Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Christopher Stephens

Ref: 2026-0386 Date: 24 Jun 2026 Coroner: Rachael Griffin Area: Dorset 1 response identified · 2 indexed addressees View PDF

Response deadline: 19 August 2026 (stated in the report).

Date 24 Jun 2026
56-day deadline 19 Aug 2026 stated in the report
Responses identified 1 of 2

Coroner's concerns

Coroner’s Concerns (source excerpt)
At the time of Christopher’s death, there was a safety briefing in place from HMPPS relating to prisoners obstructing the observation panels on cell doors. It states: “Observation panels in cell doors allow staff to carry out regular safety checks on prisoners when they are locked in their cells.
View full coroner's concerns
At the time of Christopher’s death, there was a safety briefing in place from HMPPS relating to prisoners obstructing the observation panels on cell doors. It states:       

“Observation  panels  in  cell  doors  allow  staff  to  carry  out  regular  safety checks on prisoners when they are locked in their cells. Every time staff approach a prisoner’s cell, they must ensure that the observation panel is clear, in case of an emergency situation.”  It gives guidance as to what to do when panels are obstructed.

It also states: “Local safety measures should explain what to do if the occupant(s) of a cell cannot be seen due to the panel being covered or blocked.”  Evidence confirmed that there are currently no local safety measures in place at HMP Guys Marsh in relation to observation panels.  

The safety briefing also states: “Staff should always be able to clearly observe the occupants of a cell, in case they are unwell or there is an emergency situation.  

A clear observation panel can help to save lives.” At the time of Christopher’s death there were local procedures in place by the Governing  Governor,  through  operational  orders,  and  the  Head  of  Safety Governor, through Governor notices to staff, that directed:  “When conducting a roll check all staff must satisfy themselves for signs of life for every Prisoner that they are accounting for.  

When unlocking a cell door staff must obtain a verbal response from each Prisoner. If a response is not obtained then staff will access the cell to check on their welfare.” 

Evidence was given that there was a culture at the time of Christopher’s death, on the wing where he resided at HMP Guys Marsh, that prisoners would obscure panels which would not be challenged and that prison staff would not undertake roll checks and the unlocking of cells in accordance with the orders given. Whilst some witnesses said this has improved since Christopher’s death, one prison officer stated that when she was working at the prison in May 2026, before she left for another posting, this lack of compliance with national and local guidance regarding these issues was still ongoing at HMP Guys Marsh.  

I am concerned that the lack of local safety measures in place at HMP Guys Marsh in respect of observation panels on cell doors, the culture at HMP Guys Marsh around not challenging prisoners on obscuring observation panels or ensuring prisoners are seen in cells, and not undertaking welfare checks at unlock and roll checks could compromise prisoners’ health and lead to future deaths.  

It states at paragraph 111 of the Prison and Probation Ombudsmen report into Christopher’s death:  “Under the Offender Management in Custody (OMiC) model, every prisoner should have a dedicated key worker with whom they have weekly contact. The purpose of the model is to improve safety by building better relationships between staff and prisoners”  

Christopher had only 2 key worker sessions recorded in the prison records whilst he was at HMP Guys Marsh, one on his day of arrival and the other 6 days later. Information provided during the Inquest was that of all the prisoners at HMP Guys  Marsh,  only  the  top  40  priority  cohort  identified  through  the  Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM) process are currently seen once a month by an allocated keyworker and are discussed at a monthly key work meeting. Further, that normal keywork is not taking place as it should be due to staffing levels as they are unable to detail staff daily.  

Each prisoner should be allocated a keyworker and the key worker is a member of prison staff whose responsibility is to support the prisoner throughout their custodial period. As an article on the government website states:  “It’s a way for offenders to build relationships with officers that are healthy and make them feel comfortable speaking to prison officers. It’s a process to reduce violence, reduce drug-use, give offenders a point of contact with an officer to help them cope with custodial life.”  I am concerned that the lack of delivery of key work to all prisoners at HMP Guys Marsh  could lead to future deaths as key work is an opportunity to disclose issues or concerns which can include matters relating to mental health or drugs use.

