Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Robert Day

Ref: 2026-0169 Date: 24 Mar 2026 Coroner: Ian Potter Area: Kent and Medway Responses identified: 3 / 3 View PDF

Frontline emergency services lack national guidance for managing complex, time-critical mental health crises where existing legal powers may be insufficient or unclear, risking patient lives.

Date 24 Mar 2026
56-day deadline 19 May 2026
Responses identified 3 of 3
Suicide (from 2015)

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
Frontline emergency services lack national guidance for managing complex, time-critical mental health crises where existing legal powers may be insufficient or unclear, risking patient lives.
View full coroner's concerns
While this report has three recipients due to the crossover between the services involved (ambulance service, police, community mental health), I am more than content that one recipient and / or government department may wish to take the lead in providing a single response.

The MATTER OF CONCERN is as follows: (1) I heard compelling evidence from the Head of Mental Health at South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust regarding the difficulties faced by emergency services generally in situations such as the presentation of Robert Day on 14 January 2025. It must be accepted (with no disrespect intended) that frontline paramedics and police officers are not specialists in the provision of mental health care. Despite this, the evidence was that an increasing number of calls to the emergency services (ambulance and police, in particular) have a mental health element to them. It was clear from the evidence that the joint response crew (one paramedic and one police officer) who attended Robert on 14 January 2025, did their very best to assist Robert in what can be described as a particularly difficult set of circumstances. A capacity assessment was undertaken and the responders reasonably believed that Robert did have capacity to make the decision to refuse treatment even in the knowledge that, without it, his death within the coming hours was highly likely. I heard that the police could not have deployed section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to take Robert to a place of safety because, at that time, the hotel room was his home. In any event, section 136 would not allow for treatment. Further, in the circumstances of Robert's case, the process of applying for a warrant under section 135 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was also likely inappropriate given the critical nature and timing of Robert's situation. While not hearing specific and detailed evidence on other provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, the witness was clear that these matters would likely be beyond the scope of understanding of most frontline emergency workers. The fundamental issue was considered to be 'what can the frontline crew actually do' in such complex situations. I heard evidence that, sadly, Robert's situation is unlikely to have been novel but that there is an absence of national guidance to frontline emergency services in dealing with the complexities of cases such as Robert's. I acknowledge the complex interplay between the various agencies and services involved, but highlight to you my concern that the absence of any national guidance / advice to frontline emergency crews risks the lives of others who are found to be at time critical risk as a result of underlying mental health concerns.

Responses

3 respondents
Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust NHS / Health Body
24 Mar 2026 PDF
Action Taken

The Trust has already implemented recording for all calls on the '836 line' and established monthly review meetings and audits for call quality. They have also completed a review of existing training related to professional curiosity and are developing new policies and training to address the DNA policy and promote holistic patient assessment. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Potter Inquest into the death of Mr Robert Day Kent and Medway Mental Health Trust Response to the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Death I write in response to the Regulation 28 Report dated 24 March 2026, sent to Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust (the Trust) following the conclusion of the inquest into the very sad death of Mr Robert Day on 15 January 2025. In your report to the Trust, you raised the following matters of concern:
1. Professional Curiosity I heard evidence that led me to conclude that in the weeks prior to Robert's death some of the mental health professionals from the Trust that were involved in his care did not display sufficient professional curiosity. This included, but was not limited to:
• Conducting what should have been 'home visits' in public places, which denied the clinician(s) the opportunity to fully and holistically assess Robert and his needs;
• Overly strict adherence to the Trust's Did Not Attend (DNA) policy, which lacked any meaningful thought being given as to the reason(s) why an appointment

