Prevent learning review: Sir David Amess attack

Referral Process – There is no single referral process across the country. Whilst a National Prevent Referral Form exists the take up is not consistent. The inconsistency in relation to this is problematic. Where processes are different in different areas there are more chances of failure. It is recommended that consistency be applied across the country and that all referrals are made to the police in the first instance. This will allow de-confliction to take place. Consideration should be given to applying the Welsh model of referrals across the country whereby referrals are automatically submitted to CTP and Local Authorities. In line with this consideration should be given to reviewing the online "front door" process to Prevent. An explanation of how a Prevent referral is handled and access to the form via gov.uk could be considered.

Deconfliction and FIMU – The added value that FIMU assessment can provide when it comes to decision making is important. Consideration should be given to looking at minimum process standards, identification of best-practice, and sharing of this across the CTP Network.

Review of Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) – There have been considerable changes to the policy and guidance in relation to PCM and Channel. These are positive and clearly show a professionalisation of Prevent. However, the VAF has remained extant. This case review and discussions with policy makers and practitioners makes it clear that the VAF is problematic. The process can be considered complex and the application of the principles which support this process are evidently not always followed. As a tool aimed at identifying vulnerability it may well not be doing the job it was designed for but rather serves as a retrospective recording process which is completed by practitioners because they have to. It is recommended that the Home Office commit to a full review of the VAF process with the aim of providing a process for practitioners which ensures that vulnerability is understood, risks are identified, and that this then leads to the practical aspects of the support plan, and subsequent actions. At the moment there is a disconnect between the work of the panels, the support plans, and the VAF. Whilst this review is undertaken an interim consideration could be to look at pooling best practice in terms of CTP training in relation to the DIF, and Home Office training relating to the VAF. This may allow the opportunity to identify practical steps which can be used for the wider root and branch review of the VAF process.

Data Retention – If the proposed changes by the College of Policing were in place when this review was commissioned there would, in theory, have been no material to review. The proposed linkage of CMIS and PCMT in which the possible data retention period could be reduced to 5 years is problematic. The Anderson Report in 2017 made it clear that consideration needed to be given to Closed Subjects of Interest from Investigations. Whilst the level of risk in Prevent cases are by definition lower there are clearly instances such as this case, Parsons Green and [another relevant case] where the suspect has a Prevent footprint. It is highly probable that there will be future cases. It is recommended that this decision to limit retention to 5 years be re-visited. Certainly, cases which reach the threshold of Channel should be considered for longer retention.