Eleventh Report - UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific

The Chinese Government’s wider goal to achieve regional and global dominance— and the increasingly aggressive means by which it is pursuing this—highlight the long-term and strategic threat that China poses to the rules-based international order. It appears that China intends to confront Taiwan, whether by direct military action or ‘grey zone’ attacks, in the coming years. Any conflict in Taiwan will have formidable consequences across the globe and risks the international rules-based order. The Government and the UK Armed Forces must ensure that they have plans for the UK’s response—co-ordinated with allies and partners—to a range of actions by China against Taiwan. The Government should set out these plans to the Committee in a classified private briefing.

The Committee supports the Government’s assessment that China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is “an epoch-defining and systemic challenge”. China seeks to erode the current rules-based international order by exploiting weaknesses in the system. Rather than looking to act as the world’s policeman in a mutually beneficial system, China’s interest is in establishing dominance over its wider region to purely Chinese advantage. In military terms, China’s publicly stated ambition to “fight and win” global wars by 2049 illustrates the threat it poses to international security. An important waypoint is China’s goal of establishing a fully modernised military—and a peer adversary of the United States—by 2027. The Government should carry out an assessment of China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to consider whether it should be labelled as a threat to national and international security.

The UK’s regional military presence in the Indo-Pacific remains limited and the strategy to which it contributes is unclear. This contrasts to both the US—a global and Pacific power—and to France–a more comparable actor to the UK in terms of geography, scale, and military capability. Without a larger permanent presence it is unlikely that the UK would be able to make a substantial contribution to allied efforts in the event of conflict in the region. In order to deliver this, the Government must make a choice as to whether it will increase resources in the region, or rebalance current resources towards the Indo-Pacific. The Ministry of Defence should pursue closer cooperation with the United States and France and continue to pursue basing with other regional allies. All of these efforts should be consolidated into a single, cross-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific which states how the UK’s military instruments should be utilised in both peacetime and during conflict. (Paragraph 44) UK Defence Relationships in the Indo-Pacific

We welcome the announcement of the SSN-AUKUS class submarine, including the increased port visits and the Rotational Force, in maintaining a coherent regional presence. The UK must, however, be realistic and cognisant of the significant hurdles for all AUKUS partners in constructing nuclear-powered submarines. A fundamental challenge is the continuing lack of clarity about how many submarines 40 UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific will ultimately be built, the cost, and the availability of a skilled workforce. We call on the Government to set out in its response to this Report the anticipated timescale for producing a detailed plan on: how much it expects SSN-AUKUS to cost, how it will address the skills shortage, and how many SSN-AUKUS class it will produce. It should also set out any existing plans so far as they exist.

AUKUS offers a tangible opportunity to respond to growing tensions in the Indo- Pacific. Through Pillar 1 AUKUS, the UK can tackle shared challenges together with our allies, with the goal of upholding the rules-based order. Moreover, Pillar 2 offers an immediate avenue for developing the UK’s defence capabilities, and to access and share critical intelligence and technology. In the short term, Pillar 2 should be expanded to secure and diversify supply chains for munitions and critical minerals. In the medium term, the Government should consider opportunities to involve other likeminded nations and allies in activities related to the advanced capabilities involved in Pillar Two, but only if this can be achieved without compromising the strong relationships developed between the three AUKUS partners.

We welcome the Government’s practical efforts in strengthening ties with Japan. Japan is an invaluable ally in the region given its geo-strategic location. As Japan enhances its own defence posture, the UK should build on these valuable commitments to continue strengthening UK–Japan defence cooperation and remain steadfast allies in the pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The UK should plan a programme of joint exercises with the Japanese armed forces, and continue collaboration on science and technology programmes as part of the Hiroshima Accord.

We recommend that the Government focus on achieving a higher level of military benefit for both the Indian and UK armed forces from combined training carried out when the Royal Navy’s carrier strike group returns to the Indian Ocean as CSG25 in two years’ time.

We welcome the recent actions taken to enhance UK–India defence cooperation through the 2030 UK-India Roadmap. This relationship is critical not only because of the breadth and depth of our existing and potential cooperation, but also due to India’s unique position as a peer to China (in economic terms), whilst also bordering China, and its non-aligned status. The UK must be a reliable partner to India and continue co-operation on defence initiatives and capability building. The Government should work to establish the UK as a top tier defence partner to India through greater government-to-government coordination, and by creating strategic industrial partnerships to provide greater opportunities for the UK defence industry. This should include supporting efforts by India to reduce its dependency on Russian military equipment. (Paragraph 74) Regional Cooperation

The UK must rekindle its statecraft skills and reaffirm its commitment as a reliable partner to countries in South-East Asia and the Pacific, in order to uphold the international rules-based order, given its proximity to China and the political diversity of the region. The Committee welcomes the 2022 UK-ASEAN Action Plan as an opportunity for the UK to institutionalise its regional engagement. Although not primarily a defence cooperation mechanism, the UK should further its UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific 41 engagement with ASEAN on maritime security, building resilience in member states, and seek to deepen its bilateral relationships with these countries through capacity- building exercises. In parallel with this, the UK should continue to strengthen and build productive relationships with South-East Asian states and the Pacific Islands.

It is imperative that the UK strengthens its partnerships with regional allies to maintain and deliver a shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. AUKUS, ASEAN and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) serve different, but valuable, purposes in achieving regional security and stability, in line with the UK’s vision for the region. The UK should not consider seeking membership of the Quad in the short term. The UK should approach its relationship with the Quad incrementally whilst monitoring how the forum and its priorities develop in the coming years. The UK should seek to strengthen its relationship with the Quad through functional engagement in specific working groups and by participating in the more formal Quad- plus engagement groups.

Long-standing membership of the Five Power Defence Arrangements offers opportunities for the UK to lead the defence conversation, alongside Australia, in engaging with smaller non-aligned nations in the Indo-Pacific, whilst noting the strategic sensitivities for some of those nations. (Paragraph 91) What next for the Tilt?

Defence was only a small element of the so-called Indo-Pacific ‘Tilt’ outlined in the 2021 Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper. The result has been a modest increase in UK military presence in the region. This has manifested primarily through increased presence in the region of naval capabilities, and an increase in defence diplomacy and work on enhancing relationships with allies. The Government states that the tilt is now complete, and it will be made a permanent pillar of the UK’s foreign policy. We reject the notion that the ‘tilt’ has been “achieved” from a Defence perspective. With only a modest presence compared to allies, little to no fighting force in the region, and little by way of regular activity, Defence’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific is far from being achieved. Fundamentally UK Defence is already under-resourced for its role within NATO in the Euro-Atlantic, which is the core current and medium-term security challenge for the UK and Europe. If we aspire to play any significant role in the Indo-Pacific this would need a major commitment of cash, equipment and personnel. Without this, the UK may need to curb its ambitions in the region.

The UK Government’s future strategy for the Indo-Pacific is still unclear. The Government should create a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy, which sets out how military instruments can be used in support of the UK’s wider pursuit of its goals and interests in the region in peacetime and during conflict. Within this strategy, the Ministry of Defence should include a comprehensive defence and diplomatic response to the growing threat posed by China under the CCP. This strategy should also identify the specific aims of the Tilt and make clear how the Government intends to achieve these, whilst being realistic about what is achievable. (Paragraph 97) 42 UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific