Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences (Part 1): Disclosure in the Digital Age

1. The Government agrees with the objective of this recommendation: as the criminal justice system adopts advanced technology to support material management and disclosure, this must be done in a way that commands confidence across all participants, protects fair trial rights, and delivers value for money. 2. Achieving that objective requires robust scrutiny of both tools and processes to ensure they are safe, effective and secure. Tools alone will not suffice; they must be supported by the right governance, skills and training so they are configured and operated competently. 3. We therefore agree to take forward recommendation 1, with modifications to avoid duplicating existing governance and to ensure the right bodies are involved. In line with the Review’s emphasis on cross-system confidence, our first step will be to map the current groups and forums across the criminal justice system, identifying where functions already exist and where gaps remain. 4. To deliver the intended benefits while avoiding duplication, we consider a single forum, with two membership groups, to be most effective model. 5. Strategic operational group (cross agency). A version of this forum for law enforcement and other operational stakeholders, providing a structured space for internal operational discussions on emerging tools and capabilities. Its remit will include horizon scanning; standards for deployment and configuration; operational learning; identification of common requirements across forces and agencies; and consistent approaches to assessing performance, security and value for money. It will also coordinate skills and training needs across organisations. 6. Engagement group across the Criminal Justice System. A version of this forum bringing together law enforcement and prosecutors with judicial and defence representatives. Recognising that disclosure technology engages core trial safeguards, this will promote transparency and a shared understanding of how tools are used (generally and, where appropriate, in specific contexts), support confidence in the integrity of processes, and help ensure the right to a fair trial is upheld as technology evolves. 7. Collectively, this forum will address this recommendation’s subpoints (a)–(e): surveying available tools and functionality; agreeing metrics for accuracy, security and value for money; defining skills and training requirements; building confidence across partners; and establishing a regular review cycle. 8. Proposals on terms of reference, membership and reporting lines will be brought forward following the initial mapping exercise. The criminal justice engagement group terms of reference will be agreed with the senior judiciary to safeguard judicial independence. 9. In seeking to establish this forum, we will also consider the criminal justice system governance proposals from the Independent Review of Criminal Courts, to ensure that development of new groups and structures are effective and coherent.

10. The Government agrees with this recommendation. We strongly support the responsible exploration and adoption of advanced technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), to improve the efficiency and quality of investigative analysis and disclosure. The use of AI in this context must be lawful, fair and proportionate, and subject to robust governance, assurance and transparency so that it commands confidence across the criminal justice system. 11. We are already taking steps to ensure technology supports policing and law enforcement safely and at pace. As set out in the Police Reform White Paper, the Government will invest £115 million over the next three years to enable the rapid and responsible adoption of AI and automation by the police, including through a new National Centre for AI in Policing (Police AI) to identify, test and scale tools responsibly. 12. We have also worked with the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to develop a Joint Operating Procedure (JOP) that outlines a standardised approach for police and CPS collaboration on the use of AI in the investigative process. 13. We will build on this work to develop a cross-agency protocol that will: a. Set out core principles for responsible AI use in investigative analysis and disclosure, including appropriate human oversight, clear accountability, legality, proportionality, and safeguards to uphold fair trial rights. b. Establish expectations for testing, assurance and recordkeeping, so that the use of AI tools is auditable, evidence based and capable of effective scrutiny, with attention to accuracy, security, explainability and bias monitoring. 14. Support consistent implementation through guidance and learning, so that the workforce has the skills and training to deploy and operate AI tools competently and in line with legal and professional obligations. 15. The protocol will be developed with operational partners, prosecutors, defence and the judiciary. It will enable cross agency sharing of best practice and risk mitigations, and will be subject to regular review. Taken together, these measures will help ensure that AI-enabled innovation strengthens, rather than undermines, fairness, privacy and public confidence in the disclosure process.

16. The Government agrees with this recommendation. Capturing economies of scale in the procurement of technology is essential to securing better value for money, reducing duplication, and supporting consistent adoption of effective tools across policing and law enforcement. 17. This is why we recently published the Police Reform White Paper, which recognises that the current fragmented approach, where forces often procure technology separately, creates unnecessary cost and inhibits rapid national rollout. The White Paper commits to a more coordinated approach, enabling technology and equipment to be procured nationally and “bought once” by the National Police Service on behalf of all, with savings reinvested back into frontline policing.5 18. The White Paper also sets out that the new National Police Service will provide a single source of strategic leadership and will be empowered to set mandatory standards in areas including technology and data. This provides a clear basis for ensuring that national procurement supports interoperability and consistent standards, alongside improved value for money. 19. We will therefore take forward this recommendation by developing a central procurement capability for relevant technology categories, aligned with the policing reform programme. This will include engagement with policing and Home Office commercial functions and with policing leadership to agree requirements and standards, and to ensure appropriate governance, assurance and transparency. Our aim is to secure value for money, interoperability and consistent standards, while supporting innovation and competition and avoiding unnecessary duplication. pdf Para 159, iii.

20. The Government agrees with this recommendation. Digital forensics is now fundamental to the investigation of modern crime, and a crucial initial step in the disclosure process. Therefore, a more coherent governance model is needed to streamline decision making and standardise access to capability. 21. As set out in the Police Reform White Paper, we have committed to creating a National Police Service to provide stronger national leadership and enabling services, including a new national forensics service. The White Paper also highlights the scale of current pressures, noting that around 20,000 devices may be awaiting analysis at any time, and that nationally managed capability will support faster, more consistent rollout of new technologies and best practice.6 22. We will therefore take this recommendation forward through the policing reform programme, developing strengthened governance for digital forensics that avoids duplication, supports consistent national standards, and applies quality assurance and accreditation requirements in a proportionate and deliverable way. pdf Para 159, iii.

23. The Government agrees with this recommendation. The ability for law enforcement agencies and police forces to share sensitive material swiftly and securely with prosecutors and other criminal justice partners is essential to effective investigations, timely charging decisions, and the fair and efficient progression of cases. 24. Consistent with the Police Reform White Paper’s focus on strengthening national enabling capability, improving consistency, and equipping policing with the data and technology required to meet modern demands, the Government will undertake a review of current access to secure platforms for the sharing of sensitive material across law enforcement and local forces. 25. This internal review will identify gaps, duplication and barriers to secure information sharing, and will inform options to improve interoperability, assurance and usability, so that sensitive material can be handled and shared appropriately, with robust safeguards and public confidence.

