Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Catherine Morgan – Prevention of future deaths report

Date: 19 May 2026 View PDF

The Trust's risk assessments for patient leave were inconsistent with guidelines, and systems for safeguarding and monitoring voluntary patients were inadequate. The Metropolitan Police Service's rigid application of policies also led to delayed deployment.

Date 19 May 2026
56-day deadline 15 Jul 2026
Responses identified 2

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
The Trust's risk assessments for patient leave were inconsistent with guidelines, and systems for safeguarding and monitoring voluntary patients were inadequate. The Metropolitan Police Service's rigid application of policies also led to delayed deployment.
View full coroner's concerns
[250-word statement addressing what circumstances of the death have led to the coroner’s  concern, and why the coroner thinks the person to whom the report is directed is responsible  for taking action to prevent future deaths. This statement must not propose what action should be taken, as coroners cannot make recommendations].  Re: South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust: It is recognised that the Trust has identified and put in train work that needs to be undertaken to address the issues that arose at the inquest. Much of the work has not yet been  implemented or is not yet complete and until this is done the following remain as concerns: 
1. Evidence was given at the inquest that although dynamic risk assessments were undertaken in advance of leave being authorised, risk assessments were not consistent with NICE Guidelines;
2. The systems in place for safeguarding voluntary patients in respect of leave and recording the decisions was inadequate and decisions were largely communicated by word of mouth which led to differences of understanding what had been agreed, the basis on which it had been agreed and by whom it was agreed. Documentation in respect of leave was incomplete and did not comply with policy. The nurse in charge was not informed of the decision for leave or the circumstances in which leave was granted;
3. The system for monitoring leave was inadequate, reliance being placed on hourly checks. The nurse conducting the hourly check at 12.00 when Catherine was due to return was not aware that she was on unescorted leave and did not escalate the matter to the nurse in charge with the result that the ward only became aware that she had not returned when her mother arrived at 12.50. Consideration was not given to the appropriate amount of leeway to be given to the patient before escalating the fact of them not having returned, with patients being given 30 minutes or more;
4. Ward staff appeared to take a different approach to leave and return depending upon the status of the patient as a detained or voluntary patient;
5. A photograph of the patient was not included in the grab pack. Unlike detained patients there was no checklist for voluntary patients as to the measures taken to locate the patient

Re: Metropolitan Police Service:

It is recognised that MPS has identified and put in train procedures to address the issues that arose at the inquest particularly in relation to the approach of MPS following a decision to  transfer a CAD to the BCU MPU. The following remain as concerns: 

1. An overly rigid approach to the Right Care Right Person policy and affinity protocol resulted in a delayed deployment. Even where call handlers have real concerns that someone not  returning to a mental health unit is a high risk missing person, the outcome of the toolkit not to deploy is the same if the individual’s address has not been visited, even when told that they  would not go there. The way in which the policy was applied removed any discretion by call  handlers and despatchers to deploy whilst checks at the address were being conducted.  Evidence was given at the inquest that the call handler in the second call to MPS attempted to convey her concerns that there should be immediate deployment to her supervisors in  despatch and was advised the police would not deploy;   

2. A call handler informed SLAM to call London Ambulance Service to do a welfare check at the home address of the patient in circumstances where the ambulance service will only  attend an address if the resident is known to be there;

Re: College of Policing:

It was recognised by MPS at the inquest that there was an overly rigid approach to the Right Care Right Person policy and Affinity Protocol resulting from the robust application of the  policy and protocol (see above). Some changes have been made within MPS within the  parameters allowed given national guidance and standards, but evidence was given to the  effect that training as to the application of the policy, protocol and toolkit could result in the  professional judgement of call handlers/despatchers/supervisors being restricted resulting in delays to deployment

Responses

2 respondents
South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust NHS Trust
19 May 2026 PDF
Action Taken

