Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Recommendation 9
9
Deferred
Paragraph: 109
Produce and share implementation timetable with measurable deliverables for recruitment and retention
Conclusion
Efforts to improve the recruitment and retention of both Regulars and Reserves are currently being considered by the MOD. We therefore recommend that once decisions have been made to adopt these recommendations, an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables is produced and shared with us so that we can scrutinise the progress made by the Department.
Government Response Summary
The government's response outlined the new purpose of Defence and broad strategic investments and capabilities from the Defence Command Paper 2023, but did not commit to providing an implementation timetable with measurable deliverables for recruitment and retention initiatives.
Paragraph Reference:
109
Government Response
Deferred
HM Government
Deferred
. On 18th July the Government published the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23). The Defence Command Paper (DCP) built upon the DCP of March 2021. This mid-cycle refresh was needed given three changes in circumstance: i) the evolving threat picture–not least Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s growing assertiveness–and the technological advances since 2021; ii) the increase in the MOD’s budget, now over £50 billion a year for the first time and next year we expect it to rise to around £55.6bn; iii) the publication in March 2023 of a refreshed Integrated Review that set out the Government’s new grand strategic aims and approach. DCP23 articulates a new, clear purpose for Defence: to protect the nation, and to help it prosper. It sets out how we will double-down in certain areas, such as the centrality of NATO, the importance of nuclear and the strength of our alliances and partnerships. As a leading member of NATO–the most successful military alliance in history–the UK and our Allies have a competitive advantage over our adversaries through the solidarity of 32 nations and the multiplying effect of interoperable forces. In NATO, Allies do not fight alone. It is through NATO and the UK’s wider Alliances and partnerships that the UK provides a credible defence from and deterrence to the threats the country faces. The UK can draw on the capabilities of the 32 NATO Allies and not only from our own armed forces. Through our offer to NATO, we offer the Alliance the full spectrum of defence capabilities, including by declaring our Continuous at Sea Nuclear Deterrent to the Alliance as well as our offensive cyber capabilities through the National Cyber Force. NATO has four times as many ships and three times as many submarines as Russia. The UK is the only nuclear power dedicated to supporting NATO and is key to protecting NATO’s vital Atlantic supply lines; this is a uniquely and vitally important role in the Alliance. Re-investment in our warfighting force through the lens of its contribution principally to NATO, that force still underpins our hard-power projection in the world beyond as well. Our aircraft carriers, for example, have been both committed to NATO in the last twenty- four months as well as deployed into the Indo-Pacific to contribute to other UK foreign policy aims in that region. The UK already has a significant recapitalisation programme underway across all domains. Defence has new platforms that are in service, or are coming into service, which will completely transform the Armed Forces’ capability. Through commitments made in DCP23, Defence is prioritising the things that will make those capabilities more lethal and ready, such as stockpiles, munitions, and enablers including storage facilities and our transformed partnership with industry, where we will engage much earlier in strategic conversations to create a more resilient, reliable, and adaptable industrial base. This will not only bolster UK industry and diplomatic influence, but also helps sustain Ukraine in the fight in 2024 and develops its economy beyond. This is highlighted in the new Integrated Procurement Model–a system that will see earlier expert assurance of future military programmes to ensure they will deliver for UK forces on the frontline. The reforms will look to avoid previous challenges where programmes have been over-complex, over-budget, and over time. The reforms will see greater empowerment of subject matter experts across the defence enterprise including Dstl scientists, government export leads, finance experts and industry partners to challenge and shape proposals before they receive the go-ahead. Driving pace is key to the overall reforms and the concept of ‘spiral’ development will be at the forefront as new programmes are initiated, avoiding capabilities that are not adaptable to the changing environment or are overly complex and too bespoke to export. shortfalls in capabilities where we cannot continue to maintain risk. Beyond the significant upgrading of our Nuclear Systems, with Dreadnought on track to deliver in the 2030s, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities, as well as Electronic Warfare capabilities, signals intelligence and cyber, will grow in importance. The lethality of our Forces will be enhanced; The Royal Navy continues to develop lethality to complement its carrier and amphibious strike capabilities. It has bought the Naval Strike Missile capability at pace allowing precision strike on land and at sea. The Army is enhancing its deep fire capabilities, to counter and hit precise deeper targets. The RAF is continuing to evolve and innovate, including counter-UAS technology and initial Swarming Drones capabilities. We have published our drone strategy. And MOD is doing more to increase operational productivity by rebalancing investment in capabilities’ availability and sustainment. But Defence must continue to do more. We are prioritising transforming