Select committee inquiry

Future Force 2020

Closed

Defence Committee · Opened 2 July 2014 · Closed 22 July 2015

4 recommendations · 4 conclusions
Inquiry on parliament.uk ↗

What the inquiry looked at

“The Committee will be scrutinising the Ministry of Defence plans for the future of the Armed Forces – Future Force 2020. The Committee is particularly concerned about the size and capability of the Armed Forces. Terms of reference: Future Force 2020”

The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.

What it found

In the committee's words, from the summary of 10th Report - Re-thinking defence to meet new threats (1.09 MB) ↗

The world is more dangerous and unstable than at any time since the end of the Cold War.

Is the UK ready to respond?

For the first time in twenty years, an advanced military state has challenged the borders of European nations, and the security challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia have increased dramatically in scale and complexity. Russia has annexed Crimea, and Russian-backed separatists have taken much of Eastern Ukraine. DAESH (or ISIL) have seized the second largest city in Iraq, and now control areas of a territory larger than the United Kingdom. The Libyan government has retreated to a ship off the coast. The President of Yemen has fled from his capital. Boko Haram controls swathes of Northern Nigeria. South Sudan—the newest country in the world—is in Civil War. Over 10,000 civilians were casualties in Afghanistan last year. Serious instability persists in Darfur, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Pakistan. Three million people have been displaced and two hundred thousand killed in Syria.

The UK cannot afford to ignore these challenges and retreat to isolation. Global peace and security is of immense importance to the world, and to the UK itself. The UK occupies a key leadership role in international organisations, and can leverage both its formidable military heritage, and its network of alliances. It still has the capacity to play a deeply constructive role in preserving and restoring security.

But the UK’s current Defence Assumptions are not sufficient for this changed environment. The 2010 National Security Strategy had assumed that “Cold War” capacities for state-on-state conflict were no longer needed, and that instead, the military would focus on ‘fragile states’, lightly-armed insurgents and terrorists, through enduring stabilisation operations (which were assumed to be relatively infrequent). The SDSR was primarily designed in the light of the UK’s presence in Afghanistan (a mission, in which the UK deployed fewer than 10,000 troops as part of a 100,000 strong, US-dominated coalition).

Future Force 2020 planned to deal with one problem at a time by deploying 6,600 troops on a decade-long enduring stabilisation operation in a single country. And even US doctrine, envisaged sustaining a deployment in only two countries.

Now there is a requirement to support stability in a dozen different theatres simultaneously, and to engage with both unconventional and conventional threats. The first task for the UK is to ensure that it is able to engage as part of a broad coalition or alliance in tackling these threats (which are beyond the scope of any one country). In particular, the UK must build on its strong alliance with the United States, and ensure that European NATO allies are operating at maximum effectiveness. It must use its leadership position in NATO to ensure that NATO has the full spectrum of conventional forces, trained, exercised, and psychologically prepared to defend the European order against a conventional threat. The UK’s commitment to spend 2% of GDP on Defence, will be an important mark of seriousness to our US allies, and an important symbolic marker for other NATO countries.

What the government said

The government responded on 22 July 2015.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response.

The Government welcomes the Committee's inquiry, says some of the areas raised, such as equipment capability choices, are "being actively considered as part of SDSR 2015", and sets out where it takes a different view.

  • On defence spending, it cites the Chancellor's commitment to meeting "the properly measured NATO pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defence every year of this decade".
  • On maritime surveillance, it says "The SDSR will reconsider the requirement for a maritime patrol aircraft", informed by the latest threat assessments.
  • On the second carrier, it is using the SDSR to determine how best to employ both ships and will inform the Committee of its conclusions once SDSR 2015 has been completed.
  • On cyber doctrine, it says the existing doctrine is sensitive information, but it is developing new material that it "expect[s] to issue later this year".

How the inquiry ran

Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 2 July 2014 to its close on 22 July 2015.

  1. Oral evidence 3 sessions
  2. Report 24 Mar 2015
  3. Government response 22 Jul 2015

What it recommended 4 recommendations · 4 conclusions

1The US has made it clear that it perceives the UK’s commitment as the lynchpin...
Concluded (the committee's words)
The US has made it clear that it perceives the UK’s commitment as the lynchpin of the broader NATO commitment to increase Defence Spending. And, therefore, if the UK were to reduce expenditure, it would undermine the alliance as a whole.
2We are concerned that, should defence spending in the UK fall below the NATO target...
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are concerned that, should defence spending in the UK fall below the NATO target of 2% of GDP in 2016–17, the impact on the UK’s credibility as a military ally would be extremely damaging, particularly in the eyes of the US and our European partners. It would damage UK leadership in NATO and Putin’s Russia will be looking very carefully for signs of weakness in NATO.
3Maritime surveillance remains a crucial gap in the capabilities of the Armed Forces with extremely...
Concluded (the committee's words)
Maritime surveillance remains a crucial gap in the capabilities of the Armed Forces with extremely serious implications for the protection of other capabilities within the Armed Forces. Bridging this critical capability gap must be a very high priority for the next Strategic Defence and Security Review.
4We are concerned that bringing the second carrier into service will involve very considerable additional...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are concerned that bringing the second carrier into service will involve very considerable additional costs, additional manpower, extra aircraft and the considerable amount of support and protection needed to make it viable. It makes little sense to maintain an additional aircraft carrier without aircraft to fly off it and the necessary aircraft, surface ships and submarines to protect it. In response to this Report, the Government should set out its assessment of the consequences of its decision to bring the second carrier into service for the other capabilities that will be required by the UK Armed Forces. It should also set out the consequences for the personnel required in the Royal Navy. If there is to be no increase in Royal Navy manpower, then it should set out how the second carrier will be manned and what effect the manning of the second carrier will have on the rest of the fleet.
5These are only examples of the kinds of capability, which may be required to provide...
Concluded (the committee's words)
These are only examples of the kinds of capability, which may be required to provide firmer conventional deterrent against an advanced military state such as Russia. But even this short list—maritime surveillance aircraft, CBRN capabilities, Ballistic Missile Defence, a comprehensive carrier strike capability, more Royal Navy vessels and Royal Air Force planes, and enhanced divisional manoeuvre and armoured capacity in the military and possible pre-positioning of troops in continental Europe, will require a significantly increased Defence budget.
6We urge the MoD to re-establish a Defence Historical Analysis and Conflict Research Centre in...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We urge the MoD to re-establish a Defence Historical Analysis and Conflict Research Centre in order to address the lessons of recent conflicts and to investigate current trends in warfare.
7We are unclear as to how work on cyber warfare has developed in the Armed...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We are unclear as to how work on cyber warfare has developed in the Armed Forces. The Government should tell us when it will finalise its doctrine and guidance on the use of cyber defence and warfare.
8We welcome the Armed Forces’ focus on keeping pace with the developments of the “information...
Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the Armed Forces’ focus on keeping pace with the developments of the “information age” in gathering intelligence. The fast pace of change requires the Armed Forces to exploit all areas of expertise and we call on the MoD to examine opportunities for work in partnership with academics and the private sector. However, the gathering of intelligence represents only part of the picture. Combating asymmetric subversion and understanding ambiguous Russian tactics also requires a deep understanding of the country itself. Re-developing and maintaining the capacity for proper analysis and assessment of events in Russia and other areas where the UK Armed Forces may be engaged is as important as the gathering of intelligence itself.

Evidence

Oral evidence sessions 3