Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Recommendation 79
79
Deferred
UK Armed Forces fail to sustainably utilise reserve forces, hindering capability and deployment
Conclusion
A number of our witnesses were concerned with how the UK Armed Forces utilised their reserve forces. Professor Justin Bronk suggested that neither the Army nor the Air Force had “really figured out how to use the reserves sustainably” and Lord Houghton told us that that the UK did “not have a properly functioning Reserve” which he described as a “national embarrassment”.165 Professor Vince Connolly told us that part of the issue for the Army Reserve was that it was expected to provide both “individual backfill and some measure of collective capability” but that its size and its training (focused on “a wide set of missions and tasks”) hindered its ability to provide sustainability in an enduring high intensity large scale conflict.166 Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman thought that the Reserve ought to become a “pretty high priority” and that work ought to be carried out by the Services on how best to use reservists as well as integrating the Reserve with the Regular Force. He suggested that “there is an awful lot you could do with the reserves at a time when you are finding it difficult to recruit the regulars. It is a cultural thing as much as anything else”.167 Box 2: The Reserve Forces The reserve forces are made up of the following components: • The volunteer reserve forces (also referred to as the Active Reserve) are the Army Reserve, the Maritime Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. These are volunteers who commit to train for a certain number of days each year. Both civilians and ex-regular service personnel can join. • The ex-regular reserve force (also referred to as the Strategic Reserve) are those personnel who have left the Armed Forces but are subject to call-out (able to be mobilised for the period specified in their original commitment to serve) or recall (able to be mobilised in a national emergency despite having completed their residual commitment). • The Sponsored Reserve are reservists who are employed during a third-party contract to fulfil a
Government Response Summary
The committee's response indicates that the government has acknowledged the issues with reserve forces and is deferring detailed action to be based on recommendations from the upcoming Reserve Forces 2030 Review and Haythornthwaite Review.
Government Response
Deferred
HM Government
Deferred
Whilst we welcome the Government’s recognition that these issues require fresh solutions and look forward to reviewing plans based on recommendations from the Reserve Forces 2030 Review and the Haythornthwaite Review to alleviate the crisis in the recruitment and retention of both Regulars and Reserves, we do not believe it is being carried out at the required pace. We heard no evidence that gives us confidence that the recruitment crisis will be resolved anytime soon. Our strategic resilience draws also from our ability to mobilise at scale our military resources in a time of crisis in response to threats to our homeland. Our Reserves, with specialist skills and unique connections, will be at the heart of this effort, forming the core of the second- and third echelon forces that will reinforce and sustain warfighting capabilities and protect the homeland. The Strategic Reserve–built around the ex-regular reserve forces–will add further depth of capability, able to generate previously unassigned surge capacity and wider access to expertise in time of crisis or national emergencies.