South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust has reviewed policies, implemented changes to its electronic patient record system, and reinforced staff training on documenting and monitoring leave for informal patients. They have also implemented a twice-daily ward round and developed a checklist for actions when a voluntary patient goes on leave, with further policy reviews planned. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mrs Patricia Harding, H.M. Senior Coroner for Kent and Medway Re: Catherine Mary Morgan Date of birth: 07.09.1986 Date of death: 04.09.2024 Thank you for your Regulation 28 Report dated 19 May 2026, setting out your concerns to be addressed by various organisations, including South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust (the “Trust”), in relation to the sad death of Ms Catherine Mary Morgan. The Trust continues to offer its sincerest condolences to the family and profoundly regrets that deficiencies were identified by the jury in their conclusion in respect of the care provided to Catherine by the Trust. The Trust is committed to ensuring that lessons are learned from this sad case. The concerns in respect of the Trust set out in the Learned Coroner’s report were summarised as follows:
1. Risk assessments in respect of leave were not being conducted in accordance with NICE Guidelines
2. The systems in place for recording and communicating leave for a voluntary patient were inadequate
3. The system for monitoring return from leave was inadequate
4. Ward staff appeared to take a different approach to leave and return depending upon the status of the patient as a detained or voluntary patient
5. A photograph of the patient was not included in the grab pack, unlike detained patients there was no checklist for voluntary patients as to the measures taken to locate the patient The Trust notes that the Learned Coroner has recognised that the Trust had identified and put in train work that needs to be undertaken to address these issues. However, the Learned Coroner also noted that much of the work has not yet been implemented or is not yet complete and that until this is done you remain concerned. We take this opportunity to provide further assurance and explanation with regard to changes implemented and ongoing at the Trust which are relevant to the above concerns including learning which has been implemented directly as a result of the Patient Safety Incident Investigation carried out following Ms Morgan’s death.
1. Risk assessments in respect of leave were not being conducted in accordance with NICE Guidelines, specifically evidence was given at the inquest that although dynamic risk assessments were undertaken in advance of leave being authorised, risk assessments were not consistent with NICE Guidelines. The Trust acknowledges that at the time of Catherine’s death the Trust’s approach to risk assessment was not yet consistent with NICE guideline NG225 Self-harm: assessment, management and preventing recurrence (2022). However, the Trust has now fully adopted NICE and NHSE guidance on individualised risk formulation and management planning. The Trust’s move to a personalised approach to risk has been launched in four phases:
- Phase 1: Listening and engagement (April – June 2025)
- Phase 2: Co-production and testing (July – September 2025) A484

[Page 2] A485
- Phase 3: Implementation (October 2025 – January 2026)
- Phase 4: Evaluation To carry this out, the Trust established two groups to work in partnership with:
1. Personalised Approach to Risk of Suicide Steering group; and
2. Lived experience reference group. The Steering group provides strategic direction, approves major decision, ensures alignment with organisation goals and shares messages across staff groups and directorates. It includes representatives from across the organisation as well as external stakeholders. The lived experience group is a group of service users and carers as advocates for lived experience representation and had oversight of the Trust’s co-production work. Phase 1: Listening and engagement In Phase 1, the Trust explored staff and service user and carer experiences of risk assessment and safety conversations. The Trust reviewed best practice, learning from other organisations and existing work taking place in the organis ation. As part of this phase, the Trust revised its Clinical Risk Assessment and Management of Harm Policy, which came into force in December 2025, and which was previously provided as part of the Trust’s evidence. The revised version updates previous Trust policy to reflect NICE guidance on self-harm: assessment, management and preventing recurrence (2022), statement from NHSE on risk assessment tools and NHSE Staying safe from suicide Guidance 2025. The policy provides staff with clear guidance on risk assessment, formulation, and the ongoing management of harm, emphasising the need for an individualised, patient‑centred approach moving away from traditional classifications of “low”, “medium” and “high” risk. It supports the development of a collaborative and proportionate risk management plan with the patient, aimed at reducing the likelihood of foreseeable harm. The policy further highlights the critical importance of safety planning as an integral extension of the risk management process, incorporating crisis and contingency planning for patients with a history of self‑harm or suicidal ideation, to mitigate the risk of recurrence and prevent avoidable future harm. Aligned with this the Trust’s risk assessment tool in the Trust’s electronic Patient Journey System (“ePJS”) has been updated to include a caveat that the tool should not be used to predict the risk of suicide and a tick- box acknowledging that the user understands this. The Trust would like to make further changes to the risk assessment tool in ePJS to support the personalised approach to risk. However, there is a now a ‘changes freeze’ in relation to ePJS, as the Trust is in the process of moving to a new provider (further detail below). Phase 2: Cultural change programme The Trust has mandatory training for all clinicians on the management of Clinical Risk, which must be completed every 3 years. As part of Phase 2, this internal training was updated to include the revised Clinical Risk Assessment and Management of Harm Policy. In addition, all clinicians at the Trust have been given access to an NHS England eLearning module on Staying Safe from Suicide (which takes half a day to complete), which incorporates further training and guidance on delivering care in accordance with the revised NHSE and NICE guidance. The e-Learning module is designed to support all mental health practitioners to provide consistent high-quality approaches to suicide risk assessment and management. The sessions provide evidence-based guidance on how to approach and support people to stay safe from suicide and feature case study based exercises that allow practitioners to develop their knowledge and apply the guidance in real-world scenarios. There is agreement for this eLearning module to be added to the Trust’s mandatory training schedule, using a staggered approach (with nurses prioritised), which is in line with NHS England’s National Suicide Prevention Strategy. Furthermore, the Trust has also been one of a handful of Trusts who have been working with the National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide as part of the journey towards a personalised approach to risk. The Trust has found it very helpful to learn from the experiences of other mental health providers and sharing the Trust’s own reflections. A485

