Select committee: Defence Committee

5th Report - Defence in the Grey Zone

HC 405 Published 9 July 2025

Defence Committee Defence in the Grey Zone Report on parliament.uk ↗

At a glance6 recommendations and 8 conclusions · Government response published 24 October 2025

The government's response

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The Government agrees with, or partially agrees with, most of the Committee's recommendations on grey zone threats, but says it "cannot commit to specific capabilities at this stage" and does not accept the case for a dedicated Homeland Security Minister.

On expanding capabilities against grey zone threats and seabed operations, it "agree[s]", pointing to the Strategic Defence Review's 'Atlantic Bastion' concept and a possible Defence Readiness Bill, which could include "possibly including a new Reserve Force".
On the Joint Expeditionary Force, it "partially agrees" and says there are "no plans to increase the JEF membership beyond ten". It "accept[s] this recommendation with caveats" on deployable capability in the High North.
On forward basing in the Baltic, it "note[s] and partially agree[s]", saying it "must balance this against the need to sustain credible deterrence effects across all domains and regions".
It commits to review and report to the Committee within a year on protecting the networks it relies on. On a dedicated Homeland Security Minister, it says the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister and Security Minister "remain suitable leads".

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

What the committee recommended 14

See all 14 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

5th Report - Defence in the Grey Zone ↗The committee's report, HC 405, parliament.uk
5th Special Report - Defence in the Grey Zone: Government Response ↗The government's response, 24 October 2025, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 14

1
Defence capabilities against increasingly severe grey zone threats remain significantly limited. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
Defence has a significant role in deterring and defending against grey zone threats, especially those of a more severe nature, including attacks on critical national infrastructure such as undersea data cables and energy pipelines. Despite an increase in the frequency and severity of these attacks, the armed forces have limited existing capabilities focused on combatting grey zone threats but can enhance them, including through better coordination between different groups involved in information operations to increase their overall effectiveness. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32)
2
Expand current Defence capabilities to deter and effectively defend against grey zone threats. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Ministry of Defence should consider how current capabilities can be further expanded to deter and defend against grey zone threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)
3
Increase effectiveness and number of Royal Navy vessels for seabed operations against grey zone threats. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Ministry of Defence should consider the specific benefits of both expanding the number, and increasing the effectiveness of, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Royal Navy vessels able to undertake seabed operations to better counter grey zone threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34) Extending defence against grey zone threats
4
Joint Expeditionary Force requires credible deployable capabilities for effective grey zone threat combat. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Joint Expeditionary Force’s freedom to operate independently should allow it to be more responsive and agile in combatting grey zone threats. But it can only do this if it possesses credible, deployable capabilities. Expanding membership of the JEF might also bring benefits. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)
5
Enhance JEF’s deployable capability, including Royal Navy ships, to combat grey zone threats in the Arctic. Recommendation · addressed to Ministry of Defence Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Government should consider enhancing the JEF’s deployable capability to combat grey zone threats, such as protecting seabed infrastructure and permitting extended military operations in the High North/Arctic, for example by reinforcing the bows of Royal Navy ships, including the future Type 83 Destroyers. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45) 27
6
Forward base additional military capabilities in the Baltic to deter grey zone threats and reassure allies. Recommendation · addressed to Ministry of Defence Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Government should consider the benefits of forward basing additional military capabilities for extended periods in the Baltic to enhance their deterrent value against adversaries, increase their responsiveness to grey zone threats, reassure allies, and protect the critical shipping lanes used to reinforce UK forces in Estonia. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)
7
Defence must enhance protection of reliant digital networks and secure sufficient cybersecurity skills. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
Digital networks are only as strong and resilient to cyberattack as their weakest links, and recent attacks indicate that the Ministry of Defence must do more to help protect all those networks it relies on to fulfil its mission— not just those which it directly controls. Defence also needs the right skills, in sufficient numbers, if it is to continue building its own systems’ resilience to cyberattacks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)
8
Review and report on Ministry of Defence plans to protect digital networks from cyberattack. Recommendation · addressed to Ministry of Defence Recommendation (the committee's words)
Within a year the Ministry of Defence should review and report back to us on its plans to better protect all the digital networks it relies on, allowing it to enhance the overall resilience of these networks to cyberattack. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)
9
Set out a clear plan for recruiting and retaining Ministry of Defence cyber and digital skills. Recommendation · addressed to Ministry of Defence Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Ministry of Defence should set out a clear plan and timetable for recruiting and retaining additional cyber and digital skills, such as adopting ideas from the Haythornthwaite Review and through direct partnerships with private IT companies or targeting suitably skilled individuals on a part or full-time basis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62) Building homeland resilience
10
Homeland resilience will require more cross-Government planning and a dedicated Security Minister. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
As the recent SDR sets out, homeland resilience will become a significant activity for the MOD in the coming years and will require more cross- Government planning and coordination. The MOD is unlikely to lead many of these work streams. However, even with limited resources, it can proactively make an immediate impact by engaging with wider Government, society and industry; by sharing its expertise on grey zone threats; and by applying its planning and leadership skills to help build greater consensus on the challenges and enhance long-term resilience. Further, a dedicated Homeland Security Minister would be more likely to drive through the urgent changes required to improve the UK’s current levels of preparedness and resilience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)
11
Increased armed forces visibility and engagement positively impacts military recruitment and preparedness. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
This should also allow other departments, society and industry to be more aware of, and therefore more prepared for, the potential challenges ahead—relieving pressure on Defence to focus on its principal tasks during a national emergency or conflict. Greater visibility and engagement of the armed forces with society should also have a positive impact on military recruitment. (Recommendation, Paragraph 79) 28
12
Ensure a dedicated Homeland Security Minister coordinates national preparedness and resilience efforts. Recommendation · addressed to Ministry of Defence Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Government should ensure there is a dedicated Homeland Security Minister to coordinate across central, regional and local Government, industry and wider society to rapidly enhance the UK’s national preparedness and resilience. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)
13
Adopt a 'leading from behind' approach to share MOD expertise with other departments. Recommendation · addressed to Ministry of Defence Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Ministry of Defence should proactively adopt a greater ‘leading from behind’ approach to sharing its leadership, organisational and wider expertise with other departments to bolster their intrinsic long-term resilience planning and preparedness. This should reduce their demands on the Ministry of Defence during any critical grey zone or conventional military crisis, thus allowing Defence to focus on its primary role during a crisis of preparing for, and potentially undertaking, warfighting. (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)
14
Proactively engage with wider society to build consensus on threats to the UK. Conclusion · addressed to Ministry of Defence Conclusion (the committee's words)
At societal level, the Ministry of Defence should draw on its understanding of the threats faced to make a greater impact by proactively engaging far more with wider society, both public and private—for example, critical national industries, schools and communities—to help generate a dialogue around those threats to the UK and build consensus around a common response. (Recommendation, Paragraph 82) 29