Independent review
Defence Reform: An Independent Report into the Structure and Management of the Ministry of Defence
Government response
The government responded to the review on 27 June 2011.
Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.
The Defence Secretary, Dr Fox, has said he agrees with all of the recommendations in the Levene report, and says the MOD will transform them into change.
- Among the key recommendations the response lists are extra powers for the Single Service Chiefs, including increased control of equipment programmes and greater freedom to flex within their budgets, within "a much clearer framework of accountability and control".
- It lists a smaller but stronger and more strategic Defence Board, and a new Joint Forces Command with a new Military Commander, to oversee joint capabilities including cyber warfare and military intelligence.
- It also lists a greater focus on affordability and budgetary discipline, a simpler structure with fewer senior posts, and new, more joint personnel management for senior military officers.
- The one stated timing is that the MOD will publish a blueprint setting out all the major changes the Department is embarked on "later this year".
About this review
Summary written by this siteIndependent review of the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence. Recommended radical decentralisation giving single Services greater autonomy with accountability and reducing the size of Head Office.
Recommendations 53
Recommendation 1
Key recommendation 1. Strengthened top-level decision-making should be centred on a new and smaller Defence Board chaired by the Defence Secretary, with another Minister, the PUS, CDS, DG Finance, Chief of Defence Materiel and three Non-Executive Directors as members, responsible for providing strategic direction to the Department and holding it to account. The Department should place an emphasis on individual executive accountability, with the formal committee structure reduced and simplified.
Recommendation 1a
The new Defence Board should be the primary decision-making body for non operational matters. It should meet ten times a year. It should subsume the functions of the current Defence Board.
Recommendation 1b
Formal sub-committees to the new Defence Board should be established to conduct investment approvals (Investment Approvals Committee), audit (Defence Audit Committee) and to oversee the career management system for senior civilians and military officers (Appointments Committee).
Recommendation 2
Key recommendation 2. The number and responsibilities of MOD Ministers should be reviewed to align with the new model.
Recommendation 3
Key recommendation 3. The Permanent Secretary and Chief of Defence Staff should continue jointly to lead Defence, but with their roles and responsibilities clarified. PUS’s responsibilities include ensuring that the Defence Programme is affordable. As well as being responsible for the conduct of operations, CDS should represent the views of the Armed Forces on the new Board.
Recommendation 3a
PUS and CDS should be jointly responsible for strategy and should chair a new ‘strategy’ group to support them in delivering this function.
Recommendation 3b
CDS should continue to convene a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in ‘operations’ mode to support him in his operational responsibilities. He should also convene a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in ‘Armed Forces’ mode to inform but not constrain his contribution on the new Defence Board.
Recommendation 4
Key recommendation 4. The Head Office performs a vital role in Defence, supporting PUS, CDS and Ministers. It should be clear on what that role is, have the people and skills to do it properly, and resist the temptation to do more. Our view is that the role needs to be more strategic than now, and as a result (and as a crucial enabler to this) the Head Office should be considerably smaller. This applies to the top structure as much as the rest.
Recommendation 4a
Given the challenges facing Defence today, the 2nd PUS and VCDS posts should be retained, to allow PUS and CDS to focus on the highest priority tasks, and their roles should be clarified. VCDS should support CDS in his increased role as the single military adviser on the Defence Board. 2nd PUS should lead the ‘enable’ function and act as head of profession for MOD civil servants. Together they should drive Transformation.
Recommendation 4b
The 3 star / Director General (DG) structure should be revised to reflect the new model. At its core should be four posts leading the policy, military strategy, finance and military capability functions. This should enable the reduction of at least one 3 star / DG post. The Chief Scientific Adviser should become a 3 star. The Head Office DG Commercial post has lapsed. The Department should consider whether the Chief of Defence Intelligence and DG Human Resources and Corporate Service posts continue to merit a 3 star given the changes to their responsibilities.
Recommendation 4c
The Department should take stock of progress in implementation in two years’ time, and consider whether the proposed role and structure of the Head Office, including the requirement, role and seniority of the 2nd PUS and VCDS remain valid.
Recommendation 5
Key recommendation 5. The focus of the Service Chiefs should be on running their Service, including the development and generation of forces within their allocated budget, combined with their existing responsibility for the custodianship of their Service, and they should be empowered to perform their role effectively.
Recommendation 5a
The Service Chiefs should remain responsible for the overall leadership and custodianship of their Service, and should continue to provide operational advice to CDS and, when required, Ministers, on the employment of their Service.
