Defence and Climate Change

The increasing exploitation of the Arctic for international trade and exploration for critical minerals gives greater importance to the role of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) as a security alliance in the ‘High North’. The Ministry of Defence should assess how the JEF might need to be adapted in the face of climate-change induced developments in the Arctic and beyond.

Military equipment will need to be adapted to operate effectively under the more extreme temperature ranges that are predicted, as well to help reduce emissions, although this should be achieved without compromising military capability. This process cannot be delayed; more than a 1,000 new tanks and other armoured vehicles with conventional diesel engines will enter service in the next few years and will still be in service after the 2050 net zero target. Armed Forces training will also need to be adapted in the face of rising global temperatures, so military readiness to respond to crises is not eroded.

Defence should undertake research and assess best practice from academia, industry, allies and partners on operating in demanding environments and ensure all Defence Lines of Development are suitably adapted to continue to allow UK Armed Forces to operate effectively across more extreme climatic conditions over the coming decades. It should also push hard to reduce carbon emissions from its equipment, without eroding military capability.

The Ministry of Defence should set out the balance of investment opportunities around accelerating the fitting of low-carbon energy sources to the defence estate in the UK and abroad to achieve ‘estate net zero’ by 2030. Although this will require additional initial capital outlay, it should reduce whole-life costs and carbon emissions and increase Defence’s energy resilience and self-sufficiency.

This balance of investment analysis should also be applied to the housing stock as, in conjunction with wider upgrades, it could enhance the living conditions of Service personnel and their families, thereby improving retention.

The Ministry of Defence should assess whether continued reductions in the size of the Armed Forces will likely result in Defence accepting fewer MACA tasks requested by Government over the coming decades, and if so should ensure wider Government is fully aware of the implications of this, including the need for alternative non-regular- forces capacity. (Paragraph 48) Defence as a global leader for tackling climate change

Undertaking the role of global leader is not easy. Rear Admiral Paul Beattie, Director Naval Staff, Royal Navy, recently described the measures necessary for climate change adaption in the military as the “… biggest change programme in defence”. He noted that, unusually for technology, countries “can’t look to the US” for global leadership and that some were therefore looking to the UK. However, such a role 32 Defence and Climate Change requires considerable resources, and time, so was not a decision to be taken lightly. Influencing with UK partners through international organisations such as NATO and the UN could provide a helpful approach.

The Ministry of Defence should work with other UK government partners to encourage the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to update their reporting framework so emissions from military fuel use and other activities are set out in National Inventory Reports. The Ministry of Defence should also urge NATO to increase its transparency and publish its methodology for accounting for greenhouse gas emissions.

Measuring and reporting against the total defence carbon emission figure would support both the Government’s agenda of reducing emissions to net zero by 2050, but also provide a gold standard of military emissions reporting for other countries to emulate. Good practice would be to ensure these figures are independently verified.

The Ministry of Defence should return to publishing a more in-depth, stand-alone annual review of its climate and sustainability performance, with independent verification of emissions measuring and reporting. It should commission work to better understand total defence carbon emissions. It should also explain the apparent discrepancy in reporting overall emission figures in 2019–20 and again in 2020–21, and then reporting those same (now historic) figures again in the 2021–22 Annual Report but with values that have increased by over 40%. (Paragraph 67) Defence’s contribution to ‘net zero’

The Ministry of Defence is in line to achieve its Greening Government Commitments’ carbon reduction targets early, but these are insufficiently demanding. It appears that the Ministry can meet its targets entirely by taking advantage of the decarbonisation of the National Grid. Targets are hardly stretching if they can be met without any effort, especially for a department that produces half of all central government emissions. For the next round of Greening Government Commitments from 2025– 2030, Defence should ensure its targets are more demanding and accompanied by plans to achieve them.

We welcome the Ministry of Defence’s efforts to expand coverage of carbon emissions, but more needs to be achieved to ensure all Defence emissions are measured. Best commercial practice for promoting emissions reductions and net-zero targets are the Science Based Targets initiatives (SBTi), which can also apply to major suppliers along with carbon reduction plans. The Ministry of Defence, therefore, should look to adopt Science-Based Targets initiative-approved measures for Defence and major suppliers, and develop carbon reduction plans for major suppliers.

We note with interest the RAF setting itself a demanding target for reducing carbon emissions—a decade ahead of the Government’s 2050 goal—and look forward to examining the detailed plan for how it will be achieved. The RAF has also set out clear milestones towards achieving its 2040 ambition, aiming for a net zero airbase by 2025 and a net zero RAF estate by 2030, but milestones are not plans and Defence and Climate Change 33 programmes. We have not seen similar plans setting out milestones and targets for all other Top-Level Budget holders and enabling organisations to achieve net zero by 2050.

Nor do the various organisations within Defence separately report their emissions publicly, so gauging progress towards their targets is not yet possible. Top-Level Budget holders and other significant enabling organisations should report their emissions separately starting with the 2023–24 Annual Report & Accounts, with emission reduction targets ideally set over 5-year periods to match the GGC plan.

Given increasing scientific concerns around failing to hold to the 1.5° limit on warming and the need for Defence to transition from establishing a comprehensive baseline of carbon emissions in Epoch 1 to significantly reducing emissions in Epoch 2, having the climate change director also responsible for the Union and Levelling-Up in the Ministry of Defence may be too distracting for the important work that needs to be achieved at pace.

The Ministry of Defence should appoint a dedicated climate change director who would be able to fully focus on coordinating carbon reductions across the whole of Defence, including holding separate commands and organisations to account for progress in reducing emissions against their individual goals and measuring and reporting that progress in a timely manner. (Paragraph 94) 34 Defence and Climate Change