Highways England acknowledges receipt of the report and briefly summarises their procedures for temporary road closures, stating that closures are kept to the shortest time possible and safety is prioritised. (AI summary)
Catherine Gardiner, Jason Aleixo, Lorraine Maclellan
Ford's vehicle design should include fault code provision for engine shutdowns caused by the DMF protection system, and the manufacturer has yet to conduct a forensic examination to identify relevant faults.
Coroner's concerns
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2) This vehicle remains in the custody of the Forensic Collision Investigation Unit Whilst Ford was involved in the investigation in terms of considering relevant fault codes, they have not examined the vehicle forensically to ascertain whether can identify a relevant fault: Ford is now offered the opportunity to carry out this investigation; with the results of that investigation to be included in their Regulation 28 response One of the interested persons has indicated that wish for their own investigators to be present whilst the examination of the vehicle takes place, and request that that be facilitated_
Responses
Ford acknowledges the report and emphasises their commitment to customer safety and quality control, highlighting their monitoring and improvement processes, but doesn't commit to any specific action as a result of this case. (AI summary)
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Highways England clarifies the oversight role of the Department for Transport (DfT) and Office of Road and Rail (ORR), and explains its statutory powers regarding traffic regulation orders under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. It notes the absence of incentives or penalties related to hard shoulder closures. (AI summary)
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1. The oversight role would sit with the Department for Transport (DfT) who use the Office of Road and Rail (ORR) to monitor Highways England. Under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 made by parliament, Highways England, as the highway authority have the statutory powers to put prohibitions and restrictions in place .on the strategic road network in England. Under the Act, Temporary Traffic Regulation Orders for events, such as a temporary closure of a hard shoulder, can remain in force for up to 18 months from the date on which the Order comes into force. There is nothing in statute to say that the Order must have a specific end date as long as the Order does not exceed a period of 18 months.
2. In terms of our monitoring by th~ ORR on behalf of DfT, there is currently no incentive to reduce · the duration} of hard shoulder closures or any penalty for prolonging hard shoulder closures: Your sincerely Region.al Director, South East l'\ INVESTORS Registered office Bri<jgo House, 1Wafnu1 Tree Close, GuUdford GUI 4l.Z Hi!tiWnys Englanll CorJl)any Limiled regisle<ed 111 England mdWries oorrber 09346363 ,_,, IN·peoPLE
Report sections
Investigation and inquest
Circumstances of the death
AIl three vehicles had been driving along on the M4 between junctions 14 and 13; a1 were driving at just over SOmph_ It was daylight; the weather was fine There were no concerns about the road surface_ The speed limit here was the national speed limit: No vehicle was exceeding this; and speed can be ruled out as a factor in this case Mr Hall overtook the LGV; travelling at 58 mph: He moved back into lane 1, in front of the LGV; and began to pull away from him: Neither [ nor Thames Valley Police had any concerns about the driving of either vehicle This is borne out by the dashcam footage which we saw in court: Mr Hall on pulling into lane almost immediately realised that there was something amiss with the vehicle in front of him (the minibus). He described the situation as "like a wall coming towards me He managed t0 check the outer lane and move swiftly around the minibus to avoid hitting it He said very candidly that; had those lanes had not been clear; he would have collided with the minibus_ He did not think the lorry behind him had sufficient opportunity to avoid hitting the minibus The driver of the LGV gave evidence that he braked immediately when the virtually stationary minibus was visible to him: He did this before the Autonomous Braking System had a chance to operate Forensic evidence suggests that he had around 2 seconds, possibly less, between the minibus visible, and impact We heard evidence about perception-reaction time, and how our brains take time to perceive a hazard and act on that; It would appear that the LGV driver reacted t0 the situation in front of him very quickly indeed No driver would expect; when another vehicle moves out of way in front of to be presented with a stationary vehicle in the lane =& vehicle which had, up until that point; been driving perfectly normally at a similar speed A key question for the inquest was the question of what caused the minibus to come to such a sudden stop that day: a front seat passenger in the minibus) described the events from his recollection. He said that he experienced juddering in the vehicle and a loud noise from the engine. Ms Gardiner's hand was on the gearstick: He recalled her saying oh my god, oh my god". He said it felt like something had happened outside of her control: He felt that there must have been a problem with the engine_ He said Ms Gardiner did not seem ill: (Indeed Ms Gardiner survived to hospital and no medical issues were identified) Nothing was happening inside the vehicle to cause any alarm There was no hazard on the road which would have caused her to brake suddenly. It did not feel to Mr Jthat the vehicle was stalling or braking_ We considered possible causes for the sudden stopping of the minibus. We heard evidence that the system designed to protect the DMF can shut down the engine if, for instance, a driver selects high a gear and fails to correct it There are two important caveats here: This would only be relevant at low revs and Iow speed; i.e. in the final moments. It would not explain why the vehicle began to slow down from around SOmph to start with. There is no direct evidence for this Engine shut down by the DMF protection system does not trigger & fault code in this vehicle_ This is something that has been suggested as a possible explanation but only for the last few moments before impact. So the question here is what caused the minibus to start to slow down so quickly and suddenly. We have considered possible causes for this under two headings, which will call "driver input" and "vehicle_issues being his him; too key
