Independent review
Awaiting Government Response
Fisher Review (Part 2)
Index summary
The second report of the Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences, examining barriers to the investigation and prosecution of fraud committed against businesses and individuals in the digital age, and making 47 recommendations covering data-sharing, whistleblower incentivisation, investigation powers, international cooperation, prosecution, courts, penalties, rehabilitation, victims and education.
Original evidence
Recommendations
Recommendation 1
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Grant law enforcement the power to issue civil fines to individuals purchasing fraud-enabling products online, drawing on provisions in the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025 [Chapter 5]. Law enforcement should also retain discretion to pursue prosecution and custodial sentences in serious cases.
Recommendation 2
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Introduce a new corporate criminal offence for providers of regulated user-to-user services (as defined under the Online Safety Act 2023) who fail to prevent fraud on their platforms. This offence would closely mirror the recently introduced ‘failure-to-prevent’ fraud offence under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, which holds large organisations criminally liable if they fail to prevent fraud committed by associated persons for their benefit.
Recommendation 3
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Introduce an anti-fraud levy on digital and communications infrastructure providers, including social media platforms, online service providers, and other intermediaries that host or facilitate fraudulent activity. The levy would aim to distribute the financial burden of economic crime more equitably across all stakeholders whose platforms are exploited for fraud. It would be administered by Ofcom, with a sunset clause allowing for its reduction or removal if measurable improvements in fraud prevention, detection, and cooperation with law enforcement are demonstrated.
Recommendation 4
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Introduce a specific summary-only offence of identity-based impersonation, defined as the use of another person’s personal details or identity for the purpose of committing fraud.
Recommendation 5
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Create a summary-only offence for Deed Poll Abuse—changing one’s name through the deed poll process with the intent to commit a fraud.
Recommendation 6
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An adaptable approach should be adopted to tackle low-level money laundering: a. Depending on the severity of the offence, law enforcement should be granted discretion to either issue a formal warning (Cease and Desist Notice) to first-time offenders, refer culprits to mandatory re-education programme, or pursue prosecution if appropriate. b. Where offending continues, law enforcement should have the option to impose a civil penalty, such as a fixed penalty notice. c. Where offending further continues or is substantial in the first instance, law enforcement should consider prosecution under the new proposed summary-only money laundering offence, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or other relevant legislation. d. Guidance should be issued, by the National Police Chiefs’ Council and Crown Prosecution Service, to help law enforcement identify vulnerable individuals, including those who may have been coerced into offending.
Recommendation 7
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Create a summary-only offence for low-level money laundering—allowing a bank account to be used directly or indirectly by another person without a reasonable excuse.
Recommendation 8
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Report Fraud should publicly commit to a 14-day service standard, ensuring that every victim receives a clear update on the status of their report within that timeframe. This commitment should cover three key elements: a. Acknowledgement and Case Reference – Immediate confirmation of the report with a unique reference number. b. Triage Decision – Completion of an initial assessment and prioritisation within 14 days, with the outcome communicated to the victim. c. Accessible Progress Tracking – Provision of a secure, user-friendly platform enabling victims to monitor progress, view updates, and access support resources at any time.
Recommendation 9
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Intelligence sharing within public–private partnerships focused on tackling economic crime should take place within a statutory framework.
Recommendation 10
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UK law enforcement agencies should collaborate with the private legal sector market in a fair, transparent and open manner, to facilitate the recovery of losses sustained by a victim of fraud.
Recommendation 11
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Until a statutory framework has been created, establish a single memorandum of understanding between public bodies setting out how data and intelligence can be shared between these agencies, for the purpose of detecting and investigating fraud.
Recommendation 12
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a. The Home Office, working with the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Information Commissioner’s Office, should provide guidance on voluntary and compelled data-sharing for public and private sector organisations, drawing upon section 7 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, regulation 103(1) of the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, and the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023. This should explicitly cover information sharing between private sector organisations, setting out the legal basis and safeguards. b. The Government should clarify the scope of sections 333 and 342 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 concerning the tipping off offence and the prejudicing of an investigation. The NCA should provide assurance that, where information is shared with the objective being to combat criminal activity in line with this guidance these provisions will not apply.
Recommendation 13
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Section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 should be amended to mirror the information gateway in Section 7 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, thereby enabling the Serious Fraud Office to share and receive information with greater flexibility and operational reach.
Recommendation 14
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The Government to conduct a comprehensive review of the data-sharing provisions and arrangements to enable the detection and investigation of fraud. This should include sharing within and between the public and private sectors.