[Page 3] A486 Phase 3: Implementation The Trust has recently completed a procurement in relation to a new Electronic Patient Record (“EPR”) system and work is underway with the appointed provider to develop a new EPR system with a plan for this to be in place by 2028. The Trust has identified this as a huge opportunity for re-designing through the new EPR procurement. The Trust has therefore been participating in the EPR re-design process informing the new procurement and has been exploring potential changes to how risk assessments and safety plans are documented on EPR. Further detail of these potential changes are detailed below. It is noted that the new system will have capacity to do reminders when actions have not been carried out to help ensure clinical tasks are carried out in a timely fashion. Phase 4: Evaluation The Trust continues to evaluate its transition towards a personalised approach to risk assessment and suicide prevention. In respect of the Inquest process, it was identified there is still some work to be done with respect to aligning all other policies with the transformed Clinical Risk Assessment and Management of Harm policy. In particular, there are aspects within the AWOL, Absent and Missing Persons policy which retain “old” low/medium/high classifications, i.e. the checklist used to guide decision making where a patient is identified as AWOL. This policy has now been marked as under review as was previously indicated in the Trust’s evidence in this case. The review, which is further explained below, is an overarching review of three interlinked policies namely, the s17 Leave Policy, the Leave for Informal Patients Policy, and the AWOL, Absent and Missing Persons policy which aims to strengthen consistency and clarity across these interlinking areas of practice whilst aligning Trust practices fully with the new clinical risk management approach and ensuring legal compliance with relevant Mental Health legislation. The review is being undertaken by policy leads under the supervision of the Trust Director for Social Work and the Trust Mental Health Lead and is planned to be completed and approved in the Trust’s Mental Health Law Committee by October 2026. The requirement for grab packs to have a photograph and the lack of a checklist for voluntary patients will be addressed as part of the policy review.
2. The systems in place for recording and communicating leave for a voluntary patient were inadequate and decisions were largely communicated by word of mouth which led to differences of understanding what had been agreed, the basis on which it had been agreed and by whom it was agreed. Documentation in respect of leave was incomplete and did not comply with policy. The nurse in charge was not informed of the decision for leave or the circumstances in which leave was granted. The Trust acknowledges the Coroner’s concerns in this respect and recognises the paramount importance of clear information sharing and shared understanding throughout ward teams to ensure the safe use of leave by formal and informal patients. Since Ms Morgan’s death, the Trust has made significant changes to the way in which discussion and plans from ward rounds, including in relation to patient leave, are noted within EPJS and how these are shared through EPJS template documents to assist with robust handover throughout the MDT and between shifts. There is a Ward Round template (Appendix A) which guides clinicians in noting the discussion and outcomes from ward round meetings. Of note, there is specifically a space under the “Safety” tab for clinicians to record agreement and discussions around leave, however it is also anticipated that discussion and planning of leave will feature prominently in ward round discussions and to this extent they should also be reflected within the recorded considerations around risk as well as plans and actions for the patient arising from the ward round review. The Trust’s Leave for Informal Patients policy having been disclosed in the course of this inquest, the Coroner will note that it is and remains to be Trust policy that relevant senior nursing staff are required at the beginning of every shift, in line with the Clinical Handover Policy, to ensure that they are fully informed of relevant information with regard to the patients under their care to include current legal status, mental state, potential risks, and leave status. Trust policy requires firstly, receipt of a verbal handover from the previous nurse in charge and allocated nurse and secondly review of “the ePJS MDT Handover tool and recent clinical records”. A486

