5th Report - Defence in the Grey Zone

Defence has a significant role in deterring and defending against grey zone threats, especially those of a more severe nature, including attacks on critical national infrastructure such as undersea data cables and energy pipelines. Despite an increase in the frequency and severity of these attacks, the armed forces have limited existing capabilities focused on combatting grey zone threats but can enhance them, including through better coordination between different groups involved in information operations to increase their overall effectiveness. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32)

The Ministry of Defence should consider how current capabilities can be further expanded to deter and defend against grey zone threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)

The Ministry of Defence should consider the specific benefits of both expanding the number, and increasing the effectiveness of, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Royal Navy vessels able to undertake seabed operations to better counter grey zone threats. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34) Extending defence against grey zone threats

The Joint Expeditionary Force’s freedom to operate independently should allow it to be more responsive and agile in combatting grey zone threats. But it can only do this if it possesses credible, deployable capabilities. Expanding membership of the JEF might also bring benefits. (Conclusion, Paragraph 44)

The Government should consider enhancing the JEF’s deployable capability to combat grey zone threats, such as protecting seabed infrastructure and permitting extended military operations in the High North/Arctic, for example by reinforcing the bows of Royal Navy ships, including the future Type 83 Destroyers. (Recommendation, Paragraph 45) 27

The Government should consider the benefits of forward basing additional military capabilities for extended periods in the Baltic to enhance their deterrent value against adversaries, increase their responsiveness to grey zone threats, reassure allies, and protect the critical shipping lanes used to reinforce UK forces in Estonia. (Recommendation, Paragraph 46)

Digital networks are only as strong and resilient to cyberattack as their weakest links, and recent attacks indicate that the Ministry of Defence must do more to help protect all those networks it relies on to fulfil its mission— not just those which it directly controls. Defence also needs the right skills, in sufficient numbers, if it is to continue building its own systems’ resilience to cyberattacks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)

Within a year the Ministry of Defence should review and report back to us on its plans to better protect all the digital networks it relies on, allowing it to enhance the overall resilience of these networks to cyberattack. (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

The Ministry of Defence should set out a clear plan and timetable for recruiting and retaining additional cyber and digital skills, such as adopting ideas from the Haythornthwaite Review and through direct partnerships with private IT companies or targeting suitably skilled individuals on a part or full-time basis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62) Building homeland resilience

As the recent SDR sets out, homeland resilience will become a significant activity for the MOD in the coming years and will require more cross- Government planning and coordination. The MOD is unlikely to lead many of these work streams. However, even with limited resources, it can proactively make an immediate impact by engaging with wider Government, society and industry; by sharing its expertise on grey zone threats; and by applying its planning and leadership skills to help build greater consensus on the challenges and enhance long-term resilience. Further, a dedicated Homeland Security Minister would be more likely to drive through the urgent changes required to improve the UK’s current levels of preparedness and resilience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 78)

This should also allow other departments, society and industry to be more aware of, and therefore more prepared for, the potential challenges ahead—relieving pressure on Defence to focus on its principal tasks during a national emergency or conflict. Greater visibility and engagement of the armed forces with society should also have a positive impact on military recruitment. (Recommendation, Paragraph 79) 28

The Government should ensure there is a dedicated Homeland Security Minister to coordinate across central, regional and local Government, industry and wider society to rapidly enhance the UK’s national preparedness and resilience. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)

The Ministry of Defence should proactively adopt a greater ‘leading from behind’ approach to sharing its leadership, organisational and wider expertise with other departments to bolster their intrinsic long-term resilience planning and preparedness. This should reduce their demands on the Ministry of Defence during any critical grey zone or conventional military crisis, thus allowing Defence to focus on its primary role during a crisis of preparing for, and potentially undertaking, warfighting. (Recommendation, Paragraph 81)

At societal level, the Ministry of Defence should draw on its understanding of the threats faced to make a greater impact by proactively engaging far more with wider society, both public and private—for example, critical national industries, schools and communities—to help generate a dialogue around those threats to the UK and build consensus around a common response. (Recommendation, Paragraph 82) 29