Recommendation 15
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Make legislative provision for the Serious Fraud Office to financially reward whistleblowers. The Government should launch a consultation to inform the design of a suitable scheme.
Recommendation 16
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Create a new criminal offence for individuals who knowingly make false reports to the law enforcement agencies under a whistleblower incentivisation scheme. The person is not in breach of this offence if he does not know or suspect the report or evidence submitted to be false.
Recommendation 17
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Establish a criminal offence for those who harass or intimidate whistleblowers.
Recommendation 18
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Establish an independent arbitration panel to review appeals or complaints made by whistleblowers.
Recommendation 19
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Funding should be prioritised to support the implementation of artificial intelligence by law enforcement agencies in the proactive detection and disruption of fraud.
Recommendation 20
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The Law Commission recommendation 8, from its report Search Warrants (2020), should be implemented. Namely that the Insolvency Service be empowered to execute search warrants obtained under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Department of Trade and Industry Investigations) Order 2002, without the need to accompany a constable. This would extend to exercising the powers of entry as well as search. That sections 19 to 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 be extended to the Insolvency Service, with necessary modifications.
Recommendation 21
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The extraterritorial ambit of section 2(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 should be reviewed with a view in particular to expanding jurisdiction to enable the Serious Fraud office to serve a notice on: a. A United Kingdom (UK) person who is a director of a UK company and who is overseas. b. A foreign corporate without a UK presence but a sufficient UK connection.
Recommendation 22
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To prevent otherwise lawful section 49 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) notices being frustrated because relevant data is stored remotely rather than locally, it is recommended the Act be amended as follows: a. References to protected information having come into the ‘possession’ of a person should include protected information not stored locally on the device but accessible through a network connection. b. Paragraph 1(1)(a) of Schedule 2 should be amended to permit appropriate permission to be given by a lay justice. c. Section 53(5A)(a) should be amended so that the appropriate maximum term in a ‘fraud case’ is five years, adopting the same model for child indecency cases by providing a list of relevant fraud offences which engage the increased appropriate maximum term. Search warrant application forms should be amended to: a. Ask an applicant whether he or she intends to apply for appropriate permission to impose a disclosure requirement under section 49 of RIPA. b. Guide the applicant through the relevant statutory test.
Recommendation 23
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Establish a presumption in favour of use of the court’s power under Section 41(7) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make restraint orders in fraud cases, unless there is a compelling reason to oppose such an order.
Recommendation 24
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The United Kingdom Government should take the lead in developing a protocol to the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, ensuring fraud is recognised as a priority
Recommendation 25
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Designate foreign nationals orchestrating transnational fraud for targeted sanctions. This measure would enable the United Kingdom (UK) to impose asset freezes, travel bans and other penalties on individuals based overseas who coordinate or profit from large-scale fraud operations targeting UK citizens.
Recommendation 26
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Deny United Kingdom (UK) visas from foreign nationals linked to fraud against UK victims, in line with existing powers under the Immigration Rules and the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. This complements the Government’s use of targeted immigration sanctions against individuals involved in transnational criminal activity.
Recommendation 27
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Use trade agreements and memorandums of understanding to promote international law enforcement cooperation on evidence gathering, asset recovery, and extradition in fraud/economic crime cases affecting UK residents.
Recommendation 28
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Invite the Judicial College to: a. Review how best to prepare all judges, including magistrates, for the likely increase in hearing cases relating to artificial intelligence-enabled fraud and the laundering of money/assets using cryptocurrencies. b. Review and update the existing ‘Long and Complex Trials’ course and to propose updating the training, or establish a bespoke module, covering the unique challenge of managing increasingly digital-heavy, serious and complex economic crime cases, and whether this training should be a requirement for all judges who hear complex economic crime.
Recommendation 29
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Judges assigned to preside over a serious or complex economic‑crime trial (including fraud) should be allocated within four weeks of the case being transferred to the Crown Court. The allocated judge should then be afforded a minimum of one week’s uninterrupted reading time before arraignment, to enable effective case management and the early resolution of disclosure issues. This standard should be embedded in judicial scheduling as a matter of principle, to secure fairness, efficiency and public confidence.
Recommendation 30
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The Judicial Office should extend the application of the Southwark Protocol to all Crown Courts across England and Wales that hear serious fraud and economic crime.
Recommendation 31
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The Judicial Office should codify the Southwark Protocol into a Judicial Practice Direction to ensure consistent application across all Crown Courts.
Recommendation 32
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Invest in modern court technology infrastructure across England and Wales to support the effective trial of complex fraud cases.