[Page 4] A487 In the time which has passed since Ms Morgan’s death, a substantial piece of work has been undertaken to create an MDT/DCCM handover tool within EPJS which pulls together, directly from the relevant parts of EPJS, information that is relevant to clinical handovers within the Trust (Appendix B). This directly pulls relevant information from the latest completed Ward Round template for the patient, as well as other recent clinical notes and prompts clinicians who are handing over patients to consider and record all relevant aspects of patient presentation, risk and legal status. As noted above, the Trust requirement is for this information to be verbally handed over between clinical colleagues and for the document itself to be read by the clinician receiving handover. The Trust will engage with the new provider to see if the above process of pulling information for the handover tool can be further refined with the launch of the new EPR. Since the incident, the hourly observation checks (which were completed incorrectly for Catherine at 12pm on 4 September 2024) have also been made electronic as part of the Trust’s work in respect of its new Enhanced Care policy. The introduction of the checks (now known as ‘well-being checks’) in an electronic form (Appendix C) will make it easier for them to be cross referenced with the Leave Log to assist with monitoring patients on leave. It will also make it easier to audit the checks to ensure they have been correctly completed by staff. The Trust acknowledges that safe patient care not only requires a strong system to be in place for recording and sharing relevant clinical information within the MDT. Correct and relevant information must be inputted into these systems. In this case, it has been identified within the Trust’s PSII that there was a failure to document discussion around the recommended timing of leave – in particular that a suggested time of 15 – 30 mins for negotiated unaccompanied leave for Catherine was discussed during the ward round on 3 September 2024, however, this was not included in the note of the meeting on ePJS. On the 5 March 2026 this matter, along with broader considerations regarding management of informal leave and failure to return from planned leave were addressed within a Patient Safety learning article which has been published centrally and has been disseminated by Directorate governance teams to all relevant staff. A copy of this has previously been shared with the Coroner. As a point of clarity, it is not Trust policy (and it would also be contrary to the legal framework) to mandate time limits for informal leave given the legal right of informal patients to take time off the ward as they choose. It is accepted that for some individuals, safety planning in relation to time taken off the ward might encompass suggestions around the amount of time which would be and feel safe, and where this is the case it is the Trust’s expectation made plain within the aforementioned Patient Safety learning article, this discussion should be documented. With respect to other specific aspects of the Coroner’s noted concern,
• It has been discussed as a learning point from this case at the Trust’s Patient Safety Committee meeting on the 11th June that ward policies around the taking of leave including informal leave and the documenting of the same must be followed (for example if a form is required to be signed by a Registered Mental Health Nurse (RMHN) it cannot be done by a different professional such as a Nursing Associate). The learning was also discussed in the directorate learning event on 15th June. Having said that, the Trust considers it may need to update its policy in respect of registered nursing associates being able to sign patients out for leave, in light of the fact that registered nursing associates can coordinate shifts and the shift coordinator is able to sign people out.
• The Ward Risk Assessment for Section 17/Informal Leave form that was in use when Ms Morgan was a patient on the ward was not included in any Trust policy but was produced by the ward by combining the Section 17 leave risk assessment checklist and the Daily Leave Log to produce a new form. Because of the reference to section 17 leave it was not felt that this was appropriate to both detained and informal patients and thus a new standardised Leave Log has been developed that is appropriate to both detained and informal patients (Appendix D). With respect to the Section 17 leave risk assessment checklist, it has been identified that this is not in accordance with NICE guidance 2022 which does not recommend the use of risk assessment tools to predict the risk of suicide or to decide which patients receive treatment or are discharged. It is recognised that it would be helpful to capture within the standardised Leave Log/Leave Form that the patient’s time off the ward has been discussed with either the Nurse in Charge or the Patient’s Allocated Nurse (Trust policy allows both) who has confirmed in line with policy that there is no reason not to permit time off the ward as per the patient’s request.
• The Trust is currently investigating options for producing the Leave Form electronically potentially within the Trust’s “Enhanced Care on E-Obs” system, which is an electronic platform integrated with ePJS to enable recording wellbeing checks. Enhanced Care on eObs is a secure digital system that helps hospital staff record wellbeing checks and engagement during periods of enhanced care. It A487

