Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Recommendation 2
2
Acknowledged
Paragraph: 21
In the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, the Government identified and understood the...
Conclusion
In the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, the Government identified and understood the implications of the range of complex and cascading threats faced by the UK. However, the impact of both the Afghan withdrawal and the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine are being seemingly dismissed as insignificant and there appears to be no intention to re-visit the conclusions of the documents. UK Defence thus appears as arrogant and unwilling to learn lessons. Events of the last year have demonstrated that the Government was unprepared for (and in the case of Afghanistan, failed to appropriately respond to) international crises. No strategy should be set in stone nor subject to constant revision. However, there is a need for Government to be able to respond to major events—which it was manifestly not prepared for—rather than downplaying the potential implications of such geopolitical shocks.
Government Response Summary
The government states that it supports the sentiment of the recommendations made in conclusions 2,3 and 4 and recognises that the context is shifting and Defence will have to adapt accordingly to deliver the IR’s vision. They also state they are supporting the update to the Integrated Review.
Paragraph Reference:
21
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
The Government published the IR and Defence Command Paper last year in March 2021. The IR set out a vision for the UK up to 2030: a stronger, more secure, prosperous and resilient Union, acting as a problem-solving and burden-sharing nation with a global perspective, and creating new foundations for prosperity. The IR said that 2021 would be a year of British leadership, setting the tone for the UK’s international engagement in the decade ahead. The Government succeeded in meeting this ambition - including through the UK’s G7 presidency, the Global Partnership for Education summit, the 26th UN Climate Change Conference, the Carrier Strike Group deployment, and much more - and the UK is seeing the benefits of the momentum generated as a result. But alongside these successes, we recognise that the first year of the IR also presented significant challenges to the UK’s objectives and interests. In most cases these were foreseen - and planned for - in the IR’s outlook on the national security and international environment to 2030. But some manifested more rapidly and acutely than predicted. Specifically in response to the recommendations in the Committee’s Report, Defence has been steadfast in our support to Ukraine, through lethal and non-lethal aid and training of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, while simultaneously boosting our NATO presence along the Eastern flanks. Having to date committed £1.3 billion of Treasury funding for military aid to Ukraine, the UK was the first European country to provide weapons to Ukraine and we have sent over 6,900 anti-tank missiles, 120 armoured vehicles, as well as multiple launch rocket systems and anti-air missile launchers. Over six months into the conflict, we continue to assess the threat posed by Russia, and beyond. Where appropriate we will adjust in response to Russia’s threat now, however in some cases, we should wait as the situation develops. Russia’s aggression has also reaffirmed that NATO remains the cornerstone of UK and Euro-Atlantic security. The conflict has reinvigorated NATO, helping the UK shape a new NATO Strategic Concept closely aligned to the IR’s vision. Formulating Defence’s contribution to this model will be our key force driver, while Defence will work across government towards a long-term sustainable strategy to support Ukraine and maintain our leadership role in NATO are immediate priorities. Defence has also played a significant role to support the Government’s Indo-Pacific tilt, including through committing to collaborate on industrial initiatives with key partners in the region. This includes the vital AUKUS Agreement with the US and Australia, as well as our partnership with Japan to develop FCAS. In 2021 the Carrier Strike Group completed its landmark deployment, and HMS Spey and HMS Tamar were deployed to the Western Pacific, marking the first Royal Navy permanent presence in the Indo-Pacific region for more than 25 years. Our commitment is a long-term one, underpinned by integrated engagement across Government to ensure we safeguard UK economic and security interests that open societies and values are protected. Central to this will be Defence’s ability to counter China’s competitive behaviour in the region. We agree that no strategy should be set in stone. Each day Defence is using lessons learned from ongoing conflicts and events over the last year to adapt its strategic thinking and adapt our approach. This ensures that Defence’s capabilities are optimised to respond to threats both today and in the future. Following the publication of the IR and the Command Paper, the Department has adopted an approach of having an adaptive strategy, underpinned by agile planning and delivery mechanisms developed following the IR. We note the Committee flags that the importance of tanks in conflicts has increased again. Whilst tanks and other Armoured Vehicles remain central to the Army’s warfighting capability. Ukraine shows us that combined arms operations are most successful when forces are appropriately trained and integrated. The conflict has also shown that the value of tanks is dependent on the enabling capabilities behind them to ensure delivery to the frontline. This underpins the importance of investing in multiple capabilities, and the update to the Integrated Review will not reverse the Department’s commitment to the modernisation of the Armed Forces or see a return to heavy armour. To that end we support the sentiment of the recommendations made in conclusions 2,3 and 4. We believe the IR and Defence Command Paper hold true, but we are not complacent and recognise that the context in which we are operating is shifting and Defence will have to adapt accordingly to deliver the IR’s vision. Indeed, since the IR was published, we have witnessed Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine create the greatest security challenge ever experienced by NATO. Defence is supporting the update to the IR. We welcome this opportunity to strengthen our capa