[Page 2] might not have been attended. One witness considered that the policy itself was an issue;
• Robert's sister raised concerns about him to the Trust on 2 January 2025. Later that day, two mental health nurses from Medway and Swale MHT+ team conducted a 'cold call' visit to Robert. They documented a plan as a result of that visit, but I heard in evidence that this plan was "not reasonable" at that time and that a referral to the Rapid Response team would have been expected; and
• Some staff appear to have looked at Robert's presentation on one given day, without looking at his previous presentation, which I was told in evidence showed a "lack of professional curiosity". Trust Response The Trust accept that opportunities were missed to demonstrate an appropriate level of professional curiosity. Even though the plan to meet Mr Day at a public place was eventually changed to the local Community Mental Health Team based at Sittingbourne Memorial Hospital, there was insufficient clinical probing that would have helped clinicians in recognising, querying, and escalating emerging concerns from Mr Day’s presentation before discharging him. In line with the Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) principles, a learning response was undertaken through a multidisciplinary case conference with the local Community Mental Health Team on the 20th January, 2026. The focus was on understanding the care context, identifying contributory system factors, and agreeing shared learning to inform service improvement. In regards to the application of the Trust Did Not Attend (DNA) policy, it is expected that patients’ vulnerabilities, care and support needs, symptoms, safeguarding concerns, risks, the Mental Health Act (1983) and Mental Capacity Act (2005) will be considered in the implementation of this policy and not in isolation. The Trust has introduced a daily DNA huddle within the local Community Mental Health Team to allow for consideration of risk of patients and instigate relevant action required to maintain patient safety. Following the concerns raised by Mr Day’s sister on the 2nd January 2025, we have acknowledged there was inadequate challenge of assumptions, limited triangulation of care, and a lack of proactive questioning that may have contributed to a failure to fully appreciate the level of risk presented by Mr Day at the time. A referral to the Home Treatment Team (HTT) should have follow to allow for a more intensive treatment and follow up.

[Page 3] We also recognise that professional curiosity is essential in mental health care, particularly where presentation may be complex, fluctuating, or influenced by multiple factors such as lack of appropriate housing, social isolation as in the case of Mr Day. We regret that this was not consistently demonstrated in this case. In response to the coroner’s findings therefore, the organisation has taken the following actions: Strengthening Training and Awareness regarding professional curiosity
• Professional curiosity is being strengthened by focusing on developing a culture that supports personalised care and informed clinical decision-making. This is reinforced by senior clinical leaders through daily safety huddles, ward rounds, and team meetings. It will also be an agenda item at clinical summits, senior nursing leadership forum (June
2026) and the annual nursing conference (October 2026).
• Case based learning will be introduced, using real clinical scenarios to support staff in recognising when to question, probe, and escalate concerns as part of directorate leadership learning. Clinical Supervision and Reflective Practice
• Supervision frameworks will be refreshed to ensure professional curiosity and reflective questioning are routinely addressed.
• This will provide a focus on patient case discussion, supporting wider MDT and team decision making, personalised care planning and formulation that forms part of the Trust wider quality plan. Leadership and Oversight
• Senior clinical leaders, including Matrons and lead nurses are providing enhanced oversight and visible support, focusing on curiosity, challenge, and risk escalation. They do this by offering visible professional oversight of nursing and Allied Health Professionals (AHP) practice, setting clear expectations for standards of assessment, care planning, acting as a point of escalation in managing high‑risk and high‑complexity cases. Policy and Documentation

[Page 4]
• In January 2026, the Trust introduced and is embedding the Collaborative Risk Assessment and Management (CRAM) risk assessment framework. The quality of the CRAM is routinely being audited in respect of patient/carer involvement, formulation and a safety plan is present to support effective reassessment, challenge of assumptions, and clear clinical reasoning.
• The Trust is in the process of comprehensively refining the model of care within the Community Mental Health Teams with clinical pathways escalations to be clarified and clinical leadership reinforced. The Trust has also recognised that Curiosity is fundamental to effective care delivery as it enables understanding of the person, not just the presentation and has consequently adopted ‘curiosity’ as one of its values. Work is now being undertaken to embed this to ensure a change of culture within the organisation. Ongoing Monitoring and Assurance We will continue to monitor the effectiveness of these actions through:
• CRAM Quality audits – 10 patients per month for each team. These audits focus on the quality of the risk assessment, formulation and plan and are overseen by senior nursing colleagues.
• Incident reviews are undertaken in line with the Trust’s Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) to ensure learning is identified, followed through, and effectively embedded following patient safety incidents.
• Progress against the Trust Quality Improvement Plan is being strengthened through a revised governance structure implemented during May–June 2026. Four Senior Responsible Officers at Deputy level have been identified to provide assurance on delivery of quality milestones, including discharge and care planning. Each milestone is supported by defined key performance indicators to monitor impact.
2. Record Keeping (the '836 line') I received compelling evidence in the form of contemporaneous notes by both the paramedic and police officer that attended the 999 call to assist Robert on 14 January 2025 (following his taking of an overdose), which led me to conclude that the paramedic