[Page 5] A488 replaced paper forms with a more efficient digital system using iPads. As mentioned above, the Trust has recently procured a new EPR system and will be exploring with the new provider the possibility of producing the Leave form electronically, in a similar way to Enhanced Care on E-Obs, so that the form would be easier to access for the purpose of recording and monitoring leave.
3. The system for monitoring return from leave was inadequate, reliance being placed on hourly checks. The nurse conducting the hourly check at 12.00 when Catherine was due to return was not aware that she was on unescorted leave and did not escalate the matter to the nurse in charge with the result that the ward only became aware that she had not returned when her mother arrived at 12.50. Consideration was not given to the appropriate amount of leeway to be given to the patient before escalating the fact of them not having returned, with patients being given 30 minutes or more; It is also relevant to consider under this heading the Coroner’s additional concern: “Ward staff appeared to take a different approach to leave and return depending upon the status of the patient as a detained or voluntary patient” As noted above, the Trust has identified the procurement and re-design of its Electronic Patient Record system presents an opportunity to incorporate recording and monitoring of patient leave (for informal as well as formal patients) within the patient’s electronic record, for example by making the Leave Form an electronic document and therefore easier to access and monitor, as opposed to being solely reliant on a paper log. In the meantime, additional measures are in place on the ward to which Ms Morgan was admitted where they have now introduced a whiteboard in the main nursing office with leave and return times written on it. This means that it is now much easier for nursing staff to keep track of whether a patient has returned from leave at the expected time. The board is updated when a patient is signed out and then on their return. This aspect of learning from the incident was part of the presentation at the Patient Safety Committee so that other wards within the Trust can consider implementing the same system. Reminders and reflection to staff about accurate completion of leave logs/hourly leave checks have also been emphasised in a directorate learning event. It is also noted that if Leave Form can be recorded electronically, as is hoped, then this will provide a much clearer audit trail, including names of use rs and time stamps, so it will be easier to monitor compliance and promote learning compared with the existing paper systems. The Trust notes the Coroner’s specific concern with respect to the “leeway” given to informal patient’s when they do not return from leave as planned, and a difference in approach to leave and return from leave applied between informal and detained patients. Whilst it is already Trust policy that staff should promptly escalate to the nurse in charge in the event of an informal patient failing to return from leave as planned and agreed (in accordance with the Trust’s Leave for Informal Patients Policy), it is the intention that the planned review of that policy, alongside the review of the AWOL and Absent and Missing Persons policy, will ensure that relevant measures and considerations from the AWOL policy will be incorporated and reinforced within the revised Leave for Informal Patients Policy, to reduce discrepancies between the two approaches. The aforementioned Patient Safety article circulated to staff on 5 March 2026 reinforced the following:
- That it is the responsibility of the member of staff allocated to the hourly checks to check whether the patient has returned from leave at the expected time; and
- Staff must act promptly if a patient fails to return from leave, setting out 5 steps to be taken including escalation to the Nurse in Charge, contacting the patient to understand the delay, contacting family and friends where appropriate, considering a welfare check or contacting the police if there is an immediate risk; and completing a Datix incident report. A Blue Light Bulletin to share learning from the patient safety incident was issued on 10 March 2026 and emphasises that a serious incident had occurred due to staff being unaware that an informal patient had not returned from leave as expected. The bulletin highlights “the value of promptly checking on patients who do not return from leave” and sets out the relevant checks. The Bulletin has been raised in Trust governance committees, discussed with team business meetings and been made available to all staff (clinical and non- clinical). A488

