Online age verification legislation
IICSA · The Internet Investigation Report · Issued 12 March 2020 · Addressed to: UK Government
Government responseUK Government: Noted (Nov 2020)
DeliveryHome Office says in progress (Nov 2020)
Recommendation, verbatim from the inquiry
●Inquiry recommendation, J
The government should introduce legislation requiring providers of online services and social media platforms to implement more stringent age verification techniques on all relevant devices.
IICSA, The Internet Investigation Report · 12 Mar 2020 Source PDF →
Published evidence summary
AI-generated evidence summary
The Inquiry recommended that the government legislate for stricter online age verification across platforms and devices. In November 2020, HM Government stated that age assurance and age verification would play a key role in its upcoming regulatory framework for online services, though it did not mention devices (Home Office response, Nov 2020; Home Office, Nov 2020). It noted in November 2020 that platforms were expected to adopt proportionate tools to protect children and highlighted research it supported into the feasibility of identifying child users online (Home Office response, Nov 2020). It added in November 2020 that, ahead of legislation, it would publish guidance on embedding safety by design principles and develop practical advice for online companies (Home Office response, Nov 2020). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of November 2020 (Home Office response, Nov 2020).
AI-generated summary of the record on this page, checked by a second model and automatic checks, 5 Oct 2026.
Government response
●UK Government · Noted · 10 Nov 2020
11. The Government’s initial response to the White Paper, published in February 2020, outlines our proposals for tackling online harms and delivering a higher level of protection for children than for the typical adult user. We set out the expectation that companies would use a proportionate range of tools, including age assurance and age verification technologies, to prevent children from accessing age-inappropriate content such as online pornography, and to protect them from other harms. 12. The Government has been clear that we expect companies to use a range of tools now to protect children online and that we expect that age assurance methods, including age verification, will play a key role in the online harms regulatory framework. We are committed to the UK becoming a world leader in the development of online safety technology and to ensuring that companies of all sizes have access to, and adopt, innovative solutions to improve the safety of their users. We are working closely with stakeholders to consider what could be delivered ahead of, and through, the online harms regulatory framework. 13. Over the last 12 months DCMS has supported the ‘Verification of Children Online’ (VoCO) child safety research project. The report on the project’s second phase was published this month. This joint GCHQ, DCMS and Home Office project responds to the technical challenges associated with providing children with a greater level of protection from online harms and explores the feasibility of identifying child users online. The VoCO project has attempted to capture the experiences and needs of children, parents and platforms to identify what support and incentives are needed for platforms to start age assuring their users. 14. Knowing which users are children, and what age band they are in, is critical to protecting children online. If online services know which of their users are children, they are able to provide them with a higher level of protection, including preventing access to age inappropriate content. Age assurance is the term given to the broad range of technical measures that can be used by an online service to establish the age of their users. The VoCO project showed that there are a range of age assurance methods, supported by different data sources, that companies can use to assess the age of their users. Different age assurance methods provide differing levels of confidence in the age of the child. Age verification is one type of age assurance measure and provides the highest level of confidence in the assessed age of the child. Current age verification measures are effectively a full identity check. 15. The VoCO report sets out that the age assurance method used by a platform should be proportionate to the likely risk posed to a child by that platform. The report suggests that in assessing risk, companies should take into account factors such as the type of content hosted on the service, its features, and its user base. This approach is aligned with the risk-based and proportionate approach to tackling online harms that is set out in the Online Harms White Paper, published in April 2019. 16. In addition, ahead of the implementation of the new regulatory framework, the Government will continue to encourage companies to take early action to address online harms. The White Paper sets out high-level expectations of companies, including specific expectations in relation to certain harms, such as protecting children from accessing inappropriate content online. Ahead of legislation, the Government will publish guidance on embedding ‘safety by design’ principles into the design and development of online products and services. This will serve as best practice for reducing online harms for users, especially children. We are also developing a ‘one-stop shop’ to give companies practical guidance on keeping children safe online. This will help companies understand their existing legal responsibilities and learn from best practice.
Extract from: Government response to the Internet Report by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (accessible version)
Delivery
●Home Office says in progress · 10 Nov 2020
The Government has been clear that we expect companies to use a range of tools now to protect children online and that we expect that age assurance methods, including age verification, will play a key role in the online harms regulatory framework.
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