[Page 5] had sought advice from the Trust's so-called '836 line'. There was no record of the call or the advice given within Robert's electronic notes. I concluded that, in this particular case, the lack of record keeping did not contribute to death. However, record keeping in healthcare is a fundamental basic of patient care and is a central part of keeping patients safe. Again, it is not difficult to see circumstances in which a lack of clinical record-keeping would contribute to a death. As such, I raise my concern that ongoing record-keeping issues will contribute to future deaths. Trust Response Actions that are completed and in place as business as usual:
• All calls received by the 836-line are now recorded.
• A monthly meeting takes place with the Trust, British Transport Police, Kent Police and SECAMB they review 10 calls with the support of the Trust Information Governance team. These are then triangulated with the progress notes on Rio (the electronic patient notes system).
• The information governance team listen to 10 calls a month separate to the meeting for quality purposes. Actions to be completed and monitored weekly by the Acute Directorate Clinical Governance Team:
• The Trust Information Governance Team is undertaking a review to verify that all staff within the 836-line team hold an in-date licence, ensuring all calls are appropriately recorded. Where a valid licence is not in place, calls will not be recorded. This action is being led by the General Manager for the 836-line.
• A monthly audit of 10 patients will be undertaken within the directorate to review call recordings and associated progress notes for quality and safety. This action is being led by the Clinical Governance Lead for the Acute Directorate. Thank you for bringing your concerns to my attention and I am sincerely sorry for the shortfalls in the care of Mr Day.
DHSC Department for Womens Health and Mental Health
22 May 2026 PDF
Noted

The DHSC acknowledges the difficulties faced by emergency services regarding mental health incidents and mental capacity assessments, providing context on existing legislation and government initiatives. It also references the CQC's monitoring and inspection of the relevant NHS Trust. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Potter, Thank you for the Regulation 28 report of 24th March 2026 sent to myself and the Secretary of State for Department of Health and Social Care about the death of Mr Robert Joseph Day. I am replying as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Women’s Health and Mental Health. Firstly, I would like to say how saddened I was to read of the circumstances of Mr Day’s death, and I offer my sincere condolences to his family and loved ones. The circumstances your report describes are very concerning and I am grateful to you for bringing these matters to my attention. In your report, you state you heard compelling evidence from the Head of Mental Health at South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust regarding the difficulties faced by emergency services generally in situations and must accept that frontline paramedics and police officers are not specialists in the provision of mental health care. A capacity assessment was undertaken and the responders reasonably believed that the deceased did have capacity to make the decision to refuse treatment even in the knowledge that, without it, his death within the coming hours was highly likely. You also heard that the police could not have deployed section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 to take Mr Day to a place of safety because, at that time, the hotel room was his home. In any event, section 136 would not allow for treatment. Further, in the circumstances of Mr Day’s case, the process of applying for a warrant under section 135 of the Mental Health Act 1983 was also likely inappropriate given the critical nature and timing of Robert's situation. While not hearing specific and detailed evidence on other provisions of the Mental Health Act 1983, the witness was clear that these matters would likely be beyond the scope of understanding of most frontline emergency workers. The fundamental issue was considered to be 'what can the frontline crew actually do' in such complex situations. You acknowledged the complex interplay between the various agencies and services involved but highlighted your concern that the absence of any national guidance/advice to frontline emergency crews risks the lives of others who are found to be at time critical risk as a result of underlying mental health concerns.

