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Select committee inquiry

Flexible Response? An SDSR checklist of potential threats

Closed

Defence Committee · Opened 8 September 2015 · Closed 11 February 2016

14 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry looked at

“Government Response Flexible response: An SDSR checklist of potential threats and vulnerabilities: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2015–16 Flexible response: An SDSR checklist of potential threats and vulnerabilities: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2015–16 (PDF 122KB)”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What the government said

The government responded on 11 February 2016.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.

The Government notes the Committee's inquiry and states that the National Security Strategy and SDSR, published on 23 November, 'addressed the majority of the points raised by the Committee'.

  • On cyber, it agrees that potential cyber attacks pose a serious threat, and states that it "will invest £1.9 billion over the next five years" and develop a new National Cyber Centre.
  • On Russia and Article 5, it states "we remain committed to Article 5" and says it is working with NATO to improve and exercise political decision making.
  • On Whitehall expertise, it disagrees that expertise is lacking, saying it is "not fairly represented in the findings of this inquiry", while agreeing that flexibility is essential. It states it is "confident in the National Security Risk Assessment".
  • On recruitment and retention, it states that despite a challenging environment "the three Services are forecast to be in manning balance by 2020", with an upturn in recruitment and a reduction in outflow "key to achieving this".

Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error

How the inquiry ran

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 8 September 2015 to its close on 11 February 2016.

  1. Oral evidence 3 sessions
  2. Report 21 Nov 2015
  3. Government response 11 Feb 2016

What it recommended 0 recommendations · 14 conclusions

The committee's own words. Open an item to read it in full.

1It is clear that potential cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to UK security.
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is clear that potential cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to UK security. They could be mounted by a wide range of state and non-state actors. Therefore, we expect cyber resilience—alongside offensive and defensive capabilities—to be a key feature of the SDSR.
2The SDSR will have to address the threats arising from the growing instability in the...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The SDSR will have to address the threats arising from the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, it will need to demonstrate that the UK will have the capability to recognise both the existing and emerging threats from these areas, and the capacity to formulate a coherent strategy to counter them both at home and abroad.
3Increases in extremism and radicalisation are allowing terrorist groups to expand both their capabilities and...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Increases in extremism and radicalisation are allowing terrorist groups to expand both their capabilities and the geographical areas where they can operate. This clearly represents a major threat to the UK and its interests. The SDSR must determine how the UK is to respond, particularly in terms of countering any further evolution of the threat posed by international terrorism and its underlying doctrine. We expect clear roles to be assigned to the Armed Forces in response to this threat, and to see evidence of appropriate adaptation of their capabilities and organisation as distinct from those of the civilian police, anti-terrorist police and the security services.
4In the face of unorthodox and irregular forces operating deniably and in defiance of normal...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the face of unorthodox and irregular forces operating deniably and in defiance of normal international relations, the SDSR must signal an intention to develop doctrines for unconventional responses, including the use of counter-propaganda to expose the hidden links of covert aggression.
5We support the UK Government’s position that territorial disputes in the South and East China...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We support the UK Government’s position that territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas should be settled according to international rules. However, the UK may not be able to rely upon this in the future. We will therefore measure the provision of maritime capabilities in the SDSR against the potential to deploy to a number of areas, including the Pacific. (Paragraph 41) Flexible response? An SDSR checklist of potential threats and vulnerabilities 29 Potential for Russian agression in Europe and the High North and possible dilution of the commitment to Article 5
6The resurgence of an expansionist Russia represents a significant change in the threat picture since...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The resurgence of an expansionist Russia represents a significant change in the threat picture since 2010 and has implications not only for the UK but also for our allies as well. It is therefore essential that the SDSR sets out a policy to help counter this partial reversion to Cold War politics. In particular, NATO’s conventional deterrence of Russia must be credible. This is a vital obligation which we will keep under continual review.
7Whilst foreign investment in capital projects has a positive impact on the UK economy, such...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Whilst foreign investment in capital projects has a positive impact on the UK economy, such investments may open up vulnerabilities in our infrastructure. The resilience of our critical national infrastructure is vital for UK defence and security and we expect the SDSR robustly to address this potential danger.
8Adequate defence capabilities and Armed Forces are of little use without adequate decision-making and political...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Adequate defence capabilities and Armed Forces are of little use without adequate decision-making and political will. We therefore expect the SDSR to address both the UK Government’s and also NATO’s inability to react effectively to sub-conventional threats.
9Comprehensive training is vital to the provision of a military which can react to a...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Comprehensive training is vital to the provision of a military which can react to a wide range of threats. The SDSR should emphasise how training for the Armed Forces will be adapted, developed and sustained in the face of the much broader and unpredictable challenges which may confront us. Without an adequate range and quantity of single-service, joint and multinational training, UK Armed Forces may be vulnerable to a rapidly changing threat environment. The MoD will also have to set out its training programme for UK Forces’ participation in NATO’s Readiness Action Plan and High Readiness Response Force.
10Unforeseen crises and conflicts are likely to test the adaptability and capability of UK Armed...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Unforeseen crises and conflicts are likely to test the adaptability and capability of UK Armed Forces in the future, as in the past. We are particularly concerned that poor recruitment and retention of service personnel will prove an early and dangerous vulnerability to our defence and security, particularly in the context of a growing economy and public-sector pay restraint. We judge this as a high level priority to be addressed in the SDSR and expect to see a distinct plan for the successful provision and sustainment of suitable manpower.
11We are also concerned that certain critical capability gaps—military and political vulnerabilities—are addressed, amongst which...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are also concerned that certain critical capability gaps—military and political vulnerabilities—are addressed, amongst which the provision of maritime patrol and the ability to (re-)generate mass (including the necessary industrial capacity) for different strategic circumstances are paramount.
12We also expect the SDSR to chart a course to address the growing threat of...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We also expect the SDSR to chart a course to address the growing threat of long- range and anti-access fires, both in terms of protection of UK territories and deployed forces.
13The lack of expertise available in Whitehall presents a significant challenge to the UK Government’s...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The lack of expertise available in Whitehall presents a significant challenge to the UK Government’s ability to assess threats once they arise. As it will always be difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate such threats, then Government must ensure that there is a high degree of flexibility both within the UK Armed Forces and the decision- making machinery of Government. Without such flexibility, we shall lack the ability to counter any number of threats, including those which cannot be foreseen. This need for flexibility exposes the “tiered” approach of the National Security Strategy as an inadequate basis on which to erect a Strategic Defence and Security Review.
14In the weeks and months ahead, we intend to evaluate the SDSR by reference to...
Concluded (the committee's words)
In the weeks and months ahead, we intend to evaluate the SDSR by reference to the 11 potential threats and vulnerabilities identified in this Report. The SDSR must demonstrate adequate awareness of them all, and configure the Armed Forces to provide the flexibility, versatility and ability to expand which are essential for the defence and security of the United Kingdom.

Evidence

Oral evidence sessions 3