30. The Government recognises the importance of consistent application of the disclosure test in Section 3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) and accepts this recommendation. As the Government will not be progressing the recommendation to create Consolidated Guidance, this change will instead be made in the Attorney General’s Guidelines. 31. This will compliment work that is already in progress to support consistent and thoughtful application of the disclosure test, such as the recently launched joint National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) and Crown Prosecution Service Disclosure Test Crib Sheet. The Crib Sheet was launched across policing in January 2026, providing a practical tool and clear and concise guidance to assist investigators and disclosure officers in their application of the disclosure test. 32. A ‘disclosure health check’ exercise has been launched by the NPCC, with results expected shortly, including looking at uptake of the Crib sheet and collation of feedback. The Government will work with the relevant organisations to assess the impact of this initiative and to determine if any further action is required to support officers’ application of the test.

33. The Government agrees with this recommendation. The exponential growth in digital material means that, without safe and effective technological support, investigators and prosecutors risk being overwhelmed by volume, with consequential delay and disruption to the timely delivery of justice for victims and defendants. 34. We will therefore take this recommendation forward by updating the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice to make clear that technology may lawfully and appropriately be used to assist (i) the identification of potentially relevant material, (ii) the identification of material that may meet the disclosure test, and (iii) the review of large volumes of such material, without creating an expectation that every item must be manually reviewed in all cases. 35. In implementing this change, we will be clear that technology is an aid to compliant, “thinking” disclosure practice, not a substitute for legal duties or professional judgment. We will also ensure that the approach is underpinned by safeguards to maintain confidence and fairness, including: clear cross-system governance and transparency expectations (recommendation 1); a cross agency protocol on the ethical and appropriate use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in analysis and disclosure (recommendation 2); and clearer expectations on redaction in a law enforcement context (recommendation 11). 36. In accepting these proposals, the Government also seeks to ensure that defendants and their legal representatives receive relevant material more swiftly, enabling them to build their case at an earlier stage and helping to reduce delay. The Government is also considering those recommendations which call for greater transparency from the prosecution on the disclosure tools used during cases (see the response to recommendation 23 and 24 on pages 46 -49). 37. The Government notes that Sir Brian Leveson has similarly emphasised the importance of using new technologies, including AI, to improve criminal justice processes, reflecting his Terms of Reference to consider how technology can improve the criminal courts (Part II Volume 1 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts, Foreword, para. 7). Sir Brian Leveson also addresses the impacts of technology on disclosure within his discussion of disclosure reform in Chapter 5 of Part II Volume 1 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts.

38. The Government supports the objective of these recommendations. In cases involving large volumes of digital material, the manual preparation of schedule entries can impose a substantial administrative burden and divert resource away from effective case progression and “thinking” disclosure. The quality of current schedules can also vary significantly between agency and force.7 39. Consistent with the Government’s commitment in the Police Reform White Paper, we will use technology to reduce bureaucracy and support the efficient handling of material where it is safe and appropriate to do so. Our intention is to enable technology to assist investigators, disclosure officers and prosecutors in producing accurate, timely and informative schedules, so that professional time and expertise can be focused on analysis, relevance, and disclosure decisions rather than manual transcription. 40. We will therefore take forward recommendation 8 (and recommendation 84 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts8) with modifications. Specifically, we will work with law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to develop a technology‑assisted approach to schedule creation on a piloted and phased basis. This will ensure that any tools introduced operate under appropriate human oversight, support rather than replace professional judgment, and are validated in operational conditions to ensure outputs are accurate, consistent and fit for purpose before any wider adoption. 41. As with earlier recommendations regarding the use of technology, implementation of these proposals will be supported by robust governance and oversight (recommendation 1); and guidance (recommendation 2).

42. The Government agrees with this recommendation. In cases involving very large volumes of digital material, the ability to use structured metadata to support scheduling, alongside proportionate narrative description and, where appropriate, block listing, can reduce unnecessary administrative burden while improving consistency and usability for prosecutors and the court. It can also reduce delay by swiftly providing the defence an overview of the unused material held by the prosecution. 43. This approach is already reflected in practice through the Attorney General’s Guidelines, which were updated in 2024 with strengthened guidance on digital material, including an emphasis on effective strategies for block listing. However, as the Review identifies, the current provision within the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA) Code of Practice could be clearer and more consistently applied. 44. We will therefore take this recommendation forward by updating the CPIA Code of Practice to make clear that “metadata schedules” may be used appropriately, in conjunction with descriptive schedules and block listing, where this is a proportionate and reliable way of listing unused material. 45. To support consistent implementation, we will go further by setting out clearer expectations in accompanying guidance on when and how metadata schedules and block listing should be used, including safeguards to ensure that schedule entries remain sufficiently informative to enable effective prosecutorial review and meaningful scrutiny, and that the approach is applied in a “thinking” manner focused on the issues in the case.

46. The Government supports the objective of this recommendation, which seeks to reduce the pre‑charge scheduling burden in cases where a guilty plea is anticipated, including indictable‑only cases. The intention is to ensure that disclosure activity at the pre‑charge stage is proportionate and targeted, while maintaining fairness and ensuring that disclosure obligations are not compromised. Any streamlined approach would operate only where it is appropriate to do so and subject to prosecutor agreement. 47. The Government recognises that the current approach can require the preparation of full unused material schedules at an early stage in cases that are unlikely to be contested. Taking this recommendation forward has the potential to reduce unnecessary duplication of work, better prioritise investigative and prosecutorial resources, and support the efficient progression of serious cases through the criminal justice system, without detracting from the rights of defendants or the integrity of proceedings. 48. We therefore commit to taking this recommendation forward through the most effective mechanism. This will likely include amendment to the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Code of Practice and/or the relevant guidance. Any changes will include appropriate safeguards to ensure that, where a defendant subsequently changes their indication of plea and enters a not‑guilty plea, full scheduling will take place at the appropriate stage and disclosure duties will be fully complied with.