Responses

1 respondent

HM Prison and Probation Service

Central Government
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AI-classified response stance Action Taken
AI-generated response summary

HMPPS has updated local guidance and reinforced staff expectations regarding clear observation panels, re-issued operational instructions for roll checks and cell unlocking, and strengthened supervisory oversight. HMP Guys Marsh has also introduced a priority cohort approach to key work delivery for prisoners with the highest needs.

View full response
Dear Mrs Griffin, REGULATION 28 REPORT TO PREVENT FUTURE DEATHS: MR CHRISTOPHER STEPHENS Thank you for your Regulation 28 report of 24 June 2026 addressed to the Governor of HMP Guys Marsh and Director General Chief Executive Officer of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service on behalf of the Ministry of Justice following the inquest into the death of Christopher Stephens at HMP Guys Marsh on 15 April 2024. I am providing the response on behalf of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) as Interim Director General of Prisons. I know that you will share a copy of this response with Mr Stephens family, and I would first like to express my condolences for their loss. Every death in custody is a tragedy and the safety of those in our care is my absolute priority. You have raised concerns regarding the management of observation panels, welfare checks and delivery of key work sessions. HMP Guys Marsh has updated its local guidance to set out clearly the expectation on staff to ensure that observation panels, which are used to check the welfare of prisoners when they are in their cell, are unblocked and allow a clear view into the cell. Aligning with national HMPPS safety guidance, and to ensure consistent practice, the new local guidance has been issued individually to all staff with a letter explaining expectations regarding keeping observation panels clear on residential units.

[Page 2] Staff are reminded in both the letter and instruction that they are required to ensure that observation panels remain unobstructed whenever prisoners are locked behind their cell doors, with compliance monitored through routine unlock procedures and daily completion of Accommodation Fabric Decency Checks (AFDCs). Where a prisoner has blocked an observation panel staff are required to challenge the behaviour immediately, obtain visual confirmation of the prisoner's welfare, and consider further action. Any concerns identified by night operational support grade staff are escalated to the night orderly officer and then to both the head of residence and the head of safety for review and action where necessary. These expectations have been reinforced through staff briefings, local notices, and roll check guidance. Compliance is also incorporated into management assurance activity conducted on residential units, including custodial manager and supervising officer decency checks. A comprehensive review of local procedures relating to roll checks and cell unlocking has been undertaken and a range of activity has taken place as a result. Operational instructions requiring staff conducting roll checks to account for every prisoner and obtain confirmation that there is no immediate cause for concern has been re-issued. Staff have also been reminded of the need to obtain a verbal response when unlocking a cell and take appropriate action immediately where a response is not received. Learning arising from this death in custody has been shared with staff through targeted briefings, and supervisory oversight of both roll checks and unlock procedures have been strengthened to promote consistency and compliance. Where areas for improvement are identified, these are addressed through line management engagement, learning discussions, or formal management action where appropriate. Work continues with the learning and development team to ensure all new staff complete and successfully pass assessments relating to roll checks, and the security team carries out routine reviews of observation books and wing diaries to identify and investigate any anomalies. Taken together, these measures are intended to strengthen local practice, promote consistency in welfare monitoring, and provide greater assurance that staff understand and fulfil their responsibilities in maintaining prisoner safety. Delivery and quality of key work remain a priority for HMPPS. We are working to improve the quality and quantity of key work across all prisons during 2026/27. This is a vital part of our work to improve safety and reduce reoffending. All male closed prisons are resourced to deliver one key work session per week to eligible prisoners. Any reduction of the resourced delivery of one session per week should only be considered in line with existing policy as part of the local Regime Management Planning process and balanced alongside other local risks and priorities. Where prisons are balancing priorities in this way, Governors are encouraged wherever possible to deliver at least two key work sessions per prisoner over the course of a four -week period.

[Page 3] HMP Guys Marsh is reviewing its approach to key work delivery to strengthen prisoner engagement and ensure available resources are directed towards those with the greatest identified needs. This work has been undertaken within the context of operational pressures and staffing challenges that have affected the consistency with which key work can be delivered across the prison. Currently, the establishment has introduced a priority cohort approach, ensuring that prisoners identified as having the highest levels of need, including those discussed through the Safety Intervention Meeting (SIM) process, receive consistent key worker attention and oversight. By focusing available resources in this way, the prison seeks to maximise the benefit of key worker engagement for those prisoners who are most vulnerable or who present the greatest welfare concerns. The prison is committed to further improving the quality and frequency of meaningful key worker contact in support of safer outcomes for all prisoners, and the senior management team continue to look to address barriers to the full provision of key work to all prisoners. Thank you for bringing these matters to my attention. I trust that this response provides assurance that action is being taken to address the concerns identified.

