Public inquiry · Parliamentary scrutiny

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Manchester Arena Inquiry. Read indexed debates, questions, statements and early day motions, with links to the original parliamentary records.

53 indexed mentions for this inquiry Earliest recorded mention: 17 September 2020

Parliamentary mentions

4 matching mentions · newest first

CONTEST, the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 2023

Written Ministerial Statement House of Lords
Lord Sharpe of Epsom · Conservative Answering body: Home Office
Parliamentary excerpt

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:The first duty of this government is to keep the United Kingdom and its people safe. I am therefore pleased to today publish an updated version of CONTEST, the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. The strategy has been laid before Parliament as a Command Paper (CP 903), and copies are available in the Vote Office and on GOV.UK. This year ...

Recorded statement

Answering body: Home Office

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:

The first duty of this government is to keep the United Kingdom and its people safe. I am therefore pleased to today publish an updated version of CONTEST, the United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. The strategy has been laid before Parliament as a Command Paper (CP 903), and copies are available in the Vote Office and on GOV.UK.

This year marks 20 years since we launched CONTEST. The core framework that underpins the strategy – Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare – has stood the test of time and remains a strong foundation on which to base our counter-terrorism efforts.

However, the threat we face from terrorism is enduring and evolving and it is right that we update our strategy to stay ahead. I have already announced an overhaul of the Prevent pillar in response to the Independent Review of Prevent, to ensure that it recognises the central role of ideology in encouraging people to turn towards extremism and that Islamism remains our greatest threat. Since the last version of CONTEST was published in 2018, 9 terrorist attacks have been declared in the UK, in which 6 people died and 20 people were injured. Overseas, 24 UK nationals have been killed in 11 terrorist attacks. The majority of these attacks were Islamist in nature. We judge that the risk from terrorism is rising, and we must do everything within our power to reduce it.

We must also review our counter-terrorism efforts in response to external scrutiny; since 2018 there have been numerous inquests, inquiries, reviews, and exercises which have helped us learn lessons and improve our counter-terrorism system. Most recently we have received and are implementing recommendations from the Independent Review of Prevent and the Manchester Arena Inquiry.

The Home Office has updated CONTEST via comprehensive evidence-gathering and thorough consultation. This has included input and challenge from other government departments, devolved administrations, the police, the security and intelligence agencies, frontline practitioners, independent advisors and commissioners including the Commission for Countering Extremism, victims of terrorism and their families, the private sector, academia, and our international partners and allies.

The strategy sets out a need to respond to a domestic terrorist threat which is less predictable and harder to detect and investigate, a persistent and evolving threat from Islamist groups overseas, and an operating environment where accelerating advances in technology provide both opportunity and risk to our counter-terrorism efforts. It also includes a greater focus on the pivotal role of ideology in encouraging extremism.

In response, building on its established foundations, the updated version of CONTEST sets out how we will place greater focus on using all the levers of the state to identify and intervene against terrorists, build critical partnerships with the private sector and international allies to keep the public safe, and harness the opportunities presented by new technology.

Through this updated strategy, and by taking a more agile, integrated and aligned approach, we will do everything within our power to keep the public safe.

Original parliamentary record

Publication of Volume 3 of the Manchester Arena Inquiry Report

Written Ministerial Statement House of Lords
Lord Sharpe of Epsom · Conservative Answering body: Home Office
Parliamentary excerpt

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:Today the Manchester Arena Inquiry has published the third and final volume (Volume 3) of its report, which has been laid before the House. The report can be found at www.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk and on GOV.UK. Volume 3 relates to the radicalisation of the perpetrator; the planning and preparation for the attack; and whether the attack could have b...

Recorded statement

Answering body: Home Office

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:

Today the Manchester Arena Inquiry has published the third and final volume (Volume 3) of its report, which has been laid before the House. The report can be found at www.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk and on GOV.UK.

Volume 3 relates to the radicalisation of the perpetrator; the planning and preparation for the attack; and whether the attack could have been prevented.

The awful attack carried out on 22 May 2017 prematurely ended the lives of the 22 people and fundamentally damaged many more. They and their loved ones are foremost in our thoughts today. I am grateful for the strength and courage of the victims’ families and the survivors, who bravely live with the consequences of the attack every day, and to all those who have shared their experiences with the Inquiry.

I would also like to thank Sir John Saunders and his team who have spent more than three years investigating this atrocious attack. The government is committed to maximising learning from the Inquiry and will now carefully study the three volumes of findings and analysis and well over 150 recommendations and consider how best to take them forward.