49. The Government supports the intention of these recommendations, which is to significantly reduce the time police spend redacting casefiles before they are submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for a charging decision. The Government also recognises the importance of law enforcement having clarity over the redaction they are required to perform throughout the disclosure process. 50. Any criminal justice process must ensure personal data is handled appropriately and lawfully, maintaining victim and witness confidence and public trust. However, we also recognise the administrative burden that pre-charge redaction creates, and the government has given extensive consideration to how to reduce this through both legislative and non-legislative means. A ‘data bubble’, enabling law enforcement to share unredacted data with the CPS for the purposes of a charging decision, would require significant and unprecedented changes to the legislative framework, including significant amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and common law (specifically the tort of misuse of private information and the duty of confidentiality). 51. The current approach to casefile redaction (including rebuttable presumption material) is governed by the Attorney General’s Guidelines (AGG) and the Director’s Guidance on Charging (6th edition) (DG6), which frontload casefile preparation in the interests of timeliness, in readiness for onward sharing with the court and defence. The NPCC and CPS have already carried out extensive work to develop and issue simplified guidance and crib-sheets to aid officers when redacting casefiles, in line with the CPS National Police Chiefs’ Council Joint Principles for Redaction. 52. Changing the current approach, with the aim of reducing the ‘frontloaded’ effort, would necessitate changes to the AGG, DG6 and consequential amendments to the joint principles for redaction. It would also entail a revised process, with implications for roles, resourcing and IT systems. 53. We have therefore engaged CPS, AGO and NPCC in a programme of work focused on practical solutions that will make a tangible difference. This includes: a. AI-enabled automation: technology is key to reducing the burden, and we are working with policing to support their adoption of AI enabled redaction technology. The majority of forces now have AI enabled text redaction tools and we are now supporting forces to adopt audio visual multi media (AVMM) redaction technology in the most efficient way. b. Process change: We have engaged partners in a discovery exercise, commissioned through the Home Office’s Accelerated Capabilities Environment (ACE), to explore options for a more efficient process, with the aim of reducing 'wasted' redaction effort. Subject to the outcome of this work, and should the NPCC and CPS agree to implement a revised process, they would need to amend the ’Joint Principles’, and new guidance would need to be issued. It would not be for the ICO to issue such guidance, though operational partners may wish to consult them where appropriate. c. Proportionate disclosure: through casefile analysis we have established that a large part of the redaction burden is driven by the ‘rebuttable presumption’, and we have collaborated with operational partners to pilot a more proportionate approach (see following response to recommendation 81 from Sir Brian Leveson’s Review).

49. The Government supports the intention of these recommendations, which is to significantly reduce the time police spend redacting casefiles before they are submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for a charging decision. The Government also recognises the importance of law enforcement having clarity over the redaction they are required to perform throughout the disclosure process. 50. Any criminal justice process must ensure personal data is handled appropriately and lawfully, maintaining victim and witness confidence and public trust. However, we also recognise the administrative burden that pre-charge redaction creates, and the government has given extensive consideration to how to reduce this through both legislative and non-legislative means. A ‘data bubble’, enabling law enforcement to share unredacted data with the CPS for the purposes of a charging decision, would require significant and unprecedented changes to the legislative framework, including significant amendment to the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and common law (specifically the tort of misuse of private information and the duty of confidentiality). 51. The current approach to casefile redaction (including rebuttable presumption material) is governed by the Attorney General’s Guidelines (AGG) and the Director’s Guidance on Charging (6th edition) (DG6), which frontload casefile preparation in the interests of timeliness, in readiness for onward sharing with the court and defence. The NPCC and CPS have already carried out extensive work to develop and issue simplified guidance and crib-sheets to aid officers when redacting casefiles, in line with the CPS National Police Chiefs’ Council Joint Principles for Redaction. 52. Changing the current approach, with the aim of reducing the ‘frontloaded’ effort, would necessitate changes to the AGG, DG6 and consequential amendments to the joint principles for redaction. It would also entail a revised process, with implications for roles, resourcing and IT systems. 53. We have therefore engaged CPS, AGO and NPCC in a programme of work focused on practical solutions that will make a tangible difference. This includes: a. AI-enabled automation: technology is key to reducing the burden, and we are working with policing to support their adoption of AI enabled redaction technology. The majority of forces now have AI enabled text redaction tools and we are now supporting forces to adopt audio visual multi media (AVMM) redaction technology in the most efficient way. b. Process change: We have engaged partners in a discovery exercise, commissioned through the Home Office’s Accelerated Capabilities Environment (ACE), to explore options for a more efficient process, with the aim of reducing 'wasted' redaction effort. Subject to the outcome of this work, and should the NPCC and CPS agree to implement a revised process, they would need to amend the ’Joint Principles’, and new guidance would need to be issued. It would not be for the ICO to issue such guidance, though operational partners may wish to consult them where appropriate. c. Proportionate disclosure: through casefile analysis we have established that a large part of the redaction burden is driven by the ‘rebuttable presumption’, and we have collaborated with operational partners to pilot a more proportionate approach (see following response to recommendation 81 from Sir Brian Leveson’s Review).

59. The Government recognises that criminal investigations in England and Wales are undertaken by a range of bodies beyond the police, including regulators, local authorities, charities, commercial organisations and private investigators. Where such investigations give rise to criminal proceedings, whether prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service or by way of private prosecution, the fairness of the process depends on the quality, completeness and integrity of the investigative material, including the identification and handling of unused and disclosable material. 60. While the Code of Practice issued under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 formally applies to police officers, its principles set an important benchmark for good investigative and disclosure practice. In cases investigated outside policing, failures to meet equivalent standards can undermine confidence in prosecutions and risk unfairness to defendants. 61. The Government notes that positive steps have been taken within parts of the private investigation sector to raise professional standards, including through the development of the Association of British Investigators Code of Conduct. We will continue to consider whether there is a case for further regulation under the Private Security Industry Act 2001, taking care to ensure that any approach is proportionate and does not unduly restrict legitimate activity. 62. In relation to this recommendation, the Government accepts its intent and will keep the issue under consideration. This work will feed into the Government’s wider assessment of private prosecutions which is already examining safeguards, standards and oversight in this area. We will continue to monitor the quality of criminal investigations and subsequent prosecutions undertaken outside policing, including whether there is value in extending existing expectations or safeguards, as part of wider reforms, with the aim of ensuring that prosecutions brought in England and Wales are consistently fair and of high quality.

63. The Government agrees with Recommendations 14 and 15. We recognise the importance of ensuring that officers and staff joining any major UK law enforcement agency receive a consistent core understanding of the criminal justice system, the right to a fair trial, and the central importance of disclosure, while allowing agencies to reflect their specific operational context within their own training arrangements. 64. We will therefore work to coordinate and bring together the College of Policing, law enforcement agencies, and police forces to agree a single, shared product setting out minimum learning standards. This will take the form of an agreed document describing the core topics and baseline level of understanding expected of new recruits (Bronze), as well as investigators and disclosure officers (Silver). This approach is intended to raise the overall standard, reduce disparities in understanding and application of disclosure obligations across agencies, and support the sharing of best practice, while leaving responsibility for training delivery and assurance with individual agencies

63. The Government agrees with Recommendations 14 and 15. We recognise the importance of ensuring that officers and staff joining any major UK law enforcement agency receive a consistent core understanding of the criminal justice system, the right to a fair trial, and the central importance of disclosure, while allowing agencies to reflect their specific operational context within their own training arrangements. 64. We will therefore work to coordinate and bring together the College of Policing, law enforcement agencies, and police forces to agree a single, shared product setting out minimum learning standards. This will take the form of an agreed document describing the core topics and baseline level of understanding expected of new recruits (Bronze), as well as investigators and disclosure officers (Silver). This approach is intended to raise the overall standard, reduce disparities in understanding and application of disclosure obligations across agencies, and support the sharing of best practice, while leaving responsibility for training delivery and assurance with individual agencies