[Page 6] A489 In addition, there was a Lewisham Quality Meeting held on 13 April 2026 chaired by , Deputy Head of Nursing and Quality with attendance by front line clinical staff, including Band 5 and 6 nurses who carry out nurse in charge role. Learning and discussion was held in relation to the nurse in charge role, including the key role they play in relation to leave, expectations of those in that role and in light of the clearly set parameters of the role set out within the Trust policies and procedures. This reflective session emphasised the role of the nurse in charge as not only the most senior nurse on duty but the clinical leader, risk manager, coordinator and decision-maker responsible for keeping patients and staff safe while ensuring high-quality, lawful mental health care. It was stressed that the nurse in charge holds overall accountability for patient care on the shift and their role in relation to escalating emerging risks on the ward, including making real-time decisions about calling the police. In addition, nurse in charge performance of these responsibilities is assessed through monthly supervision and annual appraisal processes. Ward managers and matrons undertake direct observation of practice on the wards. Any concerns will be raised with staff immediately. Supervision is a space for continued reflection and learning, consideration of feedback, discussion of cases and case-based scenarios to test and enhance individual’s understanding of the expectations and requirements of role, mandatory training completion is reviewed during supervision and additional training and support needs can be considered.
4. A photograph of the patient was not included in the grab pack. Unlike detained patients there was no checklist for voluntary patients as to the measures taken to locate the patient The issue of a checklist is addressed above. With respect to the requirement to include a grab pack, policy requirements with respect to this will be reviewed as part of the Mental Health Law Committee’s aforementioned tripartite Policy Review. The Trust acknowledges the Coroner's concern that a photograph of the patient was not included within the grab pack and that, unlike detained patients, there was no standardised checklist documenting the actions taken to locate an informal (voluntary) patient who failed to return. The Trust's Leave for Informal Patients Policy already sets out the actions that staff must take when an informal patient does not return from agreed leave, including risk assessment, attempts to contact the patient, liaison with family or carers where appropriate, and escalation to senior clinicians and the police where required. Nevertheless, it is accepted that a standardised checklist of actions would be beneficial. In relation to patient identification, whilst a photograph was not available in this case, the grab pack contains detailed identifying information, including physical description and distinguishing features, which could assist police in locating and identifying the individual. As part of the Trust's policy review and learning arising from this incident, arrangements are being strengthened to ensure a more consistent and robust approach for informal patients. The revised policy will introduce a standardised checklist, aligned to the processes already in place for detained patients, to provide clear documentation and assurance that all reasonable steps have been taken to locate a patient who is absent and considered at risk. The requirement in the Trust’s AWOL policy for there to be a current photograph associated with a patient’s grab pack derives from the Mental Health Code of Practice’s guidance that detained patients should have a photograph included in their notes (27.22). The Trust acknowledges that its policy does not make clear that this guidance relates to detained patients rather than voluntary patients. The review will also consider requirements relating to the availability and maintenance of patient photographs within grab packs, subject to appropriate consent, information governance, and legal requirements. These changes will support consistency of practice, improve record keeping, strengthen assurance regarding actions taken, and enhance the information available to partner agencies, including the police, during missing person investigations. Conclusion The Trust regrets that the work that it has undertaken to address the learning that has arisen from this sad case and through the inquest process has not yet been completed. Nevertheless, the Trust hopes that the A489

[Page 7] A490 information provided in this response provides reassurance to the Coroner and the family that work is underway and there is a timeline for action. The Trust acknowledges that the principal outstanding actions at this stage are (1) the tripartite policy reviews to bring the policies in respect of leave up to date with NICE guidance and (2) the discussions with the new provider to explore how the Trust’s systems in respect of documenting, communicating and monitoring leave might be strengthened under the newly-procured EPR – both of which are actions that will inevitably take some time to complete and embed. In the meantime, the Trust has taken action through various forums to reinforce to its staff its expectations around the recording, communicating and monitoring of leave for informal patients, and the key role played by nursing staff in this, as well as continuing to embed NICE guidance and the individualised approach to risk assessment and safety planning. The Trust would once again like to offer its sincere apologies and condolences to Ms Morgan’s family for the shortcomings that were identified on the part of the Trust.
College of Policing Police / Law Enforcement
PDF
Action Planned

The College of Policing plans to revise the Right Care Right Person toolkit to reinforce professional judgement and risk to life over process, and produce interoperability guidance for RCRP and Missing Persons frameworks. They will disseminate the updated guidance and continue to work with health and care partners. (AI summary)

View full response
[Page 1] A481 A481

[Page 2] A482 review incidents, including to specialist missing person teams where there is uncertainty regarding the appropriate classification of incidents.
3. Engagement with operational stakeholders The College has engaged with forces to understand how the current guidance is being interpreted in practice, specifically in relation to the exercise of professional judgement and thresholds for deployment. Further Action Proposed The College will implement the following actions to directly address the concern raised and strengthen national consistency:
1. Revision of the Right Care Right Person toolkit guidance The College will revise the national Right Care Right Person toolkit to explicitly reinforce the requirement for professional judgement in all cases. This will include clear direction that risk to life and vulnerability must take precedence over process driven decision making, and that deployment should not be unduly delayed where a real and immediate risk to life or serious harm is identified.
2. Development of interoperability guidance between RCRP and Missing Persons frameworks The College will produce additional guidance to support decision making in cases where it is not immediately clear whether an incident should be managed under the Right Care Right Person approach or as a missing person investigation. The guidance will incorporate the use of escalation routes, such as referral to specialist missing person teams, to ensure that complex or ambiguous cases receive timely review by appropriately trained staff.
3. Dissemination and implementation support The College will communicate the updated guidance to all forces and provide a dedicated input within the national RCRP Tactical Delivery Board to support consistent implementation across policing.
4. Work with health and care partners to maintain a strong focus on prevention and early intervention The College will work to ensure risks are identified, assessed and managed at the earliest opportunity by the right agency responsible for an individual's care and treatment. This includes promoting the appropriate use of health, safeguarding and care powers to reduce escalation, minimise harm, and ensure individuals receive timely care, treatment and support before risks escalate to a level that may require an emergency response. The College will publish the revised guidance following the completion of the review of existing guidance which is currently underway. Updated materials will then be disseminated to forces, supported by clear communications and practitioner briefings to promote understanding, consistency and effective implementation of the revised guidance. These actions are intended to reinforce the role of professional judgement within national guidance and provide operational staff with greater confidence and support in making proportionate, risk-based decisions. By promoting a more flexible and informed approach to assessment and response, they aim to reduce delays in deployment that can arise from process-driven interpretations of policy. Ultimately, these measures will help ensure that vulnerable individuals receive a timely and appropriate response, improving outcomes while supporting effective and efficient use of resources. A482

[Page 3] A483 A483

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 10 September 2024 I commenced an investigation into the death of Catherine Mary MORGAN, aged 37 Years.  The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest on 16th March 2026. The conclusion of the inquest was Catherine Morgan took her own life whilst suffering from anxiety and  depression 

1a Multiple Injuries 1b 1c 1d
Circumstances of the death
Catherine Morgan was diagnosed with mixed anxiety and severe depressive disorder. In July 2024 she left her flat in Lewisham and went to stay with her parents in Wimbledon where she was seen by a GP, a therapist and a psychiatrist. 