Original parliamentary record

Homeland Security Policy Update

Written Ministerial Statement House of Lords
Lord Sharpe of Epsom · Conservative Answering body: Home Office
Parliamentary excerpt

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:Today I am pleased to announce the foundational policy elements that will form the basis of this Government’s upcoming Protect Duty Bill, also known as Martyn’s Law. These proposals have been developed in response to feedback received to the Government’s 2021 consultation on policy, where seven in ten respondents supported the concept that businesses sh...

Recorded statement

Answering body: Home Office

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:

Today I am pleased to announce the foundational policy elements that will form the basis of this Government’s upcoming Protect Duty Bill, also known as Martyn’s Law. These proposals have been developed in response to feedback received to the Government’s 2021 consultation on policy, where seven in ten respondents supported the concept that businesses should protect the public, and in partnership with key stakeholders. Government will continue to work closely with business stakeholders to ensure that guidance and support is bespoke, accessible and easy to understand, enabling Martyn’s Law to be implemented successfully in an effective and proportionate manner.

As you will be aware, the Chair of the Manchester Arena Inquiry recommended the introduction of a Duty in June 2021. This was further to the 2017 London Bridge Prevention of Future Deaths Report, which recommended introduction of legislation setting out the duties of public authorities. Martyn’s Law has been championed by the Martyn’s Law Campaign (led by Figen Murray, the mother of Martyn Hett killed in the Manchester attack) and the Survivors Against Terror network, whom I would like to pay tribute to today. It is also supported by expert security partners such as the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) within Counter Terrorism Policing.

Overview

The proposed Martyn’s Law will seek to improve the safety and security of our citizens so they can enjoy public premises without fear of terrorism by improving protective security and organisational preparedness at a wide range of locations across the UK. It is emphatically in the public interest for the Government and business to work together to ensure people are protected when visiting venues, retail areas, and other publicly accessible venues without introducing undue burden. Those responsible will be required to consider the threat from terrorism and implement appropriate, proportionate mitigation measures. The two primary objectives for Martyn’s Law will be to i) clarify who is responsible for security activity at locations in scope, thereby increasing accountability; and ii) improve outcomes UK-wide so that security activity is delivered to a consistent level. An inspection and enforcement regime will seek to educate, advise, and ensure compliance with Martyn’s Law.

Proportionate requirements

In developing Martyn’s Law policy, I have been clear that proportionality and clarity are fundamental to successful delivery. Legislation will therefore establish a tiered model, introducing a requirements framework that is linked to the type of activity that takes place at eligible locations and the number of people (occupancy) that the location can safety accommodate at any time. Wherever possible and appropriate the policy has been aligned to wider regimes designed to keep the public safe (e.g., Health and Safety and Fire Safety) to increase ease of understanding. The distinct requirements for each tier are:

Standard- will drive good preparedness outcomes. Locations with a maximum occupancy of greater than 100 people at any time will be required to undertake low-cost, simple yet effective activities to improve protective security and preparedness. This will be achieved by accessing free awareness raising materials and development of a basic preparedness plan considering how best a location can respond to a terrorist event in their locale.

Enhanced- focussed on high-capacity locations in recognition of the potential consequences of a successful attack. Locations with an occupancy of 800+ at any time will additionally be required to take forward a risk assessment and subsequently develop and implement a security plan. Enhanced Duty holders will be required to meet a reasonably practicable test.

Locations with a maximum occupancy at any time of less than 100 will fall out of scope, however, they will be encouraged to adopt good security practices on a voluntary basis. This will be supported by free guidance and training materials. To ensure that Martyn’s Law is agile and responsive, Government will have the ability to adjust capacity thresholds in response to changes in the nature of the terrorist threat.

Definitions

Premises will fall within scope of Martyn’s Law where “qualifying activities” take place. This will include activities such as entertainment and leisure, retail, food and drink, museums and galleries, sports grounds, public areas of local and central Government buildings (e.g., town halls), visitor attractions, temporary events, Places of Worship, health, and education. It is proposed that Martyn’s Law will apply to eligible locations which are either: a building (including collections of buildings used for the same purposes, e.g., a campus); or location/event (including a temporary event) that has a defined boundary, allowing capacity to be known. Eligible locations whose maximum occupancy meets the above specified thresholds will be then drawn into the relevant tier. This would include, for example, music festivals, where there are known and controlled boundaries in place.