65. The Government agrees with the intent of Recommendation 16, which is to establish a sustainable pool of experienced and capable disclosure officers with the confidence and skills required to oversee disclosure in complex and largescale criminal cases. We recognise that this depends not only on initial training, but also on retention, practical experience, and opportunities for officers to develop and apply advanced disclosure skills over time. It is important that such roles are supported in a way that encourages experienced practitioners to remain within disclosure focused functions. 66. However, the Government notes concerns raised by policing partners that a formal, mandatory accreditation pathway could be costly and, in some cases, disincentivising, and that a single model may not be suitable across all agencies. We therefore do not propose to establish a universal accreditation framework at this stage. Instead, we will explore proportionate alternatives, including the development of stand-alone modules or the integration of advanced disclosure and material management content within existing training frameworks. 67. This approach would support the development and retention of skilled disclosure officers, help increase the breadth of expertise across agencies, and enable mobility of experienced practitioners where appropriate, while retaining flexibility for specialist bodies, such as the Serious Fraud Office, to continue to design and deliver bespoke training aligned to their case complexity and operational needs.

68. The Government agrees with the intent of Recommendations 17 and 18. We recognise that disclosure practice and processes will continue to evolve over time, including changes in how disclosure duties are discharged, and that minimum learning standards must remain current. We will therefore support, utilising insight from the College of Policing, periodic review and refresh of the agreed Bronze and Silver minimum standards, to ensure the products reflect current law, policy, guidance and operational practice, and do not embed outdated approaches. 69. Responsibility would remain with individual law enforcement agencies to determine how best to ensure officers and staff are aware of any updates and undertake refresher learning when required, taking account of role, experience and operational context rather than mandating uniform refresh cycles. 70. Alongside this, the Government agrees that the quality of delivery of disclosure learning is critical to ensuring that agreed standards translate into effective practice and behavioural change. We therefore support strengthened quality assurance of training delivered by the College of Policing, higher education institutions and other delivery partners, with findings shared with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to support continuous improvement, the sharing of best practice, and early identification of where delivery does not meet expected standards.

68. The Government agrees with the intent of Recommendations 17 and 18. We recognise that disclosure practice and processes will continue to evolve over time, including changes in how disclosure duties are discharged, and that minimum learning standards must remain current. We will therefore support, utilising insight from the College of Policing, periodic review and refresh of the agreed Bronze and Silver minimum standards, to ensure the products reflect current law, policy, guidance and operational practice, and do not embed outdated approaches. 69. Responsibility would remain with individual law enforcement agencies to determine how best to ensure officers and staff are aware of any updates and undertake refresher learning when required, taking account of role, experience and operational context rather than mandating uniform refresh cycles. 70. Alongside this, the Government agrees that the quality of delivery of disclosure learning is critical to ensuring that agreed standards translate into effective practice and behavioural change. We therefore support strengthened quality assurance of training delivered by the College of Policing, higher education institutions and other delivery partners, with findings shared with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to support continuous improvement, the sharing of best practice, and early identification of where delivery does not meet expected standards.

75. The Government partially accepts these recommendations and agrees with the underlying objective of strengthening early and regular engagement between investigators and prosecutors to support effective disclosure decision‑making and case progression. Criminal justice partners have expressed strong support for the intent of the recommendations, particularly where early engagement can add value in more complex cases. 76. However, the Government does not accept the recommendation that this engagement should be mandated through a prescriptive, blanket approach-such as requiring pre‑charge discussions in every case or fixed‑interval disclosure meetings. Stakeholders have highlighted that, given case volumes, a universal requirement would be disproportionate, place significant pressure on operational capacity and risk delaying case progression. It was also noted that not all cases require formal engagement on disclosure, and that fixed timescales risk creating artificial checkpoints and unproductive activity that do not reflect case need or add value. 77. The Government notes that significant work is already underway across the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and policing to embed the principles of early and effective engagement. This includes CPS guidance promoting a “one prosecution team” approach and early advice in appropriate cases; the use of Real Time Case Conversations to support early collaboration between prosecutors and investigators; joint initiatives under the Domestic Abuse Joint Justice Plan; strengthened Joint Operational Improvement Meeting arrangements for more complex cases; and existing assurance mechanisms, including case strategy and Disclosure Gateway Assessments, which provide oversight of disclosure practice. 78. Building on this existing work, the Government supports a more targeted and flexible approach to the application of the recommendations. Rather than applying universally, the approach will apply only to anticipated not guilty plea cases where an Investigation Management Document has been produced, ensuring that engagement is focused on cases where the nature and complexity of the issues mean that early and ongoing discussion is most likely to add value. 79. The timing, form and frequency of engagement will be guided by professional judgement rather than fixed timescales, with discussions taking place where needed to support effective disclosure decision‑making and case progression. Where either the investigator or prosecutor identifies a need for engagement, there will be an expectation that this is addressed, supported by appropriate escalation and oversight arrangements. Effectiveness will be monitored through existing assurance and review mechanisms. 80. This approach is considered better aligned with operational realities while still delivering the intended benefits of improved collaboration and disclosure practice. The Government will continue to monitor implementation and will seek evidence of impact to inform any further action.

75. The Government partially accepts these recommendations and agrees with the underlying objective of strengthening early and regular engagement between investigators and prosecutors to support effective disclosure decision‑making and case progression. Criminal justice partners have expressed strong support for the intent of the recommendations, particularly where early engagement can add value in more complex cases. 76. However, the Government does not accept the recommendation that this engagement should be mandated through a prescriptive, blanket approach-such as requiring pre‑charge discussions in every case or fixed‑interval disclosure meetings. Stakeholders have highlighted that, given case volumes, a universal requirement would be disproportionate, place significant pressure on operational capacity and risk delaying case progression. It was also noted that not all cases require formal engagement on disclosure, and that fixed timescales risk creating artificial checkpoints and unproductive activity that do not reflect case need or add value. 77. The Government notes that significant work is already underway across the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and policing to embed the principles of early and effective engagement. This includes CPS guidance promoting a “one prosecution team” approach and early advice in appropriate cases; the use of Real Time Case Conversations to support early collaboration between prosecutors and investigators; joint initiatives under the Domestic Abuse Joint Justice Plan; strengthened Joint Operational Improvement Meeting arrangements for more complex cases; and existing assurance mechanisms, including case strategy and Disclosure Gateway Assessments, which provide oversight of disclosure practice. 78. Building on this existing work, the Government supports a more targeted and flexible approach to the application of the recommendations. Rather than applying universally, the approach will apply only to anticipated not guilty plea cases where an Investigation Management Document has been produced, ensuring that engagement is focused on cases where the nature and complexity of the issues mean that early and ongoing discussion is most likely to add value. 79. The timing, form and frequency of engagement will be guided by professional judgement rather than fixed timescales, with discussions taking place where needed to support effective disclosure decision‑making and case progression. Where either the investigator or prosecutor identifies a need for engagement, there will be an expectation that this is addressed, supported by appropriate escalation and oversight arrangements. Effectiveness will be monitored through existing assurance and review mechanisms. 80. This approach is considered better aligned with operational realities while still delivering the intended benefits of improved collaboration and disclosure practice. The Government will continue to monitor implementation and will seek evidence of impact to inform any further action.