[Page 2] I understand that this report has also been sent to the Home Office. In preparing this response, my officials have made enquiries with NHS England and the Care Quality Commission to ensure we adequately address your concerns. Upon reviewing your report, our NHSE colleagues felt it was more appropriate to reply directly to you given concerns around the absence of any national guidance/advice to frontline emergency crews. You may want to address your report to NHSE, so that they can also address your concerns. For CQC, you will see that their response to your concerns is highlighted in this letter below. While I cannot comment on the applicability of section 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act in this case, it may be helpful to say that the Government have committed to carrying out a consultation to explore the powers available to different professionals in different situations and settings, in particular but not limited to the operation of sections 135 and
136. The consultation will seek views on powers and joint working approaches to ensure health and social care professionals and police have the appropriate powers to act in order to protect people from harm to themselves and to others when in a mental health crisis. While the exact scope of the consultation is not yet defined, we are working closely with the police, health and care representative groups and people with lived experience, to define the scope for the consultation and will set out further details in due course. Whilst NHS England will reply directly to your concern about guidance, it may be helpful if I describe some of the other actions being taken to improve overall care for people in mental health crisis. To supplement the NHS 111 mental health crisis triage service, we are also deploying mental health professionals in 999 call emergency operation centres and clinical assessment services to ensure people experiencing a mental health crisis are directed towards appropriate services. We continue to increase mental health expertise for ambulance services including ensuring that mental health professionals are embedded in all emergency operation centres and improve training for ambulance staff to enable effective responses to those in mental health crisis. Substantial progress has been achieved in building a more robust crisis care pathway across all ages ensuring that people in mental health crisis have access to timely and appropriate support. Key developments include the introduction of the NHS 111 ‘select mental health’ option alongside hundreds of alternative crisis services, including crisis cafes, sanctuaries and crisis houses which provide a supportive environment outside of traditional clinical settings. Work is underway with all Integrated Care Boards to roll out crisis text services across England by March 2026. NHS England has successfully completed the delivery phase of the Mental Health Response Vehicles programme, with 88 vehicles now built and handed over to local systems. These vehicles are providing on-scene support for individuals in crisis and

[Page 3] reducing attendance in A&E for mental health concerns by delivering care directly in the community. There is also full national coverage of 24/7 liaison mental health teams providing mental health assessments and care in general acute hospitals, as well as high fidelity crisis teams in a community. We are also investing up to £120m to bring the number of mental health emergency departments up to 85. Mental Health Emergency Departments (MHEDs) provide rapid assessment and support in a therapeutic setting, helping those with mental health needs get the right care quickly and reducing reliance on Emergency Departments. Early evidence shows that MHEDs can improve patient experience and outcomes, while also easing pressure on wider urgent and emergency services. Alongside this, NHS England is also developing new core standards of care for community mental health services. These will set out the ‘must dos’ for all services to ensure that at least a minimum quality of care is being provided in all areas for all people with serious mental illness. By providing better care for all people sooner, fewer people will require the highest levels of intensive and assertive community treatment. CQC response CQC have shared the following information regarding Mr Day’s death: Mr Day was a person receiving support from Kent and Medway Mental Health NHS Trust at the time of his sad death. We note that it was his community psychiatric nurse who alerted emergency service following the disclosure that he had taken an overdose. We inspected the trust’s community mental health services for working age adults in March 2025. This inspection was completed as part of CQC's Adult Community Mental Health Programme. We also inspected crisis services and health-based places of safety as part of the programme. The programme of inspections contributes to CQC's commitment to inspect the standard of care in community mental health services across the country. We undertook a short-notice, announced comprehensive inspection of this service. You can read the report here:

health-services-for-adults-of-working-age At this inspection we rated the service as requires improvement. We found 4 breaches of regulation in relation to safe care and treatment, buildings and premises, governance, and staffing. We served a warning notice on the trust for failing to meet the regulations related to risk assessment and management of service users accessing community mental health services. We have since carried out a follow up inspection in December 2025 and we are satisfied that the Warning Notice has been met, but the report from this inspection has yet to be published.