Responsible Parties

To deliver clarity of responsibility and accountability, Martyn’s Law will define parties obliged to meet its requirements. This will be a simple formulation to establish persons in control of a premise. Where there are multiple parties at a location, Martyn’s Law will primarily place obligations on a lead party whilst placing requirements on others to co-operate with that party, such as in the development of risk assessments and security plans. Martyn’s Law Guidance will detail how and where it would be envisaged that parties will need to co-ordinate on assessments and plans and provide examples of good practice.

Exemptions

I intend that there will be some limited exclusions and exemptions from the Duty. This includes locations where transport security regulations already apply; and those that are vacant over a reasonable period or are permanently closed. Those with a large floor space and low occupancy in practice (e.g., warehouses and storage facilities) as well as offices and private residential locations, will not be in scope.

As a unique cohort, Places of Worship (PoW) will receive bespoke treatment under Martyn’s Law. All PoW will be placed into the standard tier, with a small cohort of locations that charge for entry placed into the enhanced tier. Similarly, given the existing safety and safeguarding policies in place at under 18 educational settings, such sites will be placed into the standard tier regardless of their occupancy. However, due to the accessible nature of higher educational settings I consider there is no case for any special treatment. I also consider that given their iconic status, with many locations operating as high-footfall visitor attractions, there is no case to provide any exemption for publicly accessible Defence, Royal and Crown Estate sites.

Regulation

To limit burdens on the Criminal Justice System (CJS), avoiding unnecessary criminalisation of individuals, enforcement will predominantly be delivered via a civil sanctions regime (to a civil standard). In all but the most serious cases a civil monetary penalty is likely to be issued to provide a backstop to the civil sanctions. However, in the case of the most egregious breaches a limited number of criminal offences will be available. It is not my intention for a failure to comply with standard Martyn’s Law requirements to result in criminal prosecution. In line with recent, comparable regimes, to disincentivise financial benefit from non-compliance, variable monetary penalties will be available. A maximum penalty of up to £18m or 5% of worldwide turnover will be available for Enhanced sites. Standard locations will be subject to a maximum £10,000 penalty. Civil liability for failure to comply with the requirements will be precluded by way of express provision for all duty holders.

Sensitive Information in Licensing Applications (SILA)

I intend to introduce the Sensitive Information in Licensing Applications (SILA) protocol (by way of an amendment to the Licensing Act 2003 (LA2003)) to align to the similar system already in place within planning legislation (Sensitive Information in Planning Applications (SIPA)), to reduce the risk of misuse of sensitive information in the public domain.

Bill preparation and Government support

I am pleased to have set out the above elements of Martyn’s Law, on the basis of which Government will introduce measures to the House as soon as parliamentary time allows. Statutory guidance to support duty holders in fulfilling Martyn’s Law requirements will also be developed. This will encourage a culture of continuous improvement. In addition, a range of initiatives are already in train to support understanding of Martyn’s Law and its requirements. ProtectUK will be a key tool for the effective delivery of support to all owners and operators of PALs, providing guidance and advice, training options and, engagement opportunities through webinars and forums.

An impact assessment has been developed to robustly assess the expected impact on organisations in scope.

Original parliamentary record

Publication of Volume 2 of the Manchester Arena Inquiry Report

Written Ministerial Statement House of Lords
Lord Sharpe of Epsom · Conservative Answering body: Home Office
Parliamentary excerpt

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:Today the Manchester Arena Inquiry has published Volume 2 of its report, which has been laid before the House. The report can be found at www.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk and on GOV.UK. The third and final volume of the Inquiry’s report will be published at a later date. This report relates to the emergency response into the Manchester Arena attack. I ...

Recorded statement

Answering body: Home Office

My rt hon Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Suella Braverman) has today made the following Written Ministerial Statement:

Today the Manchester Arena Inquiry has published Volume 2 of its report, which has been laid before the House. The report can be found at www.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk and on GOV.UK. The third and final volume of the Inquiry’s report will be published at a later date.

This report relates to the emergency response into the Manchester Arena attack. I am grateful for the strength and courage of the victims’ families and the survivors, and the engagement of all those who have shared their experiences to ensure the Inquiry can deliver its vital work. I am grateful too for the bravery of the emergency services who responded to the attack.

Steps have already been taken to implement learning from the attack to improve joint working between the emergency services when responding to terrorist attacks. The Government will review this report and consider where further improvements can be made and will respond to its content in due course.

I would also like to thank Sir John Saunders for his continued and considerable efforts in ensuring that the Inquiry is a success and that lessons are learned for the future from this tragic attack.

Original parliamentary record