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 15th November 2024, I commenced an investigation into the death of Christopher John Stephens, aged 33 years, born on 30th September 1990. 

The Inquest concluded before a jury on the 15th June 2026.

The medical cause of death was:

Ia Mixed Drug Intoxication ( [REDACTED])

How, when and where Christopher came by his death was recorded by the jury as:    

At the time of Christopher’s death there was an environment of the use of illicit drugs at HMP Guys Marsh.  

While not a registered drug user, there were indications that Christopher was a user of illicit drugs whilst at Guys Marsh. This was due to observations from staff and prisoners regarding his appearance and behaviours.  

During the weekend of the 13th/14th April 2024 Christopher self administered a mixture of drugs.   Welfare checks at the roll checks and the unlock of Christopher’s cell between 4.34pm on the 14th April and 9.03am on the 15th April were not undertaken in accordance with local guidance and mandatory orders. It cannot be said that this  fact  was  probably,  or  even  possibly,  causative  or  contributory  in Christopher’s death.  

Fabric was draped over Christopher’s bed which obscured the view of him during welfare checks between 4.34pm on the 14th April and 9.03am on the 15th April and this was not dealt with in accordance with the national safety briefing on obscuring observation panels. It cannot be said that this fact was probably, or even possibly, causative or contributory in Christopher’s death. The time of death is unable to be precisely determined.  Death occurred at some point between 4.17pm on the 14th of April and 9.25am on the 15th of April in his cell 54, C Spur, Mercia Wing, HMP Guys Marsh. The conclusion recorded by the jury was Misadventure.
Circumstances of the death
At the time of his death Christopher was a serving prisoner at HMP Guys Marsh having arrived there on 10th August 2023. He resided alone in a double cell.  

At around 4pm on the 14th April 2024 Christopher was seen by other prisoners who suspected he was under the influence of drugs. They did not alert staff to this.  At 4.34pm a prison officer went into Christopher’s cell and found him lay on the bed with a mobile phone beside him. She activated her body worn video (BWV), removed the phone, left the cell and closed the door which locked upon closing. During her evidence the prison officer stated that she believed Christopher was fast asleep at that time. The cell door remained locked until opened the following morning.  From the BWV, material was seen draped over the top bunk of the bed in the cell which meant that Chirstopher could not be seen on the bed. His arm was sticking out but that was all that could be seen from the door.  

A roll count was undertaken by a prison officer on the wing at 7.30pm. The officer made an entry in the observation book that there was a lot of observation panels covered. There was no escalation to the Oscar 1 in the Prison.  A roll count was undertaken by an operational support grade (OSG) member of staff at 8.42pm.  Whilst locked in their cells, prisoners tried to communicate with Christopher between 6pm and 8pm but he did not respond which was unusual.  

A roll count was undertaken by the same operational support grade (OSG) member of staff at 5.42am on the 15th April.  A roll count was undertaken by a prison officer at 7.20am. The same prison officer unlocked the cells at 8.20am. He did not undertake a welfare check on Christopher, check for signs of life or receive a verbal response from him. He unlocked the door and moved to the next cell.  At 9.03am prisoners asked staff to unlock Christopher’s door as it was closed. This was done by a different prison officer who did not undertake a welfare check, check for signs of life or obtain a verbal response from Christopher.  

Prisoners entered the cell and found Chirstopher deceased. He was cold and in rigor mortis. Prison officers responded and activated their BWV. From this Christopher was in exactly the same position he had been when the prison officer went in the previous day at 4.34pm.
Action should be taken
In my opinion unless action is taken to address the above concerns then there is a significant risk of future deaths and I believe each of you have the power to take such action.
Copies sent to
I can confirm I have sent the report to2. Government Legal Department

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Report details

Reference
2026-0386
Date of report
24 June 2026
Coroner
Rachael Griffin
Coroner area
Dorset

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 2
1 response not yet linked

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 19 Aug 2026 (stated in the report).

Sent to

Director General Chief Executive Officer of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS)
Governor of HMP Guys Marsh

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