Recommendation 5b
The Service Chiefs’ ‘direct’ role in departmental strategy, resource allocation and Defence management should be reduced, though PUS and CDS should continue to seek their advice on issues relating to their Service as appropriate.
Recommendation 5c
As a result of these changes to the role of the Service Chiefs, and to avoid duplication, the Services should no longer need a 4 star Commander-in-Chief, although this will also require further changes of responsibility at the 3 star level.
Recommendation 5d
The Service Chiefs’ principal supporting staff should be based at their Service headquarters, with a much reduced staff, headed at two-star level, based in Head Office.
Recommendation 6
Key recommendation 6. Financial management throughout the Department should be considerably strengthened and there should be a widely-shared culture of managing Defence within available resources and realistic assumptions about the longer-term budget. At the centre, the DG Finance should be a member of the new Defence Board, chair its Investment Approvals Committee (IAC) and set standards and policy for financial management across Defence. Responsibility and accountability should be aligned for all Top Level Budget (TLB) holders, with responsibility and budgets for detailed capability planning passing to the Service Chiefs and Commander Joint Force Command.
Recommendation 6a
The Head Office should be smaller, more strategic but stronger. It should advise the new Defence Board on high level balance of investment, set strategic direction and provide a strong corporate and financial management framework for the Department.
Recommendation 6b
The Service Chiefs should take responsibility (and ultimately own the budget) for detailed capability planning and propose (through a Command Plan) how best to deliver the strategic direction set by the Defence Board across all lines of development. Once the Plan is agreed by Head Office, Chiefs should be given greater freedom to flex within their budgets, provided they continue to deliver the agreed objectives within their delegated resources. The Plan should be refreshed annually, including to enable cross TLB adjustments where necessary, but the Department should aim to make major changes only at SDSRs.
Recommendation 6c
Major investments should continue to be scrutinised by the Investment Approvals Committee (IAC), chaired by DG Finance. Within a strict approvals process, he should delegate some authority for smaller projects to Directors of Resources in the relevant TLBs. The Department should rationalise current processes as far as possible (but as a minimum to ratify the strategic requirement, affordability and sequencing of these major investments). The Department will need to consider with the Treasury how quickly it is prudent to move to this more delegated model.
Recommendation 6d
DG Finance and the TLB holders should jointly appoint TLB Directors of Resources (formerly Command Secretaries). The post should report to them jointly. The Directors of Resource must have the necessary financial skills and experience and be properly supported.
Recommendation 6e
The new Defence Board should take an active role in managing departmental performance and risk at the strategic level, and the PUS should hold TLB holders to account at least on a quarterly basis for delivering their objectives within their delegated budgets.
Recommendation 6f
Financial management in the Department should be based on a single version of the financial truth. The Department should develop and resource a strategy for all management information, encompassing clear governance, processes and training, and it should invest in improving core information systems by bringing together financial, personnel and other management information in one place.
Recommendation 7
Key recommendation 7. Some military capabilities have to be integrated on a ‘joint’ basis in order to effectively enable operations. Such enabling capabilities need more effective proponency within Defence. To that end, a Joint Forces Command should be created to manage and deliver specific joint capabilities and to take the lead on joint warfare development, drawing on lessons and experimentation to advise on how the Armed Forces should conduct joint operations in the future. Certain joint and Defence capabilities should continue to be delivered on a ‘lead Service’ basis.
Recommendation 7a
The Joint Forces Command should be led by a military 4 star, and should have responsibility for commanding and generating the joint capabilities allocated to it and setting the framework for joint enablers that sit in the single Services.
Recommendation 7b
As a result, a number of military organisations currently managed by the Central TLB should pass to the Joint Forces Command.
Recommendation 7c
The Permanent Joint Headquarters should sit within the Joint Forces Command, but report for operational purposes direct to the CDS.
Recommendation 7d
In implementing the Joint Forces Command, the Department should systematically review joint or potentially joint capabilities and functions across the Services against the criteria set out below to determine which might be rationalised, the merit of further joint organisations, and which should transfer to the Joint Forces Command and which should transfer to a lead Service.
Recommendation 8
Key recommendation 8. A model for running military operations centred on the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) remains the optimum one. In principle, and to simplify roles, the Department should look to make PJHQ responsible for all military operations. The Department should consider whether those operations not currently run by PJHQ should transfer to it.
Recommendation 9
Key recommendation 9. The Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM) has a crucial role in managing through the consequences of the over-committed equipment and support programme and should have the authority he needs to do that.
Recommendation 9a
CDM should be a member of the new Defence Board.