81. Following engagement with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Government agrees in part with this recommendation, supporting its objective that investigators should be able to obtain timely advice on urgent disclosure matters where early engagement can help prevent issues later in the case. 82. However, as recognised in the Review, this issue only arises in a minority of cases. The Government therefore considers it is important to take a proportionate approach that balances improved communications with the effective use of prosecutorial resource. 83. The CPS is embedding existing processes including adding prosecutors’ contact details on the MG3 form used to record charging decisions and advice, to ensure investigators have a clear route back to the CPS if further input is needed. Areas are also monitoring compliance through routine dip sampling and are seeing greater consistency in how contact details are provided, making it easier for investigators to engage with prosecutors. 84. This work will sit alongside the Real Time Case Conversations guidance and ongoing case conversations in domestic abuse cases across CPS Areas ensuring improvements are part of the business-as-usual practice. This will reinforce the changes and support the intended improvements. 85. In addition to this, the CPS have established mechanisms through which investigators can raise urgent disclosure queries where necessary. These include Joint Operational Improvement Meetings, designated disclosure single points of contact, and clear routes to contact CPS Area offices, CPS Direct, the Central Casework Division and the Proceeds of Crime Division, with contact details published on the CPS website to enable escalation where appropriate. 86. Further to this, the Government’s partial acceptance of recommendations 19 and 20, which support strengthened early and regular engagement between investigators and prosecutors, will also help address this issue. 87. The Government will work with the CPS to keep existing arrangements under review, using evidence from the current embedding of agreed processes to inform any future refinements.

88. The most complex and voluminous cases can present a significant disclosure undertaking. If improperly managed, disclosure issues in these cases can result in significant delays, cases failing, and miscarriages of justice. The Intensive Disclosure Regime (IDR) proposed by Jonathan Fisher KC, and endorsed and commented on by Sir Brian Leveson, seeks to prevent these issues by proposing a new court pathway with additional case management requirements, new engagement obligations for the defence and prosecution, and a new hearing to focus on disclosure issues. 89. The Government recognises the benefits that this greater engagement and scrutiny of disclosure would have on cases with evidence which is particularly voluminous or complex. The IDR could be an important tool available to courts to prevent disclosure failures in such cases. 90. The Government notes the two approaches taken to define the scope of IDR by Jonathan Fisher KC and Sir Brian (recommendation 90 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts). Ensuring the right cases are captured in any new court pathway is crucial to ensure court resources are utilised effectively and that cases where the IDR would be beneficial are correctly identified. 91. The Government therefore commits to exploring a pilot of the new IDR pathway. 92. A pilot could allow for in-depth analysis of how IDR would work in practice, whether it improves efficiencies, and its associated costs. This may allow for a more informed decision to be made on the suitability of the IDR and support further roll-out of the IDR, subject to the outcomes of the pilot. 93. The Government is also aware of similar measures being used in Southwark Crown Court and will explore how this can be used to inform a pilot scheme of the IDR.

94. The Government recognises the importance of ensuring that all parties can engage meaningfully with disclosure at an early stage of proceedings. There is broad support across Government and operational partners for clear expectations on the timely provision of a Disclosure Management Document (DMD) ahead of the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH), given concerns that late disclosure can undermine effective engagement and judicial case management. 95. This recommendation is closely linked to wider criminal courts reform proposals currently under consideration following the Independent Review of Criminal Courts (Part 1), including proposals relating to the timing and function of the PTPH. As decisions on those proposals have not yet been taken, the Government considers it premature to commit to a definitive approach on the timing of DMD provision at this stage. 96. Operational feedback indicates that while some prosecutors already provide a DMD sufficiently in advance of the PTPH, introducing a fixed legally binding requirement across the envisaged cases would represent a significant change, particularly for high‑volume CPS casework. There are also risks that imposing a rigid deadline could incentivise the production of lower‑quality DMDs, potentially reducing rather than improving efficiency. 97. Subject to decisions taken on the relevant Independent Review of Criminal Courts (Part 1) recommendation, the Government considers that a pilot of CPS cases would be the most appropriate means of assessing the practical impact of the requirement. This would allow outcomes to be evaluated, including impacts on case progression, disclosure quality, and court efficiency, before any decision is taken on wider or statutory implementation. 98. Any such pilot would be contingent on and aligned with wider decisions to ensure coherence with wider criminal courts reform and to avoid the need for subsequent revision. 99. Subject to these decisions on wider court reform and the outcome of this pilot, the Government will invite the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee to consider amending the Criminal Procedure Rules to introduce this requirement.

100. The Government accepts the recommendation in principle, recognising the value of Disclosure Management Documents (DMDs) in supporting effective and proportionate disclosure in complex Crown Court cases. Existing guidance already makes DMDs mandatory in CPS Crown Court cases and their use is routine within the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). However, further consideration is required before confirming or extending requirements. 101. In particular, the Government will consider whether there is a demonstrable gap that requires formal confirmation of the existing position, and the most appropriate vehicle for doing so. Any change should be evidence‑based and proportionate; elected Crown Court cases should remain out of scope unless other complex criteria are met, reflecting current police practice and avoiding disproportionate operational burden. 102. The Government also agrees in principle with extending the information provided within DMDs, building on existing templates in the Attorney General’s Guidelines. However, the detailed requirements proposed would need to be refined and applied flexibly, ensuring that only information relevant to the specific case is mandatory and that the framework remains agile. 103. Concerns raised by operational partners regarding personal certification of technology use are noted. Any transparency around the use of technology should be framed through reference to organisational wide assurance processes, rather than individual officer certification. 104. Further work will be undertaken with criminal justice partners to determine the scope, content and implementation of any changes, ensuring they support effective disclosure without creating unnecessary burden. 105. Implementation of this recommendation may require changes to the Criminal Procedure Rules. If this is the case once the Government has considered this further, it will invite the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee to consider this recommendation.

