coverage in section 35(2) is not intended to create a legislative requirement for mandatory insurance but rather is a condition within the licence that is subject to the terms of indemnification.

The Consortium recommends that:
• HMG and the regulator consider adopting clear guidance on insurance in the absence of insurance requirement in the Regulations. Right now, insurance can be included as a condition of the licence and there is no specific guidance, under section 38(1) of the SIA 2018. Such guidance would elaborate on insurance conditions in the licence and can address the particular characteristics of RPO missions licensed in the UK.
• HMG allows alternative means of demonstrating financial security to indemnify the UK, such as by accepting a parent company guarantee or other appropriate forms of indemnity, especially considering the potential difficulty and cost in securing TPL insurance for RPO missions.

The Consortium recommends the regulator adopts guidance to reflect this approach to reporting and monitoring requirements in relation to go/no-go decisions and operations, which would:
• be agreed in the monitoring and reporting plan attached to the licence;
• be limited to written notifications to the regulator at agreed instances, as set out in the monitoring plan; and
• only involve reporting after a service has been conducted, i.e., no involvement in go/no-go decisions.

The Consortium recommends that:
• the regulator (and Secretary of State) considers guidance on the legislative tests as much as possible, to ensure regulatory certainty regarding the expectations on operators in the monitoring phase and circumstances where the regulator is expected to or allowed, by law, to give directions.

The Consortium recommends that:
• The regulator provides guidance on content and trigger points for likely additional, RPO specific monitoring pursuant to findings during Iterative Simulation workshops including:
○ Post launch separation confirmation notification
○ Completion of LEOP notification touchpoints (details in the monitoring plan)
○ Status report before and after each ‘service’ to be performed
○ Reporting against go-no go criteria set out in the application phase