Recommendation 9b
We endorse the recent decision to give him the lead for commercial and industrial policy on behalf of Defence.
Recommendation 9c
The Department should consider whether making CDM an additional Accounting Officer for expenditure on equipment and support would usefully further strengthen his authority.
Recommendation 9d
We welcome the development and increased use of the independent costing capability provided by the Cost Assurance and Analysis Service. The Department should mandate the use of this service more broadly across Defence to support investment decisions and planning.
Recommendation 9e
We note that CDM’s Materiel Strategy is examining the scope, structure and size of the Defence Equipment and Support organisation, and is due to report later this year. That work should build on the recommendations set out in this report.
Recommendation 10
Key recommendation 10. Enabling services should be delivered as efficiently, effectively and professionally as possible, including through the creation of the new Defence Infrastructure and Defence Business Services organisations on which we advised the Defence Secretary earlier in the year.
Recommendation 10a
The Department should keep under review the future scope of the Defence Infrastructure Organisation and Defence Business Services Organisation as it implements its infrastructure and corporate services transformation programmes.
Recommendation 10b
The DG Finance should be given the authority to direct standards, procedures and staffing for the finance function across the Department, in line with the changes already made to the HR and commercial functions.
Recommendation 10c
As a consequence of the changes recommended here and in Part 9, the Department should look to disestablish the Central TLB.
Recommendation 11
Key recommendation 11. In line with the overall capability planning and financial management model, the Department should afford greater priority to managing its ‘human capability’ as a strategic resource, to ensure a better balance with its consideration of equipment capability. Specifically, it should develop the ‘Whole Force Concept,’ which seeks to ensure that Defence is supported by the most cost-effective balance of regular military personnel, reservists, MOD civilians and contractors.
Recommendation 11a
The Department should reduce the size of the senior cadre of Defence and the management levels below it. To enable this, the Department should review all non-front line military posts from OF5 (Captain / Colonel / Group Captain) and civilian posts from Band B (Grade 7), to determine the need for the post, whether it needs to be civilian or military, and optimum management structures.
Recommendation 12
Key recommendation 12. The Department should manage and use its senior military and civilian personnel more effectively. With oversight of the ‘Appointments’ sub-committee to the new Board, the career management system should be designed so that individuals stay in key senior posts for longer and the processes for promotions and appointments are transparent and (on the military side) standardised, to provide assurance that both Defence and Service needs are being met.
Recommendation 12a
A new model for the management of senior military officers – the joint assured model – should be introduced, which would include a role for an independent member on Service promotion and appointing boards; an enhanced role for the existing Senior Appointments Committee, to which PUS, Commander Joint Forces Command an independent private sector representative would be added as members; and a more formal process for the involvement of reporting officers in the appointment of senior military personnel, and vice versa for civilian appointments;
Recommendation 12b
The Department should improve its talent management and succession planning in the Senior Civil Service and the management level below, and involve the Civil Service Commissioners for all appointments at 2 star and above and of CDS or VCDS for the most senior appointments.
Recommendation 12c
The Department should move to a model where most individuals stay in post for longer and the most senior civilian and military posts are held, as a rule, for 4 to 5 years.
Recommendation 12d
Defence should place greater emphasis on recruiting or developing people with the right skills and expertise, particularly in professional or more specialist functional areas.
Recommendation 12e
The Head Office should continue to set high level training and education policy, but joint requirement setting and co-ordination should be delegated to Joint Forces Command to the maximum degree possible. We do not see any changes to single Service responsibilities.
Recommendation 13
Key recommendation 13. The new Defence Board should ensure that the implementation of the Defence Reform proposals is properly resourced, coordinated from Head Office and driven by both Ministers and the senior leadership of the Department.
Recommendation 13a
The Defence Secretary should chair a group specifically to oversee implementation.
Recommendation 13b
Implementation should be led at 4 star level. They should be responsible to the Defence Secretary’s group and the Defence Board for driving through the detailed design and implementation. They should stay in post to see it through.
Recommendation 13c
Implementation should be one of the Department’s top priorities and will need to be resourced accordingly. This will need to cover training for Defence as a whole, as well the core teams who will lead the work.
Recommendation 13d
The Defence Reform Steering Group should be asked to reconvene on an annual basis for the next three years to check on progress, and report to the Defence Secretary, who should in turn report on progress to Parliament.
Recommendation 14
Key recommendation 14. The model depends on the right leadership and behaviours. The Department has failed in this regard in the past. Behaviours should be front and centre of, and embedded throughout, the implementation. The right example must be set from the top.
All text above is the review's.
No recommendations have this response.