[Page 4] I hope this response is helpful. Thank you for bringing these concerns to my attention.
Home Office Central Government
2 Jun 2026 PDF
Noted

The Home Office acknowledges the coroner's concerns regarding police actions in mental health incidents, explaining the legal limitations under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Mental Health Act 1983 that restricted police intervention in this specific case. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Potter, Thank you for your letter of 27 March 2026 enclosing a copy of the Regulation 28 Report to Preventing Future Deaths, following the inquest into the death of Robert Joseph Day. I am responding as the Minister for Policing and Crime. I would first like to express my deepest condolences to Robert’s family for their loss in what must be a truly difficult time for them. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 is designed to protect individuals who may lack the mental capacity to make their own decisions about care or treatment. The legislation states that a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if they are unable to make a decision for themselves on that matter due to an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain. Further, a person is unable to make a decision for themselves if they are unable to understand relevant information; to retain that information, to use or weight the information to make a decision or to communicate their decision. A person is to be assumed to have capacity unless it is established otherwise and making what might be considered to be an unwise or irrational decision is not by itself, proof that someone lacks capacity. Where a person is deemed to lack capacity, others, including police, may intervene in certain vital or imminent circumstances such as to enable them to receive life sustaining treatment. The College of Policing’s Authorised Professional Practice (https://www.college.police.uk/app/mental-health/mental-capacity), which is the official, evidence-based guidance for policing in England and Wales, is clear that where an issue of capacity has arisen and “where health or social care professionals are on the scene, police should defer to their expertise and provide support as appropriate and in accordance with local protocols” which was the case in this event with the attendance of paramedics. There are limited powers which are available to the police in these types of circumstances. I see that you have acknowledged that Section 136 of the Mental Health Act could not be used as Mr Day was not in a public space, which is of course correct, and your view that section 135 was inappropriate given the critical timing of the situation. In order for section

[Page 2] 135 to have been used, an approved mental health practitioner (AMHP) would have needed to be involved as they are the only professional who is able to apply for the warrant needed (although as you note, it may be unlikely that a warrant could have been granted and executed swiftly enough given the urgency of an overdose.) Further to this and the case law of R (Sessay) v South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust & Anor [2011] EWHC 2617 (QB) (https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2011/2617.html), suggests the police would not have been able to remove Mr Day from the premises as the judge in that case gave clear direction that intervention of this kind must be conducted under the Mental Health Act, either admission under s4 MHA or the execution of a s135(1) MHA warrant. The judgement highlights that the MCA and common law doctrine of necessity cannot be used by the police to remove a person from a private premises as an alternative to using the MHA 1983 s135 (where a warrant must be obtained) or s136 (where the power can only be used in a place to which the public has access). Unfortunately, there was little that the police could have legally done in this particular sad situation where Mr Day lost his life, as the officers must have regard to that person’s rights and freedom of action, which he was deemed to have under the mental capacity act; an unwise decision does not amount to an automatic lack of capacity – people are entitled to make unwise decisions and decline medical treatment, where they have legal capacity to do so. Thank you again for your letter. Very best wishes, Minister of State for Policing and Crime

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 16 January 2025 an investigation into the death of Robert Joseph DAY was commenced. The investigation concluded at the end of the inquest heard by me on 5 and 6 March 2026. The conclusion of the inquest was: Suicide The medical cause of death was: 1a Overdose of Prescription Medication
Circumstances of the death
Robert Day was 60 years of age at the time of his death. He was under the care of community mental health services in relation to his diagnosis of severe depression. On the afternoon of 14 January 2025, Robert Day disclosed to his mental health nurse during a telephone conversation that he had taken a significant overdose of his prescription medication. An ambulance was called and a joint response unit (police and ambulance service) attended Robert's room at the Travelodge in Sittingbourne (his home address at that time). Robert refused all forms of treatment, including being taken to hospital, despite being advised of the likely fatal consequences of not receiving treatment. The paramedic undertook a mental capacity assessment and concluded that Robert did have the mental capacity to refuse treatment. Robert was given safety-netting advice. Sadly, Robert was found deceased in his room on the morning of 15 January 2025. He died as a result of the overdose of prescription medication.
Copies sent to
South East Coast Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust

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Report details

Reference
2026-0169
Date of report
24 March 2026
Coroner
Ian Potter
Coroner area
Kent and Medway

Responses identified

Responses identified 3 of 3
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 19 May 2026.

Sent to

Department for Women’s Health and Metal Health
Department of Health and Social Care
Home Office

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