On 27th August 2024 Catherine travelled to Eastbourne with the intention of ending her life [REDACTED Her parents reported her missing to Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and it was quickly established by MPS that Catherine was at an intermediate station  when she answered a call made by the police. She was safely brought back home by police  on that occasion.  Catherine was taken to St.George’s Hospital by her parents and was admitted as a voluntary patient to Lewisham Hospital under South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust  (SLAM) which was the service provider of her registered address (not the address where she was then living).  On 4th September 2024 Catherine left the ward at 10.30. This was her first period of  unescorted leave. She had agreed to return to the ward by 12.00. It was only discovered that she had not returned when her mother attended to take her for lunch at 12.50.  Ward staff reported Catherine missing to MPS at 13.17. Applying the Right Care Right Person Policy and Affinity Protocol MPS declined to investigate because Catherine’s registered home address had not been visited. At 13.28 Catherine’s father rang MPS to report her missing,  providing information in relation to the earlier suicide attempt and detailing that she would not  return to the registered address. MPS again declined to investigate.  At 14.02 Catherine’s father again contacted MPS to confirm that she was not at her flat. MPS  passed the case to South West London BCU which covers Wimbledon. The CAD was  returned to the despatch unit to reassign to South East London BCU covering Lewisham.  South East London BCU received the CAD at 14.26, Thrive+ summary recording the risk as  high. The morning Operations Inspector (400) was covering for the afternoon inspector who  was on a training course and marked the CAD for her to deal with without reviewing it himself. He was unaware of a number of calls from despatch alerting him to the CAD as he was away  from his desk. When the afternoon operations Inspector arrived she went straight into a  meeting without reviewing the CAD. At 15.39 Catherine Morgan’s father called MPS as there  had been no response by the police. This was passed to the operations room. At 16.02 the  400 was informed of the phone call from Catherine’s father and read the CAD, putting in train  enquiries to establish the level of risk (some of which was already known to the police). The  CAD was graded as high risk at approximately 17.00 and the Missing Persons Unit (MPU)  started an investigation. They received information from a phone trace request approximately  60 minutes later that Catherine’s phone was within the Dover area and informed H.M.  Coastguard (HMCG).  MPS notified Kent Police and requested an area search. HMCG mobilised when they were  informed Catherine’s cell site showed her near Dover Castle. Information about financial  transactions confirmed her to be in Dover and at 18.59 cell site data placed her at  [REDACTED A HMCG search team arrived in the area a few minutes  later. A Kent Police resource was despatched at 19.13. HMCG located Catherine Morgan at  the cliff edge at 19.45 and engaged with her. Kent Police arrived on scene at 19.47. Catherine Morgan jumped to her death at 20.16 

The jury found the following failures by MPS possibly contributed to the death:
1. The call handler and despatch team applied the Right Care Right Person policy and Affinity Protocol too rigidly by not registering previous suicide intention resulting in a delayed deployment;
2. The Metropolitan Police categorising Catherine as a high risk in an untimely manner;
3. Internal communication: a) didn’t utilise existing information held within all available CADs which resulted in delays to the investigation b) No inspector cover during senior leadership team meeting policy c) Lack of prioritisation policy The jury also identified non-causative failures by SLAM ward staff:
1. Unescorted leave not signed out by registered mental health nurse;
2. Nurse in charge unaware Catherine had been given unescorted leave;
3. Ward staff unaware Catherine had not returned from leave at 12.00/12.30; 4 General observation sheet incorrectly recorded.
Action should be taken
In my opinion unless action is taken to address the above concerns then there is a significant risk of future deaths and I believe each of you have the power to take such action.
Copies sent to
I can confirm I have sent the report to:  [please do not use individual’s names, but instead roles/titles]1.Metropolitan Police Service2.South London & Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust3. College of Policing5. South West London & St George’s Mental Health NHS Trust 6. Kent Police

Similar PFD reports

Shared signals

Related inquiry recommendations

Similar themes

Report details

Date of report
19 May 2026

Responses identified

Responses identified 2
2 responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 15 Jul 2026.

Source links