106. The Government recognises the importance of resolving disclosure disagreements as early in the process as possible. Ensuring the Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing (PTPH) is effectively utilised to resolve disclosure issues prior to the commencement of the trial would prevent issues from arising during the trial and causing delays. Although discussing the Disclosure Management Document (DMD) can already happen and is specified in Better Case Management Guidance, stakeholders highlighted that disclosure and the DMD can be overlooked at the PTPH. There could therefore be value in setting out that all matters in the DMD will be discussed at the PTPH. 107. However, this recommendation is dependent on the timing of both the service of the DMD and the PTPH, which are being considered as part of this response and the Government’s response to the Independent Review of Criminal Courts respectively. As referenced in recommendation 23 above, the Government considers that the timing of the service of the DMD would require piloting subject to decisions on the relevant recommendations from Sir Brian’s Independent Review of the Criminal Courts concerning the timing of the PTPH. 108. The Government will therefore invite the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to consider implementing this recommendation, subject to decisions made on the timing of the PTPH and the outcome of any pilot regarding service of the DMD as proposed above.

109. The Government accepts that late disclosure requests may be necessary to ensure critical disclosure failings can be remedied. However, where used inappropriately, they can also have the effect of introducing significant delays to proceedings. Stakeholders highlighted that this recommendation would incentivise earlier defence engagement and prevent unnecessary delays to trials. 110. The Government recognises the need to combat unreasonable applications from disrupting trials whilst maintaining an avenue for legitimate claims. The Government will therefore invite the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to consider amending the Criminal Procedure Rules to include the factors in Recommendation 26 for judicial consideration when deciding whether to grant a late application under s.8 of the CPIA.

115. Judicial training is a matter for the independent judiciary and delivered through the Judicial College. It would therefore not be appropriate for the Government to respond to these recommendations.

116. The Government supports the intent of recommendation 28, recognising the challenges faced by officers in identifying and scheduling relevant material in summary‑only magistrates’ court cases. We agree that investigators would benefit from clearer, more consistent support and guidance. 117. However, we do not propose embedding this guidance within the existing MG6 forms, as these will be retired with the introduction of the Digital Case File system. Instead, we will take forward the intent of the recommendation through alternative routes, including the development of supporting guidance in the short term and exploring how the functionality of the Digital Case File can provide structured prompts and assistance to officers in future.

118. Whilst the Government agrees with the general premise of enhancing transparency of the disclosure regime, it is unable to accept this recommendation following careful consideration of advice received from operational agencies. We understand that the concern stems from a Local Authority prosecution13 , in which proceedings were stayed due to improper financial influence arising from a misapplication of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, rather than a failure in disclosure obligations. Whilst the facts of this case are clearly concerning, there is limited evidence to suggest that it represents a more widespread issue. 119. The Government is concerned that the proposal could generate significant unintended consequences disproportionate to the extent of the issue, including exposing charging decisions in Proceeds of Crime Act cases to routine defence challenges. It also risks creating an inaccurate public perception that financial considerations improperly influence prosecutorial decision-making as standard. 120. In addition, the Code for Crown Prosecutors permits a prosecutor to select charges which allows a confiscation order to be made in appropriate cases, where a defendant has benefited from criminal conduct. Whilst selection of charges is different to the question of whether to prosecute, the recommendation may cause confusion for prosecutors about what is expected to be disclosed. A prosecutor can legitimately take confiscation into account when selecting charges without the fact of that needing to be disclosed.

88. The most complex and voluminous cases can present a significant disclosure undertaking. If improperly managed, disclosure issues in these cases can result in significant delays, cases failing, and miscarriages of justice. The Intensive Disclosure Regime (IDR) proposed by Jonathan Fisher KC, and endorsed and commented on by Sir Brian Leveson, seeks to prevent these issues by proposing a new court pathway with additional case management requirements, new engagement obligations for the defence and prosecution, and a new hearing to focus on disclosure issues. 89. The Government recognises the benefits that this greater engagement and scrutiny of disclosure would have on cases with evidence which is particularly voluminous or complex. The IDR could be an important tool available to courts to prevent disclosure failures in such cases. 90. The Government notes the two approaches taken to define the scope of IDR by Jonathan Fisher KC and Sir Brian (recommendation 90 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts). Ensuring the right cases are captured in any new court pathway is crucial to ensure court resources are utilised effectively and that cases where the IDR would be beneficial are correctly identified. 91. The Government therefore commits to exploring a pilot of the new IDR pathway. 92. A pilot could allow for in-depth analysis of how IDR would work in practice, whether it improves efficiencies, and its associated costs. This may allow for a more informed decision to be made on the suitability of the IDR and support further roll-out of the IDR, subject to the outcomes of the pilot. 93. The Government is also aware of similar measures being used in Southwark Crown Court and will explore how this can be used to inform a pilot scheme of the IDR.

88. The most complex and voluminous cases can present a significant disclosure undertaking. If improperly managed, disclosure issues in these cases can result in significant delays, cases failing, and miscarriages of justice. The Intensive Disclosure Regime (IDR) proposed by Jonathan Fisher KC, and endorsed and commented on by Sir Brian Leveson, seeks to prevent these issues by proposing a new court pathway with additional case management requirements, new engagement obligations for the defence and prosecution, and a new hearing to focus on disclosure issues. 89. The Government recognises the benefits that this greater engagement and scrutiny of disclosure would have on cases with evidence which is particularly voluminous or complex. The IDR could be an important tool available to courts to prevent disclosure failures in such cases. 90. The Government notes the two approaches taken to define the scope of IDR by Jonathan Fisher KC and Sir Brian (recommendation 90 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts). Ensuring the right cases are captured in any new court pathway is crucial to ensure court resources are utilised effectively and that cases where the IDR would be beneficial are correctly identified. 91. The Government therefore commits to exploring a pilot of the new IDR pathway. 92. A pilot could allow for in-depth analysis of how IDR would work in practice, whether it improves efficiencies, and its associated costs. This may allow for a more informed decision to be made on the suitability of the IDR and support further roll-out of the IDR, subject to the outcomes of the pilot. 93. The Government is also aware of similar measures being used in Southwark Crown Court and will explore how this can be used to inform a pilot scheme of the IDR.

88. The most complex and voluminous cases can present a significant disclosure undertaking. If improperly managed, disclosure issues in these cases can result in significant delays, cases failing, and miscarriages of justice. The Intensive Disclosure Regime (IDR) proposed by Jonathan Fisher KC, and endorsed and commented on by Sir Brian Leveson, seeks to prevent these issues by proposing a new court pathway with additional case management requirements, new engagement obligations for the defence and prosecution, and a new hearing to focus on disclosure issues. 89. The Government recognises the benefits that this greater engagement and scrutiny of disclosure would have on cases with evidence which is particularly voluminous or complex. The IDR could be an important tool available to courts to prevent disclosure failures in such cases. 90. The Government notes the two approaches taken to define the scope of IDR by Jonathan Fisher KC and Sir Brian (recommendation 90 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts). Ensuring the right cases are captured in any new court pathway is crucial to ensure court resources are utilised effectively and that cases where the IDR would be beneficial are correctly identified. 91. The Government therefore commits to exploring a pilot of the new IDR pathway. 92. A pilot could allow for in-depth analysis of how IDR would work in practice, whether it improves efficiencies, and its associated costs. This may allow for a more informed decision to be made on the suitability of the IDR and support further roll-out of the IDR, subject to the outcomes of the pilot. 93. The Government is also aware of similar measures being used in Southwark Crown Court and will explore how this can be used to inform a pilot scheme of the IDR.