Recommendation 33
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Extend civil powers already available to the Crown Courts, namely provisions under section 2 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, to enable courts to wind up a company explicitly being used, by a defendant, to commit fraud. Such powers would complement the introduction of a Criminal Receivership Order to strengthen the enforcement of financial penalties and asset recovery in economic crime cases (as proposed in Recommendation 3.9 of the Independent Sentencing Review).
Recommendation 34
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Pilot ‘diversion from court’ schemes for low-level fraud offenders, particularly where there is early admission of responsibility.
Recommendation 35
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Update the sentencing framework for serious fraud offences and money laundering, increasing the maximum custodial penalties to 20 years to reflect the gravity and impact of these crimes. It is for the Sentencing Council to review these proposals and to consider guidelines for sentencing for the most serious offenders.
Recommendation 36
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The Government should review and reform the current early guilty plea framework for complex fraud and economic crime cases. Specifically: a. Enhanced judicial indications – Replace the current approach with a reformed Goodyear indication process, enabling judges to provide a specific sentence indication (rather than a broad range) should an early guilty plea be considered. This would give defendants greater clarity and incentivise early resolution. b. Increased sentence discount for very early pleas – Introduce a 50% significant sentence reduction for guilty pleas entered at the earliest opportunity, reflecting the significant savings in time and cost for the justice system and the benefit to victims.
Recommendation 37
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Introduce a statutory provision under Chapter 3 of the Sentencing Act 2020, mirroring section 74, which would enable discounted sentences where there is swift full payment of confiscation orders. This is in contrast to the current model of extending custodial sentences for delayed payment.
Recommendation 38
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The Ministry of Justice should begin systematically collecting and publishing data on the number of individuals imprisoned for failing to satisfy a confiscation order. This dataset should include a breakdown by the value of the order, using the following bands: a. Less than £1 million. b. £1 million–£5 million. c. £5 million–£10 million. d. More than £10 million.
Recommendation 39
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The Government should consider creating a separate statutory, court-supervised deferred prosecution mechanism for directors, senior managers and, where justified, other em-ployees materially implicated in serious corporate economic crime. Any such mechanism should operate alongside, and not in place of, corporate liability, and should be capable of incorporating appropriate preventative measures, including restrictions akin to serious crime prevention order measures, where proportionate.
Recommendation 40
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Proceeds of Deferred Prosecution Agreements should be injected into the criminal justice system and a proportion ring-fenced for economic crime enforcement activity.
Recommendation 41
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The Government should legislate to create a fraud-specific civil protective order regime, modelled on Part 4 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009, empowering magistrates’ courts to impose tailored restrictions on individuals suspected of minor fraud. This regime should include financial, business and digital activity controls, alongside positive compliance requirements, and operate within a framework of judicial oversight and proportionality.
Recommendation 42
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Pilot a restorative justice programme for fraud cases, to be used only where it is assessed as appropriate and pursuant to clear criteria, and where both the offender and the victim provide informed consent. The scheme should facilitate structured dialogue aimed at acknowledging harm, promoting accountability, and supporting victim recovery, and can operate alongside or as an alternative, to criminal proceedings.
Recommendation 43
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Victims of fraud should be clearly informed, through an amendment to the Victims’ Code, of their right to participate as third parties in Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 proceedings, particularly where law enforcement agencies have frozen assets linked to criminal conduct.
Recommendation 44
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Enhance and target the ‘Stop! Think Fraud’ public awareness campaign to better protect high-risk regions and vulnerable demographics.
Recommendation 45
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Fraud prevention and ethical awareness should be more explicitly embedded in the national curriculum. While some elements exist within personal, social, health and economic (PSHE) education, this foundation should be strengthened by integrating structured content on fraud risks, dishonesty, and ethical decision-making—particularly in digital and financial contexts. This should be delivered through modules on internet safety, digital literacy, or citizenship, with a focus on real-world scenarios such as online fraud and money muling.
Recommendation 46
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The Financial Conduct Authority should work with consumer banks to introduce mandatory educational learning for individuals under 18 years old before they can open an account. This could take the form of a short video or interactive session delivered via a mobile application, which explains the risks of fraud, scams, and money muling. The goal is to promote early financial literacy and reduce the risk of exploitation of young people in facilitating fraud and money laundering.
Recommendation 47
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Appoint a cross-Government Fraud Lead (‘Fraud Czar’) to drive strategic coordination and accountability in the United Kingdom’s response to fraud. This senior figure should be empowered to lead the Government’s fraud agenda across departments, ensuring coherence between emerging threats, policy, enforcement, prevention, and victim support.
No recommendations with this response.