Driver Input We heard evidence from the two lorry drivers involved and a passenger in minibus asked each of the forensic experts (from Thames Valley Police and Ford) if could think of ways in which driver input could have caused the vehicle to behave as it did. Firstly, we considered what would perhaps be the most likely cause of a vehicle coming to an abrupt stop; namely heavy braking In this respect; we heard evidence from (driver of the box van who narrowly avoided colliding with the mini bus) tnat the brake lights were not on when he first noticed the minibus was slowing down; despite describing the situation as "like a wall coming towards me This is borne out by dashcam footage which shows that the brake lights on the minibus were illuminated only moments before impact: There were no tyre marks on the road consistent with braking not definitive on their own, but part of the overall picture: Ms Gardiner had no leg and foot injuries consistent with braking: There was no reason for her to brake suddenly neither inside nor outside of the vehicle. For all of these reasons; found it unlikely that the minibus began to slow down because of braking by the driver. We considered whether selecting either too low or too high a gear could have been & problem: We heard that TVP attempted to reconstruct the situation that occurred, using a similar vehicle. It is plainly obvious that selecting even 6'h gear when driving at over 5Omph would not cause the vehicle to slow down so dramatically with or without juddering: If too low a gear had been selected and this was the cause of the sudden drop speed, we heard in evidence that a fault code would have been triggered The evidence of was that Ms Gardiner was not changing gears at the time. His impression was that something had happened beyond her control. find it unlikely that upshifting or downshifting of gears by the driver caused the vehicle to start to slow down. The reconstruction by Thames Valley Police officers, even with full knowledge of these events, was unable to trigger this response in a very similar vehicle. The engine for this minibus did run during subsequent examination Not one of the highly experienced forensic witnesses has been able to think of any other possible scenarios where something the driver did could have caused the vehicle to have started t0 slow down so quickly_ There is simply no evidence to suggest that was the case_ Vehicle Issues We were able to rule out; on the evidence, certain more common reasons for engines to cut out, including: Running out of fuel on the basis of vehicle examination, lack of fault code and the fact that witness evidence suggests that the minibus had recently been filled with fuel: DPF overheating again not likely following the vehicle examination and absence of fault code: We heard evidence that there was a vehicle recall for Ford transits that were built between 12/9/14 and 26/1/15 vehicles in which fuel injectors had not the they heavy heavy very been properly installed leading to engine shutdown Again forensic vehicle examination and absence of relevant fault codes suggests that this is an unlikely cause This vehicle does not fall within the relevant date range for this product recall: questioned whether the DMF protection system could possibly have triggered inappropriately _ i,e: at higher revs and speed This was felt to be unlikely by each of the forensic experts If, for instance, the engine speed sensor was sending incorrect information to the DMF protection system; a fault code would be expected: Again however;, crucially; no code is recorded when the DMF system is triggered so no one can be confident of its role in these events Ford appears to view this situation as driver error: It is something which Mr Moolman (for Ford) accepted should be reviewed Having considered possible explanations under headings of driver input and vehicle issues, all we were able t0 do is rule things out: There was no clear or obvious reason why this vehicle stopped so suddenly_ Factual witness and expert evidence points more towards vehicle input than driver error; but this is based on an absence of evidence despite the extensive investigations which have taken place_ form this view on a balance of probabilities basis This was a view accepted by the witness for Ford and is also the view of ffrom the Forensic Collision Investigation Unit (FCIU): We heard evidence from about another fatality that he was recently asked to assist with (in the investigation)_ This involved a vehicle which, whilst not exactly the same, was still a Ford transit: He told us that this vehicle stopped unexpectedly and was in collision with another vehicle: treated this evidence with necessary caution, given the limited information that we had about the circumstances of that case. It was however sufficiently similar to be of concern t0 me:
Action should be taken
Similar PFD reports
Related inquiry recommendations
Report details
- Reference
- 2019-0350
- Date of report
- 24 October 2019
- Coroner
- Heidi Connor
- Coroner area
- Berkshire
Responses identified
Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 17 Jan 2020 (estimated).
Sent to
- Ford UK
- Highways England