Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Recommendation 17
17
Accepted
Paragraph: 93
If Afghanistan was intended to be an example of effective policy integration in action then...
Conclusion
If Afghanistan was intended to be an example of effective policy integration in action then it leaves a lot to be desired. It is even more worrying given that the NSC apparently gave the political direction required to bring together a ‘whole- of-systems’ approach. If the NSC set the appropriate direction then it leads to two pertinent questions: why did implementation of the policy, agreed by Ministers, fail? And how can the Government ensure that integrated, cross-Government policy decisions—made by those Ministers who have been elected by the UK public and accountable to them and this Parliament—are fully implemented in future? The fact that these Departments are carrying out individual lessons learned exercises, rather than a single integrated exercise, is concerning. Furthermore, the Government has failed to take disciplinary action against any senior individual for any (of the many) mistakes made during the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Government Response Summary
The government states that UK policy on Afghanistan has been made across Government, co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, working to Cabinet Ministers in the relevant Cabinet Sub-Committee.
Paragraph Reference:
93
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government
Accepted
Throughout the two decades of our military engagement since 2001, UK policy on Afghanistan has been made across Government, co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, working to Cabinet Ministers in the relevant Cabinet Sub-Committee. The creation of the National Security Council and National Security Secretariat in 2010 were in part a response to the perceived need for strengthened central co-ordination of UK international engagements involving the interests of multiple Departments—particularly those, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, which included long-term UK military deployments. Since 2010, the National Security Council has been the principal Ministerial decision-making body on Afghanistan policy, supported by the National Security Secretariat, which has led policy co-ordination, and has overseen its implementation, at senior official level. These NSC meetings considered the prospects for the peace process envisaged under the Doha Agreement, and how the UK could help maximise the chances of its success, as that outcome was judged to be likely to best serve UK long-term interests. In parallel, they also set in motion contingency planning for a range of scenarios, reflecting the outcomes judged most likely by the JIC. Planning for a possible military withdrawal named “Operation CATTALO” started in March 2020, including provision for Embassy closure and withdrawal of people and equipment if required. Standing plans for a military-led 14 Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report civilian evacuation were reviewed and updated from Spring 2020, alongside planning for potential military withdrawal. This became known as Operation PITTING in January 2021, and this planning was further accelerated following the April 2021 decision to withdraw NATO troops. To support this work between January and October 2021, there were 11 NSCs or Ministerial COBRs on Afghanistan, usually chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by Cabinet Ministers from across Government. There were three NSC (Officials) meetings. There were 14 official-level COBRs chaired by the National Security Adviser and 28 chaired by the Deputy National Security Adviser.