88. The most complex and voluminous cases can present a significant disclosure undertaking. If improperly managed, disclosure issues in these cases can result in significant delays, cases failing, and miscarriages of justice. The Intensive Disclosure Regime (IDR) proposed by Jonathan Fisher KC, and endorsed and commented on by Sir Brian Leveson, seeks to prevent these issues by proposing a new court pathway with additional case management requirements, new engagement obligations for the defence and prosecution, and a new hearing to focus on disclosure issues. 89. The Government recognises the benefits that this greater engagement and scrutiny of disclosure would have on cases with evidence which is particularly voluminous or complex. The IDR could be an important tool available to courts to prevent disclosure failures in such cases. 90. The Government notes the two approaches taken to define the scope of IDR by Jonathan Fisher KC and Sir Brian (recommendation 90 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts). Ensuring the right cases are captured in any new court pathway is crucial to ensure court resources are utilised effectively and that cases where the IDR would be beneficial are correctly identified. 91. The Government therefore commits to exploring a pilot of the new IDR pathway. 92. A pilot could allow for in-depth analysis of how IDR would work in practice, whether it improves efficiencies, and its associated costs. This may allow for a more informed decision to be made on the suitability of the IDR and support further roll-out of the IDR, subject to the outcomes of the pilot. 93. The Government is also aware of similar measures being used in Southwark Crown Court and will explore how this can be used to inform a pilot scheme of the IDR.

88. The most complex and voluminous cases can present a significant disclosure undertaking. If improperly managed, disclosure issues in these cases can result in significant delays, cases failing, and miscarriages of justice. The Intensive Disclosure Regime (IDR) proposed by Jonathan Fisher KC, and endorsed and commented on by Sir Brian Leveson, seeks to prevent these issues by proposing a new court pathway with additional case management requirements, new engagement obligations for the defence and prosecution, and a new hearing to focus on disclosure issues. 89. The Government recognises the benefits that this greater engagement and scrutiny of disclosure would have on cases with evidence which is particularly voluminous or complex. The IDR could be an important tool available to courts to prevent disclosure failures in such cases. 90. The Government notes the two approaches taken to define the scope of IDR by Jonathan Fisher KC and Sir Brian (recommendation 90 of the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts). Ensuring the right cases are captured in any new court pathway is crucial to ensure court resources are utilised effectively and that cases where the IDR would be beneficial are correctly identified. 91. The Government therefore commits to exploring a pilot of the new IDR pathway. 92. A pilot could allow for in-depth analysis of how IDR would work in practice, whether it improves efficiencies, and its associated costs. This may allow for a more informed decision to be made on the suitability of the IDR and support further roll-out of the IDR, subject to the outcomes of the pilot. 93. The Government is also aware of similar measures being used in Southwark Crown Court and will explore how this can be used to inform a pilot scheme of the IDR.

115. Judicial training is a matter for the independent judiciary and delivered through the Judicial College. It would therefore not be appropriate for the Government to respond to these recommendations.

121. Following engagement with the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Government agrees with this recommendation. It is essential that where convictions are quashed due to disclosure failings, prosecution authorities take prompt and structured steps to understand the causes of those failings, to strengthen internal processes where required, and to consider whether similar risks may arise in other concluded cases or live proceedings. 122. Prosecution authorities already undertake a range of case reviews and assurance processes. When a case fails due to disclosure, the CPS acts immediately and refers cases to the Director of Legal Services or in a monthly high risk case log return. They also use disclosure champions for wider dissemination to support a local or national response or review. Similarly, the SFO promptly carries out Case Learning Events following the conclusion of every case to identify learning points, wider impact across related cases and continuous improvements for future casework. When a case fails due to disclosure, it is immediately escalated and the SFO’s subsequent review and response is led by the SFO Executive Committee. 123. We agree, however, that it is important that these arrangements are consistently applied and can inform both organisational improvement and system-wide learning. The Government welcomes further evidence from Jonathan Fisher KC on any specific shortcomings that he assessed in existing processes so that we can focus efforts appropriately. 124. Prosecution authorities will continue to ensure that robust review mechanisms are in place where convictions are quashed by the Court of Appeal on disclosure grounds, including assessing whether issues may have implications beyond the individual case. Where appropriate, learning from such reviews will be used to strengthen internal assurance, casework supervision, and casework practices. 125. We also agree on the importance of sharing relevant learning to support improvement across the wider criminal justice system. Where disclosure failings identify issues of broader applicability, prosecution authorities will continue to work with others as appropriate, taking account of the distinct roles and remits of different organisations. Engagement with the College of Policing will take place specifically where a review identifies a policing/training standards issue that merits curricular change. 126. These ongoing measures will help ensure that disclosure failures are addressed transparently and in a structured manner, that risks to other cases are identified and managed appropriately, and that learning is embedded to strengthen confidence in the integrity of the justice system. 127. The Government will also consider how this recommendation should apply to private prosecutors as part of the Government’s wider consideration of reforms in this area.

128. The Government has considered recommendation 37 carefully and agrees with its underlying objective of reducing unnecessary administrative burden associated with the scheduling of material. We recognise that, in certain circumstances, the return of material or copies of material may support effective case preparation and the right to a fair trial, and existing law and guidance already provide for this in limited and controlled circumstances. 129. However, the Government notes significant challenges with the recommendation as drafted. In practice, the return of material, particularly digital material, would involve providing extractions or copies rather than the original devices. Under the current framework governing the extraction of electronic information, law enforcement agencies are required to take a targeted, proportionate approach to data extraction, download and retention. Providing a full copy of a digital device would typically require a complete extraction and review to identify criminal content, sensitive material or legally privileged information. This would run counter to established statutory duties and guidance, which emphasise extracting only what is necessary to pursue reasonable lines of enquiry. 130. There are also substantial concerns about operational feasibility and consistency. Digital extraction backlogs already exist across law enforcement, driven by the scale and complexity of modern data. Introducing additional full extractions would risk exacerbating these pressures and impacting compliance with existing disclosure obligations and court timetables. Stakeholders also raised concerns about inconsistent court application, the risk of significant redaction burdens in practice, and the potential for this approach to be used as a proxy for broad disclosure requests. 131. For these reasons, the Government will not be taking forward recommendation 37 in its current form, as it is not compatible with the existing statutory framework. However, the Government notes that the actions it is taking forward in relation to technology‑assisted scheduling, including the use of tools and metadata to support more efficient, accurate and consistent scheduling, are intended to address many of the same pressures identified by this recommendation. These measures should significantly reduce the resource burden associated with scheduling material, while remaining consistent with data protection, disclosure obligations and the right to a fair trial.

