Future Force 2020
Closed
What the inquiry looked at
“The Committee will be scrutinising the Ministry of Defence plans for the future of the Armed Forces – Future Force 2020. The Committee is particularly concerned about the size and capability of the Armed Forces. Terms of reference: Future Force 2020”
The committee's words, from the inquiry page on parliament.uk ↗.
What it found
The world is more dangerous and unstable than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
Is the UK ready to respond?
For the first time in twenty years, an advanced military state has challenged the borders of European nations, and the security challenges in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia have increased dramatically in scale and complexity. Russia has annexed Crimea, and Russian-backed separatists have taken much of Eastern Ukraine. DAESH (or ISIL) have seized the second largest city in Iraq, and now control areas of a territory larger than the United Kingdom. The Libyan government has retreated to a ship off the coast. The President of Yemen has fled from his capital. Boko Haram controls swathes of Northern Nigeria. South Sudan—the newest country in the world—is in Civil War. Over 10,000 civilians were casualties in Afghanistan last year. Serious instability persists in Darfur, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and Pakistan. Three million people have been displaced and two hundred thousand killed in Syria.
The UK cannot afford to ignore these challenges and retreat to isolation. Global peace and security is of immense importance to the world, and to the UK itself. The UK occupies a key leadership role in international organisations, and can leverage both its formidable military heritage, and its network of alliances. It still has the capacity to play a deeply constructive role in preserving and restoring security.
But the UK’s current Defence Assumptions are not sufficient for this changed environment. The 2010 National Security Strategy had assumed that “Cold War” capacities for state-on-state conflict were no longer needed, and that instead, the military would focus on ‘fragile states’, lightly-armed insurgents and terrorists, through enduring stabilisation operations (which were assumed to be relatively infrequent). The SDSR was primarily designed in the light of the UK’s presence in Afghanistan (a mission, in which the UK deployed fewer than 10,000 troops as part of a 100,000 strong, US-dominated coalition).
Future Force 2020 planned to deal with one problem at a time by deploying 6,600 troops on a decade-long enduring stabilisation operation in a single country. And even US doctrine, envisaged sustaining a deployment in only two countries.
Now there is a requirement to support stability in a dozen different theatres simultaneously, and to engage with both unconventional and conventional threats. The first task for the UK is to ensure that it is able to engage as part of a broad coalition or alliance in tackling these threats (which are beyond the scope of any one country). In particular, the UK must build on its strong alliance with the United States, and ensure that European NATO allies are operating at maximum effectiveness. It must use its leadership position in NATO to ensure that NATO has the full spectrum of conventional forces, trained, exercised, and psychologically prepared to defend the European order against a conventional threat. The UK’s commitment to spend 2% of GDP on Defence, will be an important mark of seriousness to our US allies, and an important symbolic marker for other NATO countries.
What the government said
The government responded on 22 July 2015.
The Government welcomes the Committee's inquiry, says some of the areas raised, such as equipment capability choices, are "being actively considered as part of SDSR 2015", and sets out where it takes a different view.
- On defence spending, it cites the Chancellor's commitment to meeting "the properly measured NATO pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defence every year of this decade".
- On maritime surveillance, it says "The SDSR will reconsider the requirement for a maritime patrol aircraft", informed by the latest threat assessments.
- On the second carrier, it is using the SDSR to determine how best to employ both ships and will inform the Committee of its conclusions once SDSR 2015 has been completed.
- On cyber doctrine, it says the existing doctrine is sensitive information, but it is developing new material that it "expect[s] to issue later this year".
Read the government's response ↗ Read the report ↗ Report an error
How the inquiry ran
Each dot is a dated item listed on this page, from the inquiry's opening on 2 July 2014 to its close on 22 July 2015.
- Oral evidence 3 sessions
- Report 24 Mar 2015
- Government response 22 Jul 2015
What it recommended 4 recommendations · 4 conclusions
1The US has made it clear that it perceives the UK’s commitment as the lynchpin...
2We are concerned that, should defence spending in the UK fall below the NATO target...
3Maritime surveillance remains a crucial gap in the capabilities of the Armed Forces with extremely...
4We are concerned that bringing the second carrier into service will involve very considerable additional...
5These are only examples of the kinds of capability, which may be required to provide...
6We urge the MoD to re-establish a Defence Historical Analysis and Conflict Research Centre in...
7We are unclear as to how work on cyber warfare has developed in the Armed...
8We welcome the Armed Forces’ focus on keeping pace with the developments of the “information...
Evidence
Oral evidence sessions 3
- 17 Dec 2014No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗
- 5 Nov 2014No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗
- 22 Oct 2014No witnesses recordedparliament.uk ↗