Establish Pharmaceutical Expert Advisory Panel

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the critical importance of expert advice to inform government decision-making and the value of drawing on expertise from across science, academia and the life sciences sector.

The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) played a central role in ensuring that ministers had access to co-ordinated scientific and technical advice during the pandemic. The pandemic also demonstrated the importance of close and productive relationships between government and life sciences partners (including through the Vaccine Taskforce and Antivirals and Therapeutics Taskforce) in supporting the rapid development, manufacture and deployment of medical countermeasures.

The government recognises that there is more it can do to draw systematically on life sciences expertise to support pandemic preparedness between emergencies. Both the UK Biological Security Strategy and the Pandemic Preparedness Strategy recognise the vital role played by the life sciences sector in pandemic preparedness. In particular, there is value in strengthening the mechanisms through which government can access strategic industry and academic expertise on:

capabilities

manufacturing

supply chains and the development of medical countermeasures

maintaining the relationships and shared understanding needed to support a rapid response during a future health emergency

Government welcomes the recommendation’s focus on formalising access to this expertise and maintaining relationships between crises. The government therefore agrees that a more structured mechanism for engagement with industry, academia and other stakeholders could:

build on the lessons and successes of the Vaccine Taskforce and Antivirals and Therapeutics Taskforce during COVID-19 and the significant work undertaken since

enhance information sharing and access to expertise

We propose taking forward a modified version of the recommendation by establishing an industry stakeholder advisory group with a clearly defined advisory remit, and membership that draws on relevant technical, scientific, manufacturing and commercial expertise. Responsibility for overseeing preparedness and setting strategic direction will remain with government, informed by scientific evidence, risk assessment and expert advice.

The group will provide a clear route for government to draw on industry and academic expert advice and strategic insight on:

system-level preparedness (identifying gaps, risks and interdependencies across research, development, manufacturing and supply chains that could affect timely access to medical countermeasures)

the adequacy, flexibility and scalability of current UK pharmaceutical manufacturing capability and the resilience of critical supply chains

approaches to supporting and incentivising industry-targeted investment in UK pharmaceutical research and manufacturing capability

industry capability, and vaccine and therapeutic development

how relevant capabilities and assets across industry and academia could work together to support preparedness, including informing government planning for how these could be drawn upon during a future health emergency

The proposed advisory group would sit alongside and complement existing sources of expert advice. SAGE provides co-ordinated scientific and technical advice to support government decision-making during emergencies, while bodies including the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) and the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group (NERVTAG) provide specialist advice within their respective remits.

The proposed group would not duplicate these functions. Its particular focus would be on strengthening government’s ability to draw systematically on strategic life sciences expertise on capabilities, manufacturing, supply chains and pandemic preparedness, particularly between emergencies.

Government regularly engages with the life sciences sector and academia through existing mechanisms, including the Office for Life Sciences’ account management function. These provide important routes for engagement, but do not provide the same strategic focus on industry capabilities and pandemic preparedness envisaged for the new group.

Consistent with the approach set out in the Pandemic Preparedness Strategy, the stakeholder advisory group would form part of the wider preparedness landscape, providing external expertise, advice and challenge to inform government’s planning between emergencies. Maintaining these relationships and a shared understanding of relevant capabilities and assets between emergencies could also support our ability to mobilise industry rapidly during a future health emergency.

The group’s role will recognise legitimate commercial sensitivities. The detailed arrangements will enable meaningful exchange of information and expertise, while recognising that organisations may not always be able to share commercially sensitive information in a multi-party forum.

To take the new group forward, we will engage with organisations from across the life sciences sector, academia and other relevant organisations to help determine how the stakeholder advisory group can best add value for both government and the sector. This will include determining its detailed scope, membership and relationship with existing pandemic preparedness arrangements.

No statement on delivery from Department of Health and Social Care has been found in the sources searched. This is separate from the response above.