Prevent learning review: Southport attack

It is recommended that a standardised sharing of information product be considered for national use by all FIMUs when sharing the results of checks conducted for Prevent. This product should be agreed nationally, its use mandated and written into [the policy on intelligence].

Further training should be considered regarding the circumstances where visits to individuals during the initial assessment can be conducted. The policy in 2019 and currently remains as visiting by exception, which could make the officers conducting the assessment feel constrained at this stage of the process. A review of how this is framed in the CTCO policy coupled with further training may help CTCO's with regards to the decision to visit an individual at the initial assessment phase, without the need to progress the referral into PLP to achieve this.

A review of current training for supervisors should be considered to strengthen that when signing off assessments as complete, all behavioural factors and motivations for behaviours have been captured on the assessments, whether deemed Prevent relevant or not. Current assessments do not include a Prevent 'relevancy' element to factors. The new Prevent Assessment Framework (PAF) due to go live in September 2024 goes some way to addressing the Prevent relevancy for each of the susceptibility factors.

Consider whether CTCO guidance could be strengthened where internet usage / search history or other online activity is relevant. This could ensure CTCOs are proactive in obtaining and recording internet search results in order to adequately assess the referral and make sure the information does not remain unknown. However, this will need to be balanced against the limited capabilities for police to conduct intrusive surveillance within the Prevent process. The mandating of open-source research should be considered at the PGA initial assessment.

Policy and guidance should be considered whereby referrals involving children and / or complex needs should be routinely referred to Channel unless immediate closure is the chosen option, or the CT risks are deemed too high for Channel.

Full access to the current PCMT system is restricted to police only. While the Home Office has limited access, this should be reviewed, enabling scrutiny at all levels of Prevent delivery as part of quality and business assurance processes. This access will enable studies to be conducted of all parts of the process which will inform changes in policy and guidance and be able to hold key stakeholders to account.

Each new comment on PCMT should be unique showing the officer has considered their views again. If there is no new information or no further updates then this should be articulated rather than copying a previous entry.

It should be considered that Annex B be embedded into [the policy on intelligence] and not sit as an appendix. The policy should be explicit that it is for Prevent to determine closure once the referral has been handed to Prevent for action and initial assessment. It should be made clear that FIMU should refrain from suggesting Prevent outcomes as this may influence decisions made by CTCOs or support closure prematurely from Prevent.

Consider a terminology change in Prevent management. CTP relevant should be replaced by the term 'Prevent Relevant'. This differentiates it from the term used in the IMU which may have a slightly different meaning.

Currently Prevent referrals are assessed [under general risk assessment outcomes] by the FIMUs. Consideration should be given to Prevent having its own [risk assessment] outcome specifically which is clearly defined in policy. The current CTCO guidance coupled with [the policy on intelligence] Annex B guidance defines the roles of CTP Prevent.

[The policy on intelligence] Annex B appears a little dated and consideration should be given to a review / refresh. E.g the guidance refers to the purpose of Prevent is to 'protect vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism' which is not an accurate term to describe Prevent.

Training for FIMU staff on Prevent should be reviewed to ensure a full current understanding of Prevent delivery and regular training refreshes delivered as part of continued professional development (CPD). Where training is deemed to be inadequate then the appropriate courses are built and delivered.

Training for Prevent staff on [the policy on intelligence] guidance and FIMU delivery should be reviewed and where training is identified as inadequate the appropriate courses created and delivered, and regular training refreshers.

CTCO policy should be reviewed to ensure all outstanding enquiries or information gathering is completed prior to closure.

Static vulnerabilities can make an individual highly susceptible. Additional training should be considered, for those conducting assessments, on the importance of understanding the impact of static vulnerabilities on altering the risks of radicalisation. Where there are cases of limited engagement and complex needs, such as Autism in this case, then decisions to refer to Channel should be seriously considered. This would enable a professional perspective on the impact of the static vulnerabilities and a multi-agency approach to managing the susceptibility to being drawn into terrorism. This recommendation should be viewed alongside recommendation 5.

Consideration should be given to reviewing and strengthening the formalised structure of PLP case management in Policy / Guidance, and how this structure can be enforced across the different CTP regions in the country to ensure each PLP Panel meeting is run in a consistent manner. This could include Chairing oversight by a senior ranking officer, recording of those in attendance, minute taking, frequency of meetings, Case Management Plan creation, review of plans and potential for a live review of information placed onto PCMT where appropriate.

Considerations should be given to guidance with regards to how repeat referrals are combined with previous ones to reflect the repeat nature. A review of the multiple referral policy addendum should be conducted to consider whether learning points from this review should be included and whether the policy could be strengthened with regards to the actions required to be taken in light of the repeat referral.

A review of the current PCMT prompt screens should be considered to see if these prompts are sufficient to negate the need for a full data inputting standards manual and policy. If not, a data inputting standards manual should be considered and embedded into policy. Inaccurate recording of data (names, dates of birth and data missing) can lead to previous information not being found by CTCO's assessing a new referral and a potential failure to join the dots between referrals. A policy in this area may make it easier to hold users to account for their inputting standards.