First Report - Russia and Ukraine border tensions

The UK, working with NATO allies and the Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE), should encourage Ukraine, Russia and the separatists in the Donbas region to enforce the ceasefire and additional measures agreed in July 2020 by the Minsk Trilateral Contact Group.

The UK, working with NATO allies and other UN Member states, should insist Russia lifts restrictions on the movement of foreign vessels in the Black Sea, particularly in the Kerch Strait, which is in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and Russia’s agreement with Ukraine on maritime cooperation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. If Russia does not comply with UNCLOS rules, the UK should support Ukraine’s efforts to seek resolution through the dispute mechanism under Part XV of the UNCLOS, either through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or to the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal.

The 1 May deadline, by when Russia said it would pull back additional troops exercising on the border with Ukraine, has passed; the UK, working with NATO allies and other OSCE Member states, should insist Russia withdraws all its additional troops and equipment from the border with Ukraine and from the Crimea. There are legitimate concerns about the underlying nature of Russia’s actions. (Paragraph 16) Russia’s motivation

The large scale of the Russian military build-up is unusual for a normal exercise, but our evidence suggests that based on where troops are positioned in Crimea, it is unlikely to be a preparation for a full-scale Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine.

Russia has a right to deploy troops on its own territory but also has a duty to regional security and stability to be transparent about military exercises and military activity close to her borders, as set out in Section 1 of the OSCE’s Helsinki Final Act on exchange of military information on exercises.

Russia prefers to keep the West in the dark about its military activities and the strategic goals, which underpin them. However, it is unlikely that Russia would want to provoke further Western economic sanctions or military assistance to Ukraine.

Russia has several probable motives for escalating tensions on the border with Ukraine, driven by regional insecurities and President Putin’s willingness to engage in power politics. Russia is using its military for coercive diplomacy, to pressure the Ukrainian Government to make concessions in the political settlements for the Donbas and to test Western allies’ resolve to come to Ukraine’s aid. (Paragraph 48) 26 Russia and Ukraine border tensions The international response

Russia must honour its commitments under the Vienna Document as an OSCE participating State and fully co-operate in OSCE meetings to support confidence and security-building measures and de-escalate conflict. The UK should, with its Allies, use the OSCE mechanisms in the Helsinki Final Act to hold Russia to account, and if necessary, bring the dispute before the OSCE’s Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

The UK, with the US, should insist Russia stand by the international agreements it has signed up to and its commitment, made in 1994, to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In contrast to Georgia’s response in 2008 to send in troops to counter Russian aggression, Ukraine has demonstrated restraint and sought to resolve the escalating situation through political and diplomatic channels.

The UK’s presidency of the G7 is an opportunity for the UK to demonstrate global leadership in security, diplomacy and conflict resolution, consistent with its expressed strategic intentions set out in the Integrated Review.

UK Ministers should continue to support and encourage Ukraine to seek peaceful resolution to the conflict with Russia, through political settlement and implementation of the Minsk agreements.

The UK Government should continue to work closely with Ukraine, NATO and other allies to monitor the situation on the ground, share intelligence and plan a co-ordinated approach for joint action to promote collective security in the region.

The UK and NATO must push back on Russia’s narrative, that Ukrainian membership of NATO, and NATO enlargement in general, would present a threat to Russia’s security, pointing out, for example, that Russia, not Ukraine or NATO, has taken or supported activities that destabilise the region. (Paragraph 71) UK Military Support to Ukraine

We welcome the new Memorandum of Intention for naval projects with Ukraine and endorse the UK Government putting in place a much longer-term package of support, beyond the conclusion of Operation Orbital in 2023, to assist Ukraine in building up the capability and resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces, particularly the navy. We would like to receive annual updates on the progress of the naval capabilities enhancement programme.

The UK and NATO should continue to maximise efforts to help Ukraine reform to meet NATO standards and to become more interoperable with NATO and its equipment, for example through regular joint training exercises.

We believe the UK Government’s response to the Ukraine crisis, demonstrates a commitment to the overarching themes for Global Britain set out above in the Integrated Review and the Defence Command paper. This can be evidenced in Russia and Ukraine border tensions 27 UK military aid, intelligence sharing, vocal political and diplomatic support for Ukraine, and the carrier strike deployment, as part of a co-ordinated approach alongside NATO allies.

However, Britain’s global ambitions now include a tilt to the Indo-Pacific, with the Government promising to deepen engagement by our armed forces and establish a greater and more persistent presence there as well.

The Integrated Review identifies Russia as “the most acute direct threat to the UK”. The UK Government should clarify how its global ambitions, in particular its proposed tilt to the Indo-Pacific, will be balanced with deterring the threat from Russia to UK security in the Euro-Atlantic region. (Paragraph 97) Lessons learnt

We commend the UK Government for their role in intelligence sharing and monitoring the situation in the Donbas and Crimea.

The International community has reacted quickly and united behind a clear message to Russia that the world is watching and there will be consequences for illegal military action. Lessons have been learnt from the Georgia crisis in 2008 and the Ukraine crisis in 2014, primarily that the international response must be decisive and unanimous in the face of Russian aggression.

The UK and NATO must decide what their red lines are and the appropriate action which could be taken, if Russia crosses a red line. (Paragraph 112) 28 Russia and Ukraine border tensions