26. The Government does not accept the recommendation to consolidate the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure and Judicial Protocols into a refined single document referenced in legislation. 27. The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure is guidance for prosecutors, investigators and defence practitioners on the application of the disclosure regime established by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. Any guidance issued by the Judiciary, by contrast, will relate to practical applications by the court. These documents service distinct functions and consolidation may cut across issues of independence. Stakeholders have also noted that consolidating guidance could make it more difficult to agree and implement timely amendments. 28. Whilst not advocating for consolidation of guidance that serves different purposes into a single document, we recognise the concern underpinning the recommendation. As recommended, there are clear benefits to consolidating the guidance in one place, particularly in promoting consistency, ease of use and alignment across investigators and prosecutors. 29. To address this, the Government will develop a central GOV.UK depository webpage bringing together links to the key statutory framework and guidance on disclosure. Clear labelling will be used to ensure current versions of guidance are readily identifiable, including the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (CPIA), the CPIA Code of Practice, the Criminal Procedure Rules and the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure. A central ‘landing pad’ will make navigation simpler, improve practitioner engagement with the current disclosure legislative regime, ensure there is one place for this information and improve the current digital framework by reducing the reliance on outdated or duplicated copies of guidance.

26. The Government does not accept the recommendation to consolidate the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure and Judicial Protocols into a refined single document referenced in legislation. 27. The Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure is guidance for prosecutors, investigators and defence practitioners on the application of the disclosure regime established by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. Any guidance issued by the Judiciary, by contrast, will relate to practical applications by the court. These documents service distinct functions and consolidation may cut across issues of independence. Stakeholders have also noted that consolidating guidance could make it more difficult to agree and implement timely amendments. 28. Whilst not advocating for consolidation of guidance that serves different purposes into a single document, we recognise the concern underpinning the recommendation. As recommended, there are clear benefits to consolidating the guidance in one place, particularly in promoting consistency, ease of use and alignment across investigators and prosecutors. 29. To address this, the Government will develop a central GOV.UK depository webpage bringing together links to the key statutory framework and guidance on disclosure. Clear labelling will be used to ensure current versions of guidance are readily identifiable, including the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act (CPIA), the CPIA Code of Practice, the Criminal Procedure Rules and the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure. A central ‘landing pad’ will make navigation simpler, improve practitioner engagement with the current disclosure legislative regime, ensure there is one place for this information and improve the current digital framework by reducing the reliance on outdated or duplicated copies of guidance.

132. The Government recognises the importance of ensuring compliance with disclosure requirements and timelines, as well as the need to hold non- compliant parties to account. However, as highlighted by Jonathan Fisher KC, there are important fairness, resourcing, and due process implications which must be taken into account when considering sanctions for non-compliance. 133. As mentioned in the previous section, the Government will not be taking forward the proposed consolidated guidance, so this cannot be used as a means to implement any sanctions measure. However, existing judicial case management powers could be utilised to action this measure. 134. Accordingly, whilst the Government recognises the need for greater compliance with disclosure, it is for the judiciary to decide how to best use their case management powers for this purpose.

135. The Government agrees that criminal legal aid fee schemes should support early engagement with the disclosure process, and early preparation of cases more broadly. Payment for pre-charge engagement was introduced in 2021, though the Government acknowledges take-up remains low. The MoJ will consider how best to encourage take-up, including discussing it with the relevant sub-group of the Criminal Legal Aid Advisory Board (CLAAB). 136. Although providers are already able to ‘self-grant’ for pre-charge engagement, the MoJ will consider if there are opportunities to streamline the application process further with CLAAB. The Government therefore partially accepts this recommendation.

137. The Government recognises the value in a coordinated, cross-departmental governance system with clear and appropriate accountability to ensure the disclosure regime is fit for purpose across the criminal justice system. 138. However, it is important to ensure that criminal justice system governance is streamlined and effective. The Government is currently considering the new governance structures proposed in the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts. Once the Government has decided how to respond to these recommendations, we will examine how best to implement this recommendation within that new structure. 139. In the interim, a nominated senior civil servant from each of the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Attorney General’s Office will meet at regular intervals to review, discuss and scrutinise the implementation of new disclosure policies. Operational partners will be invited to this group where relevant and if required, this cross-system group will escalate matters for consideration to the Criminal Justice Action Group – the senior official-level cross-CJS governance forum chaired by the MoJ Permanent Secretary.

140. The Government accepts the need for greater data availability. Ensuring greater high-quality data is available will allow for effective scrutiny and improvement of the disclosure regime, as well as for evaluation of the changes accepted in this response. 141. The Government will continue to examine any data initiatives arising from Sir Brian Leveson’s Independent Review of the Criminal Courts alongside the recommendations accepted within this response, including quantitative assessments of any recommendations implemented.

137. The Government recognises the value in a coordinated, cross-departmental governance system with clear and appropriate accountability to ensure the disclosure regime is fit for purpose across the criminal justice system. 138. However, it is important to ensure that criminal justice system governance is streamlined and effective. The Government is currently considering the new governance structures proposed in the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts. Once the Government has decided how to respond to these recommendations, we will examine how best to implement this recommendation within that new structure. 139. In the interim, a nominated senior civil servant from each of the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, and the Attorney General’s Office will meet at regular intervals to review, discuss and scrutinise the implementation of new disclosure policies. Operational partners will be invited to this group where relevant and if required, this cross-system group will escalate matters for consideration to the Criminal Justice Action Group – the senior official-level cross-CJS governance forum chaired by the MoJ Permanent Secretary.

142. The Government is committed to ensuring that the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) remains an effective and robust framework for the recovery of criminal assets, and that it continues to operate compatibly within a modernised disclosure regime. Criminal confiscation is the most frequently used asset recovery power and plays a critical role in depriving offenders of the proceeds of their crimes. 143. While POCA and the Criminal Procedure Rules do not expressly require a further review of disclosure following receipt of the defence response to a statement of information under section 17, the Government notes that, as a matter of common law, the prosecution is likely already required to keep disclosure under review in confiscation proceedings, including after such a response. The Government also recognises, however, that disclosure obligations in confiscation proceedings are not articulated with the same statutory clarity as those under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. 144. The Government considers that this recommendation is not essential to the fairness or efficiency of confiscation proceedings. Nonetheless, the Government understands that the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee, which is independent of Government, may wish to consider the recommendation.